The East Asia Institute (EAI), in collaboration with the International House of Japan (IHJ), conducted the 13th Korea-Japan Joint Public Opinion Survey. The results of this survey are presented in visual format in this "EAI Public Opinion Briefing." The survey findings reveal that South Korean respondents' favorable impressions of Japan, trust in Japan, and evaluations of the current Korea-Japan relationship all rose in tandem, each reaching record highs since the survey began — continuing an upward trend that started after bottoming out in 2020. Japanese respondents' impressions of Korea also improved, largely recovering the ground lost the previous year, though the improvement remained comparatively modest, suggesting the asymmetry between the two countries' perceptions persists. At the same time, South Korean respondents showed a marked decline in favorability toward and trust in the United States, while both Korean and Japanese respondents expressed strongly unfavorable impressions of and low trust in China. Taken together, the results suggest growing support for strengthened Korea-Japan security cooperation alongside a broadly positive outlook on the trajectory of the bilateral relationship.

Myungkoo Kang, Professor at the City University of New York, identifies the source of dollar hegemony's resilience to U.S. debt transfer as a three-layer payment infrastructure, rather than currency holdings. The author analyzes that while alternative networks like mBridge are expanding, they have yet to displace the existing infrastructure, and that the policies sustaining dollar hegemony are instead breeding chronic financial instability. Professor Kang notes this coexistence will persist for a decade or more, and recommends Korea craft a vision and strategy to maintain its footing in the dollar order while preserving room to shift toward alternatives.

Inhwan Oh, Senior Research Fellow at EAI, diagnoses the current world order not as a new Cold War or multipolarity, but as an "unstable hybrid order" where the U.S. and China compete without strategic settlement. The author explains that acknowledging this reality frees the NATO-IP4 partnership from the misconception of being an 'Asian NATO,' highlighting instead its role in enabling middle powers to collectively reshape the global order in ways that redress its past flaws. Dr. Oh suggests that deepening concrete coordination in areas like maritime industrial ecosystems and emerging technologies while increasing the transparency of engagements with China will ensure NATO-IP4 connects, rather than fragments, the regions of the world.