This book is an attempt to investigate how South Korean identity and values have changed over the last ten years, and how they have remained the same. This book was written using data collected from the South Korean Identity Survey, which is jointly administered by the East Asia Institute, the Korea University Institute for Asia, and the Joongang Ilbo. The survey covers a diverse array of topics including the multifaceted South Korean identity and values, perceptions of past historical events, social participation, perceived conflicts, perceptions of the international world, and so on. Furthermore, as a longitudinal survey that has been conducted three times over the last ten years, the South Korean Identity survey has increased academic value and utility in capturing the long-term changes occurring in South Korean society compared to a cross-sectional study.   "Assessing the future of South Korean society through an analysis of the changes in South Korean national identity"   10 years of change for the nation- how has South Korean society changed? Over the past ten years, South Korea’s birth rate has remained abysmally low (The total birth rate is less than 1.3). With this low birth rate, the ageing of society has been accelerating. Economic inequality has worsened, and the youth unemployment rate has skyrocketed since 2012. Security concerns over North Korea’s ongoing nuclear tests and missile launches have also grown. On the other hand, South Korea’s population has increasingly diversified owing to globalization and opening. The number of non-Korean residents in the country has steadily increased, surpassing 1,740,000 in January of 2015. These changes have had a significant influence on the identity and values of the Koreans who have endured them. The book South Korean Identity tracks and analyzes these changes and assesses the future of South Korean society.     Table of Contents     I. Perceptions of Local Community and Multiculturalism   1. The South Korean Community and Neighborhood Identity   ■ Sook-Hee Oh 2. Multilayered South Korean Identity and the Future of National Multiculturalism: Who Imagines a Multicultural Nation?   ■ Jung-Mee Hwang 3. South Korean Multiculturalism and Changes in Perceptions of Multicultural Minorities: From Compassion to Indifference?   ■ In-Jin Yoon   II. Perceptions of Citizens and the State   4. South Koreans' Participation in Voluntary Associations and Citizenship   ■ Seokho Kim 5. Changes in Citizen Perceptions of the Government’s Role   ■M. Jae Moon• Tae-Hyung Kim 6. Is Post Materialism on the Rise among South Koreans?   ■ Joon Han   III. Social Conflicts and Perceptions of North Korea•Unification•The International Community   7. Changes in Perceptions of Social Conflicts in South Korea, 2005-2015   ■ Won-Taek Kang 8. Changes in South Korean Perceptions of North Korea and Unification, 2005-2015   ■ Nae-Young Lee 9. Changes in South Korean Perceptions of the US and China in Response to Escalating Competition between the US and China in East Asia   ■ Jung-Nam Lee and Do-Hyung Ha     *This media note was translated from the original Korean by Natalie Grant.

Preface   “Koreans” from a Korean perspective; tracking the change in Korean identity   “Who is Korean?” Political identity defines ‘us’ as being inside of the political bubble and ‘they’ as being on the outside. For ‘us,’ since Koreans have lived on Korean peninsula and shared cultural and linguistic homogeneity for a long time, being Korean in itself defines Korean identity. In other words, the discrepancy between the racial and territorial identity as in modern European national states did not exist in Korea.   However, the division of the Korean Peninsula made it impossible to realize nationalism’s basic principle of “one people, one nation.” This has made today’s national and ethnic identity more complicated than it used to be the past. As South Korea created its own identity through the successful achievements of political, economical, and social progress, the unification of ethnic and national identity is no longer expected to be a natural result of the eventual reunification of South and North Korea. Also, globalization and Korea’s strengthened place in the international community have diversified Korean culture, while also newly intensifying its identity crisis. This is the reason why the question “who is Korean?” is important.   The book Understanding Korean Identity Through the Lens of Opinion Survey is the result of an attempt to examine the above mentioned question. When the 60th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from the Japanese regime in 2005 was being celebrated, EAI published Korean Politics and National Identity based on its first public survey on Korean identity. This joint-research project conducted by EAI (President: Sook Jong Lee, Professor at Sungkyunkwan University) and the Asiatic Research Institute of Korea University (President: Nae-Young Lee, Professor at Korea University) is an extension of such past research; it attempts to track the changes in and persistence of Korean identity over last 5 years based on the results of the second public survey on Korean identity conducted in 2010 in a comparative manner. The team consists of experts from EAI and the Asiatic Research Institute in various fields including Political Science, Sociology, and Public Administration, to comprehensively analyze the changes in Korean identity.   South Korea’s “Korean Identity,” Diffusion of “Global Citizenship” in Global Era.   This book consists of the nine chapters of research. First, Won-Taek Kang points out the increasing strength of South Korea’s own “Korean identity,” while examining the potential conflict between South Korea’s own national identity and ethnic identity encompassing the Korean peninsula. Nae-Young Lee analyzes Koreans’ viewpoints on reunification and concludes that hostile sentiment towards North Korea has increased over the last 5 years, and skepticism and cautious attitudes towards the reunification have become pervasive. Globalization and the change in location of Korea’s place in international community result in considerable changes in Koreans’ perspectives of international society. Sook-Jong Lee argues that global citizenship is emphasized among Koreans as they started stress their contributions to international society. In addition, Lee points out the increased importance of diplomatic power in order to secure leverage in international society. Also, Shin-wha Lee claims that interests in non-military and non-traditional security issues have increased in accordance with the heightened caution towards super-national issues (초국가적 이슈) like natural disasters, disease, and economic crises.   “The Era of Democratization and Multiculturalism,” New Definition of Korean   Through analysis of the relationship between democracy and nationalism, Han-Wool Chung and Kon Su Yi discover the tendency of “democratic nationalism,” and find that high levels of democratic citizenship and radical nationalism are coexisting. Interestingly, Chung and Yi view the growth of democratic citizenship as a factor that not only weakens the exclusiveness of nationalism, but also strengthens the consciousness sovereignty. On the other hand, In-Jin Yoon analyzes the awareness of overseas Koreans, North Korean defectors, and foreign immigrants. Yoon argues that Koreans place a high emphasis on ethnic characteristics like birthplace and lineage, civil components like nationality, and the observance of laws and systems. Jung-Mee Hwang explored the receptivity of multiculturalism and claims that even though Koreans are yet to internalize cultural diversity and multiculturalism, most of them agree with the policy of promoting multiracialism and multiculturalism.   Change in national identity and the advent of a new national agenda   Such changes in national and ethnic identity must influence the formation of the national agenda. M. Jae Moon suggests that the 5 national agendas that Koreans desire are: fair wealth distribution and development as a welfare state, continuous economic development, social integration, establishment of a transparent and fair democratic state, and establishment of a unified nation and conveyance of international leadership. Moon emphasizes that establishing policies to pursue continuous economic growth and to plan comprehensive welfare policies is critical in dealing with social changes. In this context, Yong wook Lee explains that Koreans have a high level of preference for materialism compared to other nations, and this tendency does not differ among each generation. Moon claims that such high preferences for materialism is based on an overwhelming emphasis on material success and social status over other values.   Evolving challenges and opportunities for Koreans; what is the choice of Koreans?   This research shows that Korean society is more diversified than ever. At the same time, Koreans’ viewpoints on national identity have been gradually changing and this tendency will continue into the future. This phenomenon may come as a new challenge to Koreans who have lived in the myth of a single-nation state for a long time. Nonetheless, this change will enable Koreans to progress more in the future with regards to ongoing globalization and the heightened status of Korea in the international community. The question is whether Korean society can properly grasp the meaning of the changing identities and appropriately respond. The readers will discover the possibilities and limits surrounding this issue in Understanding Korean Identity Through the Lens of Opinion Survey.   Table of Contents   Chapter 1. The Changing National Identity in Korean Society ｜ Won-Taek Kang Chapter 2. The National Identity of Koreans and Changing Views toward North Korea and Reunification ｜ Nae-Young Lee Chapter 3. The View of Koreans on Security and Foreign Affairs ｜ Shin-wha Lee Chapter 4. Global Identity and Korea’s Diplomacy ｜ Sook-Jong Lee Chapter 5. Changing Korean Society and the National Agenda ｜ M. Jae Moon Chapter 6. Does Democracy Strengthen Nationalism? The Possibility of a Democratic National Identity from Comparative Analysis between Surveys in 2005 and 2010 ｜ Han Wool Jeong and Kon Su Yi Chapter 7. What Defines Korean Nationality? The View of Koreans on Nation and Nationality ｜ In-Jin Yoon Chapter 8. The Adaptability of Koreans to Multiculturalism and National Identity ｜ Jung-Mee Hwang Chapter 9. Materialism in Korea ｜ Yong Wook Lee   Appendix Project overview Questionnaire Result comparison table   *This preface was translated from the original Korean by EAI intern Chaeree Lee and edited by Ben Engel.

The East Asia Institute’s Center for Public Opinion Research published a book titled “Korean Politics and National Identity” based on the research on public opinion concerning national identity conducted in 2005. The book was edited by the chairperson of the EAI Citizens Politics Research Team(Won-Taek Kang, and a total of nine scholars participated to convey a message about Koreans’ strengthened national identity).   We have believed in the myth of a ‘homogenous race’ for a long time. We have learned that we are all offspring of Dangun, the legendary founding father of Korea, and lived homogeneous lives based on identical history, language, and culture. However, this myth is being challenged, since Korean society is no longer racially homogeneous. As the number of foreign laborers residing in Korea for a long period of time and the number of Koreans who marry foreigners increases, the number of multiracial Koreans is accordingly rising. Also, the Chosun race, whose appearance and language are not so different from Koreans’, regard themselves as Chinese and have Chinese nationality. In contrast, Hines Ward, who looks different from Koreans and speaks different language, is regarded as a Korean. In addition, the number of “New Koreans” who escaped from North Korea is increasing. In other words, Koreans are having an identity crisis.”   This book is an attempt to examine the change in Korean identity. It attempts to analyze how Korean identity, which was considered natural in the past, has changed over the years. This book consists of two parts: part one tracks changes in identities in Korean society, and part two examines the characteristics of new identities through the lens of changed perspectives on North Korea, reunification, and Korea’s past.    Table of Contents   Part One: National Identity and Korean Nationalism 1. Korean National (kookga) Identity and Ethnic (min-jok) Identity: Korean National Identity ｜ Won-Taek Kang 2. Group Identity, The Social and Political Crevices ｜ Min-jun Kim 3. Class Identity and Korean Political Behavior ｜ Han-Wool Jung 4. Growth of Democratic Citizenship and National Identity ｜ Han-Wool Jung, Won-Chil Jung   Part Two: National Identity and Integration 5. Koreans’ Perception of the Korean War and Independence Period, Min-jok and Kook-ga Identity ｜ Jang-Su Kim 6. Koreans’ Assessments of Former Governments and Historical Pride ｜ Hyun-Woo Lee 7. Koreans’ Perception of North Korea and Reunification, National Identity ｜ Nae-Young Lee 8. Korean Anti-materialism ｜ Jae-Yul Lee, Jun Han   *This preface was translated from the original Korean by EAI intern Chaeree Lee and edited by Ben Engel.

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Note Even after the end of the Japanese colonial rule in 1945, bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan have been tainted by various unresolved historical issues, including those related to comfort women and victims of forced labor. Amid the series of tit-for-tat aggravating relations with Japan, the East Asia Institute (EAI) asked South Koreans to evaluate their perception of Japan in the 2020 Korean Identity Survey. This issue briefing evaluates the trends in South Koreans’ perception of Japan with the results from the series of four Korean Identity surveys (2005-2020) and those from the previous two Korea-Japan Public Opinion surveys (2018-2019) conducted by EAI. Overall, South Koreans’ perception of Japan in 2020 can be summarized by heightened hostility, low affinity, and the linkage between historical and security issues, especially when addressing the future of the South Korea-United States-Japan trilateral relations.     Heightened South Korean Hostility toward Japan The 2020 Korean Identity Survey asked 1,000 respondents to score their sentiment toward other countries. The levels of public sentiment were rated from a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 to 49 classifying as hostile (or unfavorable), 50 as neutral, and 51 to 100 as favorable. When we look at the level of public sentiment, Japan had the lowest average score as the least favorable nation for South Korea. Japan’s scored 30 points on average, which was even lower than that of North Korea (33.3 points). Russia scored 36.2 points, China scored 45.2 points, and the United States scored 62 points respectively. Looking at the evaluation of the United States according to the different generations, the highest score was 64.3 points in the 18 to 29 age group, and the lowest score was 59.6 points in the 50 to 59 age group. As for China, respondents aged 40 to 49 were most favorable with 46.7 points, and those aged 18 to 29 years old were least favorable with 43.1 points. For Japan, lowest points (28.7) were given by respondents aged 60 and over, and those aged 18 to 29 years provided the highest scores averaging 32.1 points, which was also the only score higher than that of North Korea for the same age group (30.9 points). If you look only at the 18 to 29 age group, the highest affinity is for the United States and Japan, and the lowest affinity is for China.   Figure 1. South Koreans’ Favorability toward Other Countries in 2020 Note: The number is average in the 0 (most hostile) to 100 (most favorable) scale.   From the respondents who answered to “hostile (0 to 49),” South Korean hostility toward Japan reached its highest at 71.9%. The order of the countries with highest to lowest degrees of hostility is Japan (71.9%), North Korea (65.7%), Russia (60.5%), China (40.1%), and the United States (10.2%). Compared to the results of the 2015 survey, South Korean hostility increased for all countries except for North Korea and was especially high for China and Japan. Hostility toward China increased by 149% (24 percentage points), and hostility to Japan increased by 22% (13.1 percentage points). The United States was no exception with a 113% (5.4 percentage points) rise in hostility, indicating that South Korea's negative perception toward neighboring countries increased overall. Yet among the five countries, hostility toward the United States was the lowest at 10%.   Figure 2. South Koreans’ Hostility Perception (2015, 2020) Note: The number is percentage of 0-49 scores in the 0 (most hostile)-100 (most favorable) scale.   Threats and Conflict Perceptions toward Japan The threat perceptions of Japan differed significantly when evaluating the changes in responses from 2010 to 2015, but they were very much stagnant from 2015 to 2020. This variance between 2010 to 2015 and 2015 to 2020 could be explained by the changes in Japan's foreign policy since the inauguration of Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo in 2012. Despite conflicts between South Korea and Japan throughout 2019, the threat perception of “South Korea-Japan Conflict” decreased by 0.5 percentage points from 90% in 2015 to 89.5% in 2020. The risk of “Japan's Pursuit of Military Power” also decreased by 0.8 percentage points from 90.5% to 89.7%. The proportion of respondents who defined “Japan’s Pursuit of Military Power” as “very threatening” as opposed to only “somewhat threatening” also decreased by 0.6 percentage points compared to 2015 (from 31.6% in 2015 to 31% in 2020). While these findings suggest that the threat perception of Japan has not yet peaked even after the escalation of tensions between South Korea and Japan in 2019, the minimal changes in percentage points between 2015 and 2020 also infer that the Japanese threat has remained predominant for South Koreans since it reached its peak in 2015.   Figure 3. South Koreans’ Threat Perceptions toward Japan (2010, 2015, 2020)   Furthermore, South Korea's perception of “Conflict between China and Japan” as a threat surged in 2015 (from 65.4% in 2010 to 86.2% in 2015). The proportion of respondents who deemed the same factor as “very threatening” also increased in 2020 (from 18.7% in 2015 to 22.6% in 2020). These results show that in addition to the continued threat perception of Japan from 2015 to 2020, there is an added risk perception of China-Japan conflicts. The increased threat perception of China-Japan conflicts indicates that the threat from Japan can arise not only from domestic or bilateral level, but also from a regional level.   Increased Disfavor of Both Japan and China in 2020, but More So of Japan In the Korea-Japan Public Opinion Survey, which is administered by both EAI and The Genron NPO of Japan annually with 1,000 individuals since 2013, one of the continued questions is "Which country from Japan and China do you feel more affinity towards?" This question was also included in the 2020 Korean Identity survey and the analysis of results from 2018, 2019 and 2020 indicate that South Koreans are feeling increasingly more favorable towards China than Japan. In the 2018 and 2019 surveys, the responses to “unfavorable of both countries” accumulated to 22% and 24% respectively, which were similar to the responses for both "more favorable of Japan” and "more favorable of China.” However, in the 2020 survey, the number of respondents who did not feel favorable of both Japan and China nearly doubled to 44.5%. As shown by the results of the 2020 survey, South Koreans are displaying heightened exclusivity in their perceptions of China and Japan, which have been marked by increased hostility and threat perception, and a decline in affinity.   Figure 4. Favorability toward Japan and China (2018, 2019, 2020) In particular, the fall in the level of favorability toward Japan from 17.8% in 2019 to 7% in 2020 explains the rise in the percentage of responses for the "unfavorable of both Japan and China” option (from 22.8% in 2019 to 44.5% in 2020). This decrease in South Koreans’ affinity toward Japan can also be explained by the 2019 South Korea-Japan bilateral conflicts.   The U.S. as a Mediator: A Way to Resolve Past History Conflicts with Japan The 2020 survey shows that the perception of South Korea-Japan relations is shifting from a bilateral perspective focused on historical issues to a multifaceted relationship encompassing various issues. For instance, throughout the past five years, the South Korean public has shown increased support for resolving the historical problem with Japan in tandem with other issues (61.2%), more than taking separate approaches (38.4%).   Figure 5. How to Resolve Historical and Other Issues with Japan? (2015, 2020) In addition, South Koreans are highly positive about the strengthening of the trilateral military security cooperation with the United States and Japan. Their level of support has grown in general throughout the past three years. Support for ROK-US-Japan military security cooperation rose from 60.9% in 2018 to 66.2% in 2019 and decreased slightly to 58.3% in 2020. Despite grave deteriorations in bilateral relations following the South Korea-Japan disputes in 2019, South Koreans remain in support of joint military security cooperation with Japan through the United States. As such, it can be suggested that South Korea cooperate with Japan through a multilateral platform provided by the United States rather than by pursuing a bilateral approach.   Figure 6. ROK-US-Japan Trilateral Military Cooperation (2018-2020)   Conclusion The analysis of the 2020 Korean Identity survey results shows that South Korea’s affinity toward Japan has decreased while the level of hostility has increased. Japan’s colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula has been one of the biggest obstacles for the development of South Korea-Japan relations for the past 55 years after diplomatic normalization. In 2019, bilateral tensions peaked due to historical issues related to comfort women and forced labor victims. But the margin of deteriorated opinion against Japan was bigger between 2010 and 2015 than between 2015 and 2020. An added dynamic to South Koreans’ threat perception of Japan in 2020 is increased caution towards China-Japan conflicts. Furthermore, as indicated in the 2020 survey, South Koreans are not in favor of both Japan and China. Whether the history issues should be dealt separately from economic and security issues has been continuously discussed among experts. However, the Korea public favors a linked solution and supports security cooperation with Japan under the participation of the U.S. Considering the importance of bilateral relations between Korea and Japan, it is time for leaders of both countries to make efforts to ameliorate the relationship by focusing on common grounds of national interest and devising an effective public diplomacy to each other. ■     ■ Seunghee Oh  is the executive director and a principal researcher of EAI. Her research focuses on the Japanese foreign policy and Sino-Japanese relations. Her recent publications include Postwar Japan-China Relations, 1949-2019 (2019), Japan’s Struggle for Recognition and Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Normalization: A Recognitive Approach to the One-China Principle (2017).   ■ Typeset by Sea Young Kim, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208)  |  sykim@eai.or.kr     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.    

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Note How does South Korea position itself amid rising U.S.-China competition in times of COVID-19? In the East Asia Institute (EAI)’s fourth South Korean Identity public opinion survey (May 2020), a general increase in hostile sentiments towards neighboring countries was revealed. Yet despite such developments, South Korea continues to display high affinity toward the U.S., which it views as a potential buffer and safeguard against the threat of rising China. Furthermore, while tensions have heightened between South Korea and the U.S. throughout the Moon and Trump administrations due to disagreements over defense cost sharing and the U.S. pursuit of the "America First” policy, South Korea increasingly desires to strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance.     United States as More Favorable than China As shown in Figure 1, South Koreans’ favorability levels of both the United States and China have decreased while negative sentiments have risen for both countries alike. However, the specific degree to which South Koreans’ sense of hostility has risen differs for the U.S. and China. While negative sentiments toward the U.S. increased by 5.4 percentage points (from 4.8% in 2015 to 10.2% in 2020) it has grown by 24 percentage points for China. In addition, though the level of affinity for the U.S. fell by 17.6 percentage points (from 77.3% in 2015 to 63.7% in 2020), over 60% of the respondents have retained positive feelings towards the U.S. On the other hand, the level of favorability for China has fallen by more than a half, with a 29.6 percentage point decrease (from 50% in 2015 to 20.4% in 2020). As a result, the percentage of hostility toward China has surpassed that of favorability since the 2015 survey. Figure 1: South Korean Sentiments toward the U.S. vs. China (2015-2020)   The generational trend reflected in the affinity levels is also important, especially considering the future of South Korea’s bilateral relations with the U.S. and China. In addition to the generally favorable sentiment that South Koreans have of the U.S. and vice versa toward China, there is a large gap in how younger South Koreans see the U.S. and China (Figure 2). According to both the 2015 and 2020 surveys, South Koreans aged 18 to 29 have the most affinity toward the U.S. amongst the five age groups (82.6% in 2015 and 72% in 2020).   Figure 2: South Korean Sentiments toward the U.S. and China, by Age Group (2020) The same group of young South Koreans, however, holds the largest hostility toward China (45.1% in 2020). This upsurge in anti-Chinese sentiment among the younger generation is noteworthy as South Koreans aged 18 to 29 had rated China’s favorability highest amongst the different age groups in the previous 2015 survey (52.7%) (Figure 3). Such an increase in South Korea’s hostile sentiment could be explained by China’s pressure and subsequent economic retaliation against South Korea during the years of 2015-2016 for the issue of deploying THAAD and the outbreak of the Wuhan originated COVID-19 pandemic since February 2020.   Figure 3: South Korean Sentiments toward China, by Age Group (2015)   United States as a Safeguard against the Threat of Rising China For the questions addressing the risk factors for South Korea’s national interests in the next decade, respondents had the options of labelling the different categories as either “very threatening,” “somewhat threatening,” and “not a threat at all.” The percentage of responses for “very threatening” and “somewhat threatening” was then added to assess South Korea’s perceived priority national threats (Figure 4).   Figure 4: Top Perceived Threats to South Korea's National Interests for the Next Decade (2020)   Other than “Infectious Diseases”(66.2%), which surpassed “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons” as the top national threat for the first time due to the COVID-19 pandemic, “Rise of China” continues to rank among the top five listed risk factors to South Korea’s national interests. In fact, the number of respondents who identified it as either “very threatening” or “somewhat threatening” has increased by 2.7 percentage points since 2015 (from 39% in 2015 to 41.7% in 2020). South Korea’s perception of China as a threat has also been echoed in previous EAI surveys. For example, in the Seventh Korea-Japan Public Opinion Survey conducted in May 2019 (hereafter, the May 2019 survey) administered by both EAI and The Genron NPO, China followed North Korea as the number two country of threat to South Korea. In another EAI survey on the Mid-term Assessment of the Moon Jae-in Administration from November 2019 (hereafter, the November 2019 survey), 66.9% of the respondents also identified China’s rise as a threat rather than as an opportunity (22.6%) for South Korea. How do South Koreans, then, view the United States in comparison to China? Although 31.4% of the respondents have identified “U.S. ‘America First’ Policy” (a newly added category for the 2020 survey) as a threat (Figure 4), the overall view that South Koreans have of the U.S. is that it is a strategic buffer against China. For example, in the same survey from November 2019, 60.1% of the respondents agreed that the ROK-U.S. alliance helps to protect South Korea from China’s economic and diplomatic pressure compared to 34.5% who disagreed. While an increased number of South Koreans feel that “U.S.-China Hegemonic Competition” is a national threat (from 24.4% in 2015 to 34.9% in 2020) (Figure 3), more South Koreans would rely on the U.S. than on China in facing rising tensions between the two countries (Figure 5). Aside from the fact that two out of three South Koreans have voted in favor of taking a “balanced approach” toward both the U.S. and China, more respondents opted to “strengthen relations with the United States” (24.9%) than “strengthen relations with China” (11.1%). The trend is also rising for those in favor of the U.S. (from 22.7% in 2015 to 24.9% in 2020) whereas it has fallen for China (from 13.1% in 2015 to 11.1% in 2020). In the aforementioned November 2019 survey, a similar trend was observed in which the number of respondents who answered that they would support the U.S. (24.4%) in the case of U.S.-China tensions exceeded those in support of China (5.1%) by nearly five folds.   Figure 5: Position South Korea Should Take in U.S.-China Hegemonic Competition (2015-2020)   Increased Desire to Strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance South Koreans continue to desire the strengthening of the existing alliance with the United States (Figure 6). Since the Korean Identity survey was first administered in 2005, the percentage of respondents opting for the strengthening of the ROK-U.S. alliance has continuously risen by 14.3 percentage points (from 30.3% in 2005 to 44.6% in 2020). While more South Koreans prefer the pursuit of independent diplomacy in 2020 than in 2015 (from 20.9% in 2015 to 27% in 2020), the gap between the percentage of respondents supporting the bilateral alliance (44.6%) versus independent diplomacy (27%) is still significant by 17.6 percentage points.   Figure 6: Desirable Relations with the United States (2005-2020) Meanwhile, China continues to rank first as the country expected to influence South Korea the most in the next decade among five countries including the U.S., Japan, Russia and North Korea. This could be explained by the economic significance China holds as South Korea's largest trading partner of 162 billion USD, followed by the U.S. at 73 billion USD (World Bank, 2018). In the 2020 survey, South Koreans selected "development as an economic power” as the number one long-term future policy agenda (with 28% of the respondents) among thirteen policies, which emphasizes China's importance as a leading economic partner for South Korea. Similarly, in the May 2019 survey, 83.9% of the respondents selected China as a more important economic partner for South Korea compared to the U.S. (72.6 %).   Figure 7: Country Expected to Influence South Korea the Most in the Next Decade (2005-2020)[1]   Although China is an important trade partner for South Korea, the number of respondents seeing it as the most influential country for South Korea has decreased since 2015 by 18.5 percentage points (from 72.1% in 2015 to 53.6% in 2020). On the other hand, the perception of influence that South Koreans have of the U.S. has risen by 17 percentage points (from 13.3% in 2015 to 30.3% in 2020). In the May 2019 survey, there had also been a 4.4 percentage point increase in the number of respondents who had selected that U.S. regional influence would rise in the next decade (from 30.5% in 2018 to 34.9% in 2019). Only a tenth of the respondents (9.1%) predicted that U.S. power would diminish within the same survey.   Conclusion Despite existing tensions between South Korea and the U.S., the 2020 Korean Identity survey shows that the ROK-U.S. alliance continues to hold significance to South Korea as a safeguard against the threat of rising China. The bilateral alliance between the two countries extends beyond security and economic means, as more than half of the respondents in the November 2019 survey (51%) stated that the alliance is natural given the shared values between the two countries (compared to 33.8% of the respondents who disagreed). The importance that South Koreans place upon the ROK-U.S. alliance exceeds beyond the difficulties that the nation faces as a middle power caught amid rising U.S.-China hegemonic competition. In the November 2019 survey, 70.9% disagreed that the importance of the ROK-U.S. alliance would be reduced if the U.S. power declines more than that of China within the region. As mentioned in "ROK-US Cooperation in an Era of US-China Strategic Competition” (Lee, 2019), the U.S. needs to take this opportunity to be "prudent and patient” in addressing South Korea even if the domestic public opinion in South Korea remains largely in favor of the U.S. With 31.4% of the respondents identifying the Trump administration's "America First” policy as a national threat, anti-American sentiments will arise and weaken domestic support for the ROK-U.S. alliance if the U.S. demands extensive economic commitments from South Korea toward the alliance and threatens to withdraw the U.S. force from the Korean Peninsula. ■   press coverage Trump’s South Korea bashing doesn’t strengthen Xi     ■ Sea Young Kim is a research associate and project manager at the East Asia Institute. Her recent publication includes "New North-Southeast Asia Security Links: Defending, Recentring, and Extending Regional Order” (Australian Journal of Politics and History, 2019).   ■ Sook Jong Lee is a Senior Fellow and Trustee at the East Asia Institute and served the Institute as President from 2008 to 2018. She is also a professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan University. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed. 2016), Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013 and 2016), Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (eds. 2011).   ■ Typeset by Sea Young Kim, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208)  |  sykim@eai.or.kr     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.    

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Note The year of 2020 marks 75 years of division of the Korean Peninsula into two Koreas. It may be a short interlude in terms of Korea’s long-term preceding history as one nation, but this modern history of separation seems to be long enough for South Koreans to perceive North Korea as a separate country different from their own. This issue briefing reviews South Koreans' perception of North Korea and their attitude toward unification of the Korean Peninsula based on the results of the East Asia Institute’s fourth Korean Identity public opinion survey in 2020.     Distancing Inter-Korean relations, Neighbor rather than Brother The series of four Korean Identity surveys (2005, 2010, 2015 and 2020) reveal that South Koreans increasingly regard North Korea as a separate country. Since 2005, the proportion of respondents who perceive North Korea as a different country increased by 10.9 percentage points (from 77.7% in 2005 to 90.2% in 2020). In addition, 70.5% of South Korean citizens responded that South Korea is the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula. South Koreans’ negative perception of North Korea has also steadily increased. From the five different options that South Koreans can select as the adequate description of North Korea, the options including “one of us” and “brother” imply a closer perceived connection between the two Koreas, whereas those ranging from “neighbor,” “stranger,” and “enemy” imply that North Korea is a separate entity from South Korea. Since 2005, there has been a continuous decline in the South Koreans’ recognition of North Korea as “one of us” and “brother.” For instance, the number of people who answered “one of us” has declined by more than half from 30.5% in 2005 to 13.9% in 2020. In contrast, people who answered “stranger” or “enemy” have increased significantly from 2005 to 2020 by 8.6 percentage points and 11.1 percentage points respectively. The 2020 survey also saw the largest percentage of South Koreans recognizing North Korea as a “neighbor” for the first time since 2005 with 21.8% (Figure 2). As such, North Korea is being increasingly considered as a separate nation, as are other surrounding nations including China and Japan. The perception of North Korea as a different entity is likely to increase with time. As shown in Figure 3, 24.4% of those in their 20s consider North Korea as a “stranger.” This is nearly 10 percentage points higher than the responses for “one of us” (14%) and “brother” (15.3%). Furthermore, even those in their 40s and 50s are more likely to consider North Korea as a “neighbor” (26.3%) rather than as a “brother” (22.7%).   Unification: More Costly and Alien for South Korea Cautious and cost-conscious views on unification The public perception of North Korea as a separate entity is also linked to the domestic perspective of unification of the Korean Peninsula. An increasing number of South Koreans feel that unification is no longer an urgent issue, and even unnecessary for the future of peninsular affairs. For instance, as sown in Figure 4, the proportion of responses to “Unification is very much needed” fell by half from 2005 to 2020 (from 17.4% in 2005 to 8.9% in 2020), while that for the “There is no need to rush unification” option rose by 12.1 percentage points (from 19.6% to 31.7%). An increasing number of respondents also selected the “There is no need for unification” option compared to 2005 (from 7.9% in 2005 to 20.2% in 2020).     In addition to the continuous decline in the number of South Koreans who feel that unification is necessary, there has also been a transition in the perceived reasons why unification is necessary for South Korea. In 2015, the primary reason for unification was due to the shared ethnic and cultural background between the two Koreas. Responses to the option stating “South Korea and North Korea are one heritage” was at 37.2% and those in support for the “Reunion of separated families” was also at 16.7%. However, the results have taken on a more economic turn in the 2020 survey results. As Figure 5 indicates, the percentage of those who answered “(Unification) can accelerate economic growth” marked its highest at 41.1%, while that for the “South and North are one heritage” declined by 7.7 percentage points since 2015 (from 37.2% in 2015 to 29.5% in 2020). Furthermore, the proportion of responses supporting the “Reunion of separated families” also notably declined by 12.8 percentage points (from 16.7% in 2015 to 3.9% in 2020), while that for “[Unification] decreases the cost coming from division” increased by 2 percentage points (from 9.8% in 2015 to 11.8% in 2020). This phenomenon implies that South Koreans are increasingly placing importance on the economic benefits of unification rather than its value as an integration of heritage or lost kin.     Similarly, less South Koreans are willing to pay for the costs associated with unification. For instance, more than half of the respondents answered that they will not pay at all (53%), followed by those who selected the “less than 50,000 KRW per year” option (21.7%). In addition, those who prefer that the level economic aid to North Korea remain at its status quo was at 56.4% in 2015 and 46.5% in 2020. Only 4.9% believed that South Korea needs to further expand aid to North Korea, marking the lowest percentage since 2005. On the other hand, 17.2% of the respondents selected “We must not provide any economic assistance [to North Korea]” in 2020 marking its peak since 2005.   Two state solutions preferred as a way of unification South Koreans’ preferred unification method has also changed since the previous Korean Identity survey in 2015. In 2015, more than half of the respondents (52.9%) answered that unification should be achieved under the South Korean system, while the two-state solution was the second preferred method (33%). However, in 2020, “Unification with continued existence of the two systems” (44.9%) reclaimed its place as South Koreans’ most preferred way for unification. The heightened preference toward a two-state system also relates to how more South Koreans view North Korea as a separate entity and “neighbor” rather than “one of us”; an increased number of South Koreans desire to maintain two individual systems of government rather than implement an integrated system of government even if the Korean Peninsula is unified.       The United States as the Most Helpful Country for the Future of the Korean Peninsula In the case that the two Koreas are unable to resolve existing conflicts by themselves, which country would be of most assistance for establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula? Results from the preceding three Korean Identity surveys from 2010, 2015 and 2020 imply that the United States is the most helpful nation for the future of the Korean Peninsula. As shown in Figure 7, South Koreans prefer United States as the desired country of assistance amongst the U.S., China, Japan and Russia. While support for the U.S. fell by 8.7 percentage points throughout the past five years (from 34.8% in 2015 to 34.8% in 2020), the U.S. has been the only country with a continued two-digit percentage of support. On the other hand, support for China, South Koreans’ second choice, has fallen by nearly a half (from 11.8% in 2015 to 6.3% in 2020). Support for the U.S. is also ten times higher than those for Japan (3.1%) and Russia (3.2%). Overall, the U.S. remains as the most preferred country by South Koreans for helping the unification of the two Koreas.   The recent state of affairs also highlight the importance of the U.S. in unification and Korean Peninsula issues. The two Koreas and the United States have held multiple talks and summits, with the most recent one being held at the demilitarized zone (DMZ) on June 30, 2019. In these summits with North Korea, the U.S. continuously acted as a mediator, and its significance is displayed again in Moon’s speech at the EU virtual summit in June 30. At the EU virtual summit, President Moon mentioned that the South Korean government plans on making thorough efforts to allow North Korea and the U.S. to reinitiate dialogues before the U.S. presidential election in November 2020. Moon’s words, combined with the recent flow of political events, show that the role of the U.S. is becoming more important for the reconciliation between the two Koreas.               Conclusion Considering the results of the 2020 Korean Identity survey, we can see that ethnicity is losing its value as a reason for unification between South Korea and North Korea. This tendency is associated with the rising nationalistic sentiments in South Korea in terms of both politics and the economy. More South Koreans view North Korea as a separate entity—as a neighbor—rather than as a country of. This increasingly nationalistic view is especially visible as the younger generation grows increasingly accustomed to the modernized and affluent South Korea and those in the older generations with first-hand ties to the war and division of the Korean Peninsula gradually decrease in number. The increased economic approach to North Korea and unification implicates that any unification policy needs to emphasize its benefits than costs considering the perception of South Korean citizens. Proposing and pursuing unification policy that has been conducted in the past, without considering the social perception changes, will be difficult to be successful. It is important to consider various conditions when imposing the unification policy. In addition, the positive view of the U.S. as a supporter in unifying two Koreas reveals that the U.S. is has an important role in maintaining peace preceding unification efforts. Although Korea shows its tendency to be independent, the result implies that the role of the U.S. cannot be disregarded. ■     ■ Taehee Whang is a Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Yonsei University. His recent works are ""Economic Sanctions and Government Spending Adjustments: The Case of Disaster Preparedness" (BJPS 2019, co-authored), "Do sanctions spell disaster? Economic sanctions, political institutions, and technological safety" (EJIR 2019, co-authored), "Talking to Whom? Changing Audiences of North Korean Nuclear Tests: Supervised Machine-Learning Analysis of the KCNA" (SSQ 2017, co-authored), "Detecting audience costs in international disputes" (IO 2015, co-authored).    ■ Jinkyung Baek is a research associate and project manager at the East Asia Institute.  Her recent publications include “North Korea’s Biological and Chemical Weapons and the Path to Denuclearization” (Global NK Commentary, 2019), “The Drive for North Korea Policy to Realize Peace and Prosperity on the Korean Peninsula” (Global NK Commentary, 2019) and “Present and Future of the Four-Point Strategy toward North Korea” (Global NK Commentary, 2020).   ■ Typeset by Sea Young Kim, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208)  |  sykim@eai.or.kr     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.    

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Note In 2005, the East Asia Institute (EAI) initiated the Korean Identity public opinion survey aimed at identifying the shifting values and identity of South Koreans. Since then, the survey has been conducted once every five years to analyze long-term trends of how South Korean people perceive themselves and others. The fourth Korean Identity survey, which was conducted from May 6 to 27, 2020, covers South Korean views of history, social participation, social conflicts and foreign affairs. This issue briefing series provides a first-hand analysis of the results on the South Korean perception of foreign affairs, which display rising South Korean hostility toward surrounding nations, narrowing sense of national identity, and continued support for the U.S. role on the Korean Peninsula and the wider region. The first issue briefing of four deals with South Korean views on outbound and inbound globalization and threats to national interest.   [Issue Briefing Series] "Rising Hostility, Narrowing Identity and Supporting the U.S. Role" South Korean Perception of Foreign Affairs: Rising Hostility, Narrowing Identity and Supporting the U.S. Role (Sook Jong Lee, Sea Young Kim)   South Korean Perception of North Korea and Unification: The Future of the Korean Peninsula, Neighbor rather than Brother (Taehee Whang, Jinkyung Baek) [Click for More Information]   South Korean Perception of the United States and China: United States, a More Favorable Partner than China (Sea Young Kim, Sook Jong Lee) [Click for More Information]   South Korea’s Hostile Views toward Japan amid Aggravating Bilateral Relations (Seunghee Oh) [Click for More Information]     Robust Support for Economic Globalization but Dampened Support for Aid and Migration South Koreans continue to express wide support for and embrace the adoption of free trade agreements with other nations (80.7% in 2020 and 82.6% in 2015). This provides a glimpse into how South Koreans view globalization as a tool for securing export markets. At the same time, however, their support for the usage of domestic products has also grown over the past five years. In 2015, 53.1% of the respondents had agreed that the use of domestic products is anachronistic in the era of globalization. In 2020, more respondents (54.6%) disagreed with the statement than those in support (46.5%). In 2020, a similar reversal has occurred in which more respondents (54.2%) stood against the idea of providing further aid to developing nations than those in support (45.9%). Five years ago, more respondents (50.9%) had supported increased aid towards developing nations than those who had disagreed (49.1%). These trends reflect the current difficulties faced by the domestic economy.     Figure 2: South Korea Should Adopt More Free Trade Agreements (FTA) in the Era of Globalization     In both the 2015 and 2020 surveys, the percentage of respondents against the easing of foreigners’ acquisition of Korean nationality (65.8% in 2015 and 66.4% in 2020) nearly doubled that of those in support (34.2% in 2015 and 33.6% in 2020). This reflects a strong sense of national identity perceived by South Koreans when defining the necessary citizenship qualifications. Although South Koreans support globalization as a tool for expanding trade and exports, they remain hesitant to accept foreigners as South Korean citizens.     Figure 3: Foreigners should be able to Acquire South Korean Nationality More Easily     Rising Awareness of Pandemic and Environment Risks amid Globalization The drawbacks of globalization have hit South Korea hard especially in times of COVID-19. For instance, 84.5% of the respondents agreed that it is difficult to prevent the spread of harmful diseases. 74.5% of the respondents also argued that globalization has incurred domestic socio-economic inequalities. Furthermore, 69.5% of the respondents stated that large foreign corporations are damaging to the domestic economy, demonstrating a 5.7% increase since 2015 (63.8%).   Figure 4: Due to Globalization, It Has Become More Difficult to Prevent the Spread of Harmful Diseases     Figure 5: Due to Globalization, Domestic Socio-Economic Inequalities Have Increased in South Korea       Figure 6: Large Foreign Corporations Are Increasingly Damaging the South Korean Domestic Economy     Strong Trust in International Organizations and Rules South Koreans also show continued support for international organizations. For example, in both the 2015 and 2020 surveys, nearly 60% of the respondents (59.1% in 2015 and 58.5% in 2020) stated that the South Korean government should heed to the decisions made by international organizations even if the South Korean government may hold different views on shared issues. Considering how many South Koreans still perceive that the nation is not being adequately treated on the international stage (65.1% in 2015 and 57.9% in 2020), such results infer that South Koreans maintain a position of acceptance when it comes to decisions made by international organizations.   Figure 7: South Korea Should Heed to Decisions Made by Intl Organizations despite Differences in Opinion       Strengthened Nationalism: Dokdo, Strong Military and Nuclear Armament The survey also sheds light onto the competitive dynamics between globalization and South Korean nationalism. For instance, there is an overwhelming and continued support for the statement that South Korea should protect its territory of Dokdo no matter the cost (87% in 2010, 93.9% in 2015, and 90% in 2020). In addition, more South Koreans believe that the nation needs a stronger military to survive in the international society (70.7% in 2010, 85.2% in 2015, and 82.2% in 2020). A generally positive trend can also be seen for the question asking whether South Korea should possess its own nuclear weapons (66.5% in 2005, 68% in 2010, 71% in 2015, and 61.8% in 2020). However, as discussed in the previous section, South Koreans’ strong sense of nationalism does not necessarily lead to distrust in international organizations. In addition, diverging South Korean attitudes and perceptions towards globalization cannot be explained solely by differentiating pro-nationalistic and pro-globalization sentiments. Rather, nationalism and globalization are interlinked as nationalistic sentiments help to heighten South Korea’s national prestige and international standing.         Figure 8: South Korea Should Protect the Dokdo Territory No Matter the Cost     Figure 9: South Korea Needs a Stronger Military to Survive in the International Society     Figure 10: South Korea Needs Its Own Nuclear Weapons   Threats to National Interest for the Next 10 Years Pandemic as the Number One Threat For the questions addressing the risk factors for South Korea’s national interests in the next decade, respondents had the options of labelling them as either “very threatening,” “somewhat threatening,” and “not a threat at all.” The top three national threats according to the 2020 survey’s “very threatening” responses were the following: 1) infectious diseases (66.2%), 2) North Korea’s nuclear weapons (55.5%), and 3) environmental crises such as global warming (55.2%). These were then followed by international terrorism (46.4%), China’s rise as a great power (41.7%), energy supply and distribution (41.6%), disasters including nuclear disasters (41.6%), unemployment crisis due to the use of artificial intelligence (AI) (40.1%). With the COVID-19 pandemic, infectious diseases surpassed North Korea’s nuclear weapons as the first-rated threat for the first time in 2020. Specific survey findings are addressed categorically below.   Continuous Perceptions of Threats from North Korea South Koreans continue to identify North Korea’s nuclear arsenal as the top-rated threat, as with instabilities and tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Those who saw North Korea’s nuclear weapons as a threat increased by 0.8 percentage points overall, from 94.5% in 2015 to 95.3% in 2020. What is noteworthy is the 14.3 percentage point upsurge in the number of respondents who saw it as “very threatening” from 2010 to 2015 (46.3% in 2010 and 60.6% in 2015). Likewise, more respondents identified tensions and instabilities on the Korean Peninsula as a threat compared to 2015 (93.3% in 2015 and 94.9% in 2020). [For more information, see the second issue briefing of the series: “South Korean Perception of North Korea and Unification: The Future of the Korean Peninsula, Neighbor rather than Brother”]   China’s Rise and Intensifying U.S.-China Hegemonic Competition: According to the three surveys conducted in 2010, 2015 and 2020, more than 90% of South Koreans believe that China's rise is a national threat (92.6% in 2010, 95.1% in 2015, and 94.7% in 2020). The percentage of respondents who defined it as “very threatening” also further increased by 2.7 percentage points since 2015 (from 39% in 2015 to 41.7% in 2020). With regards to U.S.-China hegemonic competition, threat perception increased by 5.3 percentage points (89.4% in 2015 and 94.7% in 2020). Those who defined it as “very threatening” rose by 10.5 percentage points since 2015 (24.4% in 2015 and 34.9% in 2020). 95.3% of the respondents also identified the U.S. “America First” policy as a threat with 31.4% seeing it as “very threatening.” Despite these developments, however, support for the ROK-U.S. alliance remains strong. [For more information, see the third issue briefing of the series: “South Korean Perception of the United States and China: United States, a More Favorable Partner than China”]   Further Parting Away from Japan South Koreans continue to identify Japan’s militarization and bilateral conflicts with Japan as threats to national interests. However, such threats rank below China’s rise as a great power and the U.S.-China rivalry. While bilateral tensions have risen with Japan, little change has been made in the responses from the 2015 and 2020 surveys. For instance, from 2010 to 2015, there was an overall 15.9 percentage point increase in the number of respondents who saw Japan’s militarization as a threat (74.6% in 2010 and 90.5% in 2015), with a 12.6% increase in those who defined it as “very threatening” (19.0% in 2010 and 31.6% in 2015). However, the figures in 2015 have been overall maintained as 89.7% saw it as a threat in 2020, with 31% opting for the “very threatening” option. Furthermore, while 89.5% of the respondents answered that South Korea-Japan tension is a threat, only 25% of the same respondents see it as “very threatening.” This is also not a significant development from the past as 90% of the respondents saw bilateral conflicts as a threat in 2015, with 25.4% selecting the “very threatening” option. [For more information, see the fourth issue briefing of the series: "South Korea’s Hostile Views toward Japan amid Aggravating Bilateral Relations"] ■     ■ Sook Jong Lee is a Senior Fellow and Trustee at the East Asia Institute and served the Institute as President from 2008 to 2018. She is also a professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan University. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed. 2016), Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013 and 2016), Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (eds. 2011).   ■ Sea Young Kim is a research associate and project manager at the East Asia Institute. Her recent publication includes "New North-Southeast Asia Security Links: Defending, Recentring, and Extending Regional Order” (Australian Journal of Politics and History, 2019).   ■ Typeset by Sea Young Kim, Research Associate/Project Manager             For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208)  |  sykim@eai.or.kr     The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.