.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:24px;} Editor's Note On November 13, 2020, the EAI and Brookings institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". In session 2: economy, energy, and environment, David dollar addressed that the US has the tools to restrict exports and impose tariffs on products that have obvious national security implications. We are striving for what Hank Paulson has called, “small yards with high fences.” In other words, define a small number of national security technologies that get serious restrictions, but otherwise allow trade, investment, joint research - all of the foundations of an open innovation ecosystem. The US needs to coordinate with alliance partners like South Korea on the definition of critical technologies and sanctions to protect them.     Quotes from the Paper   The problem The U.S. and South Korea share a set of concerns with China’s trade and investment practices, which in many instances are outside the norms of advanced economies. China likes to think of itself as a developing country, based on its per capita GDP, but it is the second largest economy in the world and the largest trading nation so that the U.S. and its partners like South Korea would like to see it move quickly to advanced country standards. The specific policies in question include extensive non-tariff barriers such as arbitrary and changeable standards; restrictions on foreign investment in some sectors, particularly in services; poor protection of intellectual property rights; forced technology transfer through various coercive means; extensive role in the economy of state-owned enterprises that have favorable access to land and credit; and subsidies to develop specific technologies. The impact of these policies is to distort trade flows from what they would be in a more fully open environment. Bringing China up to advanced country norms would open new trading opportunities and raise American and South Korean incomes.   Specific objectives of the U.S. and South Korea in Dealing with China We would like to see China move as quickly as possible to developed-country norms for trade and investment. Specific features of this could include stronger penalties for IPR violations; redress mechanisms for firms that feel subject to forced technology transfer or other types of coercion; disciplines on state enterprises; and changes in laws and policies to make R&D subsidies WTO compatible.  We will want to see this codified in various ways, and in particular to have provisions similar to KORUS.  An agreement with China could be codified in a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and China, similar to what was envisaged for phase 2 of a trade deal. Ideally, similar provisions will be brought into the free-trade agreement among Korea, China, and Japan. If these different agreements have consistent treatment vis-à-vis key issues, this can be an effective way to discipline Chinese economic behavior. Similarly, if China and the EU successfully conclude a bilateral investment treaty that addresses sensitive issues, that too would be supportive of integrating China into the global economic system. Changes in Chinese policies will have even more force if they are included in larger agreements, and eventually in reformed WTO rules. A Biden administration can be expected to operate in a more multilateral fashion compared to President Trump, and that is likely to be more effective at changing Chinese trade practices.   Recommendations Negotiate away the import tariffs aimed at China in exchange for a phase 2 agreement that addresses the main structural concerns. The U.S. will have to be realistic; China is not going to completely change overnight and the U.S does not have that much leverage. But there are reformers in China who would like to make significant changes to non-tariff barriers, investment restrictions, IPR protection, state enterprises, and subsidies because these changes are needed for China to sustain reasonable growth. So, significant advance is possible.      Author’s Biography ■ David Dollar is a senior fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution and host of the Brookings trade podcast, Dollar&Sense. He is a leading expert on China's economy and U.S.-China economic relations. From 2009 to 2013, he was the U.S. Treasury’s economic and financial emissary to China, based in Beijing, facilitating the macroeconomic and financial policy dialogue between the United States and China. Prior to joining Treasury, Dollar worked 20 years for the World Bank, serving as country director for China and Mongolia, based in Beijing (2004-2009). His other World Bank assignments focused on Asian economies, including South Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Bangladesh, and India. Dollar also worked in the World Bank’s research department. His publications focus on economic reform in China, globalization, and economic growth. He also taught economics at University of California Los Angeles, during which time he spent a semester in Beijing at the Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1986. He has a doctorate in economics from New York University and a bachelor's in Chinese history and language from Dartmouth College.  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:24px;} Editor's Note On November 13, 2020, the EAI and Brookings institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". In session 2: economy, energy, and environment, Yul Sohn addressed that in contrast to the Unites States that can leverage its power to increase its strategic and economic counterbalance to China, South Korea is forced to play a more complex game. Given its deep yet asymmetric economic interdependence with China as well as demands for Chinese cooperation with regard to North Korean threats, South Korea needs to accommodate China while at the same time courting US engagement both economically and militarily. In that sense, two countries need strategic consultation and coordination over complex interdependence in the following three areas. 1) A recent development in weaponized trade and interdependence invoking national security boils down to the question of how we can restrain the abuse of a broader definition of security, namely over-securitization, and strike a right balance of national security and economic interdependence. South Korea underwent THAAD retaliation by China, US countervailing duties on steel and aluminum under Section 232, and Japan’s tightening of export controls over chemical components crucial to South Korea’s semiconductor industry. 2) Second question comes down to the China challenge, where the world is struggling to seek a collective approach against China’s disruptive mercantilist behaviors.  3) Last area of concern is the compelling need for a rules-based economic order in the region, which would restrain Chinese predation, America’s protectionism, increase middle power space, and sustain liberal norms.     Quotes from the Paper   Introduction                   For most of the period since the signing of the ROK-US alliance treaty in 1953, relations between South Korea and the United States have been characterized by bilateralism: primarily dyadic links have been developed in economic as well as political- security relationships. In the area of international trade and investment, the KOR-US FTA is a culmination point of bilateralism: by far, the largest bilateral FTA for each other.   Rising Tide of Aggressive Unilateralism By the late-2010s, great powers tended to treat interdependence as a means that would pursue exclusive economic and strategic interests. They put a greater focus on relative economic gains and increased concern over security risks posed by interdependence while ostensibly upholding the tenets of the liberal international order. This trend posed a considerable dilemma for South Korea, which depends on military alliance with the US but economically with China. If economics and security are decoupled, South Korea will find no difficulty. The reality is the opposite: that South Korea has suffered three major trade shocks as economics and security were coupled negatively. All three came as a form of trade retaliations that invoked national security issue.   Beyond Bilateralism Throughout the current co-project, there is a set of agreements (among the EAI scholars) including that either US nor China will win primacy in Asia; there is certainly no choice to thwart China rising; and these dichotomies are destructive for South Korea; and the decay of the US-led rules based order is undesirable. South Korea needs to restore an open, rules-based order that binds great powers to the rules.     Author’s Biography ■ Yul Sohn is the president of EAI and a professor at Yonsei University’s Graduate School of International Studies. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago. He previously served as the dean of Yonsei University GSIS, president of the Korean Association of International Studies, and president of the Korean Studies of Contemporary Japan. His research focuses on the Japanese and international political economy, East Asian regionalism, and public diplomacy. His recent publications include Japan and Asia's Contested Order (2018, with T.J. Pempel), and Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia (2016, with Jan Melissen).  

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note On November 13, 2020, the EAI and Brookings institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". In session 1: politics and security, Jonathan D. Pollack addressed that, five American presidents have tried to slow down or prevent outright North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons capability, using the full range of political, economic and diplomatic tools and strategies. Fully realized operational nuclear weapons capability by North Korea would be a strategic disaster for China and for the United States. Since it can negatively affect both countries, North Korea’s nuclear weapons can be the task that US and China can cooperate on. To this end, the US and China need to realize through dialogues that North Korea’s nuclear weapon is a common security concern for both countries. Since it is impossible to separate North Korea from China in geopolitical, economic and historical aspects, it is necessary for the US to try to have candid talks with China on the North Korea issue, even though it is likely to be difficult.     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   Joe Biden’s election as America’s 46th President and the defeat of Donald Trump necessitate a care-ful appraisal of U.S. Korea policy, and of U.S. strategy and policy in Northeast Asia as a whole. These require an evaluation of the legacy of the Trump Administration; and consideration of three issues that will shape U.S. policy in the Biden Administration: (1) reaffirming and rebuilding Ameri-ca’s alliance relationships; (2) China’s political, economic, and strategic directions and how U.S. pol-icy could influence Beijing’s policy choices; and (3) North Korea’s political, economic, and strategic orientation, and how the actions of the U.S. and other powers could influence the DPRK’s calcula-tions and future behavior. None of these issues are for the United States alone to decide. At the same time, no incoming administration starts with a blank slate. A single short essay cannot address these issues in detail, but it can identify the issues that will most likely shape U.S. policy choices.   What the Trump Administration Leaves Behind Donald Trump will leave office as the most disruptive president in the history of U.S. foreign policy.  (Time does not allow for a comparable accounting of the effects of his presidency on America’s do-mestic politics and institutional integrity.) Trump’s disdain for alliances; his contempt for multilater-alism and withdrawal from negotiated international agreements; his adherence to stark, highly pred-atory views of international politics; his overt preference for authoritarian, anti-democratic leaders; his insistence on “America first” and mercantilist policies; and his dismissiveness of scientific exper-tise and economic logic have been evident from the very outset of his administration. With few ex-ceptions, America’s alliance relationships and international partnerships have been badly undermined, with the U.S. president no longer willing to uphold principles and policies integral to the interna-tional order developed since the end of World War II.   The Road Ahead The upheaval in U.S. policy making over the past four years requires review of how America’s East Asian allies and partners perceive the U.S. in the aftermath of the Trump Administration. Will the damage to the U.S. “brand name” prove lasting, or is America’s reputation recoverable under a very different president? What remedial actions must be taken to prevent further damage to America’s international reputation? Or is the centrality of the United States to international peace and security simply too great for any regional actors to challenge the U.S. role? Is there an alternative strategic rationale to sustain America’s alliances that could garner ample domestic support in the U.S. and among its major security partners, including the ROK?   The China Question The Biden Administration will also need to confront lasting challenges in relation to China. The de-terioration in U.S.-China relations under the Trump Administration has been profound, though it al-so reflects an increasing shift in U.S. thinking about China in both political parties and in U.S. public opinion. The question is not whether there will be “strategic competition” between Washington and Beijing, but what kind of competition. The core questions concern the boundaries of U.S.-China ri-valry; whether there are viable means to manage competition; the areas where cooperation remains essential; and the potential risks if both powers prove incapable of controlling their more intensely competitive instincts and practices. Korea will be at or near the center of many of these issues.   North Korea: The Strategic Outlier  Joe Biden will be the sixth American president seeking to slow or inhibit North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. These have entailed use of the full range of political, economic, security, and dip-lomatic tools, and none of have achieved lasting success. As a consequence, the DPRK is now much closer to a fully realized nuclear weapons capability that can threaten all the states of Northeast Asia and (prospectively) the U.S. mainland. Pyongyang insists that it is not prepared to negotiate any lim-its on its nuclear weapons inventory, let alone dismantle what it already possesses. It seeks full ac-ceptance as the world’s ninth nuclear-armed state. In its view, nuclear diplomacy can only be for purposes of arms control, not disarmament. Kim Jong-un also claims that (because North Korea now possesses the means of nuclear retaliation) it can deter any American attack. But its continued de-velopment efforts and the possibility of testing new, as yet untested systems indicates that it has yet to achieve what it deems necessary for its strategic needs. Moreover, the DPRK remains unwilling to forego continued weapons development in favor of pressing economic and societal needs. At times, Pyongyang insists upon the removal of multilateral sanctions that it claims have had a crip-pling effect on its long-term development.       Author’s Biography Jonathan D. Pollack is a nonresident senior fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center and Cen-ter for East Asia Policy at the Brookings Institution. Between 2012 and 2014, he served as director of the John L. Thornton China Center. Prior to joining Brookings in 2010, he was professor of Asian and Pacific Studies and chairman of the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War Col-lege, Newport, Rhode Island. He previously worked at the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, Cal-ifornia, where he served in various senior research and management positions, including chairman of the political science department, corporate research manager for international policy and senior advi-sor for international policy. His recent publications include Strategic Surprise? U.S.-China Relations in the Early 21st Century, Korea-The East Asian Pivot, Asia Eyes America: Regional Perspective on U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy in the 21st Century. His principal research interests include Chinese na-tional security strategy; U.S.-China relations; U.S. strategy in Asia and the Pacific; Korean politics and foreign policy; Asian international politics; and nuclear weapons and international security. He received his master's and doctorate in political science from the University of Michigan, and was a post-doctoral research fellow at Harvard University.

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note On November 13, 2020, the EAI and Brookings institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". In session 1: politics and security, Sook Jong Lee addressed that, based on the survey result from 2005 to 2020 conducted by the East Asia Institute on Korean Identity, Korean’s support for the Korea-US alliance has been strengthened since the mid-2000s. Over the past 15 years, support for the Korea-US alliance has increased by 17.6 percent, and the support base has been solid regardless of ideology and political orientation. Meanwhile, regarding a survey question on the awareness of threats from other countries, it shows that people are more supportive to US-Korea alliances when they feel the greater threats from North Korea. In addition, regarding a survey question on US-China competition, more than 64 percent responded that South Korea should take a neutral stance amid US-China competition. However, if they had to choose between the US and China, more than twice as many people responded they would choose the US. As a conflict between the US and China intensifies, the awareness on threat has increased, and this suggests that intensifying US-China competition could negatively affect the South Korea-US alliance. Considering the so-called transactional approach that the Trump administration has shown to its allies, the new Biden administration’s stance of respecting the alliance is comforting to Koreans. It is expected to have a positive impact on Korea-US alliance. In addition, as the Korean government strengthens regional and global cooperation in areas such as democracy, health, and climate change, South Korea will be able to strengthen cooperation with the US in the aforementioned areas.     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   Smaller countries tend to seek alliance with a stronger country when their geopolitical environment is unfavorable. South Korea’s alliance with the United States is supported by this geopolitical reason and is also rooted historically. By helping to both liberate South Korea from its 35 year-long Japa-nese colonial rule and defend it against North Korea’s invasion during the Korean War (1950-1953), the U.S. has planted historical legacy of the 1953 mutual security agreement, which continues to this date. However, the transition of South Korea (hereafter, Korea or ROK) from an impoverished na-tion to a developed democracy has made Koreans more conscious of establishing an equal partner-ship with their security patron. This is considered a natural development provided Korea’s progress and democratization.   Autonomy vs. Alliance Snyder (2018) identifies geopolitical environment, rising national capacity, and domestic politics as three major factors that affect Korea’s strategic choice. Among the possible four strategies based on the autonomy vs. alliance axis and the peninsular focused parochialism vs. internationalism axis, he argues that the Korean strategy has evolved from parochial alliance dependency to alliance enabled internationalism. Since Korea is relatively weak compared to surrounding nations including China, Japan, and Russia, it faces limitations in its strategic choice. As such, it is difficult for Korea to withdraw from its alliance with the U.S. and its domestic politics plays less of a determining factor in its strategic choice when compared to other nations.  This is a valid point considering how the Korean government and political parties remain committed to the alliance regardless of their ideo-logical preferences. In terms of public opinion, however, there has been a notable change. Foreign policies tend to be more determined by technocrats and experts compared to other internally orient-ed economic and social policies. Nevertheless, they also lie increasingly under the scrutiny of media and advocacy citizen groups. How foreign policy issues are framed in the context of domestic poli-tics is important in determining the level of public support. Accordingly, managing public opinion is important in sustaining public support for the alliance.   Factors Affecting the ROK-US Alliance Support This section compares alliance support across groups that are divided by different features and views. Nine variables are grouped into five categories in addition to two demographic variables. Survey respondents are divided into three groups. The first group consists of people who favor au-tonomous diplomacy, who selected a score from the 0 to 3 spectrum. The second group is composed of people with a neutral view, who selected from the 4 to 6 spectrum. The third group consists of those in support of the alliance support who selected from the 7 to 10 spectrum. The percentage proportions of these three groups of favoring autonomy, neutrality, and alliance are 19.4%, 47.4%, and 33.3% respectively, of the total number of 1,003 respondents.   Correlation Analysis This section examines the correlation among considered variables. The purpose of correlation analy-sis is to examine the direction and degree of interaction among all variables. Several variables show high degrees of correlation with each other. For instance, the level of support for the alliance posi-tively correlates with the following variables: 1) threat perception of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, 2) favorability of the U.S. over China within the U.S.-China hegemonic competition, 3) favorable sentiment towards the U.S., and 4) weaker commitment to democracy.   Hierarchical Regression Analysis  This section examines the level of influence amongst different variables. Model 1 examines three demographical variables: greater age and lower educational levels were seen to increase support for the ROK-U.S. alliance. Model 2 then takes into account all of the discussed variables in a cross ta-ble to perform simple correlation analyses. Among the threat perceptions, North Korea’s nuclear threat and the U.S.-China competition threat remain most significant in determining the different attitudes within the autonomy-alliance spectrum. The rise of China threat loses its statistical signifi-cance when correlated with alliance attitude in this hierarchical regression analysis. As seen in the simple correlation analysis, threat perception of North Korea’s nuclear program is positively correlat-ed with the level of support of the alliance. It is also notable that the threat perception coming from the U.S.-China competition is significantly significant in determining the alliance attitude in this model unlike the previous simple correlation analysis. In particular, those who see the hegemonic competition between the U.S. and China as a threat to Korea’s national interest are less supportive of the alliance with the U.S. This finding suggests that the Korean public is likely to see the burden of alliance ties with the U.S. as being increasingly costly along with rising bilateral competition be-tween two great powers. The fear of entanglement with regards to the U.S.-led conflict will also increase although the majority still favors the U.S. as a more dependable security guarantor. It is no-table that the desirable position in the U.S.-China competition loses its direct influence upon the al-liance attitude although there was a statistically significant correlation between two variables in the previous model. On the other hand, favorability remains strong in influencing people’s support for the ROK-U.S. In addition, the relationship between higher commitment to democracy and lower level of support for the alliance remains statistically significant in this model.   Conclusion This paper aimed to measure the potential factors that can influence Koreans’ view on the ROK-U.S. alliance. The level of support for the alliance is measured according to a numerical spectrum ranging from 0 (autonomy) to 10 (alliance). Three statistical methods were employed to identify significant relations between these factors and the support towards the alliance. First, a cross-table analysis was conducted to compare group differences on alliance views. Second, a correlation analysis was con-ducted to check the degree of proximity between the different factors and whether they exerted a positive or negative influence upon alliance perception. Third, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to measure the weight of influence of each factor in comparison with others.     Author’s Biography Sook Jong Lee is a Professor of Public Administration at Sungkyunkwan University and Senior Fellow of the East Asia Institute. She has been directing the Asian Democracy Research Network since its formation in 2015, leading a network of about nineteen research organizations across Asia to promote democracy with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Ko-rea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed. 2016), and Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013 and 2016).

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note On November 13, 2020, the EAI and Brookings institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". In session 1: politics and security, Lindsey W. Ford addressed that while extensive cooperation has been pursued in the Indo-Pacific region, led by QUAD countries, South Korea has not actively participated in security cooperation at the regional level for a long time, only focusing on Korean Peninsula issues. It is natural for South Korea to prioritize its domestic security tasks including the North Korean nuclear threat, but considering South Korea’s status at the regional and global levels, as well as its expanding economic cooperation, its contribution to regional security cooperation is still insignificant. South Korea can more actively present a vision on regional peace and security based on Moon Jae-in government’s New Southern Policy; and may contribute more tosecurity cooperation within the Indo-Pacific region. Rather than focusing on South Korea’s official participation in QUAD, the focus should be on enhancing practical defense cooperation between South Korea and the members of QUAD. South Korea can contribute to the expansion of the regional security cooperation network by promoting bilateral and multilateral cooperation with QUAD members. As an influential middle power, South Korea has many areas to contribute to regional security cooperation. In particular, it has proposed to strengthen future cooperation with Australia and India in areas such as maritime, space, and defense security at the bilateral level.     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the “Quad”) has emerged as one of the highest-profile initia-tives associated with the Trump administration’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific" concept. Renewed attention to the Quad reflects long-standing U.S. efforts to shift from a bilateral hub-and-spoke model of Asian security toward a networked approach that encourages new “multiparty arrange-ment(s)” with “our strongest, most important allies”.  Yet the Republic of Korea (“South Korea”), one of the region’s leading middle powers and a close U.S. ally, is notably absent from this forum.     South Korea, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and the Quad The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue first met in 2007, emerging from a more informal Australia-India-Japan-U.S. core group that was established to coordinate responses to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami.  Although the group failed to gain traction in 2007, partially due to China’s strong objec-tions, it was revived after a decade-long hiatus in November 2017.  While media reports frequently depict the dialogue as an anti-China containment mechanism or the precursor to a more formal “Asian NATO”, participating nations themselves have pushed back against these characterizations, stressing the positive sum ambitions of the dialogue.  Moreover, official statements from recent dis-cussions consistently emphasize the non-exclusive nature of the grouping, and its role as just one among many elements of a broader, ASEAN-centric security architecture.   Looking Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities Two lessons are apparent in reviewing South Korea’s defense ties with Australia and India over the past decade. First, there are common linkages across South Korea’s defense ties with Quad coun-tries that could provide a solid foundation for multilateral engagement. As per Figure 1 (below), South Korea engages in a high-level 2+2 dialogue, maritime exercises, and defense technology co-operation with Australia, India, and the United States, while both India and the United States have concluded logistics agreements with South Korea. South Korea also has some variation on a classi-fied information sharing agreement with all four countries.    Conclusion As the Moon administration continues to develop its New Southern Policy, defense cooperation should be an integral piece of its partnership-building activities with other Asian partners. Although South Korea enjoys a strong alliance with the United States, its influence as a leading Asian middle power would be enhanced by developing stronger security partnerships with other like-minded In-do-Pacific partners. Current debates around Korean participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dia-logue risk undermining this interest, by implicitly placing form over function and creating an overly narrow focus on a single dialogue mechanism. The more important goal for both Seoul and allied capitals should be to enhance South Korea’s contributions to regional security through its participa-tion in regional defense networks. Instead of looking to the Quad to achieve this goal, policymakers should instead focus on strengthening bilateral and trilateral defense ties between South Korea and Quad countries. This initiative would not only enhance South Korea’s influence beyond Northeast Asia, it would also provide a new area of cooperation for the US-Korea alliance, making it more rel-evant to the needs of the broader Indo-Pacific region.     The Prospect of North Korea’s denuclearization under the Biden administration and South Korea’s tasks Given these backdrop, North Korea policy of the next US Biden administration is likely to be very critical for the future negotiation for denuclearization of the North. Biden’s approach, so far, can be summarized as follows: first, principled pragmatism which will be the guiding line for bottom-up approach with North Korea will prevail; second, cooperation with South Korea and other East Asian allies will be essential in accomplishing denuclearization of North Korea; third, to prevent further development of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities is important with a view to the ultimate purpose of complete denuclearization; and fourth, human rights in North Korea will be an essential concern for the Biden administration.       Author’s Biography Lindsey W. Ford is a David M. Rubenstein Fellow in the Foreign Policy program. She is also an adjunct lecturer at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. Her research focuses on U.S. defense strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, including U.S. security allianc-es, military posture, and regional security architecture. Ford is a frequent commentator on Asian se-curity and defense issues and her analysis has been featured by outlets including the New York Times, the Wall St. Journal, the Financial Times, Politico, Foreign Policy, the Straits Times, CNN, MSNBC, and Bloomberg. She graduated with a master’s in public affairs and Asian studies from the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas-Austin, and a bachelor’s in vocal performance from Samford University. director for political-security affairs at the Asia So-ciety Policy Institute (ASPI). From 2009-15, She served in a variety of roles within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. She also served as the senior adviser to the assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affair. She was also a leading architect of the Asia rebalance strategy work for the Department of Defense’s 2012 “Defense Strategic Guidance Review” and oversaw the development of the Department’s first “Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy” in 2015.  

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note On November 13, 2020, the EAI and Brookings institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". In session 1: politics and security, Chaesung Chun and Young-Sun Ha addressed that as the US-China strategic competition gradually shifts toward a hegemonic challenge, South Korea’s North Korea strategies are faced with increasing difficulties. The Biden administration's foreign policy will focus on strengthening diplomacy based on legitimacy and norms. There is no doubt that South Korea’s strategic purpose is in line with the US. However, South Korea still depends on China, and there is a pending issue of North Korea. Therefore, this must be considered when planning the ways to maintain the alliance-based network between the US and South Korea. For South Korea, it is necessary to strengthen the security system, among regional alliances, but the key is how to collectively respond to China’s retaliation and minimize damage in the future, as the country has already experienced from THAAD issue. Taking this situation into account, the carefully designed package to continue regional alliance network in Asia and to strategically response to the rise of China.  This includes flexible security network, a solid collective mechanism to respond to China’s potential retaliatory measures, and China’s coercion, and well devised division of labor in jointly responding and cooperating with Asian allies.     Quotes from the Paper US-China Strategic Rivalry and the US strategy                   These days China, in US strategic thinking, is perceived as pursuing hegemonic power not only in Asia, but also globally. Anti-Chinese sentiment following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has fueled this opinion. China’s relatively quick economic recovery adds to the concern over the rise of China. Chinese intrusions into major disputed territories including the South China Sea are in-creasing, and China continues to expand its global presence by supplying global public goods in many areas especially for global health. Challenges posed by China today make the US more nerv-ous than during the 2008 Financial Crisis. During the campaign years for the presidential election, the US China policy has been heavily politicized and is emerging as an important electoral agenda with other overwhelming domestic political issues.   South Korea’s position and the future of cooperation with the United States As South Korea’s critical interests lie in inter-Korean reconciliation and peace with complete denu-clearization of North Korea and South Korea’s economic development influenced by close interde-pendence with China, the US-China rivalry puts South Korea in a very difficult position.   North Korea’s Strategy after the Hanoi summit 2019 After the Honoi no deal in February, 2019, North Korea has searched for a new strategy to further its position both domestically and in dealing with the United States and south Korea. North Korea’s speeches and actions since the breakdown of the February 2019 Hanoi Summit should be interpret-ed from a perspective that encompasses North Korea's survival strategy based on its three revolu-tionary capabilities. Chairman Kim Jong-Un, at the First session of the Fourteenth Supreme People’s Assembly, gave a policy speech under the title of “On Socialist Construction and the Internal and External Policies of the Government of the Republic at the Present Stage,” which adhered to the basic principles of the three revolutionary capabilities.   North Korea in 2020, and the future task of South Korea and the United States North Korea’s effort to break through the impasse in 2019 is facing an even more difficult phase with the global spread of COVID-19 in 2020. It faces practical limitations in increasing its domestic and international capabilities. The improvement in inter-Korean relations over the past two years was expected to contribute to the strengthening of its domestic and international capabilities but has failed to yield any significant developments. North Korea even blew up the Inter-Korean Liason Office, which was built under the auspices of the Panmunjom Declaration of April 27, 2018.   The Prospect of North Korea’s denuclearization under the Biden administration and South Korea’s tasks Given these backdrop, North Korea policy of the next US Biden administration is likely to be very critical for the future negotiation for denuclearization of the North. Biden’s approach, so far, can be summarized as follows: first, principled pragmatism which will be the guiding line for bottom-up approach with North Korea will prevail; second, cooperation with South Korea and other East Asian allies will be essential in accomplishing denuclearization of North Korea; third, to prevent further development of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities is important with a view to the ultimate purpose of complete denuclearization; and fourth, human rights in North Korea will be an essential concern for the Biden administration.       Author’s Biography Young-Sun Ha is chairman of the board of trustees of the East Asia Institute. He is also a profes-sor emeritus at Seoul National University’s department of political science and international relations. Ha currently serves as a member of the senior advisory group for the Inter-Korean Summit Talks Preparation Committee. He also served as a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Group, co-chairman of Korea-Japan Joint Research Project for New Era, president of the Korea Peace Studies Association, and research fellow at Princeton University’s Center for International Studies and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. His recent books and edited vol-umes include A New Perspective on the Diplomatic History of Korea, World Politics of Love: War and Peace, U.S.-China Competition in the Architecture of a Regional Order in the Asia-Pacific; Korean Peninsula Among Big Powers: 1972 vs. 2014, Complex World Politics: Strategies, Principles, and a New Order, The Future of North Korea 2032: The Strategy of Coevolution for the Advancement, The Emergence of Complex Alliances in the 21st Century, and A New Era of Complex Networks in Korea-Japan Relations. He received his BA and MA from Seoul National University and his PhD from the University of Washington.   Chaesung Chun is the Chair of the National Security Research Center at the East Asia Institute, and a Professor of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. Dr. Chun received his PhD in international relations at Northwestern University in the United States, and serves on the policy advisory committee to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Unification. His main research interests include international political theory, the ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsular affairs. He is the co-author of The Korean War: Threat and Peace, and the author of a number of publications including Are Politics Moral and Internation-al Politics in East Asia: History and Theory.  

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note On November 13, 2020, the EAI and Brookings institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". In session 1: politics and security, Jung H. Pak addressed that the continued US-China rivalry has weakened China’s willingness to cooperate on major security issues including North Korea’s denuclearization, while attempts to expand its influence on the Korean Peninsula and reduce US influence in Northeast Asia have increased. Furthermore, China's influence on the security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula has also been boosted by the enhancement of relations with North Korea in 2018, the convergence of interests with China, North Korea and South Korea, and the Trump administration's precarious approach. In order to coordinate strategic understanding between China and South Korea amid consistent effort in regional and global level on North Korean denuclearization, the author points out that the US should take a multilateral approach instead of unilateralism that has been practiced during the Trump administration without outstanding progress. In order to achieve this plan, the US should consider launching and regularizing the trilateral talks with China and South Korea. The US, South Korea and China need to confirm the goal of North Korea’s denuclearization, and the need to implement strong sanctions to prevent nuclear proliferation. Moreover, these countries need to develop a roadmap for negotiations to provide both carrots and sticks in the North Korea’s verifiable denuclearization efforts. At the same time, they need to study on how economic cooperation can increase human enhance, inflow of information into North Korea and integrate North Korea into the regional economy.     Quotes from the Paper   Introduction                   China is seeking to weave engagement with North and South Korea to try to increase its influence over the Korean Peninsula, including on the North Korean nuclear issue, and weaken the perception of Washington’s relevance in the region as it seeks to establish its regional dominance. Chinese pres-ident Xi Jinping almost certainly sees opportunities to make progress on those goals, given the stalemate in U.S.-North Korea nuclear talks and the significant fissures that have opened in U.S.-South Korea ties under the Trump and Moon administrations.   Warming ties to Pyongyang, after a rough start After seven years of icy ties during which high-level exchanges came to a near standstill, Beijing and Pyongyang have jumpstarted robust diplomacy, trading high-level party and military delega-tions and encouraging the growth of economic cooperation. From 2018-2019, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un met five times, including Xi’s visit to Pyongyang in June 2019, the first time a Chinese head of state visited North Korea since 2005.   Beijing’s motivations Yet Xi’s efforts to grow closer to Kim, despite the latter’s highly provocative actions in late 2017 and disregard for China’s preferences, reveal Beijing’s longstanding preferred approach for dealing with North Korea, one that places a premium on stability, puts off denuclearization to a distant fu-ture—or perhaps even accommodate North Korea’s nuclear weapons status, as former U.S. diplomat Evans Revere has suggested—and stresses economic inducements rather than pressure. Using the momentum of summitry that was unleashed by the unprecedented meetings between President Trump and Kim Jong Un, and the latter’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear and long-range ballistic missile testing, Beijing has sought to amplify its call for reduction of sanctions pressure on Pyong-yang, putting it at odds with U.S. policy.   Beijing’s view of Seoul While Xi has visited Pyongyang in 2019, he has yet to go to Seoul (as of November 2020), suggest-ing that Beijing is placing a higher priority on building ties to Pyongyang and that tension remains after South Korea agreed in 2016 to deploy THAAD, the U.S. missile defense system, in response to North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016. Beijing opposed the THAAD deployment as a threat to China’s security, and in retaliation, implemented an unofficial economic boycott against South Korea, which cost the smaller country $7.5 billion in losses in 2017 alone, compared to Chi-na’s self-inflicted losses of $880 million.   Trying to drive a wedge in the U.S.-South Korea alliance Even as Beijing sought to punish Seoul for its alliance with Washington, Chinese leaders saw mounting signs of deepening U.S.-South Korea cleavages. President Trump has repeatedly criticized the alliance, threatened to end the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, blustered about military action against North Korea, without regard to the potentially devastating impact on South Korea, demand-ed an exorbitant 400% increase in host nation support for U.S. troops stationed on the Peninsula, and hinted at a desire to withdraw U.S. troops.   A wary North and South Korea likely to limit Beijing’s influence  As of late 2020, China’s ties to both Koreas are stable, though tensions exist under the surface. While there appears to be a troubling convergence of interests between Beijing, Pyongyang, and Seoul, mutual suspicion and fundamental differences in national priorities will limit China’s ability to press Pyongyang and Seoul to yield to its preferences.   Implications for the U.S.-South Korea alliance In the near to medium term, Beijing is likely to seek to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula, even if it means putting off the issue of North Korea’s denuclearization to the distant future. To do so, Chinese leaders probably will emphasize the need for “security guarantees,” relaxation of sanc-tions implementation, and discourage U.S. or South Korean actions—such as military drills or criti-cism of the North’s human rights violations—that have the potential to trigger North Korean ire, but which also threaten China’s interests. Moreover, to mollify Kim Jong Un, China since late 2018 has been easing trade restrictions, to the frustration of U.S. and the United Nations officials who have been trying to keep sanctions pressure on North Korea.     Author’s Biography Jung H. Pak is a senior fellow and the SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies at Brookings Institu-tion’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies. She received her doctorate from Columbia University in U.S. history. Her research interests include the national security challenges facing the United States and East Asia, including North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities, the regime’s domestic and foreign policy calculus, inter-nal stability, and inter-Korean ties. She is also focused on developing interdisciplinary forums to bolster regional dialogue on counterterrorism, nonproliferation, cybersecurity, and climate change. Her recent publications in-clude Becoming Kim Jong Un: A Former CIA Officer’s Insights into North Korea’s Enigmatic Young Dictator.

Editor's Note China has overtaken Japan as the world’s second largest economy and has been seeking to reform the global governance system to expand its role and influence to match its growing economic power. In an effort to achieve these goals, China has adopted a global development strategy, known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and also created parallel regional organizations and institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Rumi Aoyama offers a broad picture of such shifts in China’s foreign policy by analyzing changes in perception of the Chinese leadership as well as a wide range of BRI-related activities.     Quotes from the paper  Introduction Over the past few decades, China has experienced remarkable economic growth in a larger effort to transition   into a market economy by pressing forward its reform and opening-up policy. Since the Nixon administration and particularly following China’s opening-up, Western-aligned developed nations such as the United States and Japan have pursued engagement with China. The underlying hope was that China would eventually transform into a democratic state that values freedom and the rule of law in the process of being incorporated into the existing West-led liberal international order. China’s presence on the international stage has dramatically expanded along with its rapid economic growth. The Xi Jinping administration’s motto is “achieving the great revival of the Chinese nation,” and its stated goal is for China to become a “modern socialist superpower” whose political system differs from that of Western-aligned nations. President Xi Jinping has promoted the Belt and Road Initiative as his signature foreign policy initiative, established various international organizations under China’s leadership such as AIIB, and retained a hardline stance on maritime issues. However, the international environment surrounding China continues to change. Within the last few years, several Western-aligned developed nations have begun to reconsider their policies of engagement with China, and the growing consensus in Washington seems to be that the engagement strategy has failed. For instance, the 2013 Foreign Affairs article, “The China Reckoning” by Kurt Campbell and Ely Ratner sparked debates on the existing US-China policy by suggesting the engagement policy’s failure to secure the liberal democratic order and calling for a new approach to China. In this paper, the author seeks to ascertain the characteristics of China’s foreign policy, and to clarify developments in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) promoted by the Xi Jinping administration as well as changes in China’s foreign policy, on the basis of China’s execution of its foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.   Perception of Security Threat China has consistently worked towards eliminating the military presence of major nations in areas surrounding China as well as increasing its own military might. In 1993, China announced a “new strategic guideline” in which the scope of defense of the Chinese military was revised from the “homeland” to “air, ground, sea, and outer space,” emphasizing its priority in developing sea and air power. In recent years, achievement of a comprehensive operational capability enabling the Chinese military to launch strikes in remote seas has emerged as a goal for China’s military modernization policy, and since the start of the Xi Jinping administration, China has abandoned the Soviet-style ground force model and has started to emphasize joint operation capabilities in areas including “land, sea, air, defensive missiles, and cyber defense.” China has reduced its forces by 300,000 people, reorganized the previous seven military regions into five theater commands, and is modernizing its military by strengthening its navy and air force as well as its outer space and cyber capabilities. With the realization of the Belt and Road Initiative, the importance of maritime, outer space, and Arctic issues has increased, and joint military-civilian technological development is being promoted in those three areas. Through such policy transitions, it can be found that China’s perception of security threats has also been shifted.   Suspicion towards US-NATO Collusion China’s geopolitical feature is that it is surrounded on three sides by land with one side facing the sea, and there has been a difference in opinion as to whether China is a continental nation or a maritime nation, but in recent years, the recognition that China is both a maritime and continental nation has quickly spread within China. Amid a political atmosphere where China’s maritime advancement is legitimized by the government, the People’s Liberation Army, and domestic public opinion, NATO’s position on maritime issues has garnered attention. Regarding the maritime issue, many argue that there is a possibility of conflict with NATO in the long term (He 2014). It is true that the passage of Chinese military vessels through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal has caused concern for some NATO members. Also, in April 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Abe and then NATO Secretary General Rasmussen issued the “Joint Political Declaration between Japan and NATO,” and in May 2014, a Japan/NATO IPCP was agreed. The strengthening of relations between NATO and Japan, as well as the involvement of NATO in the nine choke points of the Indian Ocean have raised new concerns for China. Since the 2010s, China’s interest in the Arctic region has increased, and NATO’s positions have been studied. In November 2008, the EU put out a policy paper entitled “The European Union and the Arctic Region”; in January 2009, then NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer pointed out the importance of the Arctic region, and in April of the same year, the joint declaration from the NATO summit held in Strasbourg, France also mentioned the Arctic. The general view in China is that while caution is warranted towards NATO’s increasing emphasis on the Arctic, at the current stage, entry by NATO into the Arctic is limited (Li 2014). As mentioned, in regards to the security threat towards China, China’s suspicion towards collusion between the US and NATO is especially great. While Russia is a strategic buffer for China, collusion between the US, Japan, and NATO regarding the maritime issue has recently become of increased concern for China.   Transformation of US-Led Security Network in Asia and Closer China-Russia Relations China’s foreign policy developed after the Cold War had been based on tacit acceptance of the presence of US military alliances in Asia. Needless to say, China came to be greatly suspicious of a series of moves made by the United States since the autumn of 2011 to strengthen military ties in the Asia region. Meanwhile, the United States’ strengthened military and economic commitment in the Asia-Pacific region brought about strong concerns by Russia, since they threatened to break the previous power equilibrium between the United States and Russia. The deployment of THAAD resulted in a strong backlash not only from China but also from Russia, similar to when NATO deployed a missile defense system in Europe. Russia’s moves can be understood through this logic.                       Cooperation between China and Russia regarding space and cyber security has also been quickly developing in recent years (Sutter 2018). In October 2018, at a meeting with Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Kuzhugetovich Shoygu, President Xi Jinping stated that “both nations are of utmost importance to each other, and are strategic cooperative partners to prioritize in foreign policy,” (Xinhuanet Oct. 19, 2018) giving greater praise to the nations’ relationship than ever before. Closer ties between China and Russia have also affected China’s view of the Russia-led CSTO in Central Asia. CSTO is a small collective security organization and China’s view is that Russia has outsized influence in the organization (Wang 2007). Since the SCO and the CSTO agreed to build a cooperative relationship in 2007, security cooperation between the Russia-led CSTO and China-led SCO and BRICS has been discussed (Russian Security Council Develops New Formats of Cooperation within CIS, BRICS, CSTO, SCO 2017). Of course, this cooperative relationship is far from being promoted to a “new Warsaw Pact” covering the Eurasian continent, let alone the world. The CSTO is an “indispensable presence” in Central Asia (Li and Niu 2016), and thus, in promoting BRI, China will likely put effort into strengthening its cooperative relationship with CSTO while its relationships with the United States and NATO were being taken into consideration. As aforementioned, in considering security concerns towards the United States, China always considers its security policy in terms of the US-China-Russia triangle. As the US-led security network in Asia is strengthened, ties between Russia and China are becoming closer.   Belt and Road Initiative and Foreign Policy Strategies of China Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is also centered on the four elements of “institutional hegemony, economic hegemony, political/ideological hegemony, and military hegemony.” Although the BRI was initiated under the Xi Jinping administration, it serves as the foundation for China’s post-Cold War foreign policy, and thus, the execution of the Belt and Road Initiative will be analyzed here with consideration for China’s efforts up to now.   Pursuit of Structural Power in International Order China’s influence in the existing international financial system has significantly increased. In the IMF, which was created under the Bretton Woods system, the voting share held by a member state depends on the amount of contribution by the member state. As a result of the reform to the IMF voting shares agreed in 2010, China’s contribution proportion rose to the third place after the United States and Japan. As well as seeking to increase its influence in the existing international financial institutions, China has put effort into creating financial institutions led by China. The AIIB is an idea that was unveiled in October 2013 together with the Belt and Road Initiative when President Xi Jinping visited Indonesia. In addition to the establishment of the BRICS New Development Bank and the AIIB, there are also discussions regarding the establishment of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization Development Bank. China has been actively involved in regional organizations throughout the world since the latter half of the 1990s, and has established cooperative relationships with them. The Xi Jinping administration has consolidated into one framework China’s efforts in Asia, Africa, Europe, the Arab world, and Pacific Island nations, has increased its cooperation with Latin America, and its involvement in Arctic Council (AC). China’s policy of engagement is at the center of its global strategy surrounding the Belt and Road Initiative, by which China seeks to create an economic and political sphere of influence in five areas: policy, finance, trade, infrastructure, and people-to-people exchanges (Five Connectivities: 五通).   Ideological Hegemony — China’s Governance Model Considering various discussions within China since 1990, China’s political values today include the three ideologies of universal values, Marxism-Leninism, and Chinese traditional thought, and as a nation that is seeking to increase its soft power, China cannot depend completely on any one of the three ideologies in its foreign policy philosophy, and therefore vacillates between all three (Aoyama and Amako 2015). In this situation, the Chinese government is attempting to spread state capitalism as the Chinese governance model throughout the international community under the BRI. This Chinese governance model seeks a foundation for economic growth and stability in China, and thus, whether China can overcome economic friction with the United States as well as manage its economy in a sustained and stable manner is crucial in determining the outlook of Chinese soft power.   Military Hegemony with focus on Cyber/Space Power Under the Xi Jinping administration, the importance of space and cyber warfare forces in addition to ground, naval, and air forces has rapidly increased in China’s military strategy (Wang 2016). In August 2018, the United States Department of Defense released its Annual Report to Congress pertaining to military and security developments in China, and this Report points out that China’s efforts in space technology are a major concern for the United States. The 2018 Defense of Japan white paper also states that China sees information operations for definitively gaining information superiority as one form of its asymmetrical military capabilities, and argues that China’s capabilities in electronic and cyber warfare, which aim to confuse the enemy’s chain of command during a conflict, are rapidly increasing (Defense of Japan 2018). The white paper “China’s Military Strategy” published by the Chinese government in 2015 states that China’s military strategy is active defense and that China’s future strategy is informationized local wars (China's Military Strategy 2015). The paper additionally states that the Chinese military’s eight duties include safeguarding the security and interests of new areas such as outer space and cyberspace in addition to territorial integrity, national unification, maintenance of world peace, stabilization of the domestic political society, and the like. Thus, in recent years, with an increased dependence on satellites and computer networks in the military, the Xi Jinping administration has put particular effort into outer space and cyberspace in order to create a world-class military. International cooperation on the projects of outer space and cyberspace has been emphasized under the BRI as an important policy.   Conclusion While having achieved remarkable economic growth, Chinese foreign policy has also undergone significant changes. At the beginning of the 1990s, China had predicted that the post-Cold War world order would constitute one superpower and multiple great powers, but by now, China has put efforts into forming a “G2+” world order (the two superpowers of China and the US as well as other political powers). China’s strategy for rising in prominence has been strongly influenced by international political theories and concepts such as the hegemonic stability theory and structural power. China has been seeking to increase its standing in the changing international order by increasing structural power, building infrastructure, and providing international public goods such as the RCEP and FTAAP. The Xi Jinping administration continues moving in this direction and promoting the Belt and Road Initiative so as to be centered on institutional hegemony, economic hegemony, political/ideological hegemony, and military hegemony. On the other hand, with major reforms in the party and state organization as well as reforms in creation and execution of policies, the unifying ability of the Communist Party as well as coordination between the state administration, local governments, and corporations have been strengthened in order to promote the Belt and Road Initiative. Under the Xi Jinping administration, the Communist Party (the state) now has the power to decide a policy, market mechanisms continue to be incorporated into executing policies, and the state administration, local governments, and corporations are cooperating to execute policies as a whole. In short, the arrangement of the government and market and that of the government and corporations have greatly changed, and there are strong tinges of state capitalism under Xi’s leadership.   As distrust towards the West in terms of security escalates and China attempts to respond to the changing international situation, China-Russia ties have become closer. In new security areas such as outer space and cyberspace, China and Russia have shown remarkable unity in terms of global governance and the direction of foreign policy, and have consequently widened the gap with Western nations. Thus, the international situation is becoming increasingly fluid.     Author’s Biography Rumi Aoyama is director of Waseda Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies, and a Professor at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies at Waseda University. She has been a visiting scholar at Stanford University (2005-2006) and George Washington University (2016-2017). She earned her Ph.D. in Law from the Graduate School of Law, Keio University. She specializes in China’s contemporary foreign policy and politics. Her publication, entitled Contemporary China’s Foreign Policy (Keio University Press, 2008), was honored with the 24th Masayoshi Ohira Foundation Memorial Prize. Other recent publications include Decoding the Rise of China (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); A Diplomatic History of the People’s Republic of China (University of Tokyo Press, 2017); China and the Future of International Order (University of Tokyo Press, 2015)..