Commentary Issue Briefing
[Myanmar Special] ⑥ Questions Thrown at Korean Media by Myanmar’s Democratization Protests

1. "What Can Korea Do to Save the Lives of Myanmar's Citizens?"   SisaIN's ongoing coverage of Myanmar that started in March 2021 and lasted for five months under the hashtag #WatchingMyanmar began with this question[1]. It was clearly unusual for a journalist to begin not by asking "what is happening," but "what can we do." The media's natural role is to convey the reality of a country's anti-human crimes as they happen, but it must be asked whether simply broadcasting bloodshed in real time is the entirety of their role. Both foreign and domestic media wondered as they watched the situation develop in Myanmar, isolated from the rest of the world thanks to the flight suspensions caused by COVID-19. "What exactly is the role of the media? Can the media ever be neutral?"   SisaIN wasn't the only media outlet that covered the active protests against the coup in Myanmar. Why was the press so interested in an issue happening in another country 4,000km away? We want to talk about why we decided to report actively on Myanmar's civil resistance, our solidarity with local journalists, what we learned in the process, and what challenges remain. The domestic media's record keeping of Myanmar's solidarity activities is an important beginning to understanding the traces left by Myanmar's democratization protests in Korean society. Moreover, with reporting on Myanmar having fallen substantially, this can become an opportunity to think about the next steps that the media should take to report on the current deadlock.   2. Stepping Back in Time to One Year Ago   As the number of victims of the military and police's strong suppression campaign in Myanmar grew, headlines like "Bloody Sunday," "Hell Night," and "Bloodshed" filled the pages of Korean local news. Koreans watched helplessly as the situation unfolded. SisaIN began meeting weekly with Myanmar residents of Korea who held local protests denouncing the military. That was the only scene that could be covered right away.   Those we covered had ended up with a different scene on their hands than what they had expected. The messenger inboxes on their smartphones were filled with SOS requests sent by local protesters in Myanmar requesting fees for medical treatment, bulletproof vests and helmets, USIM cards (after the military cut off the internet, the Thai USIM cards were the only way people could get online), and living expenses for those who were part of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM). Photos of people on the ground with their skin torn and bleeding appeared as they scrolled through social media. "I'm unarmed and facing the military." "A bullet pierced my jaw, I need money to get treatment." "I need help with funeral expense." Those who had established themselves in Korea as migrant workers, international students, or marriage migrants were transformed on February 1, 2021 into activists. That's when I asked for the first time: "What can we do for Myanmar?"   If it hadn't been for COVID-19, a number of domestic and foreign media outlets would have gone to Myanmar, and if foreign media had been present, the situation in the country might not have been so prolonged. As it was, the only foreign journalists in the world who were able to enter Yangon, Myanmar "with military permission" were Clarissa Ward and her team from the BBC on March 31 last year. All of the news coverage was done with the military accompanying the reporters, and as they left the scene, the Myanmar military detained those who had spoken with the BBC. A local Myanmar journalist who I met while I was covering the country told me this in a furious voice. "Why don't any countries intervene? It's a question we ask frequently. The answer is simple. There is no benefit to be had from helping Myanmar." At the time, the Myanmar protesters took to the streets with signs with the slogan "#How many dead bodies needed to take action?"   3. The Reason SisaIN Launched a Myanmar Campaign   One way that the Myanmar military, which triggered the coup, created chaos was through a kind of isolation strategy. They banned assembly using COVID-19 as an excuse to suppress protests, cut off the internet, and target journalists and media outlets. Journalists in Myanmar became the military's first targets. The military revoked the publishing licenses of independent media and charged journalists and citizen journalists covering the protests with "dissemination of fake news" and "incitement." As of January 10, 2022, 115 journalists in Myanmar have been arrested and 44 have been detained (Reporting ASEAN 2021).   It was clear that unless the incidents marked with the hashtag #WhatsHappeninginMyanmar such as violence, shootings, and state repression continued to be shared online, the interest and therefore pressure and condemnation of the international community would lessen. One journalist in Myanmar said "We are empowered by those who are watching us from abroad." When I heard the message "keep watching us," I realized the reality that what Myanmar is fighting against is not the military, but rather isolation. If military rule becomes easier when citizens are isolated, then is the opposite, that military rule becomes more vulnerable when citizens are connected to the outside, also true? The international community must move to resolve the situation in Myanmar, and in order to get the international community to move, news of the situation must continue to be disseminated. We decided to participate by playing this role.   Reporters and journalists in Myanmar continued to risk their lives to record the suffering in Myanmar even after the publishing companies were closed or kicked out of the country. I asked them to contribute. Communication and collaboration with journalists in Myanmar was an ongoing challenge. Maintaining a line of communication, receiving articles on schedule, and paying them was not a smooth process. The internet was cut off from 1am to 9am local time every day, so the journalists had to move periodically to avoid the military and police. As of 2022, the Myanmar journalists who have been linked to us have either crossed the Thai border after having their lives threatened, entered the border area and taken up arms, or been imprisoned.   In April 2021, SisaIN launched the social enterprise "Today's Action" and the #WatchingMyanmar campaign. More than 800 people contributed to our fundraising drive to pay journalists in Myanmar for their news coverage (the campaign lasted until May 20, 2021, and 854 people contributed a total of 37,125,386 KRW). There was also the question "isn't this basically the role that the media should play"? I hoped that the fees we sent would be a small motivational force for the journalists who had been without income for months to continue their coverage. Above all, for a media outlet to place an issue on the permanent agenda, the editorial board must be understanding and willing to ensure that the issue is not erased or forgotten among the incessant flood of news articles on other topics. The anti-coup protests in Myanmar were determined to be an important enough issue to invest the necessary manpower, financial resources, and editorial personnel even though it was an overseas issue.   4. A Flow of Solidarity with Myanmar in Korean Media   Lee Yoo-kyung, an expert in international conflict who has long been interested in Myanmar, provided the following assessment of the Korean media's reporting on the Myanmar democratization protests. "Has the Korean media ever paid attention to international issues like this? I think it is playing a very positive role by setting the agenda of what it is we need to know. To go one step further, compared to the number of articles published, diversity, in-depth reporting, and analysis of the issue still seems quite lacking” (broadcast on the KBS program "Inquiring Journalists Q" on May 17, 2021). Beyond relaying the brutal violence of the military, there have not been sufficient attempts to gain a comprehensive understanding of the democratic crisis in Myanmar, such as how the military became so powerful and its long history of conflicts with ethnic minorities.   Nevertheless, considering that the domestic media tends to handle foreign issues merely as "hot topics," it is significant that there have been a variety of efforts made by the media to provide informative reporting on the Myanmar issue. On April 12, 2021, the Weekly Trend produced a special issue titled "Citizens Win" comprising photos and articles from journalists in Myanmar. At the time, Kim Young-mi, a professional producer in the conflict zone who participated in the project, gathered reporters from Myanmar on site to garner attention regarding the "Docu and News Korea" media outlet. In August 2021, OhMyNews launched the online serial "I am a Journalist in Myanmar—Crisis Journalism Restoration Project." This enabled the receipt of articles from the Myanmar Photojournalists Association (MPA) and their dissemination in both Korean and Burmese with the support of readers. As of January 14, 2022, over 20 million KRW had been collected. Hankyoreh 21 continues its #StandwithMyanmar series both on the ground and online, and posts articles in Burmese every week in solidarity and support of the people of Myanmar. In addition, broadcasting companies have produced several documentaries providing updates on the local situation in Myanmar and in-depth analysis on the coup including KBS Sisa Planning Window, Sisa Direct, and MBC's PD Handbook.   What had changed? Korean civil society has been more fervent in its support of and solidarity for the democratization protests in Myanmar than in any other country. On February 24, 2021, Myanmar citizens were filmed kneeling in front of the Korean embassy in Yangon and saying "please help me." South Korean citizens, who want to do anything they can to help, have done everything from staging fundraising activities, street protests, signature campaigns, and social media campaigns. These scenes have been transmitted to those in Myanmar through social media. Many who saw the protests in Myanmar in 2021 were reminded of the Gwangju protests in 1980. The sense of responsibility as one of the few countries in Asia that has succeeded in consolidating democracy has coexisted delicately with the shame and indebtedness of having a shared history of military dictatorship and national violence.   On March 2, the Korea Video Journalists Association issued a statement of solidarity expressing this sentiment. "We South Korean video journalists who clearly remember the horrors of the Gwangju Democratization Struggle in May 1980 came across the tragic news and videos from Myanmar and could not help but be reminded of that terrible month. We could not put words to our shock and anger. The apathy of Korea's video journalists towards Gwangju in May was made up for by the fierce coverage of media outlets and journalists from other countries like German video journalist Jürgen Hinzpeter who risked their lives. Thanks to their video coverage and reporting, even though Gwangju was isolated from the rest of Korea, the world learned of the suffering that was wrought there, which created international solidarity with the protests of our citizens in support of democracy. In response to the appeal of Myanmar's citizens asking ‘how much more blood must be shed?,’ our broadcast journalists are actively covering and reporting on Myanmar's fiery democratic struggle in an attempt to pay the debt that we owe to the citizens of Gwangju in South Korea in 1980 and the people of the world who supported us."   Senior journalists from the 1980s have continued to issue statements of solidarity. On April 13, five media organizations, including the Korea Organization for Freedom of the Press and Association of Retired Journalists from the 1980s, stood in front of the Myanmar embassy in Korea and held a press conference. "Like the people of Myanmar, we have suffered the pain of a military coup perpetrated by those who covet power and wealth and have been kicked out of scenes for providing news coverage. We, who have inherited the Gwangju Democratization Struggle and fought strongly for a democratic press and press freedom against a military dictatorship, send our strong support to the people of Myanmar as they engage in righteous protest and pledge strong solidarity with Myanmar's democratic civil society."   5. Myanmar as an Instrument by which to View Korea   Of course, there are criticisms that Gwangju and Myanmar should not be equated. The geopolitical positions and international situations surrounding the two countries are entirely different, and Myanmar has a longer history of military rule than South Korea as well as prolonged conflict between ethnic minorities. So we need to be vigilant about "informing" them about democracy or viewing Myanmar "advantageously" or "kindly."   One thing is clear: the history of Gwangju is a deeply sensitive link to Asian democratic crises such as those in Hong Kong, Thailand, and Myanmar. Last May, Hong Kong, Thailand, South Korea (Gwangju), and Myanmar's 2030 youths gathered and organized a meeting on the theme of Asian democracy, calling themselves the "Milktea Alliance." Lee Hee-young, a native of Gwangju who joined the conference, talked about it. "Watching the citizens of Gwangju in solidarity with other Asian countries gave me a fresh look at the events of May 18. Even when we held the first ‘pots and pans’ protest (a protest in solidarity with the citizens of Myanmar who express resistance to the military by banging pots and pans), we did not expect that so many older people would participate every week. Looking at these elders made me think that perhaps we could once again face and heal the memories of the 1980s. Gwangju continues to suffer from invisible discrimination, but that has meant that it is a city where oppressed voices can easily make themselves heard."   The situation in Myanmar has thus awakened a "feeling of being apart but connected." This has meant that the media has a great deal of things to worry about and deal with. How should questions about corporate social responsibility be asked to a company that was once regarded as playing a leading role in economic growth and is now suspected of funding the military following the coup? Can Korean society go beyond issuing statements against the military and take in refugees? What are the tasks ahead to uncover the truth and heal the trauma of the families who were left bereaved in the May 18 Gwangju tragedy? What about the problem of the human rights of Myanmar's migrant workers who suffer invisible forms of discrimination? It is not a simple matter to support the democratization of Myanmar. The questions that Myanmar has thrown at our society are heavy ones.   6. Challenges for the Media One Year After the Coup   One of the readers who participated in the SisaIN #WatchingMyanmar campaign is particularly memorable. "Even though I am not a citizen of Myanmar, I was comforted (as I participated in the campaign). There was a feeling that solidarity would build up into a greater strength, and a sense of closeness, belonging, and comfort that the solidarity itself gave me." I thought it would expand democracy and civil society by capturing how Myanmar's democratization protests, which were dismissed as just "other countries," change Korean civil society and form a basis on which to connect Asian citizens. This is no different from the duties of the press.   One thing that I have learned from reporting on Myanmar is that democracies need to be surrounded by other democracies. When a country's democracy is at risk, the international community needs the support and assistance of neighboring countries to better intervene. The international community, including organizations like the United Nations and ASEAN, have failed to give the military official warnings or care much about the situation is because they have become used to Myanmar's prolonged isolation measures. Ultimately, General Min Aung Hlaing announced that he would extend the state of emergency until August 2023, breaking his promise to hold a general election within a year of the coup. He then took office as Prime Minister. Southeast Asian researchers concluded that this move was the beginning of the military's plan for long-term rule. Myanmar has entered a de facto state of civil war.   The Media Freedom Index, which is one indicator of democracy, has demonstrated a similar pattern. In the 2021 Press Freedom Index released by Reporters Without Borders last April, all of the Asian countries except for Taiwan (43rd), South Korea (42nd), Japan (67th), and Mongolia (68th) were outside the top 100. Military dictatorship and media repression are at the heart of the crisis faced by reporters in Southeast Asia. Perhaps as a result, there have been signs that struggling Asian journalists have flocked around the crisis in Myanmar. Asian journalists associations, such as the Thai Foreign Correspondents' Club (FCCT), have sought practical ways to help such as through fundraising activities and the provision of equipment. Gwen Robinson, former FCCT president, said "Until recently, the Thai media has followed the law that requires censoring references to the royal family. However, this has started to change. Watching the struggle of Myanmar's media against censorship, I felt that the media in Thailand was no different." How the current situation in Myanmar continues to unfold will affect the military as well as citizens in Hong Kong, Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, and other Southeast Asian countries.   It has been one year since the coup in Myanmar. The interest of the international community and the volume of reporting on the crisis have dropped significantly. Within the media, there is also the reality that there are "more pressing issues" which push it aside. However, there has not been a single day in Myanmar where the citizens of the country have failed to raise their voices in opposition to the coup. The hashtag movements #SaveMyanmar and #PrayForMyanmar continue daily on social media, where journalists on the scene record acts of military violence and civil resistance. "Someone has to stay here and report. We will show the international community the human rights abuses and acts of violence perpetrated by the military. I know that the citizens of Myanmar are prepared to fight to the end, so no matter what happens to me I won't regret my decision now" (Myanmar independent press outlet Frontier Myanmar reporter, December 16). Faithfully recording these voices is one way to keep the embers of interest in Myanmar alive. This is because moving the international situation with the intertwined interests of each country, and creating pressure on the international community that will make it difficult to ignore Myanmar's military, ultimately begins with cultivating the interest of the public. This is why the question "what can Korea do for Myanmar's democratization?" has not yet been answered. This is why discussions in the media, civil society, and the government ministries must continue. ■   References   Reporting ASEAN. 2021. https://www.reportingasean.net/. SisaIN. “The Military Coup in Myanmar 300 Days, People are still getting hurt and dying [in Korean].” December 16, 2021. https://www.sisain.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=46206. OhMyNews. “I am a Burmese journalist – a Project to Restore Journalist in Crisis [in Korean].” 2021. http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/Series/series_premium_list.aspx?SRS_CD=0000014012&CMPT_CD=M0146 Weekly Kyunghyang. “Spring Revolution in Myanmar will win eventually [in Korean].” April 05, 2021. http://m.weekly.khan.co.kr/view.html?med_id=weekly&artid=202104051526391&code=117&s_code=n0002#c2b Hankyoreh 21. “#Stand with Myanmar [in Korean].” 2021. https://h21.hani.co.kr/arti/SERIES/2593/ KBS Sisa Planning Window. “Will the revolution fail? [in Korean].” May 09, 2021. https://mylovekbs.kbs.co.kr/index.html?source=mylovekbs&sname=mylovekbs&stype=blog&contents_id=70000000395517 KBS Sisa Direct. “Our Protest is not over [in Korean].” June 18, 2021. https://vod.kbs.co.kr/index.html?source=episode&sname=vod&stype=vod&program_code=T2019-0280&program_id=PS-2021091763-01-000&broadcast_complete_yn=N&local_station_code=00§ion_code=05§ion_sub_code=06 MBC PD Handbook. “#SaveMyanmar [in Korean].” May 18, 2021. https://program.imbc.com/Enews/Detail/pdnote?idx=314415     [1] For more information, please refer to the special website organized by SisaIN (http://myanmar.sisain.co.kr/).     ■ Younghwa Kim has been working for 〈SisaIN〉 as a report since 2018. She has covered pro-democracy protests in Hongkong in 2009, in Thailand in 2020, and in Myanmar in 2021. In March 2021, she began with the small question “What can we do for Myanmar?” and has arrived at the #WatchingMyanmar campaign. Through the two-month campaign started in April, many Koreans showed their support for independent journalists in Myanmar and participated in “today’s actions” for the democracy in the country. She is interested in recording Asian democracies going through turbulent times and the ways that young people in the countries break through the challenge.     ■ Typeset by Juhyun Jun Head of the Future, Innovation, and Governance TeamㆍResearch Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr  

Younghwa Kim 2022-03-23Views : 15513
Commentary Issue Briefing
[Myanmar Special] ⑤ The Uninterrupted Struggle of Myanmar’s Civil Society for Democracy: Reflections on EAI’s Myanmar Cooperation Project

On February 1, 2021, another tragedy of history was captured, rather comedically, on the video camera of an aerobics instructor in Naypyidaw, the capital of Myanmar. The video shows a series of vehicles driven by the military entering the Federal Parliament to take control. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the aerobics instructor is wearing a mask and performing a series of youthful movements. While the camera was focused on 2021, the motorcade in the background was strongly reminiscent of 1962 and 1988.   The history of democracy in Myanmar has been one of setbacks. Even when colonial rule was undone and an independent government was established, it was not possible to overcome the incompetence of the government and the divisive political and social environment, resulting in the military regime's usurpation of power. The 8888 Uprising of 1988, which was a civil resistance movement against the incompetence and corruption of the military dictatorship, and the 2007 Saffron Revolution, joined by the Buddhist monks, were both thwarted in less than two months due to the military's violent suppression tactics. Myanmar's military has become a professional coup organization, taking power with ease in the name of restoring national integration and order, and leaving those who spill blood or give their lives in civil resistance with the trauma of frustration. Democracy and freedom have only been possible to a limited degree when practiced with "discipline" as a "benefit" given by the military.   But the desire of Myanmar's citizens for democracy has not been so easily thwarted. Although many democratic activists have been imprisoned or made political exiles along the way, civil society built up its internal capacity as it waited for the opportunity to end the military dictatorship and win freedom. That opportunity came in 2015. The National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, overwhelmed Thein Sein's Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in the November general election, finally bringing an end to a long history of military dictatorship. More than 75% of eligible voters cast a vote in the election, and the will of a united civil society led to a political victory through the democratic process.   However, it appears that it has not been as easy for the military to usurp power in the 2021 coup as it was in the past, and the coup thus remains unfinished. Civil resistance, although reduced in comparison to the beginning of the coup, continues in the streets of major cities like Yangon and Mandalay. This is a tactical shift in civil resistance to be able to respond quickly to violent suppression, such as shooting at protesters. Myanmar's support for the National Unity Government (NUG), which seeks to be the centerpiece of restoring democracy, is broad and nationwide. All bonds issued to fund NUG's activities were purchased within ten hours. Of course they didn't expect to profit. This was rather a reflection of the desire of Myanmar's people for the restoration of democracy.   Currently, there is a tense, ongoing battle between Myanmar's military, which is bent on maintaining its grip on power through indiscriminate violence, and the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) and the democratic faction, which is preparing opportunities for democracy restoration and sending continued messages of resistance.   1. The 2015 General Election and Challenges for Civil Society in Myanmar   In 2015, Myanmar's civil society was quietly preparing for a historic opportunity. In accordance with Thein Sein's liberalization policies, democratization activists who had been imprisoned were released, and dissidents who had been exiled abroad and supported the domestic resistance movement returned home. These forward-looking liberalization policies relaxed the military's control, and past democracy activists sought out new ways to promote Myanmar's political development within civil society.   Their homeland had changed. In the last remaining land of potential on the Indochina Peninsula, foreign capital investment flooded in, providing new momentum to the economy that had previously been solely reliant on China. Myanmar's residents also quickly adapted to the ever-changing telecommunications technologies, actively forming social networks in cyberspace. The old style of going out into the streets, holding pickets, and shouting into a megaphone no longer appealed to Myanmar's changed civil society. Democracy activists knew that Myanmar's civil society needed to develop its capacity so that it could seize and develop democratic opportunities. This is because they knew that reliance on a small number of political leaders could not guarantee democratic development and achievements.   They took note of the general election scheduled for November 2015. If it were held as the government promised, it would be a golden opportunity to end the dictatorship of the military and establish a democratic civil government. This would require the active participation of citizens who had the right to vote. Civil society groups banded together and organized voting education for the people of Myanmar ahead of the general elections. Civil society groups organized by democracy activists toured the country, providing voting education for citizens everywhere. The general elections, which covered not only Federal Parliament but also the local parliaments of mid-tier regional areas, were a complex and difficult challenge for ordinary citizens to grasp, as they were not often given the opportunity to vote. This is why they needed training and demonstrations to understand how to do so. Civil society organizations visited small villages and large cities alike as they crossed the country offering voting education. The combination of a high literacy rate and a strong desire for democracy among the populace increased the effectiveness of this education. The high turnout in the general elections was thanks to the sweat of the Myanmar civil society activists who circulated throughout the country in 2015.   These democracy activists and the civil society organizations they founded could not imagine the challenges that would lie before them following the election. The advocacy or activist groups of the past could not play a meaningful role as they did in the past. It was necessary to consider what roles and responsibilities could contribute to this historical opportunity to achieve democracy. It was against this backdrop that the East Asia Institute (EAI), together with local civil society organizations in Myanmar, promoted the strengthening of civil society in the country. The aim of this program was to transform Myanmar's civil society organizations into think tanks that were capable of leading the development of a democratic agenda and facing policy challenges while contributing to the development of democracy in Myanmar.   The program operated on two major axes. The first was the sharing of experiences. The people of Myanmar were very curious about South Korea's experiences with democracy and political development, as well as its economic success. In addition, EAI's experience as a small, private, independent think tank that has become influential not only in Korea but also throughout the world has made EAI a realistic reference point for Myanmar's civil society organizations as they map the direction of their future organizational development. However, this sharing was not a unilateral transmission of knowledge and experiences. EAI also needed to understand and explore this country, as it wanted to go one step forward for its research scope to the Southeast Asian region of political and economic potentials. Since its independence, the outside world has not been able to learn much about the rich history and information about the political and economic challenges and social issues experienced by modern Myanmar. EAI sought to expand its research into democracy in Asia based on an in-depth understanding of Myanmar's politics and society. Recognizing the problem that Korea's support for developing countries remains largely economic, EAI tried to find a model case in Myanmar where the civilian contribution diplomacy of South Korea, the only country in the world to have made the shift from an ODA beneficiary to a donor, could have a practical impact by sharing experiences.   The second axis was EAI’s global network. EAI has sought to expand its success story at the regional and global levels by constructing a network with itself as the hub and major experts and other organizations as nodes. At the regional level, EAI built and continues to lead the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN), a network of democratic think tanks created to respond to democratic crises and discover research agendas. Using these experiences as a foundation, EAI first established a democratic research network within Myanmar and then acted as a bridge to connect this network to the broader regional Asian network, thereby establishing a framework to enhance the capacity of democracy in Myanmar and the civil society that underpins it. Just as human beings grow through mutual exchanges within a society, Myanmar's civil society organizations have also established channels of mutual exchange, and have become able to develop their communication channels with think tanks in other parts of Asia by participating in EAI’s established network in the region.   We held our first workshop to share experiences and discuss policy research in August 2015. In the interim, the NLD, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, achieved victory in Myanmar's historic elections and established a democratic civilian government. The following year, South Korea launched a candlelight protest and brought down the government lacking in accountability through the power of the people. EAI and its partner institutions in Myanmar shared vivid accounts of the historical experience of democracy in each country.   2. Civic Aspirations and the Limits of the NLD Government   In the latter 2010s, Myanmar's civil society grew in leaps and bounds. Here, the efforts of democratic figures were key in developing the capacity of civil society. Following the 8888 Uprising, the military closed down Yangon University since it had been the center of the student movement. In addition, higher education in any field outside medicine and technology, such as humanities or social science topics, was either extremely limited or prohibited altogether. The military coveted the autonomy of power even as it sought to deprive its people of the right to education. Myanmar's civil society worked to compensate for the deprivation of the right to education in the midst of this partial freedom.   This is one example of the primary work that EAI did with its partner institutions in Myanmar. Sandhi Governance Institute ran a women's leadership program aimed at empowering the next generation of women to become leaders in Myanmar. The Yangon School of Political Science revived political science education at the civic level, which the military had banned from being taught at public universities. The Open Myanmar Initiative built a database of politicians and maintained current data on the government and parliament, and played the role of providing such data to the public and to both domestic and overseas researchers. The Yone Kyi Yar Knowledge Propagation Society, founded by young doctors in Mandalay, established a library to spread knowledge in the community and create an arena for constructive discussion for the young generation. The Naushawng Development Institute, located in Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State, has been operating a school in cooperation with overseas NGOs to provide educational opportunities for young people from ethnic minority groups who have been marginalized from public education services.   As the voting education of civil society organizations conducted throughout the country in 2015 paid off, their activities to strengthen civil society capacity gained momentum. The Myanmar Democracy Research Network (MDRN), with its connection to a network of think tanks across Asia, learned success stories from overseas and developed them into a domestic agenda. Democracy experts and scholars from Asia and the rest of the world visited Yangon to share their knowledge and experience, and were able to communicate readily through the social network. Ahead of the 2020 general election, these groups conducted more systematic voting education compared to the efforts of five years ago. There were numerous constraints due to the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, but even so, these organizations were able to successfully complete their research projects, polling the people of Myanmar.   However, the NLD government, which had initially appeared carrying democratic aspirations, failed to respond sufficiently to democratic challenges. When conflict arose between the vested interests of the military and the democratic demands of the people, they turned their backs on democratic values. Perhaps this was due to a fear that the military would once again snatch power from their grasp, or because of the characteristics of the political elite, but either way they appeared to have struck a strategic partnership with the military. The channels of communication between members of civil society and MPs, which had been guaranteed even under Thein Sein, did not function properly, and the government sought to regulate and manage the free activities of civil society organizations and overseas NGOs. The NLD remained silent on the violence perpetrated by the military against the Rohingya. Political expression on campus was prohibited, freedom of expression was not guaranteed, student movement leaders were arrested, and measures were taken against minorities to further restrict their right to vote and ability to run for office compared to 2015. COVID-19 was used as a pretext to ban campaigning and prohibit free media coverage ahead of the 2020 elections. Only state broadcasts were legally allowed. The criticism that the NLD had become a "democratic dictatorship" was not an exaggeration.   Despite having gained generous public confidence with an overwhelming victory in the 2020 general election, the NLD government, lacking any political assets other than public support, folded quietly in the face of the military coup. Once again, the citizens were left holding the challenge of history.   Thus far, many people have lost their lives resisting the military coup. As of December 25, 2021, the official death toll had reached 1,375. 8,254 people have been imprisoned, and 39 of those have been sentenced to death. Two minors under the age of 18 are on death row. Of course, these are the official figures, and there is speculation that the number of innocent civilians who have been sacrificed is far greater.   Civil disobedience in Myanmar has taken a variety of forms. In the early days, large crowds formed the center of the protests, and each night people would bang pots and pans to send a message of resistance. They also turned the lights off for a certain period each night to show the world a darkened Myanmar via satellite and communicate their willingness to resist. As the military continued to brutally suppress protests, protesters switched to flash mobs, creating guerrilla demonstrations that coalesced and disappeared in an instant. They protested by leaving stuffed bears in the streets in place of humans. They wrote "We Want Democracy" in huge letters that could be seen by anyone flying overhead, and shared images of people making the three-finger salute on Facebook.   Along with the demonstrations, the CDM against the military regime has continued to spread. In the early days, boycotts of industrial goods produced by military-owned businesses were common. Currently, people are refusing to pay taxes in order to financially pressure the military regime. The failure to pay electricity bills to the government has begun causing widespread power outages, but the public is willing to put up with the inconvenience of no longer being able to use electricity for the time being. Despite the spread of COVID-19, the public no longer has any expectations that the government will protect their health and safety. Public services are paralyzed, and citizens are fending for themselves. As the CDM continues in an attempt to deal a blow against the military, the gap between the government and civil society has become unbridgeable.   The people of Myanmar have continued to appeal to the international community to support the restoration of democracy in the country. The courageous declaration of Myanmar's ambassador to the UN and the tearful appeal of Miss Myanmar in the Miss Universe beauty pageant remain vivid in the minds of many people the world over. Nevertheless, the international community, including the UN, has only reiterated their declarations regarding Myanmar and failed to implement any practical measures to relieve the suffering of the people there. China is effectively backing Min Aung Hlaing's regime, and ASEAN has also faced criticism for recognizing the military as Myanmar's official representative. Recently, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen visited Naypyidaw to greet Min Aung Hlaing. Democracies have taken no practical measures in response. Myanmar's citizens have stopped making the tearful appeals to the UN and international community that they did several months ago. The idleness of the global community while Myanmar struggles has been a costly lesson. The people of Myanmar are fighting a battle that no one else is going to fight for them.   3. Epilogue   It's been a year since the military took control of Naypyidaw. Still, the situation in Myanmar shows no signs of resolution. The military continues to perpetrate merciless violence on vulnerable ethnic minorities and innocent civilians. The NUG has not yet gathered sufficient strength and resources to do anything about it. Protests by the citizenry have continued unabated on the streets of the cities, with some young people taking up arms. The doctors in Mandalay, members of MDRN, are leading peaceful citizen protests in Mandalay. An ethnic minority student who dreamed of a federalist Myanmar told that he has joined the revolutionary army. Meanwhile, a young couple has given birth to a child, while a new couple announced the news of their impending marriage. The resistance, which has been dubbed the Spring Revolution, has not faltered in the slightest. In the midst of this harsh revolution, life continues for the people of Myanmar. May the moment when history is on their side come a day sooner. ■     ■ Young-Hwan Shin is an Affiliated Researcher at the Peace and Democracy Institute in Korea University and the General Manager in the Daegu Women and Family Foundation. He took a Ph.D of political science at the Department of Political Science and International Relations in Korea University. His research interest includes peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in East Asian region with traditional and non-traditional approaches, geopolitics, and international cooperation for development. He was a senior research fellow at the East Asia Institute based in Seoul, South Korea, where he participated in research projects which covered inter-Korean relations, ROK-US alliance, developmental cooperation in Myanmar. Recent publications include "Myanmar’s Broken Democracy "Disciplined" by the Military: Analysis on the Quality of Procedure in Fledging Democracy"(2022), "China's Asymmetric Approaches on Land and on Sea: An Analysis Based on Nicholas Spykman’s Geopolitical Theory"(2021), "Is Japan the "Britain" of East Asia? A Geopolitical Analysis of Japan's Long-term Strategy on the Korean Peninsula"(2020), etc.     ■ Typeset by Juhyun Jun Head of the Future, Innovation, and Governance TeamㆍResearch Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr  

Young-Hwan Shin 2022-03-23Views : 15029
Commentary Issue Briefing
[Myanmar Special] ④ The Shared Experiences of Myanmar’s Democratic Movement and Korean Civil Society

Myanmar`s democratic movement, ignited by the military coup has been more than a year by now. As of January 16, 2022, 1,469 people have been killed, more than 11,554 have been arrested, and warrants have been issued for 1,966. However, the number of victims on the ground far exceeds these figures. Although a year has passed, the situation doesn`t seem to be improving. The people of Myanmar face numerous difficulties in their isolation.   1. The Irreversibility of the Democratic Movement and the Current Status of the Civil War   At the conference hosted by Est Asia Institute (EAI) on April 16, 2021 titled "The Military Coup and Future of Democracy in Myanmar," I summarized the nature of the democracy movement in Myanmar in four words: irreversibility, omnidirectional, convergence, and interactive. Since the country began to open up in 2010, the desire of Myanmar`s people for change has led to rapid development, and the spread of mobile phones and the internet, like in other developing countries, transformed the public into global citizens who are up to date with international trends. While information was a driving force in development, it also served as a factor in the coup, as the military feared the flow of history and changing times. Despite this, the people of Myanmar are unable to return to the previous era of military dictatorship. Their willingness to spend a year risking their lives in protest illustrates this. One of my friends in Myanmar put it this way. "What the people of Myanmar want right now is not democracy. It is the end of the military. We won`t simply accept the military`s efforts to stop the democratic movement, and we cannot accept their desire to return to the state we were in before. Because of the incomplete 2008 Constitution, there is no choice but to give half of the power to the military. That means that this will happen over and over again. We will keep fighting until the military is defeated." For the people of Myanmar, the current struggle has become a fight for their lives, not just a slogan demanding that the military provide democracy.   In response to the military`s continued violence against civilians on top of the coup itself, the democratic faction, including the NLD, formed an alliance with the major ethnic groups, and the situation has now descended into civil war. On April 16, the ethnic groups from each region joined together to form the democratic National Unity Government (NUG) and a revolutionary army. Externally, the purpose of this was to unite Myanmar`s democratic camp and represent Myanmar in the international community, neutralizing the legitimacy of the military. Internally, peaceful protests became impossible even in large cities like Yangon, and support from the international community through internet communication could not be counted on. This forced the desperate choice to protect the safety of the people in response to the military`s violence, which went beyond suppressing protests to slaughter and terrorism.   Armed struggle erupted between the military and the Chin and spread to Kayah, Rakhine, and Karen territories. There is already a civil war happening in every state. In response to the armed struggle in each of these areas, the military has launched fighter jets and continues to engage in air strikes using helicopters. It has become routine to hear gunshots and explosions in the villages where ordinary citizens live. The military is trying to use its overwhelming military power to raid armed areas, find and arrest soldiers, and destroy armed forces. The Chin are considered to have the strongest military power among the major ethnic groups, and Chin Autonomous State, which was the first to engage in armed struggle, has been subjected to significant suppression. As one example, in a village in Thantlang comprising 1,600 households, more than 1,300 were destroyed by military bombing. In addition, sporadic guerrilla protests and ruthless responses continue throughout the country. In December, the military drove their vehicles into a small protest of 40 people, killing eight. According to a tally kept by the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), an organization which has supported the families of political prisoners arrested during the 8888 uprising, more than 1,400 people had been killed as of September 2021.   2. The Military`s Omnidirectional Oppression and the Crisis on the Interactiveness   Since the civil war began, it has been difficult to get a grasp on the true situation in Myanmar outside the occasional news broadcasts that are transmitted by foreign media. It is necessary to synthesize fragmented news stories and local witness testimonies to understand the substantive truth. The military had already taken control of the internet and mobile phone services last April, when my friends in Myanmar began updating me on the situation on the ground in preparation for the aforementioned conference. People were using SIM cards from neighboring countries to get around the block on mobile phone services. While the state has been unable to prevent the entire country from using mobile phones, social media censorship of individuals is confirmed to be widespread. Around 100 days after the coup, those who had been spreading the demands for democracy and causalties via Twitter and Facebook were hunted down by the military and their posts deleted. Now everyone is using untraceable mobile phone apps rather than social media to tell the outside world what is happening in Myanmar.   The military`s position is still relatively strong. They continue to suppress the public internally through subjugation and externally by winning the diplomatic approval and official recognition as a legitimate government by the international community. It was in these circumstances that ASEAN refused to allow Min Aung Hlaing to attend its regular Summit (chaired by Brunei) in October 2021, and urged implementation of the agreement for a peaceful resolution to the situation in Myanmar. However, unfortunately, this year`s ASEAN Chair, Cambodia, has a very friendly attitude towards Myanmar`s military regime. In January, Prime Minister Hun Sen visited Myanmar and issued a meaningless joint statement with Commander-in-chief Hlaing about a peaceful resolution. At first glance, this may seem to be a simple foreign news piece about Prime Minister Hun Sen, who recently handed over his position as head of state to his son, visiting a neighboring country to secure stability for his regime through solidarity with the military, but the true meaning is more painful. Because it shows that even diplomatic sanctions through ASEAN against Myanmar`s military will not be easy in 2022 while Cambodia is the chair. And it is a threat to Asian civil society to worry about. In fact, Prime Minister Hun Sen`s visit to Myanmar appears to have come as a greater shock to the people of Myanmar too. They found ASEAN`s refusal to allow Commander-in-chief Hlaing`s to visit in 2021 encouraging, but this official visit by the ASEAN Chair Cambodia proved that the NUG has no diplomatic power and unable to receive any support from the regional organization. In fact, there were protests in Myanmar where people burned Prime Minister Hun Sen`s photo and stomped on it. Korean civil society also issued a statement condemning this to stand in solidarity with the Myanmar residents of Korea, but the impact was minimal.   3. A Multi-faceted Disaster and the Fight Against Uncertainty   The UN has continued to watch the situation in Myanmar unfold with interest. As well as the UN has continued to appeal to the international community for active help, they send envoys and experts to the military to stop the violence. Also they try to block the private sectos` funding streams to the military. However, it is difficult to regard any of these efforts as a direct denunciation or sanctions against the military. In September 2021, UN Secretary General Guterres submitted a report demanding that the international community allow access to humanitarian support and assistance in response to the crisis in Myanmar and calling for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint. The report received 119 approvals, while 36 countries abstained including China, and Belarus voted against it. In November, the Security Council called for an end to the violence in Myanmar, but this seemed to be focused on the security of Rohingya refugees rather than the other violence perpetrated by the military. The UN has also indicated that ASEAN must play an important role in improving the situation in Myanmar. However, as referenced above, despite the opposition of some member states, ASEAN appears close to a split and has failed to send proper diplomatic pressure against the military. In December, a statement issued by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called the conviction of Aung San Suu Kyi a "fake trial," but this also seems to have been a mere declaration with no real influence on the situation.   According to the data released in October 2021 by the UN`s Myanmar team, there are more than 3 million people in need of urgent humanitarian assistance due to various threats to their lives including conflict, food insecurity, natural disasters, and COVID-19. Statements from locals in Myanmar also point to the severity of the situation. Industry and commerce have collapsed, and the supply of essential resources such as water and electricity is unstable. The military is using all of these factors as tools to suppress the people. Rather than repairing collapsed medical facilities, the military is trying to break the will of the people to resist by committing terrors against doctors, lawyers, journalists, and intellectuals while arresting and detaining them. Influential social figures like celebrities who communicated with citizens through social media have been indiscriminately detained or disappeared. In spite of these circumstances, young people left the cities and scattered to the provinces to join the armed forces in the mountains. People who remain in the cities are selling their asset and sending the money to the mountain areas to support it. Unlike the democratization struggle in 1988 was mainly led by college students, intellectuals, and Buddhists leaders, this democracy movement is mostly comprised of men and women under 30. People in their twenties and even 17 and 18-year-olds are said to be joining the armed struggle. Young teenagers, who are about the same age as our high school students, are going into the mountains and learning how to use guns and make bombs so that they can engage with the military. My acquaintance who shared this news with me said that he had closed his business and was sending monetary support to the armed resistance every month. He said that he had room to keep sending money now, but that he was ready to go into the mountains himself to fight when the time came.   Despite this heart-wrenching situation, people in Myanmar are well aware of the support from Korea and express their gratitude. As the interest of international civil society declines, only few countries like Korea and Japan continuously keep their eyes on Myanmar`s situation. In solidarity with Myanmar residents and international students in Korea, Korean civil society has been working to support Myanmar. Activities include statements, campaigns, and fundraising efforts. Although several routes to transmit the monetary support to Myanmar, limitations and worries are still existing since all official routes are closed.   One thing that multiple opinions point at is the Korea`s experience of civic revolution functions as the interactive experience both in Korea and Myanmar as it did among democracy seeking countries in Asia. Just as Korea`s student movement gained courage from overseas democratization movements in the past, Korea`s history of democratization, along with its economic and social development, is a great inspiration for Asian countries seeking to break down authoritarianism and promote democracy. Korean people recall the pain of Gwangju and the memories of the Candlelights Revolution while watching Myanmar`s democratization movement. It makes Korean civil society to continue its support for Myanmar and the support encourages Myanmar`s citizens to keep up the hope and fight the despair. Before the internet era, international solidarity reached to Korean civil society through international organizations; they supported Korean democratization movements with direct help such as financial support. Also inspirations came through books and songs beyond time and space. All these supports gave strenth to Korean society to keep the struggle toward democracy. In these days, through fast information exchange, the solidarity of the international civil society work as a powerful actor by encouraging citizens to actively motivate and inspire each other for keeping their struggles toward democracy.   Unfortunately, the current assistance by civil society to help Myanmar has to fight against the consistnat uncertainty although its purpose is very clear. It is difficult to say which areas we should focus our support on. It is better to approach general civil society? Should we focus on the humanitarian crisis? Or should we support the armed struggle (actually, NUG`s special ambassador to the Korean delegation officially requested arms support for Myanmar`s civil war)? It is also impossible to say whether the opinion of civil society needs to be united on this issue. However, we cannot just sit by and do nothing. This is because there is a multi-faceted disaster unfolding that directly threatens the lives of many people. Civil society continues to take up the fight for its bloodied neighbors. The international community will continue its effort to show the solidarity and provide support mobilizing every possible way. And on the day that Myanmar`s doors reopen, the solidarity of today will be a new driving force of civil society development in the country. And on the day that Myanmar`s doors reopen, the solidarity of today will be a new driving force of civil society development in the country.   From this question, I felt like I got the clue of what Korean and international civil society should do for Myanmar. I responded, “Democracy is not a fight you win or lose, it is an `endless process` of working together and nuturing the society to secure the civil rights. Even Koreans do not believe that we have fully achieved democracy. That is why Koreans will never turn away from the people of Myanmar.” ■     ■ Heon Yoon Lee is a program coordinator at Korea Democracy Foundation (KDF). She was in charge of the cooperation programs for the Malaysian civil society organizations and Myanmar children`s education at KDF. Before working at KDF, she coordinated the healthcare training program in Bangladesh and the education program for Myanmar refugee children in Maesot, Thailand sponsored by Samsung Dream Scholarship Foundation at Heart to Heart Foundation. Also she worked for the UNDP programme - Restoring livelihoods in Grenada after hurricanes Ivan and Emilyas an assitant Gender Mainstreaming trainer affiliated to the local NGO, GRENED. She obtained a Master Degree in Sustainable International Development from The Heller School for Social Policy and Management at Brandeis University, MA, USA.     ■ Typeset by Juhyun Jun Head of the Future, Innovation, and Governance TeamㆍResearch Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr  

Heon Yoon Lee 2022-03-23Views : 40520
Commentary Issue Briefing
[Myanmar Special] ③ Myanmar and ASEAN After the 2021 Coup

1. Introduction   In February 2021, Myanmar's military launched another coup and seized power. The coup took place on the day that the MPs who had won in the November 2020 election were set to convene a new session of Parliament. It brought down the civilian government that had been in power for five years since 2015 and took the country back to pre-2011, before the military's political reform. It has been a year since this occurred. During this period, the military has killed around 1,500 people, and more than 11,000 have been imprisoned. At least 100 people have been tortured to death in prison (The Irrawaddy 2022/01/05). Of course, the actual numbers are likely much higher. Despite the significant resistance to military rule by the people, the National Unity Government (NUG), and the People's Defense Force (PDF), the military remains steadfast. Criticism from regional organizations and neighboring countries including ASEAN, Western countries such as the US and Europe, and the UN, has done little to change the situation.   2. Myanmar and ASEAN in 2021   In the 70 years since Myanmar's independence in 1948, the longest period that the country has not been under military control was the 14 years between 1948 and 1962, followed by the five years from 2015 to 2020, for a total of 19 years. In other words, the country has experienced 54 years of military rule. Myanmar's military, which had been at a standstill despite pressure and persuasion attempts from the international community, suddenly implemented political reform and liberalization measures in 2011. Just four years after the liberalization measures were introduced, Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD) that she led took power in 2015. The expectations for political liberalization and democratization in Myanmar increased dramatically. In November 2020, the NLD won its second election in five years, with the new Parliament scheduled to convene on February 1, 2021 in accordance with the election results. On the very day that the second civilian government was set to launch, Myanmar's military erased the country's political liberalization with its coup d’état.   Since Myanmar became a member of ASEAN in 1997, it has been a political burden to the organization. ASEAN hoped that the 2011 political liberalization of Myanmar, which had been so arduous to prepare for, would continue and eventually relieve the ASEAN from the political burden. The February 2021 coup undoubtedly crushed the expectation. Reactions poured in from ASEAN as a whole and from its individual member states. On the day of the coup, the ASEAN Chair released a statement appealing for a restoration of the status quo through dialogue, referring to the values of democracy, rule of law, human rights, and freedom listed in the ASEAN Charter (ASEAN 2021, 1). Malaysia and Singapore also issued statements, appealing for a return to normalcy and a restoration of the democratization process (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore 2021/03/02). Soon after, other ASEAN member states including Brunei (February 24), Indonesia (February 8), Thailand (March 1, March 11), the Philippines (February 9, March 3), and Cambodia (March 9) also released statements expressing their concern about the situation in Myanmar (Al Jazeera 2021/02/01). Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi sought an ASEAN-level response through discussions with foreign ministers from major ASEAN countries, while also arranging to meet with Myanmar's Foreign Minister during the latter’s visit to Thailand on February 24 to convey ASEAN's concerns (Erwida and Koya 2021/02/24).   Despite these individual statements issued by ASEAN's member states, it took until April 24, nearly three months after the coup, for ASEAN as a whole to issue any sort of concrete action regarding the matter. The ASEAN Secretariat held a meeting during the Summit to draw up a Five-Point Consensus on how to resolve the issue in Myanmar. Despite the opposition of Myanmar's democratic forces, leader of the coup, Commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing, also attended the Summit. During this meeting, the leaders presented the Five-Point Consensus, which pledged 1) immediate cessation of violence and restraint of all parties, 2) constructive dialogue to seek a peaceful resolution, 3) dispatch of a special envoy of the ASEAN Chair to facilitate dialogue, 4) humanitarian assistance from ASEAN, and 5) a visit to Myanmar by the special envoy and delegation to meet with all parties concerned (ASEAN 2021/04/24).   We can appreciate that ASEAN put forth the effort to reach an agreement to resolve the crisis in Myanmar. However, while the Chair's statement recognizes that the situation in Myanmar is a problem, it is also reflective of ASEAN's desire to avoid conflict and tensions among member states. The title of the ASEAN Chair's statement does not mention Myanmar. The Five-Point Consensus is on a separate page as an addendum. The statement comprises nine paragraphs, and Myanmar is not mentioned until paragraphs eight and nine, after general matters such as ASEAN Centrality, the expectations and assessment of the role that Brunei will play as ASEAN's Chair, evaluation of the construction of the ASEAN community, the response to COVID-19, and cooperation with partner countries. It should be noted that the mention of the Rohingya buried in paragraph nine as a reference to the situation in Rakhine lumps the coup in together with this issue. The Chairman's statement also included a reference to the Rohingya issue, although this reference was phrased as "the situation in Rakhine State," which is where the problem occurs, rather than a direct reference to the Rohingya people.[1] The Myanmar coup d’état and its problems are relegated to paragraph eight and the Five-Point Consensus to the addendum.   The implementation of the five terms agreed to during the April Summit was plagued with issues. When Min Aung Hlaing returned home from the Summit, the military issued a statement that virtually ignored the consensus and its terms. The statement said that the military would “give careful consideration to constructive suggestions” but that Myanmar’s top priority at the moment was to "maintain law and order" and "restore community peace and tranquility (Bhavan 2021/04/27)." The dispatch of the ASEAN envoy was intended to stabilize the situation in Myanmar, and Myanmar's military made it clear that it could only consider implementing the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus after domestic order has been restored. In June, Brunei's second Foreign Minister Erywan Yusof, Chair of ASEAN, visited Myanmar together with ASEAN Secretary-General, Lim Jock Hoi, but they returned empty-handed. This visit was made without an agreement having been reached regarding the ASEAN envoy, which later increased the confusion as to whether the visit should be considered as having been from the special envoy (Editorial Board 2021/06/10).   Following this confusion, Erywan Yusof was appointed ASEAN's special envoy on August 4 (Tom 2021/08/05). His appointment came after many twists and turns, but in the end he was not able to actually do very much. ASEAN would not agree to send the special envoy to Myanmar unless they were allowed to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi, which the military refused to agree to (Grant 2021). The dispatch of the special envoy, which had been scheduled for October, was postponed. Amidst this delay, the ASEAN Summit scheduled for the second half of the year was approaching. The international community's criticism of ASEAN's ability and willingness to handle the Myanmar situation was exacerbated by the errors made surrounding the dispatch of the special envoy. The international community criticized ASEAN's actions thus far, saying ASEAN lacked both the willingness and ability to deal with the problem. The organization was unable to take any measures to refute this criticism. In the end, ASEAN decided not to invite any representatives from Myanmar to attend the October Summit meeting (ABC News 2021/10/16).   From ASEAN's perspective, it had to somehow respond to the criticism that it was lukewarm in its efforts to resolve the situation in a member state, Myanmar. The exclusion of Myanmar was an unusual measure for ASEAN to take. Logically, ASEAN cannot exclude Myanmar from the Summit. The organization’s decision-making follows the principle of consensus, which means an absence of strong objection (Rodolfo 2006). This means that if ASEAN did not invite Myanmar to the Summit, it would require Myanmar's consent to do so. Myanmar's military would have objected to this, if they were given an opportunity to express a view. This means that ASEAN's exclusion of Myanmar from the Summit was done with the consent of the other ASEAN member states and more importantly without Myanmar's participation. To expand on this interpretation, the decision to exclude Myanmar from the Summit means that Myanmar has been disenfranchised as an ASEAN member state. In other words, Myanmar has indirectly been recognized as not having the full status of a member state. The decision includes an implicit message of technically excluding Myanmar from ASEAN and does not recognize Myanmar's current military regime as Myanmar's legal government at the ASEAN level.   However, the symbolism of the message sent by the exclusion of Myanmar from the Summit has a limited practical effect. Regardless of whether ASEAN excludes Myanmar from its Summits or fails to recognize the legitimacy of the country's military rule, there will be no direct impact on the situation in the country or on the military's rule. Although the military government released 5,000 political prisoners ahead of the ASEAN Summit as a conciliatory gesture, this gesture did not lessen the military's grip on power, nor did it fix the human rights situation within Myanmar (BBC2021/10/18).   3. Two Band-aidings and a Failure   The 2021 military coup in Myanmar and the resulting burden on ASEAN were foreshadowed in the 1990s. The Myanmar military, which reversed the election results in 1990 and solidified its power, began making overtures to ASEAN in pursuit of economic growth through opening up to gain legitimacy. Unlike Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, which joined ASEAN around the same time, the process of admitting Myanmar as a member state did not go smoothly. Myanmar's accession to ASEAN, which occurred despite pressure from the international community and concerns within the organization, was the beginning of a fraught relationship between the two. Myanmar pushed to join ASEAN around the same time the international community, especially Western countries, were pressuring the country economically. Following its suppression of the democratic movement in 1988, Myanmar's military reluctantly held a general election in 1990 in an effort to gain legitimacy, wherein it lost heavily to the NLD. The military annulled the results of the election and continued its reign. The international community expressed significant opposition to this action, calling for the elected Parliament to convene and demanding that the military step down. The United States and Europe led the world in imposing economic sanctions. It was under these circumstances that Myanmar joined ASEAN.   ASEAN found itself awash in criticism that Myanmar's membership not only gave legitimacy to the military regime, but also did not help the country's democracy. European opposition was particularly strong. The European Union banned delegates from Myanmar from attending the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996. In the same year, the EU followed the example of the US and banned all high-ranking officials from making official visits to Myanmar and any Myanmar military personnel from visiting Europe. Because of these measures, Myanmar was unable to attend ASEM even as a member of ASEAN. Similarly, the EU was not allowed to participate in meetings hosted by ASEAN while Myanmar was a member state (Alice 2009, 122-123). Canada also suspended cooperation with ASEAN after Myanmar joined. The United States implemented full-scale economic sanctions against Myanmar in 1997.   Despite international pressure, ASEAN began laying the groundwork for Myanmar to become a member state in 1995.[2] The logic for Myanmar's membership was created. This is often called constructive engagement. ASEAN stressed that it is preferable to attract Myanmar to join ASEAN to induce change through dialogue and incentives, rather than just sitting back and hoping that they will change (Stephen 2010, 336)[3]. Of course, not every member state of ASEAN felt the same way. The more liberal Philippine and Thai governments of the time had reservations about Myanmar's potential membership, while authoritarian Indonesia and then-ASEAN Chair in 1997, Malaysia had a more positive outlook on the matter. Myanmar's accession to ASEAN was not about resolving the troublesome sore that was Myanmar. ASEAN simply placed a band-aid over the issue and moved on.   However, this first move quickly developed into a second problem. ASEAN member states assume the chairmanship in alphabetical order. In 2006, nine years after it had joined, Myanmar's turn as ASEAN chair was imminent. Once again, a storm of controversy surrounded the country. As of 2005, Myanmar's democracy and human rights situation had barely improved. ASEAN's logic of changing Myanmar by bringing it inside had become meaningless. The US vowed to boycott ARF if Myanmar was the chair. Then British foreign secretary Ian Pearson announced in 2005 that the US and Europe would not attend any ASEAN-related meetings if Myanmar assumed the chairmanship in 2006 (Al Jazeera 2005/07/26). ASEAN countries band-aided over the painful issue by making an agreement with Myanmar's military that Myanmar would skip its turn as chair (Murray 2005). This was ASEAN's temporary strategy to stop external pressure and allow Myanmar to save face. This was the second time that ASEAN handled the Myanmar issue in this way.   ASEAN's failure to seize these two opportunities in the past to resolve the issue of Myanmar has led it to where it is today in 2021. In 2021, ASEAN's behavior as well as its fundamental principles came under fire. As the region's oldest and most experienced multilateral institution, ASEAN has developed an argument of ASEAN Centrality–ASEAN should be at the center of any regional multilateral cooperation. The concept has been brought into doubt. It is questionable how a regional organization like ASEAN that has not been able to effectively handle a coup d’état taking place within one of its own member states will be able to occupy a central position in multilateral cooperation with larger countries in the region (Aaron 2021). The conflict of opinion within ASEAN over Myanmar has even shaken the principle of ASEAN Unity, which is the very basis of ASEAN Centrality.   Underlying ASEAN's response to the Myanmar issue in 1997, 2005, and 2021 is the principle of the ASEAN Way. The ASEAN Way, which is marked by a reluctance to interfere in domestic issues within member states, has so far served as a safeguard for these countries to avoid being criticized for their domestic problems on the ASEAN stage. ASEAN member states have preferred to negotiate behind the scenes and make a compromise rather than expose their internal disagreements, discuss them frankly even when doing so is painful, and resolve them promptly. They lack the incentive to remove these political safeguards and do away with this way of handling issues, even though doing so would lead them to a higher level of regional cooperation. This attitude is what led to ASEAN's compromises with Myanmar in 1997 and 2005, and this is the fundamental issue that underlies ASEAN's inability to do anything to resolve the situation in 2021.   4. Conclusion   Following the February 2021 coup, ASEAN exposed its limitations once again. ASEAN member states, content to hide behind the organization and adhere to the ASEAN Way, were not able to play a major role in resolving the situation in Myanmar. They made the Five-Point Consensus in the April Summit 2021 to fend off international criticism. It, however, has not been implemented. The appointment of a special ASEAN envoy was mired in confusion. Once the envoy was finally appointed after four months of foot-dragging, he failed to properly approach the issue. The envoy was blocked by the Myanmar military. The envoy was not allowed to access the forces opposed to military rule. In response to growing criticism, ASEAN decided not to invite Myanmar to the October Summit. Logically and technically, ASEAN did not give Myanmar an opportunity to participate in the decision-making, sending a tacit message regarding the status of the country's ASEAN membership. It, however, did not make any meaningful impacts on the military’s behavior or address the issue in Myanmar. Perhaps there is a widespread perception within ASEAN that if something is everyone's responsibility, it is nobody's. This type of lukewarm response will come back to burden ASEAN. ASEAN's main principles, including Centrality and Unity, have been shaken hard by the Myanmar incident.   Of course, ASEAN alone cannot be blamed for what has happened over the course of the past year. The seething international public opinion, criticisms of Myanmar's military, and media interest that followed the February 1 coup dwindled after just three or four months. Within Myanmar, the struggle against the military was left solely up to the people there, while support from outside faded. The UN Security Council was also blocked from providing assistance due to opposition from permanent members of the Council, Russia and China. The attention of the international community has been drawn away from Myanmar and focused on the response to COVID-19 and US-China competition. In the meantime, criticism of ASEAN has increased. Of course, ASEAN's response to the situation was not laudable, nor was it effective. Nevertheless, the international community, rather than taking actions targeting the Myanmar military, pointed the finger towards ASEAN for being soft on the military junta. One might ask whether the international community's powerlessness in resolving the Myanmar issue has led it to deceive itself that scapegoating ASEAN is equivalent to taking moral and ethical responsibility for the situation. ■   References   Aaron Connelly. 2021. "The coup in Myanmar and the threat to ASEAN centrality." The International Institute for Strategic Studies. March 1. ABC News. 2021. “ASEAN members elect not to invite Myanmar's military leader Min Aung Hlaing to summit.” ABC News. October 16. Alice D. Ba. 2009. (Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Pp. 122-123. Al Jazeera. 2005. “Myanmar to forgo Asean chairmanship.” Al Jazeera. July 26. Al Jazeera. 2021. “‘Serious blow to democracy’: World condemns Myanmar military coup.” Al Jazeera. February 1. ASEAN. 2021. “Chairman’s Statement on the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting.” April 24 (https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/Chairmans-Statement-on-ALM-Five-Point-Consensus-24-April-2021-FINAL-a-1.pdf). ASEAN. 2021. “ASEAN Chairman’s Statement on The Developments in The Republic of The Union of Myanmar.” January 1 (https://asean.org/asean-chairmans-statement-on-the-developments-in-the-republic-of-the-union-of-myanmar/). BBC. 2021. “Myanmar to release 5,000 prisoners held over coup.” BBC. October 18. Bhavan Jaipragas. 2021. “Myanmar’s junta to consider Asean’s five-point consensus after ‘stabilising’ the country.” South China Morning Post. April 27. Editorial board. 2021. “Brunei’s disastrous mission.” The Jakarta Post. June 10. Erwida Maulia and Koya Jibiki. 2021. “Indonesia and Myanmar foreign ministers meet in Bangkok.” Nikkei Asia. February 24. Grant Peck. 2021. “Envoy aborts visit to Myanmar, straining ASEAN relations.” AP News. October 15. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore. 2021. “Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan’s Intervention at the Informal ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 2 March 2021 at 1600hrs.” March 2 (https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2021/03/02032021-IAMM) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia. 2021. “LATEST SITUATION IN MYANMAR.” February 2 (https://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/-/latest-situation-in-myanmar).   Murray Hiebert. 2005. “Myanmar Yields Asean-Chair Turn to Defuse Tension.” The Wall Street Journal. July 27. Rodolfo C. Severino. 2006. Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the former ASEAN Secretary-general. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Pp. 34-35. The Irrawaddy. 2022. “Head of Myanmar’s Shadow Govt Vows to Continue ‘Second Struggle for Independence’” The Irrawaddy. January 5. Tom Allard. 2021. “ASEAN appoints Brunei diplomat as envoy to Myanmar.” Reuters. August 5.     [1] The Chairman's statement also included a reference to the Rohingya issue, although this reference was phrased as "the situation in Rakhine State," which is where the problem occurs, rather than a direct reference to the Rohingya people. [2] In 1994, ASEAN invited Myanmar to attend the ASEAN Conference to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). The following year, Myanmar lifted Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest and earned the right to be an ASEAN observer. In 1996, Myanmar was able to participate in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a member, and finally joined ASEAN in 1997. Stephen McCarthy. 2010. “Burma and ASEAN: A Marriage of Inconvenience.” in Lowell Dittmer. Burma or Myanmar: The Struggle for National Identity. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. p. 336. [3] For further details, see Rodolfo C. Severino. 2006. Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the former ASEAN Secretary-general. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp. 131-135.     ■ Jaehyon Lee is a senior fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. He is also a member of Policy Advisory Group for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and of Advisory Group for Presidential Committee on New Southern Policy. Previously, Dr. Lee was a visiting professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Korean National Diplomatic Academy. Dr. Lee’s research focuses on Southeast Asian politics and international relations, East Asian regional cooperation, and non-traditional and human security issues. His recent publications include “A 2+2 for the Future: The First Korea-Australia Foreign and Defence Ministers’ Meeting,” (2013), “South Korea and the South China Sea: A Domestic and International Balancing Act” (2016), and “What Asia Wants from the US: Voices from the Region” (2018). He recently translated “The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia” by Kurt Campbell into Korean. Dr. Lee received a B.A. and M.A. from Yonsei University and his Ph.D. in politics from Murdoch University, Australia.     ■ Typeset by Juhyun Jun Head of the Future, Innovation, and Governance TeamㆍResearch Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr  

Jaehyon Lee 2022-03-23Views : 21174
Commentary Issue Briefing
[Myanmar Special] ② Social and Economic Crisis of the Post-coup in Myanmar: Repeating History or a New History?

1. Introduction   Following the coup d’état initiated on February 1, 2021, a total of 1,384 people had died and 11,289 had been arrested as of December 31. Between February 1 and December 10, the military launched 7,053 attacks against civilians and citizen forces, an increase of 664% compared to 2020 (ALTSEAN 2022/01/05, 1, 4). Of 593,000 internally displaced people (IDP), 223,000 have become displaced following the coup (OCHA 2021, 17).   Although the coup was a military decision, the cause can be explained by civilian military relations. That is, the civilian government led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi neglected the military, and there were periodic emotional confrontations between the leaders of each faction. The military, acted out of a desire to regain its own status and function as a patriotic group defending the federal Union, even if it relied on force. However, the division of the society and the conflict between the people were not explicit like the military claimed, so their use of the political intervention justification to seize control of the government seems absurd.[1]   If the military's previous three political interventions of 1958, 1962 and 1988 occurred across a continual political decline and state of low national development, then the military coup of 2021 is a reactionary attempt to return the country to the past in a completely new political and social direction. If a formal representative system is set up through a general election in August 2023, Myanmar will return to a military-oriented society, and there will be heavier social and political costs involved in the country's reconstruction compared to now.   The military's regressive behavior in the process of Myanmar's normalization does not only mean political decline. It will expose the structural problems and bring about a crisis in all sectors of society. Myanmar has already become a failed state under the half-century of military rule, but the military wants to rebuild its traditional dynasty that gives it reign over the people. The country has reached an inflection point where the crises of the past will be repeated.   2. Adding Insult to Economic Injury: The Effects of a Coup Perpetrated by a Military Overwhelmed by the COVID-19 Pandemic   From 1988 until March 2011, the military government announced that average annual economic growth was double digit, but nobody believed this. In the junta, the personnel in the Central Statistical Organization distorted the numbers out of fear of offending their superiors and losing their jobs. This behavior was a very important characteristic of bureaucratic society. The Thein Sein's administration (2011-2016) promoted the establishment of an accurate statistical system in accordance with its drive to erase the chronic maladies of the country's bureaucratic society and push for reform and opening up.   This tendency of the military to distort reality appears to be experiencing a revival. For example, on December 7, 2021, Minister Aung Naing Oo of the Ministry of Investment and Foreign Economic Relations claimed that Myanmar's GDP growth rate of -18% was unreliable data from those opposed to the regime. He claimed that the real GDP growth was -8 to 9%, and that post-pandemic growth would exceed the IMF's forecast of 2.5% (Duangdee 2021/07/26; Nitta 2021/12/10; World Bank 2021/07/23). Other major institutions forecast Myanmar's economic growth for 2022 at -4 to 5%, also deviating from the Minister's predictions.   Contrary to the claims made by Minister Aung Naing Oo, Myanmar's economic recession following the coup has been serious, increasing the possibility that the people's standard of living will regress to the level that it was under the previous military government. According to the UNDP, the biggest factor impacting household income since February 1, 2021 has been the coup (75%), followed by the pandemic (25%) (UNDP 2021, 35).   Between the end of 2019 and July 2021, 3.2 million people lost their jobs due to the pandemic, with millions more being forced to reduce their working hours (ICG 2021, 8). Since shortly after the coup, the value of the kyat (MMK) has declined against the US dollar, falling 33% between January and November 2021 (OCHA 2021, 14). The international community has sounded the alarm over the crisis in Myanmar. UNDP warned that by the beginning of 2022, nearly half of Myanmar's population of 55 million, or 25 million people, are expected to be living below the national poverty line, a return to pre-2005 living standards (UNDP 2021/12/01).   These warning signs are expected to be exacerbated by the falling exchange rate. The Central Bank of Myanmar sold a total of $88 million USD on six occasions in December 2021 alone to mitigate exchange rate fluctuations (GNLM 2021/12/25). At the time of this writing, the exchange rate has not skyrocketed (see figure). However, in December 2021, the government imported 35 tons of paper for banknotes from Uzbekistan to cover military expenditures and reduced tax revenue. If the amount of money in circulation increases, it will guarantee inflation. The previous military government also frequently increased the amount of currency it issued and circulated without considering market conditions.[2]     Kyat-U.S. Dollar Exchange Rate Fluctuations   (Source: https://www.xe.com/currencycharts/?from=USD&to=MMK)   Due to the coup, the number of applications for business registration decreased by 44% in 2021 (Walker 2021/12/01). However, in an effort to break through the increasingly strong Western sanctions, the military is mobilizing the companies that it runs and promoting economic cooperation with China in order to pursue its interests. For example, when the border reopened in November 2021, Chinese companies began to restore exchanges in the extraction industries monopolized by the military such as rare earths, precious stones including rubies and jade, crude oil, and natural gas. The Western world, including the United States and European Union, has imposed targeted sanctions against high-ranking military personnel and military-owned companies, while NGOs at home and abroad demand the severance of relations with Myanmar's military, including divestment from military-owned companies. The Western society previously imposed comprehensive sanctions against Myanmar for over 20 years, but it proved ineffective.   In order for sanctions against Myanmar to succeed, the economic influence of large countries like China must be minimized, and sanctions simultaneously implemented by participating countries. The Biden administration has been the target of lobbying and objections from Singaporean and Thai oil refiners, including Chevron, and the senior members of Myanmar's military keep their funds in Southeast Asian countries, not the US or EU. It seems as though it will be impossible to choke off the funds of the military considering the circumstances. In fact, the military recognizes that cooperation with Chinese capital is not advantageous over the medium to long term, but there are no realistic alternatives. The cozy relationship between China and the military will further strengthen anti-Chinese sentiment among both the military and the general public.   The military's response to COVID-19 has also been within the realm of expected behavior, as crisis management is not a strong point. The military claims it implemented full measures against COVID-19 after the large-scale resistance fizzled out in August 2021. As of December 28, 2021, the Ministry of Health announced that 13.45 million adults had been fully vaccinated, and that they had achieved their target of fully vaccinating 50% of the population by the end of 2021 (GNLM 2021/12/28). However, there is no objective statistical data indicating that more than 10 million people were vaccinated over a period of about three months, and the military claims that the majority of its vaccines are from China, where people are reluctant to be inoculated. Verification of the claim that the omicron variant has not been found in the country is also needed. While the military has claimed it will produce its own vaccine in 2022 with China's support, the specific plans, such as the preparation of production facilities and the introduction of the necessary human resources, are not clear.   In July 2021, individual houses where all of the family members inside were infected with COVID-19 began putting out yellow flags to ask for help. However, the military cut off supplies of oxygen, making the preposterous assertion that if people memorized Buddhist scriptures they would recover. At the time, the military was more concerned with taking control of the country than with the lives of the people, and had already designated those who participated in anti-regime protests as terrorists. People retorted with the question of whether the military would embrace those who didn't participate in the protests.   3. Interregional and Intergenerational Cracks: Social Conflict and the Possibility of Integration   The military's confidence in its ability to take control of the government through a coup is based on the conviction that they have their own weapons, and the people can never form a national coalition to rise up in response. The military continues to cling to its claim that Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) tried to divide the Union in 1962, and thus the military must remain in power to prevent this from happening. The Burmans as majority have shown no concern or compassion, let alone support, for Myanmar's minority populations, and as a result ethnic minorities have suffered repression and become strangers in their own land. Therefore, ethnic minorities are not interested in whether those who took control of the regime are military or civilians, and see the military coup as a hegemonial conflict between the Burmese political elites (Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung and Noah 2021, 301). This perspective did not change during the 8888 Uprising and the Saffron Revolution of 2007. Myanmar could have headed in a different direction if ethnic minorities had joined forces with the protesters during these two political upheavals.   Both governments since 2011 have adopted national reconciliation and national integration through a ceasefire agreement with the EAOs as a top priority. As a result, at the end of the Thein Sein's government, eight of the 15 EAOs signed a Union-level ceasefire agreement. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's government changed direction yet again and implemented four ceasefire agreements under the name of the twenty-first century Panglong Conference.   While there is no evidence that minorities supported Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's government, they at least anticipated that it would take a different line than the military, which favored violence and forced annexation. The government, military, and EAOs were all the subject of negotiations, but the government consistently failed to take care of the EAOs, and the military played the two sides against each other. The ceasefire agreement accordingly failed to materialize. In addition, the National League for Democracy (NLD) suffered defeats in minority areas in the 2017 and 2018 by-elections, which gave rise to suspicions about the national unity of the government and the ruling party.   Given this background, the National Unity Government's (NUG) aspiration to form a federal army in solidarity with the EAOs is unrealistic. Some of the EAOs have been supporting the People's Defense Force (PDF) by providing military training and weapons, but it is highly unlikely that the EAOs will suddenly join the PDF. If the NLD had approached minority populations with sincerity, the groups might have been able to build mutual trust.   In early 2022, the military announced a unilateral ceasefire until the end of the year without any agreement of each EAOs. However, the military has continued its indiscriminate offensive military campaign in the areas where the PDF is believed to be active. The roughly 8,000 PDF soldiers are inadequate to fight against the more than 400,000 regular soldiers so called Tatmadaw (armed forces). Following the defeat of the democratization movement of 1988, a group of youths organized the All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF) to overthrow the military through armed struggle and went into the jungle. Their armed struggle did not last more than five years. Skirmishes between the regular army and the PDF will only increase the harm suffered by locals.   On February 17, 2021, a leader of the 88 Generation Min Ko Naing called for national unity, stating "This revolution against the military dictatorship is a combined resistance of generations X, Y, and Z" (Jordt et. al 2021, 18). However, in actuality everyone who filled the streets or was arrested as a protest leader was a member of Gen Z only. While some members from the 88 generation attended the demonstrations, leaders abstained from making political remarks or actions. Instead, the youths performed a kadaw, or big bow, in the temple even as their parents tried to dissuade them and then went out into the streets. Why did only young people fill the streets?   Myanmar's Generation Z is a kind of product of the country's political reform and opening up. For the last 10 years, Myanmar's economy has grown annually by 6-8%, with the success of the economy being up to the people. The spread of mobile phones allowed the public to express and share their political opinions online. Since its opening, opportunities for direct contact with foreigners and the ability to experience international standards and foreign ways of thinking firsthand have increased, especially for Gen Z, which has firmly established the principle of justice.   In contrast, the older generation has memories of being defeated by the military and is accustomed to a life that values a secure livelihood above resistance. This was repeated in 2021, as the price of basic necessities such as cooking oil and refined oil soared following the coup. About 76% of households maintained their lifestyles by reducing non-food consumption (ICG 2021, 8; UNDP 2021, 31). In other words, monks and members of the older generation who have experienced or witnessed the cruelties of the military firsthand have not taken easily to the streets, while twenty-something youths are convinced they can change the world. However, the absence of leadership to gather and express the will of the movement was a blind spot in the democratic movements of the past.   In April 2021, the deposed democratic faction established the National Unity Government (NUG) with the support of the people to end military rule and restore democracy, but its performance has been unsatisfactory. First of all, it is questionable whether or not NUG's status has placed it within close contact of those who oppose military rule. Although the NUG expressed its condolences every time an NLD member died of COVID-19, it did not respond to any of the street casualties. In September 2021, the NUG made a propaganda announcement against the military, inciting the people to become heroes or patriots by sacrificing themselves. It cannot be said that the organization's activities are progressive. The NUG doesn't appear to be an organization that seeks to separate itself from the people and reign from on high.   The second issue is the NUG's activities. The NUG cabinet consists mainly of NLD party members and ethnic Burman with no actual executive or legislative experience, who confine their activities to the internet due to a fear of being arrested by the military. Because they lack expertise and a transparent decision-making process, the NUG thus far has only demanded that the international community, not the military, recognize them as Myanmar's official government. This behavior is no different from that of the government-in-exile the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), whose singular achievement from its creation in 1990 until its dissolution in 2012 was the promotion of the use of the name Burma not Myanmar. The NUG does not have the right to be a symbol of democratization in Myanmar or to monopolize leadership over the democratic faction, and it does not have the full support of the people. Instead of slogans and incitement, the NUG must work together with the people to propose, push for and implement realistic countermeasures than can win against the military.   4. Conclusion: Finding Hope in Crisis   Since the coup, Myanmar has been in a social and economic crisis that it seems unable to escape unless the military’s back to barracks or resigns. Nevertheless, this coup has had unexpected consequences that will awaken the people. These include internal criticism within the democratic faction as well as an objective understanding of the history of Myanmar's oppressed minorities. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was a symbol of democratization in Myanmar, but her actual performance as a politician was not great. Her status as a kind of saint meant that criticism of her actions was not tolerated, and the NLD government became the government of and for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Generation Z has criticized this concentration of power on certain figures, and has resisted the military so strongly not to restore Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to power, but to restore democracy.   Some politicians have apologized for the behavior of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's government, which ignored human rights in ethnic minority areas, including the Rohingya, as a political calculation. However, the young generation will no longer be duped by the military's strategy to distort history surrounding minorities and maintain the regime's power on the pretext of potential conflict between the Burman and ethnic minority groups. Myanmar youths living in Korea have begun to debate whether they should shed their ethnic identities and exist simply as members of a federal Union. This coup has served as a turning point for the foundation for national reconciliation and integration in the future in order to confirm solidarity and sense of community among groups in the Union.   Despite ongoing crises in numerous sectors, the military continues to adhere to its tactics of the past, but the people seem to be preparing for the future. If the military wants to survive for a long time in the political arena, they won't be helped by the displays of force perpetrated by their predecessors. The military will have to reflect on why President Thein Sein, who was a soldier, received so much support from the people. ■   References   ALTSEAN. Coup Watch Special Edition: A Year of Struggle in Burma. Bangkok: ALTSEAN. 2022/02/09. Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung and Khun Noah. 2021. “Myanmar's Military Coup and the Elevation of the Minority Agenda?” Critical Asian Studies. 53(2). 297-309. Duangdee, Vijitra. “World Bank: Coup and Coronavirus Shrink Myanmar’s Economy by 18%.” VOA(Voice of America). 2021/07/26. GNLM(Global New Light of Myanmar). 2021/12/25; 2021/12/28. ICG(International Crisis Group). 2021. The Deadly Stalemate in Post-coup Myanmar. Asia Briefing No.170. Yangon/Bangkok/Brussels: ICG. Jordt, Ingrid, Tharaphi Than and Sue Ye Lin. 2021. How Generation Z Galvanized a Revolutionary Movement against Myanmar’s 2021 Military Coup. Trends in Southeast Asia Issue 7. Singapore: ISEAS. Nitta, Yuichi. “Myanmar to End Kirin Row Based on Law: Investment Minister.” Nikkei Asia. 2021/12/10. OCHA. 2021. Humanitarian Needs Overview: Myanmar. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/mmr_humanitarian_needs_overview_2022.pdf Steinberg, David I. 2021. The Military in Burma/Myanmar: On the Longevity of Tatmadaw Rule and Influence. Trends in Southeast Asia, Issue6. Singapore: ISEAS. UNDP. 2021. People’s Pulse: Socio-economic Impact of the Events since 1st February 2021 on Households in Myanmar. Yangon: UNDP Myanmar Office. _____. “Myanmar Urban Poverty Rates Set to Triple, New United Nations Survey Finds” 2021/12/01. Walker, Tommy. “Myanmar’s Coup Economy is ‘Boom and Bust’.” VOA. 2021/12/01. World Bank. “Myanmar Economy Expected to Contract by 18 Percent in FY2021: Report.” 2021/07/23.     [1] To know more about the background of the coup, please refer to the text of Steinberg (2021, 30). [2] The current military government's policy to restrict access to information is also being followed by the past practices. Before smartphones were commercialized from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, military authorities proposed an online access to information while maintaining a price of a SIM card around $2,000 to $3,000. In December 2021, in order to weaken the rebels' contact system, including that of the People's Defense Force (PDF), the military doubled the price of mobile data and imposed 20,000 Kyat (which was a price of 1.15% rise) for the SIM cards that initiated the services in January 2022.     ■ Jun Young Jang is a Research Professor at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Korea. Dr. Jang received his Ph.D. in International Relations from HUFS and his M.A. degrees in Southeast Asian Studies from Sogang University. He was a senior research fellow at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, a research professor at the Center of North Bay of Bengal, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, where he conducted research on Southeast Asian Politics and Myanmar Studies. He published books relating to Myanmar such as Change of Myanmar’s Foreign Policy and Foreign Relations with Major Countries, Political Economy & Reform and Open of Myanmar: Assessment and Challenge, Harp and Peacock: 70 Years of Modern Myanmar Political History, Basic Myanmar Language. He contribute to various Myanmar issues in a number of media outlets.     ■ Typeset by Juhyun Jun Head of the Future, Innovation, and Governance TeamㆍResearch Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr  

Jun Young Jang 2022-03-23Views : 33041
Commentary Issue Briefing
[Myanmar Special] ① Spring Revolution’s March towards a New Myanmar and the Promising Future of Democracy in Asia

1. The Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) Launches the National Unity Government (NUG), the only Legitimate Government   It has been one year since Myanmar sank into crisis. At dawn on February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military or Tatmadaw, which has been called the “state within the state,” launched a coup d’état. It had been just 33 years since the previous coup d’état. The coup forces, led by Commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing, detained several members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) party, including State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint, and declared a year-long state of emergency. The ghostly rumors of a coup d’état following the election on November 8, 2020 suddenly became real, and the NLD government led by Aung San Suu Kyi collapsed just before entering its second term in power.   When the first NLD government (2016-2021) took power on March 30, 2016, it pledged to revise the 2008 Constitution, establish peace through reconciliation with minority populations, and escape poverty through economic revival. Of these promises, it focused primarily on revising the 2008 Constitution, which preserved the authority of the Tatmadaw. There were even rumors in certain corners that the NLD government was trying secure assistance from China to get the Tatmadaw to accept a constitutional amendment. When the NLD took power in 2016, China was the first country that Aung San Suu Kyi visited. As the Rohingya human rights issue soured relations with the West, Aung San Suu Kyi's shift towards China became clear.   However, following the February 1 coup last year, China hid behind the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs before eventually appearing to acquiesce to the military regime. Faith was lost in Aung San Suu Kyi's pro-China path of diplomacy. China's "vulgar pragmatism", its willingness to maintain diplomatic relations with governments severely violating basic human rights if it serves national interests, prevented the UN Security Council from passing a resolution to condemn the military coup. As a result, anti-Chinese sentiment spread rapidly throughout Myanmar to the extent that China was rumored to be behind the coup. However, the country's democratic camp responded quickly. Following the military takeover, members who were elected to Parliament in the general elections on November 8th formed the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), which later launched the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) in April.   Currently, Myanmar is in a state of civil war after the NUG declared a war of resistance against the Tatmadaw in September 2021. The NUG is an underground government within the country that is engaged in all-out war with the Tatmadaw. This is in contrast to the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), which was the government-in-exile 30 years ago. The NUG is organizing a number of political forces to replace Min Aung Hlaing's illegal group that brought down the democratically elected government and has announced the building of a true federal democracy through the end of internal ethnic conflicts that have lasted for 70 years. The influence of civil society, which has led the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), in the construction of New Myanmar has proven enormous since the coup.   During the ten-year period of reform and opening, the civic consciousness of the Myanmar people expanded. This is still true a year after the February 1 coup as the people continue to engage in the CDM. As the CDM spread across the country, officers and soldiers increasingly began to leave the barracks, and the youth-led People's Defense Force (PDF) took this opportunity to build momentum for their campaign. As part of the PDF, youths who received military training from outside the city returned and began an armed struggle against the military. One example of this is the attack launched by the PDF against the towers owned by Mytel Telecommunications, a military-owned business. This was the beginning of the organized violent revolt launched in self-defense. The PDF differs from the CDM in that it is expected to replace the Tatmadaw with a federal army comprised of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).   2. Myanmar’s People Outraged by ASEAN's Incompetence and China’s “Vulgar Pragmatism"   The CPRH, which is composed of MPs who won seats in the November 2020 general election, passed an emergency resolution designating the military forces under Min Aung Hlaing as terrorists immediately following the coup, and asked the international community not to recognize them. The international community, especially ASEAN, of which Myanmar is a member state, faced a heavy burden to respond to this request from the Myanmar democratic camp.   Western nations, including the United States and the European Union, had imposed sanctions on Myanmar in the 20 years prior to the country's political opening in 2011. They suspended arms sales, expelled diplomats who were former members of the military, refused to issue visas for high-level military officers, and suspended all bilateral aid with the exception of humanitarian assistance. The United States designated military-controlled Myanmar an "outpost of tyranny." In contrast, ASEAN, which tends to operate under the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of its member countries, adopted a policy of "constructive engagement," a kind of "change through inclusion," and allowed Myanmar to become a member state in 1997 despite the opposition of Western countries. However, the following year, the Thai Foreign Minister proposed the concept of "flexible engagement" which went beyond the ASEAN policy of non-interference. This proposition was intended to be discussed whenever the policies of one ASEAN member state negatively impacted a fellow member state.   However, following the military coup in Myanmar in 2021, these movements in ASEAN’s norms have not met the expectations of the international community. Most important has been the fact that ASEAN has been unable to cope with the crisis in Myanmar, which is rapidly deteriorating into civil war. For example, in April of 2021, coup leader Min Aung Hlaing went to Jakarta and accepted the Five-Point Consensus to restore peace in Myanmar, but has yet to implement a single point.   Finally, in October of 2021, ASEAN's ten member states aggressively moved to exclude Min Aung Hlaing from participating in ASEAN summits, but Myanmar’s military did not budge. In the beginning of 2022, Hun Sen, Prime Minister of Cambodia and new ASEAN Chair, even visited Myanmar and was warmly received by Min Aung Hlaing. When Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and several other ASEAN states protested this move, Hun Sen pivoted to a somewhat tougher stance on Myanmar’s military government.   The Tatmadaw's strategy of ignoring the eyes of the international community is not a new one. Even when the United States and other countries increased sanctions against the military following the overturning of the May 1990 election, in which the Aung San Suu Kyi-led NLD won a majority of seats, the Tatmadaw did not change its behavior, nor did it react when Aung San Suu Kyi was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her struggles against the military.   This attitude is not unrelated to the friendliness of some members of the international community toward Myanmar’s military government. For example, on March 27, 2021, major powers including China and Russia as well as ASEAN member countries such as Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos sent diplomatic missions to the Armed Forces Day celebration, which was presided over by the military coup government. While the ceremony was being held, members of the Myanmar military and police were slaughtering civilians who were engaged in the CDM.   China's policy of pragmatism, which appeared to overlook the inhumane actions of the Tatmadaw, particularly drew the ire of the Myanmar people. If China actually implemented its policy of non-interference in internal affairs that it emphasized so heavily, then it should have cut ties with the Tatmadaw and engaged in non-intrusive diplomacy that supports neither the military nor the anti-military factions.   During the Cold War, China had no need to be hostile towards Tatmadaw-controlled Myanmar under General Ne Win, who took power through a coup in 1962, as the country walked the "Burmese way to socialism,” unaligned with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Because of this, China remained patient and was not provoked even when the military authorities under Ne Win nationalized much of the country and stole property from Chinese people living in Burma at the time. The nationalization policies enacted by the military elite under Ne Win's leadership belonged to the typical autarky model. Their goals were clear. The first was to end the economic dominance of foreigners, who were building an economic base in mining and commerce even after independence, and achieve the Burmanization of the economy. The other was to prevent the "penetration of neo-colonialism" by creating a fully self-reliant economy that would never again be governed by a foreign power. Although the military revolutionary elites advocated "Burmese way to socialism" as a kind of combination of Buddhism and socialism that distanced itself from materialism and were themselves a kind of non-communist left, their revolutionary line was in fact quite similar to the communist model.   3. Asia's Illiberal Governance and Creeping Sinicization   Looking back now on the early days of Myanmar, it seems as though Jeane Kirkpatrick, a right-wing diplomat in the early days of the Reagan administration, was correct in her cold-blooded assessment of government systems when she said "an anti-communist right-wing dictatorship is preferable to a totalitarian leftist dictator."   In essence, the Tatmadaw's proclaimed revolutionary line of the Burmese way to socialism became the typical political model of military-rule totalitarianism and degenerated into an economy of shortage due to the failure of the state. In contrast, even as anti-communist ASEAN member states Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand once led to the organization being ridiculed as a "dictator's club," these states managed to succeed in achieving catch-up growth. For example, the Singaporean government's ability to launch the "Asian values" discourse stemmed from its confidence in having achieved an economic miracle. There is a culture of obedience to governmental discipline at the heart of "Asian values" or "Asianness" here, as well as public recognition of and support for illiberal governance's triumphalism based on economic performance. As the end of the Cold War approached, the Asian values discourse challenged liberal triumphalism expressed as "the end of history." The Asian values discourse, which advocates for illiberal governance, asserts "more discipline and less freedom" as a virtue.   However, the illiberal governance put forth by Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore and Mahathir in Malaysia clearly differs from the illiberal governance of the Tatmadaw. If the former achieved strong economic success on the basis of an open policy externally and efficient bureaucracy internally, the latter dragged the state down to the depths of poverty through widespread nepotism and preferential treatment for the military elites while pursuing isolationism.   Thein Sein's government (2011-2016), which pursued a policy of opening and reform that went beyond expectations, accordingly anticipated performance legitimacy. However, the roadmap to “discipline-flourishing democracy” that underlies the 2008 Constitution and controls the majority of Myanmar’s administrative system posed an obstacle to reformation of the system to one that was meritocracy-based. When Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD government took over, it was not easy to simply reform the illiberal military governance of the previous 50 years. This was especially true because the 2008 Constitution stipulates that the Minister of Home Affairs must be from the military. Because of this, Myanmar could not be normalized without a major reform of the 2008 Constitution. Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD's insistence that Myanmar could not have peace and prosperity without changing the 2008 Constitution was another reason that they had the continued absolute support from the public in every election.   Of course, this "NLD syndrome" was perceived by the Tatmadaw as a challenge to discipline-flourishing democracy, an attempt to cross “the red line that should not be crossed.” In the end, the Tatmadaw responded by engaging in the anachronistic military action of a coup. The 2008 Constitution is what enabled the Tatmadaw to engage in a constitutional coup to protect their privileges as the self-styled "fathers of the nation."   Following the coup one year ago, the CDM has become a symbol of the Spring Revolution. The concept of civil disobedience first emerged in the West, where liberalism is a universal value. However, most Western powers actually gave rise to anti-colonial illiberal nationalist movements due to their two-faced attitude of only permitting liberalism within their borders while ignoring the right to liberty of colonized peoples. One example of this is how the illiberal extreme nationalist line of the Tatmadaw was formed in the process of the struggle for independence from British colonialism, which had a policy of divide and rule. In colonial Indonesia, a strong alliance formed between the Japanese fascists and Indonesian nationalists in the struggle for national independence against the Netherlands as an imperial power. Nationalists in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos also turned to illiberal governance as an alternative while they struggled against the colonialism of major powers like France and the United States that hypocritically claimed to advocate liberalism as a universal value. It is within this context that China, as a source of illiberalism, continues to hugely influence the ASEAN countries currently categorized as non-democracies. Although Asian countries have a shared background of liberation from statism as internal colonialism, in the process of decolonization, the difference in the level of acceptance of illiberal governance has created a "multi-speed Asia" as countries move toward liberal democratic rule at different speeds.   Although the Chinese Communist Party has a history of bloodshed as shown in the suppression of the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Square democracy protests, it continues to survive without any meaningful challenges from civil society. In this way, the Chinese communist model is becoming a manual for how to oppose democracy in Asia. China is a friendly factor in the expansion and maintenance of illiberal governance in Asia. For example, when the United States and other Western countries criticized the Thai military’s coup in May 2014, China gave a free pass to the military that committed the action. This is the "creeping Sinicization" phenomenon threatening democracy in Asia.   The Tatmadaw was the main fighting force against Myanmar’s colonization, but it has become a colonizing force over its own people during the past half century. Before Thein Sein's government began to pursue reform and opening in March 2011, the people of Myanmar were trapped under a "military guardianship" that thoroughly undermined their right to freedom.   However, since the February 1 coup, the Myanmar people have been fighting an all-out war against the military, who seek to return to this nightmare state. The NUG has proclaimed federal democracy as liberal governance that greatly guarantees the autonomy of ethnic minorities. CRPH published a Federal Democracy Charter toward the construction of a federal democracy and simultaneously declared the repeal of the 2008 Constitution. This federal democracy has some distinct differences from the NLD-centered governance structure which has been unable to break free of Burman centralism and remained mired in the charisma of Aung San Suu Kyi alone. This change will be pursued by the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), which consists of representatives from CRPH and NUG, civil society organizations, all political parties, the General Strike Committee (GSC), the CDM, Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), and others. The NUCC, which includes numerous organizations that have led the Spring Revolution, is a sort of revolutionary council and constituent assembly. In addition, they are experimenting with the communication politics of deliberative democracy as an alternative to majority rule democracy, which has the flaw of the tyranny of the majority. It is the central organization that will create New Myanmar and is expected to recreate the Panglong Conference, which agreed to build a federal state after independence and the unified struggle for liberation from British colonial rule.[1]1   4. The Spring Revolution Inducing “New Asian Values” to Open Up New Horizons with Cross- National Significance   Most countries that are silent allies with the Tatmadaw are illiberal and control the right to resistance internally. At the forefront of these allies is China. However, even as NUG Minister of Foreign Affairs Zin Mar Aung emphasized the importance of neighboring countries taking a friendly stance towards Myanmar’s democratic faction, she said that China appears to be attempting to strike an unbiased balance between NUG and the Tatmadaw.[2] This shows that NUG sees China diplomatically as a target for persuasion rather than ostracism.   In connection with this active diplomacy, it is worth noting that illiberal countries such as Singapore have shown "cultivated pragmatism" in their approach by calling for an immediate halt to the violence in the country. Malaysia has also expressed disapproval regarding the coup despite not being fully liberal itself. Even though both of these illiberal countries engage in diplomacy focused on their national interests, they have demonstrated a tendency toward pragmatic diplomacy that is not reluctant to criticize governments that seriously infringe the basic rights of their citizens.   It may thus only be natural that Indonesia, which singularly among the members of ASEAN has a relatively stable liberal government, has been relatively friendly towards the Myanmar democratic camp. As such, these three ASEAN members, Singapore (S), Indonesia (I), and Malaysia (M) have taken the lead within the association in pressuring the Tatmadaw.   SIM cards are a crucial means of communication in the information age. SIM cards first became popular during Myanmar’s reform and opening up period and grew the sphere of public debate that forms the basis of democracy. The cumulative effect exploded into the CDM following the 2021 coup d’état.   The diplomatic power of the NUG is essential to ensure that the three SIM countries can play a role like that of SIM cards in the restoration of democracy in Myanmar. The NUG should develop its diplomatic power so that ASEAN and the three SIM countries refuse to recognize the coup government and pressure the Tatmadaw to retreat to the barracks. The NUG must convince them that Min Aung Hlaing's coup forces are destroying the ASEAN connectivity achieved by the ten member countries. Further, since Min Aung Hlaing's coup forces are the main culprit disrupting the regional value chain, the full diplomatic power of the NUG with the like-minded SIM countries should be unleashed so that large countries like India and China can appreciate this fact.   <figure 1>Post-Coup and the Tatmadaw-Democratic Camp-International Community     The European Parliament has taken the official position that the CRPH, representing the MPs who were ousted in the February 1 coup, and the NUG are the only legitimate representative body reflecting the will of the Myanmar people. The United States has joined the European Union in calling for sanctions targeted at Min Aung Hlaing, the leadership, and their enablers, as well as the release of political prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi. South Korea is the only country in Asia since the coup to have joined the Western camp in levying sanctions against the dictatorship.   As shown in <figure 1> above, B1 includes Western countries such as the United States, the European Union, and South Korea that have decided to impose sanctions on the Tatmadaw. In contrast, B2 shows large countries such as China, India, and Russia that have maintained friendly relations with the Tatmadaw. ASEAN is also divided into countries that are friendly or unfriendly towards the military.     As shown in <figure 2> below, in order to change from B1 to B1' and B2 to B2', the NUCC, which is the broadest platform for political dialogue and includes all political forces in Myanmar's pan-democratic camp, must use its total diplomacy, persuasive diplomacy, and active diplomacy to shift the balance and reduce the influence of the members of the international community that have positive attitudes towards the Tatmadaw and instead increase the influence of those who have positive attitudes towards the NUG.     <figure 2>Power Relationships of the Tatmadaw and Pan-Democratic Forces in the Post-Coup Phase   The coup is an irrational act by the Tatmadaw to usher in a return to the nightmare totalitarian state while disregarding the political chaos and economic ruin that existed before Thein Sein's administration. The people of Myanmar are uniting in the face of the Tatmadaw’s recklessness beyond the differences of generation, sex, class, and ethnicity. In contrast, General Min Aung Hlaing, who serves as the chairman of the Myanmar military's highest decision-making body, the State Administration Council (SAC), with absolute authority, initially declared a state of emergency lasting one year before later extending the period until the year 2023. The military's reappearance on the political front, as it was prior to the reform and opening up of 2011, reveal its commitment to protecting discipline-flourishing democracy.   Following the coup in 1962 led by General Ne Win, who was one of the leaders of the anti-British and anti-Japanese struggles, the Tatmadaw opposed the realization of a federal state that would guarantee the rights to equality and self-determination for minorities and imposed a kind of internal colonial rule on ethnic minorities. Because of this, the Myanmar democratic camp, which is currently preparing a federal democratic constitution and a federal army on the premise of ending discrimination against minorities, has no other path forward.   If Myanmar’s Spring Revolution ends in failure like the 8888 revolution 34 years earlier, it will return to being "the land where time has stopped" as it was under General Ne Win. Sinicization, which promotes illiberal governance, will further quicken and prevent the rooting of liberal democracy in Asia. The future of Asian democracy depends on the success of the Spring Revolution and construction of a new Myanmar. The Asian way put forth by the Spring Revolution goes beyond the basic illiberal “Asian values” paradigm to open new horizons with cross-national significance. ■     * In 1989, the year following the 8888 Democratic Resistance, the Tatmadaw unilaterally changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar. Until the NLD decided to participate in the by-election on April 1, 2012, the democratic camp adhered to the national name of Burma in order not to recognize the military government. In this article, considering the context of the times, I will mix the two national names of Burma and Myanmar. [1] The first people’s assembly was held by the NUCC from January 27 to 29, 2022, and included 38 organizations with a total of 388 attendees. [2] Please see Minister of Foreign Affairs Zin Mar Aung’s keynote speech at a meeting organized by the NUG representative to the Republic of Korea on January 23, 2022.     ■ Eun Hong Park is a Professor in the Division of Social Sciences and the Master of Arts in Inter-Asia NGO Studies (MAINS) at Sungkonghoe University and the Director of the Center for Asian NGO at the university. His major book publications include "Transformation of East Asia: Beyond the Developmental States" and his articles on Myanmar (in Korean) include "Myanmar's Spring Revolution: The Narrative of the Tatmadaw’s Pathway to the Collapse of Guardianship," "Myanmar as Model of ‘Orderly Transition’: The Evolution from ‘Change within Regime to ‘Change of Regime,” “Myanmar 2018: ‘ Rohingya Crisis’ and Democratic Consolidation at Crossroads ,” “National Revolution vs. Civil Revolution: The Comparison between Thailand and Myanmar,” “The Coloniality of Socialism of Our Style as a Post-Colonial Regime Focusing on the Revolution Era of Sukarno and Ne Win,” “South Korean Democracy and Human Rights Diplomacy: The Legitimacy of Diplomatic Sanctions against Burma’s Military Government”. Professor Park studied political science at Thammasat University in Thailand as a visiting Ph.D. student. He was also a visiting researcher at the Political Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University. He is currently acting as an advisor to the Presidential Commission on Policy Planning, Republic of Korea. He also serves as a counselor of the National Unity Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar Representative to the Republic of Korea.     ■ Typeset by Juhyun Jun Head of the Future, Innovation, and Governance TeamㆍResearch Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr  

Eun Hong Park 2022-03-23Views : 23621
Commentary Issue Briefing
[Myanmar Special] “Revisiting Burma in 2022” Commentary Series

“Revisiting Burma in 2022”   The East Asia Institute (EAI) has initiated and participated in a project titled “Strengthening Civil Society Organizations in Myanmar (Myanmar Democracy Research Network: MDRN)” since 2015. MDRN is an international education cooperation program that strives to enhance the organizational and research capabilities of Myanmar's nascent think tanks. EAI has hosted workshops and seminars to assist Myanmar in achieving sound democratic development based on civil society development.   However, as executing programs with local partners became substantially difficult after the military coup on February 1, 2021, the purpose of the project changed to international assistance and research for Myanmarese democracy. With the knowledge of Korea’s democratization journey, the EAI MDRN team suggests that Myanmar is currently tasked with internalizing democratic norms just like other democratized countries.   This year, a year after the coup, EAI organized the Myanmar Special Commentary Series, “Revisiting Burma in 2022.” The series examines Myanmar's past, present, and future to explore democracy in Myanmar.   The topics of the commentary series are as follows:   1. Eun Hong Park, Spring Revolution’s March towards a New Myanmar and the Promising Future of Democracy in Asia [Read More] 2. Jun Young Jang, Social and Economic Crisis of the Post-coup in Myanmar: Repeating History or a New History? [Read More] 3. Jaehyon Lee, Myanmar and ASEAN After the 2021 Coup [Read More] 4. Hyun Yoon Lee, The Shared Experiences of Myanmar’s Democratic Movement and Korean Civil Society [Read More] 5. Young-Hwan Shin, The Uninterrupted Struggle of Myanmar’s Civil Society for Democracy: Reflections on EAI’s Myanmar Cooperation Project [Read More] 6. Younghwa Kim, Questions Thrown at Korean Media by Myanmar’s Democratization Protests [Read More] 7. Hun Joon Kim, The Situation in Myanmar and International Human Rights [Read More]  

2022-03-23Views : 11295
Commentary Issue Briefing
[EAI Issue Briefing] Myanmar Citizens Legitimized the 2020 General Election: The Post-Election Surveys Denying the Military Claims

[Editor’s Note] The military seized control of Myanmar on February 1, following the November 2020 general election which resulted in huge victory for Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) party. The military claims that the election was a “fraud,” demanding a rerun of the votes. The Union Election Commission and local and international observers have denied such charges, stating that there have not been previously arranged election manipulations. In response to these events, Professor Jin Seok Bae and Professor Sook Jong Lee raise an important question: How do citizens of Myanmar perceive the recent election and the state of democracy in their nation? The authors analyze results of post-election surveys conducted by the East Asia Institute(EAI) and its local partnership institutions in Mandalay Region and Kachin State. While these surveys do not represent the nationwide opinions, the authors contend, they show the majority of citizens believe the election was free and fair and support the democratization their nation. The authors add that in order for Myanmar to progress beyond the current situation, there needs to be support for Myanmar democracy from the international community including Asian democracies.     Introduction On February 1, 2021, the Myanmar military declared a state of emergency, detaining the president and key members of the ruling party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). The cause of the emergency declaration was alleged "election fraud." On February 8, the military imposed martial law and banned gatherings of more than 5 people, first in Mandalay and Yangon and then in other parts of the country as protest rallies arose. The imposition of these rules came with a warning that curfew violators would be shot.[1] The military asserted that there was terrible fraud in the voter list and that this problem will obstruct the path to democracy. Two months earlier, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the military’s electoral proxy, argued immediately after the election that the voting process had been damaged by fraud. To bolster the USDP's claims, the military raised suspicions of widespread inconsistencies in voter lists and announced on January 26 that 8.6 million cases of fraud were confirmed. In fact, the Union Election Commission and local and international observers have repeatedly rejected this election fraud charge.[2] Multiple local election monitoring organizations endorsed the legitimacy of the election.[3] International observers also concluded that some deficiencies were not significant enough to affect the election results and there were no large-scale, intentional election manipulations.[4] The real question is how the citizens of Myanmar think about their democracy and the election. The East Asia Institute (EAI), together with its Myanmar partner institutions, conducted a post-election survey related to the 2020 general election in Myanmar during December 2020 to investigate the voting behavior and political opinion of Myanmar citizens. Due to COVID-19, the original plan to conduct a nationwide poll was reduced to two polls in Mandalay Region and Kachin State respectively. The post-election surveys on the 2020 general election were conducted through face-to-face interviews using a structured questionnaire. Interviews were held from December 12th to 27th in Mandalay Region, and from December 7th to 22nd in Kachin State, with a sample size of 400 and 758 adults (aged 18 years and older), respectively. Accordingly, the survey data used here is not representative of the opinions of all Myanmar citizens. Nevertheless, the data from these two areas is valuable for understanding public opinion, as each area has important demographic and political characteristics. The political influence of the ruling NLD is quite strong in Mandalay Region. In this 2020 general election, the NLD took 35 out of 36 seats in the House of Representatives, and the other seat was won by the USDP. Mandalay’s ethnic makeup is primarily composed of Bamar, the majority ethnic group in Myanmar. Mandalay Region provides a reasonable picture of public opinion across Myanmar, where the NLD has shown overall political dominance. In Kachin State, on the other hand, the political influence of the ruling NLD remains relatively weak. In this general election, the NLD took 13 out of 18 seats in the House of Representatives, with 4 seats won by the USDP and the remaining seat taken by the Kachin State People's Party (KSPP). Kachin State is the second most influential area of opposition supporters in Myanmar after Shan State. Due to the past decade of civil war and the resulting issues of internally displaced people, the NLD government treats this state as politically sensitive. Kachin State is also very diverse in terms of ethnicity compared to other states and regions. In this regard, Kachin provides a general picture of the opinion of the section of the public who opposes the NLD.   Voters Strongly View the Election as Free and Fair Our first concern is the perception of Myanmar citizens about the fairness of the last general election. First, we look at the results of the Mandalay Region survey. As shown in Figure 1, a vast majority of the survey respondents somewhat agreed (82.5%) or totally agreed (4%) with the statement that the “2020 General Election is a multiparty democratic election.” Similarly, 86.7% of respondents agreed with the statement that the “2020 General Election was free and fair.” Around 88% of respondents agreed with the opinion that the “2020 General Election was valid and correct.” Only about 1% of respondents answered these questions negatively. Figure 1. Opinion on the 2020 General Election in Mandalay Region Source: Post-election Survey in Mandalay Region (2020)   In the Kachin State survey, there were no questions that directly addressed the fairness of the election. However, there were similar queries, such as whether the respondents trust the election results or if they are satisfied with the election process. As shown in Figure 2, a vast majority of respondents were very satisfied (72.7%) or satisfied (10.2%) with the way the voting process went in the 2020 election. Almost all (97.4%) reported experiencing no pressure at the polling station. Similarly, 77.3% of respondents overall trusted the 2020 election results, while only 9.1% of respondents expressed distrust. Around 80% of respondents agreed with the statement that the “2020 general election gave equal opportunities for all voters.” Only 8.6% of respondents disagreed with this statement.   Figure 2. Opinion on the 2020 General Election in Kachin State Source: Post-election Survey in Kachin State (2020)   The ethnic party, the KSPP, and the pro-military party, the USDP, are relatively strong in Kachin State. In this general election, these parties also ranked second and third respectively in Kachin State. One major concern is whether respondents who supported these parties trust the election results. In our survey, 68.3% of the respondents who voted for the USDP and 63% of the respondents who voted for the KSPP stated that they trust the election results. Among the major opposition supporters, only 23.8% (USDP) and 17.9% (KSPP) said they did not trust the election results. Contrary to the military's argument, we found that relatively fewer opposition supporters did not trust the election results.   Strong Support for the Democratization of Myanmar  Our second concern is the opinion of Myanmar citizens regarding the political situation leading up to the NLD's landslide victory in the 2020 general election. By gauging the response to the question of whether Myanmar is headed in the right direction, it may be possible to deduce the legitimacy of the emergency declared by the military. Very few of the respondents in the two areas surveyed said that Myanmar is headed in the wrong direction. The vast majority of respondents (85%) in Mandalay Region thought that the country is headed in the right direction as opposed to a tiny minority (2%) who thought that the country is going in the wrong direction. In Kachin State, a high percentage of respondents replied "I don't know" to this question (41.9%), but only 12.1% said that Myanmar is moving in the wrong direction, while 44.3% said it is going in the right direction. We can attest that the cause of the Myanmar military's emergency declaration is at odds with public opinion in Myanmar. The vast majority of Myanmar citizens have recognized the legitimacy of the 2020 general election. Those surveyed also generally felt that Myanmar is headed in the proper direction of democratization. Nowhere in this poll was there an indication that Myanmar was in sufficient crisis to declare a state of emergency. We need not hesitate to assert that the military's declaration of emergency is clearly a coup.   The Military’s Limited Options after the Coup Despite the strong support for further democratization of their country, many people in Myanmar did not have high expectations regarding the military's political role. In the Mandalay Region survey, when respondents were asked about the things that they expect to materialize under the newly elected government, only 28% of them agreed that the military’s involvement in politics will decline. Although 65% of respondents agreed that democratic values will strengthen ​​and 52% predicted an increase in freedom of speech, relatively fewer respondents predicted that the military's influence might decrease. The power sharing agreement that the country has run under for the past decade has created a certain acceptance of the Myanmar style of gradual or partial democratic transition. However, many citizens expressed concern that such a system clearly limited the potential scope of democratic reform, making it difficult to recognize real progress in democratization. The NLD has contributed to the democratic transition in Myanmar, but the transition remained limited owing to the solidarity of the military as an opposition force. The NLD failed to divide the military and create any substantial faction which was on its side, and as such could not create a parallel force as a counterweight to the regular forces. The country’s democratic leaders did not have the power to rotate command positions or to timely purge rival military officers.[5] Just as Huntington[6] feared, the democratic government of Myanmar “spoiled” the military by providing it with additional material, financial, and political resources rather than weakening its ability to wield power in parallel. This spoiling increased the ability of the military to organize a successful coup.[7] Myanmar’s democratic political leaders found themselves in a trap. No meaningful actions that might reduce the military’s ability to successfully regain power could be taken, because such actions in themselves were likely to spark a coup. This is why the NLD government was helpless when the military threatened a coup in late January. Myanmar’s fledgling democratic arrangement, which was dubbed “a pacted transition,” is clearly not tenable in the long run. The Myanmar military also cannot be optimistic about the situation. It has declared a state of emergency and promised new elections in a year, but it is very unlikely that the military will take office in a new election. Post-coup elections are often regarded as a referendum on the coup. As the poll results show, the citizens of Myanmar are assigning legitimacy to the 2020 general election results. If elections are held again, the defeat of the military will be very likely. The military will not be able to postpone the promised new election since it is difficult for an authoritarian regime to legitimize their continuous post-coup control of government. Research shows the median duration of coup-born regimes that held elections was approximately 88 months (7.3 years), while coup regimes that did not hold elections lasted only 24 months.[8] The Myanmar military’s options after the coup appear to be quite limited. According to the survey results in Kachin State, about 70% of the respondents agree with the statement that international organizations should have the opportunity to effectively pressure Myanmar regarding its human rights abuses, and only a small parentage (9.1%) believe that international organizations should not be allowed to pressure Myanmar. The same mindset can be applied to the coup. Like the human rights issue, there seems to be support within much of Myanmar for the international community to apply pressure with regard to the military takeover. Leaders from the UN, the Biden administration, and other Western democracies have denounced this unfortunate putsch by the military. It is time for Asian leaders to join in and raise their voices to show their support for Myanmar’s democracy. ■ [1] Al Jazeera and News Agencies. 2021. “Myanmar military ruler defends coup as protests intensify.”https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/8/myanmar-military-leader-gives-first-address-to-nation-since-coup [2] Pyae Sone Win. January 29, 2021. “Myanmar election commission rejects military’s fraud claims.” apnews.com. [3] Domestic Election Observer Organization. 2021. “Joint Statement by Domestic Election Observer Organization.” https://www.pacemyanmar.org/mmobservers-statement-eng/ [4] The Carter Center. 2020. “Election Observation Mission: Myanmar, General Election, November 8, 2020.” https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/myanmar-preliminary-statement-112020.pdf [5] Biddle, Stephen and Robert Zirkle. 1996. “Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World.” Journal of Strategic Studies 19(2): 171-212; Sudduth, Jun Koga. 2017. “Coup Risk, Coup-Proofing and Leader Survival.” Journal of Peace Research. 54(1): 3-15 [6] Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press [7] Feaver, Peter. 1999. “Civil-Military Relations.” Annual Review of Political Science. 2(1): 211-241 [8] Grewal, Sharan and Yasser Kureshi. 2019. “How to Sell a Coup: Election as Coup Legitimation.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. 63(4): 1001-1031 ■   Jin Seok Bae is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Gyeongsang National University in South Korea. His primary research interests lie in elections, party politics, and public opinion in the context of democratization and new democracies. He participated as a practitioner in the founding of Asia Democracy Network and Asia Democracy Research Network in 2013 when he was a Research Fellow at the East Asia Institute.     ■   Sook Jong Lee is a Senior Fellow and Trustee at the East Asia Institute and served the Institute as President from 2008 to 2018. She is also a professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan University. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed. 2016), Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013 and 2016), Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (eds. 2011). ■   For inquiries: Juhyun Jun, Research Associate/Project Manager 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) I jhjun@eai.or.kr  

Jin Seok Bae, Sook Jong Lee 2021-02-10Views : 91675