The East Asia Institute (President Yul Sohn) held the 9th online seminar of the COVID-19 and the New World Order series, titled “What`s Next For the U.S.-Japan-South Korea Partnership? Security and Economic Cooperation in a New Era,” co-hosted with Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. The ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan joint statements have increased expectations for a possible expansion of security and economic cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. However, heightened U.S.-China strategic competition, as well as persistent challenges in the region such as historical tensions and the North Korea threat, have complicated the strategic calculus of South Korea and Japan. Under these circumstances, South Korea, the U.S., and Japan must define their economic and security interests and seek ways to maintain friendly relations among the three countries. This seminar discussed security and economic cooperation among Korea, the United States, and Japan in the era of strategic competition between the U.S. and China.   Time & Date: November 19 (Fri) 09:00-11:00 (KST) Panelists: Joonwoo Park (Former Chairman of the Sejong Institute), Tomiko Ichikawa (Director General, The Japan Institute for International Affairs), Vincent Brooks (Former USFK Commander), Young Ja Bae (Professor, Konkuk University), Kimura Fukunari (Professor, Keio University), Andrew Grotto (Director of the Program on Geopolitics, Technology, and Governance, Stanford University) Moderators: Young-sun Ha (Chairman, EAI; Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University), Thomas Fingar (Shorenstein APARC Fellow, Stanford University Opening remarks: Yul Sohn (President, EAI; Professor, Yonsei University), Gi-wook Shin (Director, Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University)     Beyond Diverging Interests: Building a Practical Framework for Trilateral Security and Economic Cooperation   I. Session 1: U.S. –ROK-Japan Trilateral Security Cooperation   ROK-Japan relations and the Future of the Trilateral Cooperation The U.S. is determined to strengthen cooperation with South Korea and Japan to promote a rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific. Similarly, Japan has also been putting greater emphasis on the Free and Open Indo-Pacific framework. To realize this goal, it is crucial that South Korea and Japan maintain harmonious relations. Amb. Joon-woo Park, Former Chairman of the Sejong Institute, points out that improving ROK-Japan relations might be difficult under the Moon administration as Japan’s new Prime Minister Kishida has inherited Abe’s line of foreign policy – Japan appears indifferent to gestures made by President Moon. It is up to future leaders to improve relations. According to Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, Former USFK Commander, the Alliance system capitalizes upon common interests such as economic cooperation and mutual defense. He claims that opportunities on the horizon for the new administrations in the U.S., Japan, and the ROK will include an opportunity to build upon the existing Alliance system and to strengthen it by ensuring the democracies of the Indo-Pacific operate in harmony. Tomiko Ichikawa, Director-General of the Japan Institute for International Affairs, states that the allies should cooperate beyond the realm of the military alliance. To illustrate, the Quad is not just a military alliance, but in fact has many small minilateral groups for different purposes such as provisions for vaccines and infrastructure systems. To increase engagement among countries in the Indo-Pacific, such ad hoc type of grouping of “friends” may become more important in this region. On the issue of U.S. extended deterrence, Gen. Brooks emphasized that extended deterrence requires capability, but more importantly operates under the premise of trust. If trust on the U.S. erodes, South Korea and Japan’s desire to reach equilibrium in military arsenal relative to North Korea’s possessions will increase. He emphasized that U.S. capability of extended deterrence is “always there” and reaching higher levels of trust requires strong diplomatic work and confidence building on multiple levels.   The Rise of the China Threat The rise of China, identified by its state-controlled capitalism and expansionist economy, has brought a new challenge to free-market democracies. To protect economic and security interests, the Biden administration has put efforts in strengthening cooperation with its allies. The U.S., in its efforts to counter authoritarian China, will host the “Summit for Democracy” in December. According to Amb. Park, Japan has strengthened military exercises with the U.S. and its allies. Mutual surveillance activities, which were initially designed to target illegal transshipping of North Korean ships, were actually conducted to check China’s increasing military activities in the East and the South China Sea. Gen. Brooks also emphasized that the U.S.-led alliance should not be viewed as a U.S. construct, but as a modern construct that connects several of the world’s most robust economies, liberal democracies, and militarily-capable nations.   Approaching the DPRK Variable and Maintaining Peace on the Korean Peninsula Despite economic difficulties arising from tightened economic sanctions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and natural disasters, the DPRK has shown continuous determination towards building nuclear arsenal. While the end of the 6-Party Talks can be interpreted as the abandonment of the U.S.-DPRK framework, Ms. Ichikawa states that this was merely an interruption; top-level diplomacy between the U.S. and the DPRK continued even during the Trump administration. Such high-level talks with the DPRK should be maintained. Given that the Biden administration has already reached out to the DPRK, Ms. Ichikawa claims that is now up to the DPRK to decide whether or not to engage in negotiation. However, it is difficult to claim that the DPRK is one of Biden’s top foreign policy priorities. Regarding President Moon’s End of War Declaration, Gen. Vincent K. Brooks points out that there are risks associated with the declaration, but also adds that the maintenance of the status quo (armistice) will only serve as a temporary solution. When discussing the End of War Declaration, Korea should be wary of politically charged policies and refrain from associating the declaration with the reduction of USFK or UNC forces on the Korean Peninsula. Gen. Brooks emphasizes that policies “cannot be done for populist reasons rather than pragmatic reasons.”   II. Session 2: U.S.-ROK-Japan Economic Cooperation   U.S.-China Technology Rivalry The U.S.-China competition and geopolitical tension in the Asia Pacific has increasingly destabilized East Asia’s business environment. Andrew Grotto, Director of the Program on Geopolitics, Technology and Governance at the Stanford Cyber Policy Center, emphasized that the U.S.-China rivalry should not be simplified as great power competition. Instead, it should be seen as a competition of two systems: liberal rules-based international order and state-led capitalism with authoritarian characteristics. However, “decoupling” in fact, has only been partially implemented. According to Professor Fukunari, decoupling has only affected industries in sensitive technologies, rare earth metals, and in some medical/essential goods. Mr. Grotto emphasizes that decoupling and choosing sides is not a viable solution amid the U.S.-China conflict. He claims that decoupling is not only fantastical because of the complex and intertwined nature of the global supply chain, but also counterproductive as the U.S. and its allies benefit from the ecosystem of comparative advantages. The Chinese market is important for both Japan and Korea. In the case of South Korea, the U.S. is one of Korea’s biggest semiconductor export markets, while China is accounts for more than half of Korea’s semiconductor exports. Young Ja Bae, Professor at Konkuk University, states that allies should seek the optimal path for cooperation; at the same time, the U.S. should not put too much pressure on the allies’ relations with China given the current situation.   Pursuing Trilateral and Regional Cooperation Professor Bae explains that a report by the Semiconductor Industry Association reads that in the case of the U.S., self-sufficiency will increase production costs by 35-60%. In this light, she points out that it is neither desirable nor possible for the U.S. and other countries to pursue self-sufficiency in the global semiconductor value chains. The U.S, Japan, and Taiwan have engaged in dynamic cooperation in securing the supply chain. The U.S. requested TSMC and Samsung to building semiconductor manufacturing facilities within the U.S.; Japan has encouraged the construction of TSMC manufacturing facilities in Japan. Professor Bae states that South Korea is lagging behind amid the emergence of a new coalition in the semiconductor sector.   Moving Beyond Severed ROK-Japan Relations The extension of diplomatic friction between Korea and Japan onto semiconductor sector in 2019 weakened cooperation between Korean and Japanese semiconductor firms. While South Korea lacks strong material and equipment companies, Japan lacks strong Japanese semiconductor companies as of now. It is, therefore, in the best interest of the two countries to cooperate. However, both governments currently do not have policies on building the foundation for cooperation, despite economic security being one of their top priorities. Economic security is one of the top policy agendas of the Kishida Cabinet, as can be seen in the establishment of the Ministry of Economy and Security. While the Japanese government plans to enact a new economic security law, strengthening regulations on technology leakage to China, Japan's economic security strategy does not mention cooperation with Korea so far. Professor Bae states that South Korea and Japan should try to find out a way to step up cooperation in the technology sector so that they could tide over the waves of the US-China technology rivalry.      ■ Park Joon-woo_ is a former Chairman of The Sejong Institute and former Senior Secretary to the President for Political Affairs, and was a career diplomat who served 33 years at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. He served as Ambassador to the European Union and to Singapore. His overseas assignments include Washington, D.C., Tokyo, Beijing and Helsinki. After retiring in July 2011, he was appointed as Koret Fellow of the Walter Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, USA, teaching a graduate class on “Korean Foreign Policy in Transition: Korea’s Bilateral Relations with Her Major Neighboring Countries.” In September 2012, he was appointed as Visiting Professor at Yonsei University’s Institute for State Governance. From August 2013 to June 2014, Ambassador Park was appointed as President Park Geun-hye’s Senior Secretary for Political Affairs. Later, he served as Chairman of The Sejong Institute, Korea’s leading independent think-tank, for three years since February 2015. ■ Vincent K. Brooks_ is a career Army officer who recently retired from active duty as the four-star general in command of all U.S. Forces in Korea, where he concurrently commanded United Nations Command – continuously serving since 1950 and initially commanded by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur; and the Republic of Korea – U.S. Combined Forces Command comprising over 625,000 Koreans and Americans under arms. His areas of expertise are national security, policy, strategy, international relations, military operations, combating terrorism and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, diversity and inclusion, leadership in complex organizations, crisis leadership, and building cohesive trust-based teams. He is a combat veteran and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. ■ Tomiko Ichikawa_ is the Director General at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). She assumed the current position in July 2020. She joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1985. Her assignments in Japan include Directorship at West Europe Division, Economic Integration Division (EU), Non-proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division as well as Economic Policy Division. Overseas postings include Embassy of Japan in the UK and Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna. She also assumed positions in international organizations as Political Affairs Officer at UNPROFOR (UN PKO in the Former Yugoslavia) and Special Assistant to the Director General, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Ms. Ichikawa participated in the Six Party Talks (December 2006-December 2008), and continued to follow the DPRK nuclear issue at Permanent Mission in Vienna (2011-2014) and the IAEA (2014-2020). She obtained a Bachelor's in Law from the University of Tokyo and her MA in International relations and contemporary war from King’s College London, UK. ■ Young Ja Bae_ is a Professor of the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Konkuk University. Dr. Bae received her PhD in political science at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in the United States and serves on the policy advisory committee to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and vice chairman of the Korean Association of International Studies. She was a visiting scholar at National Taiwan University under Taiwan Fellowship. Her main research interests include international politics and S&T, science diplomacy, and international political economy. Her major papers include "Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment and National Security," "US-China competition and Science and Technology Innovation" and "S&T Diplomacy as Public Diplomacy: Theoretical Understanding". ■ Andrew J. Grotto_ is a William J. Perry International Security Fellow at the Cyber Policy Center and a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University. Grotto’s research interests center on the national security and international economic dimensions of America’s global leadership in information technology innovation, and its growing reliance on this innovation for its economic and social life. Before coming to Stanford, Grotto was the Senior Director for Cybersecurity Policy at the White House in both the Obama and Trump Administrations. Previously, Grotto served as Senior Advisor for Technology Policy to Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker. He also has extensive experience on Capitol Hill, serving as a member of the professional staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Grotto received his JD from the University of California at Berkeley, his MPA from Harvard University, and his BA from the University of Kentucky. ■ Fukunari Kimura_ is a Professor in Economics at Keio University and Chief Economist at the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA). He received his Bachelor of Laws from the Faculty of Law, University of Tokyo in 1982. He then received Master of Science and PhD titles from the Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1990 and 1991, respectively. He previously worked for the Department of Economics, State University of New York at Albany as Assistant Professor in 1991-1994.In particular, he has recently been active in writing academic/semi-academic books and articles on international production networks and economic integration in East Asia. ■ Young-Sun Ha_ is Chairman of the board of trustees at the East Asia Institute. He is also a professor emeritus of the department of political science and international relations at Seoul National University. Dr. Ha serves as a member of senior advisory group for the inter-Korean summit talks preparation committee(2018-). He also served as a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Group(2008-2016), the Co-chairman of Korea-Japan Joint Research Project for New Era(2009-2013), the Director of the Center for International Studies and American Studies Institute at Seoul National University, the President of the Korea Peace Studies Association, and a research fellow at the Center for International Studies at Princeton University, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm. He received his B.A. and M.A. from Seoul National University, and holds a Ph.D. in international politics from the University of Washington. ■ Thomas Fingar_ is a Shorenstein APARC Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He was the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow from 2010 through 2015 and the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford in 2009. From 2005 through 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Fingar served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2000-01 and 2004-05), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001-03), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994-2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-94), and chief of the China Division (1986-89). Between 1975 and 1986 he held a number of positions at Stanford University, including senior research associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control. Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (A.B. in Government and History, 1968), and Stanford University (M.A., 1969 and Ph.D., 1977 both in political science).     ■ Typeset by Seung Yeon Lee | Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | slee@eai.or.kr    

The East Asia Institute (President Yul Sohn) hosted an online seminar entitled, "Richard Haass on ‘The World.’" In this seminar, Dr. Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), discussed his latest book, The World: A Brief Introduction, and the state of international affairs with Dr. Young-Sun Ha, chairman of EAI (professor emeritus, Seoul National University).   Date & Time:  September 11, 2020 (Friday), 9:00 – 10:00 AM (KST) Speaker: Richard Haass (President, Council on Foreign Relations) Moderator: Young-Sun Ha (Chairman of the Board of Trustees, East Asia Institute)       ※ Provided below are selected excerpts from Dr. Richard Haass’s statements during the seminar.   I. From Disarray to Disorder                                                 An Era or Disorder, Led by Traditional and Global Issues Combined This is an important time in history. We have the traditional issues of international relations, and in particular, great power rivalry. This includes the growing rivalry between the United States and China, the renewed rivalry between the United States and Russia, rivalry between China and India, China and Japan, and so forth. This is the traditional dynamic of international relations. But what makes this era so different—what makes the 21st century so different—is that in addition to great power dynamics we have some other things going on. Most importantly, we have the emergence of global issues. Right now, the focus is on public health, but in the West Coast, we have these terrible fires which are clearly linked to a changing climate. We also live in a world where power is being diffused or disseminated in many forms to many places. You are in the shadow of just that when it comes to North Korea’s nuclear missile programs. So, all of this is happening at a time when the arrangements in place, regional and global arrangements are inadequate. Many of these arrangements date back to the immediate period after World War II. Many new issues like climate change or how to regulate cyberspace are relatively new and have arisen relatively recently. So, there’s a trend in the world away from order. Growing rivalry, inadequate institutions, diffusion of power, global issues are more and more pressing at this time. So, this is an extremely demanding period of history where we have to deal with both the traditional agenda, traditional threats to order and with the new additional set of threats to order coming from globalization. And I think the question is, are we up to it? Will the governments of the world be able to put aside their differences and meet both the traditional and the new challenges?   U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue: The First Step towards Order I agree with the assessment that the relationship between the United States and China is critical and has been fast deteriorating. I think what we are seeing is a very different China. Xi Jinping’s China is very different. It’s more oppressive at home. It’s much more assertive in its foreign policy. We are seeing that with Japan, Taiwan, India, and the South China Sea. We saw what happened in Hong Kong. China has not improved behavior in vis-a-vis intellectual property, and also in economic espionage. do not like the phrase ‘New Cold War.’ China represents a fundamentally different kind of challenge than the Soviet Union. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is integrated in the world economically. I also do not think China has the same kind of global universal ideological ambitions that the Soviet Union had. If I had to say what my goal is, my goal is that the United States and China manage their competition. We cannot eliminate the differences, but we do not want the differences to lead to conflict. We also do not want our differences to make it impossible to cooperate where our interests overlap. So the United States and China do have differences, say over the South China Sea or over Taiwan or various issues. But we have some overlapping interests in North Korea, Afghanistan, or in global public health or in climate change. So, to me, the intellectual challenge, the foreign policy challenge is how do we manage our inevitable differences? How do we manage our rivalry? How do we manage our economic competition in a way that does not make it impossible for us to also cooperate where it’s in our collective interest to cooperate? The United States and China need much more diplomatic interaction. People always point out that our militaries—that our navies and our air force—operate in close proximity. I wish our diplomats operated in close proximity. We do not have serious sets of strategic conversations. We will have to make some changes, and the United States and China have to build strategic dialogue.   Intl Organizations Have Their Own Ceilings: What We Need Is the Willingness of Nations At any time in history, at any time in the world, order and disorder coexist. We always have both. What matters is the balance between the two. And what also matters is the trend. Order usually requires two things: It requires a balance of power, and it requires certain understandings, certain agreements, among the powers about how the world is to be organized. It also needs a consensus on what principles the order is to be based upon. When you have a balance of power and some degree of consensus then the world tends to be fairly peaceful, fairly stable. When there is no balance of power, or when the balance of power is challenged by a rising power or by the weakening of existing powers, that usually is a recipe for conflict. We have seen this various times in history before World War I and before World War II. Can we maintain a balance of power? What explains power is not just military might but also the willingness to use it. I think what what will affect order and disorder is not simply the traditional considerations of balance of power and a consensus of the rules. But also, a willingness and ability to come together to deal with global challenges. To put it another way, we could actually have agreement in principle, say between the United States and China about the South China Sea or Taiwan. But if there was willingness in the world to address climate change, or address global public health, or deal with setting the rules for world trade, we could have balance of power. We could avoid conflict. This fall and next month is the 75th anniversary of the United Nations. And to me the United Nations is an example of an institution that cannot play a meaningful role in dealing with what I have described, either with the great power dynamics or with globalization. So institutions like the East Asia Institute(EAI) and the Council on Foreign Relations(CFR) will be important, since it will take great intellectual activity to resolve disorder. But it will also take political willingness by the United States, China, and the governments to do what is necessary to promote order.   II. Trump’s  "Inbox" for the Next U.S. Administration              Trump’s 3.5 Years: Enough to Change U.S. Foreign Policy Trajectory I knew Mr. Trump before he was president. I knew him from the world of golf and also living in New York. When he was a candidate, he asked if I could come by and talk to him about foreign policy, which I did one day at Trump Tower. He did not have highly developed views of foreign policy at the time. He had two things that came through. One, he was very critical of America’s trade agreements. Secondly, he was very wary of foreign policy in general. I disagreed on both. I basically advocated for the value of free trade to the United States overall. Although I did not persuade Mr. Trump of the wisdom of my views, I did think that once he was in office, he would evolve and become more traditional. He has not. President Trump is different from most of the post-World War II presidents. To me, he reminds me of a 19th century President Jackson. He reminds me in the 20th century, some of the isolationists we had at various times particularly in the senate. More recently, like Pat Buchanan or Ross Perot with their unilateralism, isolationism, protectionism. He represents very different tendencies in American foreign policy and so far, I would say he has changed American foreign policy more than it has changed him.   Next Administration’s "Inbox": Repairing U.S. Alliances Abroad and the Situation at Home It is still early September and we have had several surprises since September already. Between now and early November we have 53 to 54 days. There could well be 53 to 54 surprises between now and the election, so I have no idea what the result will be. And as you have read and heard, it could also be that we do not find out who the next president will be right away. There could be a very complicated situation in dealing with all the ballots because many Americans, due to COVID-19 and other reasons will choose to vote by mail. Therefore, this will probably be a closed election and a very bitterly contested election. But sooner or later we will have a president. It will either be Donald Trump or Joe Biden. Whoever it is will inherit a very difficult inbox. One of my sayings is "When you run for president, you can choose your vice president, you can choose the policies you run on, you can choose what you say if you win in your inaugural address, you can choose your cabinet. The only thing you cannot choose is your inbox." And that will be the same whether it is Mr. Trump or Mr. Biden. It will be a very difficult inbox. I would hope that the next president would spend a lot of time trying to "repair" America’s alliances in Europe and in Asia. I think if Mr. Biden were to be elected that would be a priority for him. Mr. Trump however has a slightly different view of alliances, to say the least. Unless his thinking changes, I do not think he would make the repair of American alliances a priority. He has not made alliance maintenance or improvement a priority for the last three and a half years. You do not need an American to tell someone from the Republic of Korea about the difficulties of the relationship. So again, unless Trump has a change of heart, I would not predict there would be a significant improvement in our Asia-Pacific alliance system. I would hope though, that he would rethink it particularly if he wants to pursue a serious policy towards China. The best way to pursue it is not unilaterally but is with our allies and partners. I hope he would come to see that logic. Mr. Biden, I believe, would certainly see that logic. In addition to coordinating with allies in Europe and Asia, the United States should find a way to enter what was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). There would have to be some renegotiation, but I think it is essential for the United States to rejoin the region’s principle in trade and economic initiative. The United States also needs to address some of its domestic challenges: education, infrastructure, race, immigration, the amount of money spent on basic research. We need to compete with China. So, there are things we need to do for ourselves. Let me say two other things about the next president. One is that whoever the president is, there will be a difficult relationship between the United States and China. The friction is not simply a result of Mr. Trump. But a lot of Americans, Republic and Democrats alike have a more concerned view about China and the direction it is taking. And second of all, whoever is elected is going to inherit a difficult inbox. An important part of this inbox is going to be dealing with domestic issues in the United States. It is going to be dealing with COVID-19. It is going to be dealing with tens of millions of unemployed. We are going to have deep political divisions, possibly deeper coming out of this election. We have obviously got all the challenges dealing with race and racism. So, the next president is not going to have the luxury of just being a foreign policy president. He is also very much going to have to be a domestic president.   III. North Korea and the Korean Peninsula   An Alternative Approach to North Korea: "Something-for-Something" We have tried various approaches to North Korea. To use an American expression, we have tried honey and vinegar and we do not have much to show for either. We have fought a war with North Korea. We have tried traditional diplomacy. We have tried dramatic summitry and personal diplomacy. We have tried sanctions. We have tried incentives. I do not think there can be anything fundamentally new.What we see is a North Korea that remains closed, heavily militarized and obviously has increased nuclear and missile capabilities. My own view is we should hold to the long-term goal of denuclearization. But this is not something we can negotiate. We should be open to partial agreements and essentially, what I call in my informal English, "something-for-something": giving North Korea certain sanctions relief in exchange for their taking certain steps in the nuclear area. That is something that the United States, South Korea, Japan need to coordinate very closely on in the first instance, and China and Russia should also be included in those consultations. We are going to have to operate in a very frustrating, but realistic way through the gray area of managing the problem to gradually limit it. I think that is probably the best that the next administration could do. ■     ■ Richard Haass is in his eighteenth year as president of the Council on Foreign Relations, the preeminent independent, nonpartisan organization in the United States devoted to issues of foreign policy and international relations. He has served as the senior Middle East advisor to President George H.W. Bush, the State Department's director of policy planning under Secretary of State Colin Powell, and in various positions in the Defense and State departments during the Carter and Reagan administrations. He was also U.S. coordinator for policy toward the future of Afghanistan and the U.S. envoy to both the Cyprus and Northern Ireland peace talks. A recipient of the State Department's Distinguished Honor Award, the Presidential Citizens Medal, and the Tipperary International Peace Award, Haass is also the author or editor of fourteen books on U.S. foreign policy and one book on management. His latest book is The World: A Brief Introduction. A Rhodes Scholar, he holds master’s and doctorate of philosophy degrees from Oxford University and is the recipient of numerous honorary degrees.   ■ Young-Sun Ha is chairman of the board of trustees of the East Asia Institute. He is also a professor emeritus at Seoul National University’s department of political science and international relations. Ha currently serves as a member of the senior advisory group for the Inter-Korean Summit Talks Preparation Committee. He also served as a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Group, co-chairman of Korea-Japan Joint Research Project for New Era, president of the Korea Peace Studies Association, and research fellow at Princeton University’s Center for International Studies and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. His recent books and edited volumes include A New Perspective on the Diplomatic History of Korea, World Politics of Love: War and Peace, U.S.-China Competition in the Architecture of a Regional Order in the Asia-Pacific; Korean Peninsula Among Big Powers: 1972 vs. 2014, Complex World Politics: Strategies, Principles, and a New Order, The Future of North Korea 2032: The Strategy of Coevolution for the Advancement, The Emergence of Complex Alliances in the 21st Century, and A New Era of Complex Networks in Korea-Japan Relations. He received his BA and MA from Seoul National University and his PhD from the University of Washington.   ■ For inquiries: Sea Young Kim, Research Associate/Project Manager                      02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | sykim@eai.or.kr   The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.  

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px; } #tb1 tr td:nth-of-type(1) {width:100px;} #tb1 tr td {padding:10px;} The East Asia Institute (EAI) hosted the Seoul International Conference on November 16-17, 2018 for the "Rising China and New Civilization in the Asia Pacific" research project. The conference, which was held at the Somerset Palace in Seoul, brought together the four research teams from South Korea, China, Japan, and the U.S. to present and discuss the outcomes of their first year research. The conference was divided into six sessions on China’s energy and the environment, technology development, political economy, security, and the future of the regional order. Participants discussed diverse issues on China’s growth, the challenges that it will face up to 2030, and possible solutions to those challenges. The public session, entitled "Rising China and the Future of the Asia-Pacific Order" can be found in the following video clips.   Program Rising China and the Future of the Asia-Pacific Order November 17 09:30-11:30 Moderator Yul Sohn, President, East Asia Institute Presenters Barry Naughton, University of California, San Diego The United States, China and the Asia-Pacific: The Shifting Economic Agenda Tai Ming Cheung, University of California, San Diego From Big to Powerful: China’s Quest for Security and Power in the Age of innovation Kiichi Fujiwara, University of Tokyo US Disengagement? Consequences of Power Transition for Alliances Sook Jong Lee, Sungkyunkwan University East Asian Views on Chinese Influence Feiteng Zhong, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Rising China, Developmental Security and the Emerging Order in the Asia-Pacific      

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:24px;} Editor's Note On November 13, 2020, the EAI and Brookings institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". In session 2: economy, energy, and environment, Jeffrey Ball addressed that the world is witnessing a race of pledges on de-carbonization or carbon neutrality, including President Moon Jae-in’s recent announcement to go carbon neutral by 2050 as well as pledges made by leaders of Japan, China, Europe and more. What really matters is to translate such pledges into action, and in order to operationalize such goals, geopolitical strategies need to be established and economic incentives should be provided. Many of the developed countries that announced to reduce their carbon consumption are indeed investing heavily in coal infrastructure businesses in developing countries like Vietnam. The pledges therefore should not only be limited to the domestic level, but also be expanded to the global level. Countries need to shift economic incentives so that various key players in the traditional energy sector including multinational corporations and international-development bank, can foresee profits from clean energy that are as alluring as those they have long have inked from dirty energy.     Quotes from the Paper   In late October 2020, South Korean President Moon Jae-In announced that his country would become net “carbon-neutral” by 2050. His vow came two days after a similar promise from Japan, a month after one from China, and a year after one from the European Union. South Korea, Moon promised, would work “with the international community” to achieve its ecological goal. That won’t be easy, because Moon’s government continues to work with the international community in the opposite direction. South Korea is, by at least one count, the world’s third-largest exporter of technology to build coal-fired power plants in emerging economies. South Korea generates 40% of its electricity by burning coal, and its biggest banks and industrial firms earn an outsized portion of their profits by selling machinery to turn the black rock into juice. Just three weeks before Moon’s climate pronouncement, South Korea’s government-owned utility, Korea Electric Power Corp., or Kepco, announced it would spend $189 million for a 40% slice of a 1,200-megawatt coal-fired power-plant project in Vietnam.  Kepco will acquire the stake from China Power & Light, a Hong Kong-based firm that, in a sign of the times, announced in December 2019 that it would stop investing in coal-fired electricity, concluding the sector was both environmentally untenable and economically unappealing. Kepco’s board voted to buy into the deal despite vocal objections not just from a raft of environmental groups but also from shareholders including some of the world’s whitest-shoe institutional investors, among them Switzerland’s UBS Asset Management and the Netherlands’ APG Asset Management. Why would the Moon government’s power-producing firm invest in solidifying coal’s hold on the developing world just days before Moon was to pledge his country’s deep commitment to slashing planet-warming emissions? One clue is the roster of South Korean financial behemoths that stand to profit from the Vietnam plant, Vung Ang 2. The list includes Samsung C&T Corp. and Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction Co., two lions of the South Korean industrial establishment, which will oversee the project’s construction; the government-controlled Export-Import Bank of Korea, which will provide loans for the deal; and the Korea Trade Insurance Corp., also a government firm, which will proffer financing guarantees.     Author’s Biography ■ Jeffrey Ball, a writer whose work focuses on energy and the environment, is scholar-in-residence at Stanford University’s Steyer-Taylor Center for Energy Policy and Finance and a lecturer at Stanford Law School. He also is a nonresident senior fellow in the Brookings Institution's Energy Security and Climate Initiative. Ball’s writing has appeared in Fortune, Texas Monthly, Mother Jones, the New Republic, Foreign Affairs, Joule, The Atlantic, The Wall Street Journal, and The New York Times, among other publications. At the Stanford center, a joint initiative of Stanford’s law and business schools, Ball heads a project assessing the climate implications of infrastructure investment by major economies including China, the world’s largest carbon emitter, coal burner, and renewable-energy producer. Among Ball’s writing honors were two in 2019: He won a New York Press Club Award for Journalism and was named a finalist for a Gerald Loeb Award for Distinguished Business and Financial Journalism for “Lone Star Rising,” a 2018 long-form story he wrote in Fortune on how a renewed oil boom in West Texas’ Permian Basin, one of the world’s biggest oil-producing areas, is reshaping both the region and the global energy system. Ball was the primary author of a 2017 Stanford report that assessed countries’ comparative advantages in the globalizing clean-energy sector. That report, The New Solar System, was released in March 2017 and laid out a strategy to boost solar energy to a level that would contribute meaningfully to global carbon reductions. Ball came to Stanford in 2011 from The Wall Street Journal, where he was the paper’s environment editor and before that was a columnist and reporter focusing on energy and the environment. He graduated from Yale University, where he was editor-in-chief of the Yale Daily News. Follow him on Twitter at @jeff_ball.

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:24px;} Editor's Note On November 13, 2020, the EAI and Brookings institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". In session 2: economy, energy, and environment, Samantha Gross addressed that cooperation between South Korea and the U.S. on energy or environment has been almost “absent.” South Korean government will have to align its energy policy in line with that of the U.S., which means joining the Global Green New Deal initiative if Biden Administration sets in. The form of carbon cooperation between the U.S. and China also matters; if the U.S. and China opt for the high carbon cooperation, Korea will increase import of oil and LNG from the U.S., and if they turn to a low carbon cooperation, Korea will be under pressure to reduce carbon emission as soon as possible.     Quotes from the Paper   Introduction                   In June 2020, President-elect Joe Biden pledged that the US would be carbon neutral by 2050. In the UN General Assembly in September, President Xi Jinping promised that net carbon emission would be zero in China by 2060. On October 26, Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga said that Japan would achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Two days later, President Moon Jae-in announced that Korea would go carbon neutral by 2050. The EU, which had already declared the European Green Deal in 2019, is seeking cooperation with the US. As a result, a hope has emerged for a Global Green New Deal.   The Development of Clean Energy Cooperation under the Obama Administration Energy cooperation between the US and China began when diplomatic relations were established in the late 1970s. During the late twentieth century, the scope of bilateral cooperation was limited. Amid the Oil crises of the 1970s and 1980s, both countries set their energy policy goals to procure energy sources. Besides, there was little discussion on international cooperation because awareness about global warming was low.   Shift to the Fossil Fuel Energy Cooperation under the Trump Administration Unlike the Obama administration, the Trump administration does not deal with energy policies in tandem with environmental policies. The goal of energy policy is energy dominance (or energy independence / self-sufficiency). Although insisting "energy production and environmental stewardship are not mutually exclusive," President Trump made the country officially withdraw from the Paris Agreement in 2019. Since the outbreak of the trade war, President Trump has pushed ahead with decoupling – or even a new Cold War – through maximum pressure on China. Thus, almost all cooperation with China promoted by the Obama administration has ceased.   Return to a Clean Energy Cooperation? China is the world’s largest producer of CO₂, accounting for 29.34% of global emissions in 2017. The US was the second-largest CO₂ emitting country (13.77%). The two countries produced nearly one-third of CO₂ in the world. In this respect, the Sino-US energy cooperation would be able to make an unprecedented contribution to the global environment. Since the trade war took place in 2018, the US and China have exchanged blame for global warming not to shoulder the burden of CO₂ emission reduction.   Conclusion The decades-long energy cooperation between the US and China gives two lessons. First, energy cooperation has been influenced by security and economic relations. When the US pursued an engagement policy with China, energy cooperation was among the key agendas of summit meetings and the Strategic Economic Dialogues. Second, disagreement on energy policy in the US matters. Democrats call for a Green New Deal, whereas Republicans deny climate change. This is why US energy policy has swung extensively.     Author’s Biography ■ Wang Hwi Lee is a Professor of Political Science and Dean of the Division of International Studies at Ajou University, Suwon, South Korea, where he has taught international political economy since 2006. He is the author of “The Politics of Economic Reform in South Korea: Crony Capitalism after Ten Years”, “Pulling South Korea away from China’s Orbit: The Strategic Implications of the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement” and “Crisis Management of the COVID-19 Pandemic in South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.” His research interests have been focused on issues of the political economy of economic policy and institutions in East Asian countries. Lee received his Ph.D. from London School of Economics and Political Science.  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:24px;} Editor's Note On November 13, 2020, the EAI and Brookings institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the  series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". In session 2: economy, energy, and environment, Samantha Gross addressed that whilst tensions between the US and China are sharply on the rise, especially in traditional areas of cooperation including economy and security, energy cooperation may be a good place to start the dialogue, since interests are so obviously aligned in this area-the liquified natural gas (LNG) sector. For the US, China and South Korea, respectively the world’s second and third largest importer of LNG, are a very attractive market. At the same time, the US’s LNG supply not only is affordable but also helps South Korea and China diversify its import sources, whose demand for LNG will be on the rise following their pledges to decrease the prevalence of coal.     Quotes from the Paper   Introduction to the energy systems in China and South Korea Energy security has long been an important geopolitical issue for the countries of east Asia. Rapid economic growth in the region over the past decades has only increased the prominence of the issue in the regions’ international affairs. Although primary energy demand in China is more than ten times that in South Korea, the energy systems of the two countries share important characteristics. Both countries import significant shares of their fuel, although for slightly different reasons.   LNG: China and Korea are important buyers in a growing market China and Korea are the world’s second and third largest importers of LNG, respectively. (Japan is the leading importer.) LNG is Korea’s only source of natural gas, as it has negligible domestic production and no source of pipeline supply. On the other hand, China has significant natural gas production, but not enough to meet demand. In 2019, LNG comprised 28% of China’s natural gas supply while pipeline gas supplied 16%. However, this supply mix is changing fast. China’s pipeline gas has historically come almost entirely from Central Asia: from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. However, the Power of Siberia pipeline from Russia delivered its first gas at the end of 2019. This pipeline will deliver 38 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually, an 80% increase in pipeline gas supply. Nonetheless, China’s growing appetite for natural gas means that LNG imports will continue to grow.    Events in the United States brought changes to the global LNG market The United States has had an overwhelming impact on global gas markets in the last decade. In the early 2000s, gas production in the United States was falling and the United States was expected to become a significant importer of LNG. Important market players, notably Qatar, made investments intending to serve the emerging U.S. market.   China’s LNG demand growth and U.S. supply growth can be helpful to Korea The emergence of U.S. LNG supply is clearly good for both China and Korea, increasing the amount of LNG on the market, providing supply on more flexible terms, and introducing a new pricing scheme to diversify purchases. Less obvious is the effect of China’s rapid LNG demand growth on Korea.     Author’s Biography ■ Samantha Gross is a fellow and director of the Energy Security and Climate Initiative. Her work is focused on the intersection of energy, environment, and policy, including climate policy and international cooperation, energy efficiency, unconventional oil and gas development, regional and global natural gas trade, and the energy-water nexus. She holds a Bachelor of Science in chemical engineering from the University of Illinois, a Master of Science in environmental engineering from Stanford, and a Master of Business Administration from the University of California at Berkeley. She has been a visiting fellow at the King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center, where she authored work on clean energy cooperation and on post-Paris climate policy. She was director of the Office of International Climate and Clean Energy at the U.S. Department of Energy. Prior to her time at the Department of Energy, Gross was director of integrated research at IHS CERA. She managed the IHS CERA Climate Change and Clean Energy forum and the IHS relationship with the World Economic Forum. She also authored numerous papers on energy and environment topics and was a frequent speaker on these topics.  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:24px;} Editor's Note On November 13, 2020, the EAI and Brookings institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". In session 2: economy, energy, and environment, Mireya Solis addressed that economic security should not equal national security because then this may be used as a pretext to unilaterally control the economy referring to national security logic. At the same time, great powers should refrain from being involved in export controls, tightening FDI screening mechanisms, and pursuing cyber-security rules, with reasons that they are concerned about the possibility of a coercive economic diplomacy. The author also points out that the Biden Administration is expected to place greater emphasis on working with like-minded countries that could be more effective in efforts to avoice over-restrictiveness and establish best standards when it comes to export controls. At the same time, the US could regain its credibility through confidence building measures, tightening its own rules on Section 232, for example, ensuring that national security tariffs are only authorized when a genuine security threats arise. The US should also articulate policy measures so that they are not just directed against China as a country, but target specific behaviors or security risks.     Quotes from the Paper The United States and China are locked in a dynamic of strategic competition across a wide array of domains covering the military, economy, and technology. Increasingly, the contest is acquiring overtones of system-to-system competition, in what is frequently depicted as a zero-sum contest between open and authoritarian societies. Economic interdependence could very well become a casualty to intensified U.S.-China rivalry. Given the high degree of economic integration between the two largest economies in the world, wholescale decoupling would entail prohibitive costs, but there are also questions as to whether China and the United States have the political will and wherewithal to execute a more limited detangling of their economies (with a likely focus on emerging technologies).   An emerging regional trade architecture sans the United States At the most fundamental level, the regional architecture defines membership and participation. The overlay of regional institutions and inter-state agreements determines which nations will benefit from preferential market access and have a voice in shaping the rules governing cross-border trade and investment flows. The benefits are not only circumscribed to increased economic competitiveness and gains from trade, but there is a foreign policy dividend as well. Insertion into the regional architecture signals long-term commitment, enables the dissemination of shared standards and norms, and confirms the shared intent to deepen ties among members. Importantly, the regional economic architecture in the Asia-Pacific has not been defined in exclusive terms, setting aside rival economic blocs. On the contrary, the regional fabric is multilayered with overlapping memberships and different levels of policy coordination.    Taking stock of “America First” trade policy With his views of international trade as a zero-sum contest and the trade deficit as an adequate tally for success or failure, President Trump promised a redo of American trade policy. “America First” trade policy rests on a profound skepticism of the multilateral trading system, a preference for bilateral talks that award the United States greater negotiation leverage, and unbridled unilateralism relying on tariffs and export controls as main tools of foreign economic policy. As American views on China have hardened, the Trump administration is not alone in its belief that the World Trade Organization (WTO) is incapable of controlling its unfair trading practices. Likewise, other U.S. administrations have been critical of the WTO Appellate Body for overstepping its bounds through its rulings. However, the Trump administration has gone further than any other previous U.S. government by letting the Appellate Body cease to function by blocking new nominations without offering a blueprint for reform; hinting at a potential tariff reset where the U.S. could eschew tariff bindings to extract reciprocity from other members; and periodically threatening to withdraw from the WTO, thereby further putting into question the viability of the international body.   COVID-19 and the nationalist temptation The global pandemic has produced large-scale loss of life (with 1,162,512 deaths and 43,787,411 infections worldwide as of October 27, 2020) and has wreaked havoc on the world economy. The projections from the International Monetary Fund and WTO are grim: a global contraction estimated at -4.4% and -1.7% for emerging and developing Asia; and a drop in merchandise trade flows of -9.2% in 2020. While the long-term consequences of the COVID-19 crisis remain unknown, it had an immediate and negative effect on open trade policies. Many countries responded to the demand surge for medical supplies and protective equipment by imposing export restrictions. At last count, 91 jurisdictions have imposed 200 restrictive measures. These measures are nevertheless self-defeating. They eliminate incentives for producers to scale up production and invite foreign retaliation that could cut off access to critical products and components. A better set of alternatives includes refurbishing stockpile programs, diversifying domestic and international suppliers, and securing international commitments to keep medical supply chains open.   A new page for American trade policy? American trade policy has been in flux. It moved from a failed attempt during the Obama administration to clinch trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic trade deals, to an emphasis on bilateral talks and unilateral measures in the Trump era that have neither reduced the trade deficit nor brought back jobs. Hence, the question arises as to whether a Biden administration could produce a reset of trade policy with better outcomes at home and abroad.   Leveraging the U.S.-Korea partnership to sustain a rules-based trade architecture Listed below are a number of areas where the United States and South Korea share interests and can work together to tackle new forms of protectionism, maintain open supply chains, and boost multilateral and regional trade governance:   Curbing COVID-19 protectionism The United States and South Korea should take a stand against export protectionism in medical supplies and personal protective equipment, urge WTO members to abide by the transparency and reporting requirements of these temporary measures, and promote transparency in stockpiling programs and cooperate to develop trusted supplier networks.   Coordinating on WTO reform The ongoing trilateral effort (U.S., EU, Japan) would benefit from South Korea’s participation as it seeks to develop updated rules on industrial subsidies and disciplines for state-owned enterprises. The United States and South Korea should advocate fixing the Appellate Body system to enable the reactivation of its dispute settlement mechanism. For the United States in particular, this will require articulating concrete reform measures that would satisfy its concerns with judicial overreach.   Disseminating regional and transregional standards on the digital economy The United States and South Korea have advanced tech sectors and common interests in ensuring strong IP protections, freedom of data flows, and rules to promote the digital economy. They should collaborate with countries that abide by these standards to negotiate a plurilateral trade agreement on the digital economy.   Admission to the CPTPP Both the United States and South Korea remain outside the regional trade agreement with the most ambitious tariff elimination targets and with a rulebook that addresses state capitalism trading practices: the CPTPP. Admission bids on their part would greatly strengthen the reach of this trade grouping by encouraging existing members to ratify and encouraging others to join.   The CPTPP chapter is closer to the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement’s IP provisions (with no extended protection on biologicals) and the U.S. could make a push for targeted revisions on environment and labor standards. CPTPP members will have asks of their own, including assurances that the U.S. will not resort to unilateral tariffs against members for alleged unfair trading practices. This could take the form of a U.S. commitment to not bypass the CPTPP dispute settlement process with a 301 investigation.     Author’s Biography ■ Mireya Solís is director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies, and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. Prior to her arrival at Brookings, Solís was a tenured associate professor at American University’s School of International Service. Solís received a doctorate in government and a master's in East Asian studies from Harvard University, and a bachelor's in international relations from El Colegio de México. Solís is an expert on Japanese foreign economic policy, U.S.-Japan relations, international trade policy, and Asia-Pacific economic integration. Her publications include Banking on Multinationals: Public Credit and the Export of Japanese Sunset Industries, Cross-Regional Trade Agreements: Understanding Permeated Regionalism in East Asia (co-editor), Competitive Regionalism: FTA Diffusion in the Pacific Rim. Solís has offered expert commentary to The New York Times, Financial Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Politico, The New Yorker, Nikkei, Kyodo News, Asahi Shimbun, Jiji Press, Japan Times, NHK World, Bloomberg, CNN, and BBC, among others.  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:24px;} Editor's Note On November 13, 2020, the EAI and Brookings institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". In session 2: economy, energy, and environment, YoungJa Bae addressed that it would be desirable to restrict technology that has obvious national security implications. The problem lies in the fact that since many technologies are of civilian nature, specifying what technologies and products hold such threats and those that should be regulated under the national security perspective is vague. The relationship between national security and trade investment needs to be discussed in a multilateral framework. This is also where the leadership role of the United States is important as it needs to help form multilateral norms regarding trade, investment and national security.     Quotes from the Paper   US-China Technology Rivalry Amid the recent trade conflict between the US and China in the Trump administration, high-tech such as semiconductors, 5G, and AI have been at the center. China has been challenging the US's advantage in the high-tech sector, and the US has tried to deter it in various ways of trade sanctions, export controls, investment regulations, restrictions on the exchange of researchers, and intellectual property lawsuits. Semiconductor, 5G, and AI are known to be the main tools driving a new economic paradigm related to the fourth industrial revolution, and these technologies are expected to be the keys for economic competitiveness in the 21st century. In addition, these technologies are typical dual-use technologies that can determine the performance of various advanced weapons.   Implication for US-Korea Technology Cooperation The US-China technology rivalry and the decoupling of the US-China in the global ICT supply chain have been causing great challenges to many countries, including Korea, which have gotten entangled within complex and mutually interdependent global economic network. In this highly integrated global economy, a country would have difficulty in restricting economic and technological relationships on the national security grounds. While many countries share some of the US’s concerns regarding China, most of them also want to maintain proper relations with China as well as the US and avoid having to choose one of them. In the Biden administration, the pressures against China are expected to continue, maybe, in a somewhat relaxed form, and the formation of a technology alliance in line with the grand multilateral strategy against China could be discussed in detail.     Author’s Biography ■ YoungJa Bae is a Professor of the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Konkuk University. Dr. Bae received her PhD in political science at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in the United States and serves on the policy advisory committee to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and vice chairman of the Korean Association of International Studies. She was a visiting scholar at National Taiwan University under Taiwan Fellowship. Her main research interests include international politics and S&T, science diplomacy, and international political economy. Her major papers include "Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment and National Security," "US-China competition and Science and Technology Innovation" and "S&T Diplomacy as Public Diplomacy: Theoretical Understanding".