In an effort to address the challenges facing South Korea since its democratization in 1987, the East Asia Institute (EAI) has proposed new institutional strategies for the desirable role, power, and responsibility of the president through the projects The Presidency in Korea in 2002 and Presidential Transitions in Korea in 2007. Today, the rapid growth of social networking technologies creates new dynamics which requires South Korea to meet the demands for increased political participation and interactive communication.   In response, the EAI has reviewed achievements from previous government administrations and launched The Presidency in Korea 2013, which seeks to develop governance that will facilitate the decision-making process of the president engaged in this new political environment. On July 12, 2012, Professor Hyung Jun Park who has served as the Senior Secretary to the President for Political Affairs during the Lee Myung-bak administration was invited to speak at the sixth round table meeting. The following is a summary of the meeting.   The Limitation of State Capacity   Considering all the various aspects involved in managing state affairs, reforming or remodeling the nation to a planned-level cannot be done through simply the president’s leadership alone. Not only are there certain limits to the state’s capacity under today’s conditions, there are also the effects of the Blue House staff, the difficulty with government bureaucracy, and relations with the National Assembly. Therefore, in order to have a successful presidency, the right diagnosis as well as an effective prescription for the expected obstacles is required.   A president’s capability to manage state affairs is constrained by the state’s capacity. Four points need to be considered in this regard. First, conceiving of state autonomy is problematic given that the concept of nation-state sovereignty has been weakened due to globalization where the power of the markets and civil society is growing. As the significance of external affairs becomes more important in South Korea, the nation sometimes heads in an unintended direction from what a president expected. For example, when President Lee Myung-bak entered office, he had to adopt his policies to cope with the global economic crisis instead of pushing ahead with his planned policies to enhance the economy.   The second aspect is that the administration must address the level of anticipation from the people that has increased greatly since democratization. The authoritarian governments of the past had the luxury of being able to push through policies under their strong leadership. The governments of today, however, find it difficult to take the initiative due to their limited capacity. This can even result in a national crisis when the government overestimates its capacity and pushes through policies that are beyond its limits.   The third aspect is the severe polarization within South Korean society. Social welfare is still at a poor level and there are certain limits to the capacity of the government to solve this problem. However, since the actual disparity that people feel is more severe than the statistics show, policies to solve the structural aspects of social polarization is crucial. At the same time, the government must learn to sympathize with the interests of the people. The gap that exists between the reality and the expectations among the people is not just about polices or the system, but rather a more general problem about politics.   The fourth and final aspect is the fact that the capability of the state is weak in terms of knowledge and information. In the past, the state was strong in information capabilities when compared to other sectors of society to the extent that the state had a monopoly over information. However, such control over knowledge and information has been weakened as the role and capacity of the private sector has increased significantly. This would imply that the term “knowledge government” is no longer an accurate description. On top of that, the culture of a bureaucratic society where even talented officials are reluctant to practice creative ideas or policies makes it harder for governments to implement preemptive measures to the changing circumstances.   Managing the Blue House Staff   A successful presidency will be assisted by staff that is able to act as the helmsman in managing statecraft. However, it is difficult to maintain consistency in statecraft considering the frequent changes in Blue House staff that occurs in the five year, single-term system. Generally, the Blue House staff consists of those who were actively involved in the president’s election campaign rather than people who are skilled in statecraft. At the same time, the skilled and talented personnel from the previous administration are immediately excluded due to ideological differences. The outcome is that the incoming administration is in a situation where amateurs are managing professional statecraft.   In order for a new administration to prove its ability, a learning period is required. However, there is little patience for this among the people and the media. With no room for mistakes, there is concern that it will be difficult to recover trust that is likely to be lost at the beginning of the administration. Thus, the Blue House must possess a plan that is concerned with the statecraft mechanism, issue management, and relation-building with other government officials. This includes contingency plans in the event of a crisis occurring. Considering the reality where a crisis can happen at any time and always unexpectedly, the ideal operational mechanism is one where government officials can take care of managing state affairs and Blue House staff can focus on the crisis. The Lee administration was able to manage the global financial crisis well because of a well-constructed crisis management system.   Strengthening the Role of Public Relations   The Blue House is a political organization, yet any incoming administration must understand that it consists of state affairs, policies, and public relations. The difficulties of communication are often found and experienced at every moment. The root of this problem comes from officials who tend to view coordination as a form of competition between different divisions and thus ignoring the fact that all policies are political issues. On top of that, these divisions tend not to look at the big picture. Thus, the different division heads in the Blue House who are in charge of managing and coordinating staff should not only be competent in state affairs, policies, and public relations but should also act as a “control tower” that can facilitate communication between the different divisions. The absence of communication between the different divisions usually results in conflict over policies and misunderstandings due to miscommunication in the process of delivering policies. The case of the Cheonan sinking is an example of unnecessary misunderstanding among Blue House staff which was caused by the poor handling of communication.   The role of public relations is not just about delivering information but is also about organizing policies effectively. In most cases, figures from the media are appointed as the head of public relations and are thus competent in this field. However, public relations and relations with the press are different, which means there are limits in coordinating an effective policy making process. Another problem is that even though the importance of public relations has grown in an era of open communication, the role of the Blue House and its public relations office has weakened. Effective communication is not just about the hardware but also about the software. It does not matter how much information the government produces as it would all be meaningless if it is not delivered properly. Despite this obvious point, the government still focuses more on the hardware rather than on developing the contents or marketing government information. When the new administration organizes the Blue House upon its inauguration in 2013, there needs to be some deep consideration on how to manage public relations in regards to the problems outlined above.   Management of the “Inner-Circle”   No matter which administration is in power, under the single-term, five-year system, the emergence of an inner-circle is likely. Such an inner-circle consists of a few powerful people within the administration who deal with personnel matters and the management of the important political offices. If this inner-circle has a clear philosophy on statecraft, a dynamic ability of balancing, and ethics of self-moderation, it would avoid political problems. However, if it becomes a political faction due to power struggles, serious political conflicts would arise within the presidential administration. In particular, if the inner-circle appoints personnel based on special connections, resistance within the government will develop. This could lead to a problem between the inner-circle and the Blue House and, in turn, could act as an obstacle in managing state affairs. In this regard, it would be better to simply check the emergence of an inner-circle at the beginning of the administration and ensure a smooth management of state affairs.   Three Leadership Qualities for the Next President   Future presidents should possess political leadership qualities that will enable them to realize their election pledges and policies. As mentioned before, it is important to recognize the limitation of the national capacity. When this premise has been set, the president and the Blue House can address state affairs and embrace other views from different voices in society. With this approach, future presidents will be able to move away from the “barricade politics” of the past and can then fulfill the expectations of the public through sympathy and integration. It is time that a president utilizes a flexible leadership which can encompass the different generations and regions within South Korea. Furthermore, future presidents should also include the following three qualities.   Popular Leadership: Popular support is an essential requirement for a successful presidency. As social polarization grows, political leadership that can touch the heart of the people is crucial. According to research conducted on U.S. presidents, there were many who endured low popularity ratings despite their high achievements, such as Lyndon B. Johnson. There were also those who depended upon high ratings rather than successful achievements, such as John F. Kennedy. And there are the rare cases of Abraham Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan who succeeded in connecting their policy achievements with popular support. However, gaining popular support is not something that can be achieved in one go, thus, these examples show that the importance in the qualities of language, character, and knowledge.   Global Leadership: Diplomatic relations in a globalized era are dependent on a leader’s individual capabilities and communication skills. Due to conflicting interests between countries, a leader should have some personal charm in order to persuade other heads of states and to develop positive diplomatic relations. The reason why many widely recognized leaders of developed countries are from financial backgrounds is because they have distinguished expertise and experience in operating in an international environment. Even a leader of a relatively small country can gain popular support and power as a leader if one proposes a desirable vision that the world should aim for. In the case of President Lee Myung-bak, he has achieved global leadership through his Green Growth Vision, improving friendly relations with other countries, hosting the G20, and managing the effects of the global financial crisis. Future presidents in South Korea should also exercise similar global leadership which can link South Korea’s national interests with a global agenda.   North Korea Policy: Since North Korea is becoming a more important challenge in both domestic and foreign affairs; an effective policy will be a requirement for the next president. Shifting from ten years of the Sunshine Policy under the previous progressive governments, the current conservative government has used a more principled approach toward North Korea, yet no significant results have been achieved. During the next administration’s term, the president will have to assess the stability of Kim Jong-un’s regime and consider the direction of change in North Korea. In this respect, in order to carry out effective policies toward North Korea and construct a new order on the Korean Peninsula, the new administration must also be able to read the international environment and use strategic thinking.■         About the Speaker Hyung Jun Park received his PhD from the Department of Sociology, Korea University and is now teaching at the Department of Sociology, Dong-A University. He has served as a member of the National Assembly, Joint Spokesperson of the Grand National Party, the Blue House Chief Spokesperson, Senior Secretary to the President for Political Affairs of the Executive Office of the President, and Special Assistant to the Blue House for Social Affairs.   Moderator Sook-Jong Lee, President of the East Asia Institute Discussants Wonchil Chung, East Asia Institute Kyou-Sup Han, Seoul National University Yong Suk Jang, Yonsei University Han Wool Jeong, East Asia Institute Won-Taek Kang, Seoul National University Nae-Young Lee, Korea University Jaeyeol Yee, Seoul National University Kon Su Yi, East Asia Institute Seong-I Yoon, Kyung Hee University

In an effort to address the challenges facing South Korea since its democratization in 1987, the East Asia Institute (EAI) has proposed new institutional strategies for the desirable role, power, and responsibility of the president through the projects The Presidency in Korea in 2002 and Presidential Transitions in Korea in 2007. Today, the rapid growth of social networking technologies creates new dynamics which requires South Korea to meet the demands for increased political participation and interactive communication.   In response, the EAI has reviewed achievements from previous government administrations and launched The Presidency in Korea 2013, which seeks to develop governance that will facilitate the decision-making process of the president engaged in this new political environment. On June 21, 2012, Jong-in Kim, Chairman of the Research Institute for Korean Development Strategies and former Senior Secretary to the President for Economic Affairs was invited to speak at the fifth roundtable meeting. The following is the summary of the main contents of the meeting. The President is the Problem   One of the main reasons for the failings of previous administrations in South Korea is the president himself. Their only focus was on being elected to the extent that they did not have any concrete vision or plan on what to do after they won. Although a president should always prioritize the most pressing issues, former presidents in South Korea have often not completed this basic task. Instead, presidents have served their terms in office being almost wholly dependent on government officials. A president cannot perform effectively in his job when he depends upon rigid government officials while the international environment and domestic opinion is constantly changing. Even presidents who have made sufficient preparations tend to endure difficult times during their term in office. It is inevitable then that presidents who only made impulsive pledges during the campaign period will come to depend too much upon government officials when he or she enters office. Simply making reforms or changes among government officials is not the answer to this problem. With only a five-year single-term system, the president must explain clearly his or her agenda to the people from the very beginning.   One of the reasons why President Kim Young-sam was unable to achieve success was that he lacked his own agenda. During his term as president, his policies evolved out of his own political instincts and reading of public opinion. Yet for all the problems during his presidency, government officials still blindly followed him. These were some of the factors that led to the difficulties South Korea faced when confronting the Asian Financial Crisis.   Overcome the Legacy of Authoritarianism   Despite the last twenty-five years of democracy in South Korea, the country still has not been able to overcome the socio-economic conflicts that built-up under the military dictatorships of the past. This is due to the fact that former presidents have all stuck to the economic growth strategy forged under the Park Chung-hee dictatorship. The Asian Financial Crisis was the perfect opportunity to change South Korea’s distorted economic structure, however the Kim Dae-jung administration choose the easy way out and saved the chaebols or conglomerates by providing them with public funds. These measures ultimately resulted in strengthening the power of the chaebols. The Roh Moo-hyun administration acted in a similar way. Because the administration came to power with little preparation, the economic policies were implemented based on ideas from the chaebol-affiliated research institutes. Ironically, over the past ten years of progressive administrations, the power of the chaebols has grown stronger and the polarization in society has worsened. As yet presidents in South Korea have been unable to break away from Park Chung-hee’s economic model of relying upon growth. President Lee Myung-bak who came to power as the “economy president” is the most faithful follower of Park Chung-hee’s economic model. Given this background, one can understand the rise and popularity of independent politicians, such as Seoul Mayor Park Won-soon and presidential candidate Ahn Cheol-soo. Although democratization in South Korea has advanced, the socio-economic legacy of the Park Chung-hee era remains. If this severe economic polarization in society is not resolved, the next president will be unlikely to achieve any success in his or her policies. Strengthen Economic Democracy   South Korea has the second worst case of wealth distribution after the United States. The economic policies of previous governments have resulted in great polarization in society. As the Kim Yong-sam administration pursued political democratization, the government’s power weakened while the influence of the chaebols became stronger. This led to the nation’s policy function being dominated by the power of the markets due to relaxation of regulations, opening of markets, and a weakening of regulatory oversight. In particular, the growing dependency on political funds from the chaebols has had a major effect on the way politics is conducted. The legislation process has also been similarly affected by increased lobbying from the chaebols. Their economic power has grown too big and now dominates every facet of society. If the government does not control this expansion of economic power, the polarization within society will only become worse. As the chaebols are often at the source of conflict and division within society, measures must be adopted to control their all-powerful influence. However, the human instinct to be greedy makes this a difficult challenge to address. The solution is for the visible hand of the government to do what the invisible hand of the markets cannot do. Economic democracy is about providing an institutional strategy to regulate excess greed. In the process of making progress with economic democracy, opposing economic forces will resist strongly. Thus, a president will need the trust of the people in order to push through such change. President Roh Moo-hyun correctly recognized the situation of the time, and placed tackling economic polarization and enhancing social integration as one of his main policies. However, despite it being at the top of his agenda, he was unable to achieve any success. This is due to the way that he did not create any specific polices and was also not properly prepared for the tasks at hand. In this sense, a president must be prepared to have a clear vision for economic democracy and must also possess specific policy capabilities. The Road to Presidential Success   Recently there has been a lot of support for making a constitutional amendment to the current five-year, single-term system. However, this does not address the problem and there is no guarantee that a president can succeed with a four-year, two-term presidential system. In the current political environment, if the system changes to a two-term presidency the first four years will only serve the function of preparing a president for his or her second term. If a president makes effective preparations for his or her policies and selects the right personnel, then the current single-term system is more than sufficient time. Success will certainly be guaranteed if the president proposes an agenda that is able to meet the challenges of the time and win the people’s trust. One of the important conditions for success is the president’s knowledge on security, economy, and education as he or she will be selecting the ministers, a process which must be done in advance. In particular, the choice of who will be the chief of staff, the brain of statecraft, will ultimately decide the success or failure of the president. Previous administrations have all made the same mistake in appointing personnel from among their campaign staff who often lack any statecraft skills. This problem can end up being magnified when someone who does not know much about how to manage the country is chosen. Another difficulty with selecting the right personnel is that political parties are focused centrally on a strong presidential candidate or a senior political figure. This means that the political parties are usually unable to put forward talented individuals who can serve the government effectively and suggests the need for a new generation of politicians to be trained through a revised political process. Finally, a successful president must exercise caution and not become too dependent on the people around him. A president should be able to recognize and attract outstanding individuals. As the past cases of presidents who failed to make policy achievements show, the president must be very careful in selecting his staff. Ultimately, the president himself should be someone who is completely free from interest groups or economic influences. ■       About the Speaker Jong-in Kim received his PhD in economics from Münster University and was a professor of economics at Sogang University. He was served four terms as a member of the National Assembly from 1981 to 2004, and was also Minister of Health and Social Affairs in 1989 and Senior Presidential Secretary for Economic Affairs in 1990. Currently, he is the Chairman of the Research Institute for Korean Development Strategies. Moderator Sook-Jong Lee, President of the East Asia Institute   Discussants Wonchil Chung, East Asia Institute Kyou-Sup Han, Seoul National University Yong Suk Jang, Yonsei University Han Wool Jeong, East Asia Institute Won-Taek Kang, Seoul National University Nae-Young Lee, Korea University Jaeyeol Yee, Seoul National University Kon Su Yi, East Asia Institute Seong-I Yoon, Kyung Hee University

In an effort to address the challenges facing South Korea since its democratization in 1987, the East Asia Institute (EAI) has proposed new institutional strategies for the desirable role, power, and responsibility of the president through the projects The Presidency in Korea in 2002 and Presidential Transitions in Korea in 2007. Today, the rapid growth of social networking technologies creates new dynamics which requires South Korea to meet the demands for increased political participation and interactive communication.   In response, the EAI has reviewed achievements from previous government administrations and launched The Presidency in Korea 2013, which seeks to develop governance that will facilitate the decision-making process of the president engaged in this new political environment. On May 11th, 2012, the EAI held its fourth round table discussion with Won Jong Lee who was former Senior Secretary to the President for Public Affairs. This is the main summary of the discussion.   The President’s Historical Legacy   Under both authoritarian regimes and democratic administrations, it can be said that presidents in South Korea have to some extent managed to establish some sort of historical legacy during their term in office. In the case of President Rhee Syngman – the founding of the nation, President Park Chung-hee – the industrialization of the country, President Chun Doo-hwan–stability after the collapse of the Park Chung-hee government, and President Roh Tae-woo achieved his legacy through his Nordpolitik policy. President Kim Young-sam achieved his legacy by transforming the country from the military-based values of the past thirty years to new civil-based values. President Kim Dae-jung advanced discussions on unification and peaceful coexistence with North Korea. The Roh Moo-hyun administration created the circumstances and environment for participatory democracy through a non-authoritative leadership. However, in case of the Lee Myung-bak administration, the legacy that it will leave behind does not seem to be clear. The Lee administration successfully came to power by understanding the needs of the time and emphasizing his role as an “economy president,” however, it is quite hard to see what legacy the administration has been trying to establish since.   What kind of historical legacy should the next president aim for? It is not so easy to predict since a president’s historical legacy is not just something given. However, it is clear that a future president should avoid relying upon populism to establish a historical legacy. Effective political leadership can understand the voices of the time with a historical context and vision in order to foresee the changes that are about to emerge in the world. Furthermore, close cooperation with the public can help to prepare and develop policies toward forming a legacy.   The Political Environment Needs Change   The political environment that a president currently operates in limits the chances for success due to the fact that politics is usually dominated by personalities rather than ideas or visions. Discussions should be held to determine which issues must be changed and adjusted to fit the reality and how democratic political parties can properly facilitate the politics. Political parties in South Korea tend not to form around any ideology or beliefs, but are mainly focused on support from a particular region. Since the party does not have common beliefs, the ideology or vision of the party leader ultimately decides the party’s identity. The problem of this personality-based system is an outcome where if voters only support a specific person of a party, the content of the policies tend to matter little. Similarly, if the voters are against a specific person, regardless of quality of the policies suggested, they will unconditionally vote against the person. Under such a reality, it is hard for a successful president to emerge.   The parties must recognize the need to change or their political role will be taken over by civic groups who can address the issues more effectively. In order to overcome this problem, political parties in South Korea must become comprehensive issue-based parties. Only in this way can democracy prosper.   Reform of the political parties must also seek to resolve the problem of communication. This begins by recognizing or acknowledging who the “others” are. In this sense, it is critical for parties to have a clear identity so that it will be an easy for the people to decide who to support. It will also make it possible to differentiate between a person who is supporting the party and a person who blindly follows a specific politician. Such a reform will ultimately lead to enhancing a party’s responsibility.   Another priority is to change the nomination system within the political parties. The current top-down system where a political leader is only concerned about support from other powerful politicians within the party rather than the public should be transformed into a more practical bottom-up system. In this regard, an open-primary system would go some way toward democratizing the selection processes within the political parties. Beginning with party reform, a successful president can be established.   Define Clear Roles for Blue House Staff   Since the Blue House is the center of governance, the success and failure of a president depends upon the role of his or her staff. The structure of the Blue House can be altered depending on the political tendency of the president. In the case of the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the President’s Office was divided into a secretariat office and a policy office. However, this duality has been shown to be difficult for the president to practice effective statecraft.   In what ways can changes be made to the presidential staff in order to enhance the success of the president? Theoretically, the presidential staff should deliver the president’s vision and the political philosophy so that the ministers of each department can put into practice his or her political will. An additional task of the president’s staff is to monitor whether the policy of the government aligns with the president’s political philosophy. On top of that, the staff should also keep the president informed with related facts to facilitate the implementation of his or her policies. However, if the Blue House tries to do everything and leaves no role for the cabinet, it becomes impossible for the president to be able to practice statecraft efficiently.   Since democratization in South Korea, relations between the president, parties, and the National Assembly have become an important variable in achieving success. The Blue House must define its role with the ruling party and avoid running into a deadlock. Theoretically, it is the ruling party that has managed relations with the opposition. However since the Kim Dae-jung administration, the Blue House has begun to take on responsibilities from the ruling party by defending against criticism from the opposition. As a result, rather than sharing statecraft roles, the ruling party now tends to pass on the responsibilities to the Blue House.   The President’s Political Leadership   In this era of governance, the more forceful leadership that was seen during the Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung administrations is no longer feasible. Presidential administrations these days must possess the capacity to mediate and integrate, which are considered to be the ultimate goals in achieving success in politics.   When a new administration enters office, they must promise to reform the limitations that faced the previous administrations. At the beginning of the administration, it is relatively easy for the president to push his or her reforms as there is a relatively high support from the public. However, as the president’s time in office progresses, not only will public support decrease but he or she will also face complex interests which will make it harder to push through their reform policies. Again this highlights the need for political leadership that holds the capacities to mediate and integrate.   Political leadership in South Korea should not adopt an authoritative style in managing government officials. Although government officials in South Korea are competent, they can also be somewhat closed and exclusive making cooperation hard to earn. This does not mean that government officials should be the target of reform or considered adversaries, it means that the president must have the leadership qualities to make full use of government officials’ abilities. Yet this can be too much for the president to manage by himself. Assigning the responsibilities of personnel management to the cabinet is one way of addressing the issue of responsibilities. In this case though, the president should still assume overall responsibility and must not pass all the blame onto the cabinet for any failings.   Finally, most of the misfortunes that occurred under previous presidents did not come from policy failures but largely from cases of corruption among the people close to the president. This kind of corruption is not an individual problem but an issue of power due to one’s ties with the president. Given this problem, a president must always be aware of the fact that this could happen among the people around him. In the eyes of the public, corruption among relatives or people close to the president will be a sign of a betrayal. It is crucial that the president keep this mind so that he or she can avoid this pitfall. ■         About the Speaker Won Jong Lee received his B.A. in the Department of Economics at Korea University. He served as the press secretary for New Democracy Party in 1976 and Special Assistant of the Public Information for the Democratic Reunification Party in 1987. After serving as the under secretary of the Public Information Agency in 1993, he worked as the Senior Secretary to the President for Political Affairs at the Presidential Secretariat. He is currently serving as the chairman of the board for Woori Noori (incorporated association) and also teaches as a professor at the Universities of Myongji, Inha and Hanyang. Moderator Sook-Jong Lee, President of the East Asia Institute   Discussants Wonchil Chung, East Asia Institute Kyou-Sup Han, Seoul National University Yong Suk Jang, Yonsei University Han Wool Jeong, East Asia Institute Won-Taek Kang, Seoul National University Nae-Young Lee, Korea University Jaeyeol Yee, Seoul National University Kon Su Yi, East Asia Institute Seong-I Yoon, Kyung Hee University

In an effort to address the challenges facing South Korea since its democratization in 1987, the East Asia Institute (EAI) has proposed new institutional strategies for the desirable role, power, and responsibility of the president through the projects The Presidency in Korea in 2002 and Presidential Transitions in Korea in 2007. Today, the rapid growth of social networking technologies creates new dynamics which requires South Korea to meet the demands for increased political participation and interactive communication.   In response, the EAI has reviewed achievements from previous government administrations and launched The Presidency in Korea 2013, which seeks to develop governance that will facilitate the decision-making process of the president engaged in this new political environment. On April 5th, 2012, the EAI held its third roundtable discussion with Dong-Kwan Lee, former Senior Secretary to the President for Public Affairs. The following is a summary of the discussion.   Sharing the Same Political DNA   A successful presidency depends upon the support of strong political forces. In order to be effective, these groups must share the same political DNA, or the same political values and ideologies with the president. When the president experiences difficulties, the number of different political forces that he or she can depend upon is an important determinant in pursuing policy objectives.   Since democratization, the previous administrations of Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, and Roh Moo-hyun were all supported by strong political forces. However, the Lee Myung-bak administration has not been able to build up reliable support base of strong political forces that he could depend upon. During the 2007 presidential election, President Lee was able to draw upon the so-called “new right forces” that were unhappy with the strong left-leaning policies of the Roh administration. Their values of neo-liberalism, national sovereignty, globalization, liberalization of education, and human rights of North Korea came to form the core of the Lee administration’s policies. However, this support base failed to become a strong political force involved in governance and was then unable to support the Lee administration during the difficult periods.   Building a Support Base   The lack of supporting political forces makes it almost impossible for a president to overcome the limits inherent in the five-year, single-term presidential system. Regardless of how well a president is prepared, the administration will struggle in persuading the people to back its policy choices. It also becomes difficult to manage the trials and errors that arise at the beginning of the inauguration. Furthermore, the administration tends to be the target of fierce political attacks during the mid-term elections. Without strong political forces that can be relied upon, it is hard for the president to defend against such fierce political attacks which then undermines policy approaches.   This is one of the reasons why the current Lee administration has failed to defend itself against political attacks from the opposition. With the experiences of the previous administration in mind, the next Presidential Transition Team should not only focus on designing policy but also consider how they will build an influential political force that can help them govern over the next five years.   Image and Communication Counts   The mishandling of the president’s image at the beginning of the Lee administration was arguably the biggest difficulty in implementing its policies despite the fact that the administration entered office with a high public approval rating. The Lee administration tried to portray itself as “people-friendly pragmatic centrists” and advocated policies that were progressive in terms of society and conservative in terms of national security. This ideological flexibility can also be understood through the Lee’s administration slogan of “left or right, so long as it helps the people, we must adopt the policy.” Despite this flexible approach, the Lee administration has been generally perceived as cozying up too much to big business and the rich. This is mainly a result of the failure in the way the administration has managed its image from when it first entered office.   This perception though misses the fact that the Lee administration at the beginning of its term in 2008 faced the global financial crisis and in response adopted an export-led and large corporation-based strategy as a way to overcome economic difficulties. Still, the responsibility for failing to push through follow-up policies such as creating new jobs or education reform lies with the ruling Saenuri Party-led populism. This opposition within the ruling party made it impossible for an administration without any supporting political forces to push forward all its centrist-reform policies.   The lack of communication can also be interpreted in a similar regard. Without supporting political forces, the administration lacked “amplifiers” for its policies. Blue House officials also tend to only speak out on issues when it is beneficial to the administration and fail to defend themselves when facing strong criticism. The success of putting across the president’s message as well as the management of his image does not solely depend on the efforts of the president and his staff in the Blue House. Academia, civil groups, and the media that are part of the president’s support base should act more in their role as “speakers” to support certain policies.   With a five-year, single-term system, there is not enough time for a president to revise errors that have occurred at the beginning of his or her term in office due to new officials replacing the previous administration during the transition period. In this respect, there needs to be a mechanism in place that can harness the experience of the previous administration to support the president-elect. While this could work in theory, in practice this would be very difficult as there are usually strong ideological differences in South Korea. The decline of the Chosun Dynasty in Korea is an important lesson on how internal political conflicts can weaken vastly a country’s power.   The Neglected Center   The virtues that the next president in South Korea must possess are communication and political leadership. President Lee, whose strengths lay in managerial leadership, lacked these virtues of communication and political capability as noted before. There are also cases where no matter how good or right the direction of the policies, the absence of political support means that a president will unlikely be positively evaluated in the future. U.S. President Jimmy Carter failure to be reelected is a very good example in this regard that highlights the importance of both political leadership and supporting political forces.   The centrist forces in South Korean society are not well reflected in current party politics, which are hindered by division of interests, intensification of ideological disputes, and political mudslinging. As both the ruling party and the opposition party are only interested in pursuing their self-interests, the isolation of the centrist political forces intensifies as does their criticism of mainstream politics.   The recent popularity of political outsider Ahn Chul-soo when he entered the presidential race can be interpreted as the result of the disillusionment with mainstream politics among the centrist political forces. In the 2012 presidential election, the candidate who wins the support of the centre will certainly succeed. However, no matter who becomes the president, if he or she fails to build a strong political force to support his or her policies then it will become difficult again to run a smooth administration. With only a five-year, single-term system, the president must build a strong and effective political force; otherwise he or she will be unlikely to build a positive legacy. ■         About the Speaker Dong-Kwan Lee received his B.A. in Politics at Seoul National University. He joined Dong-A Ilbo in 1985 and was Tokyo Correspondent, director of the department of politics and editorial writer. He mainly had expertise in the field of Korean politics and inter-Korean relations and was awarded the Korean Journalist Award and the Seoul Press Award. After consecutively serving as the Spokesman for the 17th Presidential Transition Team, Spokesman for the Blue House and Senior Secretary to the President for Public Affairs, he assisted the President as Executive for Public Affairs. He also worked as Special Assistant for the Blue House Media from January 2011 to December 2011.   Moderator Sook-Jong Lee, President of the East Asia Institute   Discussants Wonchil Chung, East Asia Institute Kyou-Sup Han, Seoul National University Yong Suk Jang, Yonsei University Han Wool Jeong, East Asia Institute Won-Taek Kang, Seoul National University Nae-Young Lee, Korea University Jaeyeol Yee, Seoul National University Kon Su Yi, East Asia Institute Seong-I Yoon, Kyung Hee University 

In an effort to address the challenges facing South Korea since its democratization in 1987, the East Asia Institute (EAI) has proposed new institutional strategies for the desirable role, power, and responsibility of the president through the projects The Presidency in Korea in 2002 and Presidential Transitions in Korea in 2007. Today, the rapid growth of social networking technologies creates new dynamics which requires South Korea to meet the demands for increased political participation and interactive communication.   In response, the EAI has reviewed achievements from previous government administrations and launched The Presidency in Korea 2013, which seeks to develop governance that will facilitate the decision-making process of the president engaged in this new political environment. On March 22, 2012, the EAI invited to its second roundtable discussion Kim Byong-Joon, Kookmin University, who has served various posts under former President Roh Moo-hyun, such as Chief National Policy Director in the Office of the President, Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister of Education and Human Resources Development. The following is a summary of the main contents of the meeting.   A Successful Presidency Begins with the Transition Period   Once the president-elect takes over the duties of the previous administration, he or she is expected to map out the new administration’s plans for the future. Ideally, the president must take on both the achievements and failings of the previous administration and use them to his or her advantage. Achievements are inherited, while failings are lessons to draw upon.   Contrary to this basic notion, the Lee Myung-bak administration did not build upon the efforts of the Roh Moo-hyun administration, perhaps due to the “amateurish government” label associated with the Roh administration. However, such an approach ultimately resulted in the waste of important political resources due to an abrupt shift in policies. For example, the sudden change in approach to North Korea by the Lee Myung-bak administration resulted in the breakdown of ties with Pyongyang and led to the loss of vital contacts with counterparts in the North that have been developed over the past decade under the previous two administrations.   Despite the importance of one’s own skills set, the president-elect cannot by himself achieve a successful outcome during the presidential transition process. Rather, the problem lies in the fact that there is no system that is designed to facilitate a smooth succession process. This makes it appear as if there was no plan on how to actually start running the new administration.   A successful execution of presidential duties begins with the presidential transition team creating a road map for the management of the new administration’s policies and requires an environment that enables for active participation in state affairs. Therefore, the composition of the transition team is crucial. Usually, the transition team consists of both scholars and politicians. While scholars tend to focus on producing policy reports, politicians are more concerned about lobbying their position to ensure that they will be involved in the new administration. Therefore, recruiting scholars or experts who are devoted to policy analysis as the majority members of the transition team is desirable.   Establish a Clear Road Map   The president in South Korea is subject to the high expectations of citizens, yet has to operate within a narrow base of authority. As such a roadmap outlining how the new administration will manage state affairs is essential. Without a clear road map, the administration will certainly struggle. As the president will always be subject to endless criticism, the lack of a road map will inevitably lead to more confusion over the administration’s policy approach.   Along with establishing a road map, the role of an advisor who can understand the president’s intention is important. This is because in the early stage of the administration, due to the overconformity from government officials, setting a direction for state affairs can deviate from the president’s policy objectives. Without a clear road map or if government officials do not understand the president’s objectives, there will likely be inefficiency in statecraft. One way to prevent this problem is to separate the policy office from the presidential secretariat in the Blue House as the tasks carried out by the two departments differ. The role of the president’s chief of staff is suitable for one with much political experience but politicians often lack specialty in certain policy issues. Thus, in order to accurately reflect the administration affairs and prevent distortion of the president’s political will, a more capable and stronger chief of policy is essential.   Communication Problems Leads to Failure   Of great importance when carrying out presidential duties is to avoid the distortion of information. Due to the president’s authority and conduct, cabinet members and advisors tend to avoid reporting certain information to the president. The distortion of information can worsen depending on the president’s behavior, especially when the president expresses strong opinions on certain issues. Information regarding public opinion is particularly easily distorted; such misrepresentation can bring about serious problems in the administration.   The president must ensure against any failings in communication with his or her staff. Above all else, the president’s views on administrative issues must be delivered clearly. Government officials are more attentive to the intentions of the Blue House rather than the orders of the ministers because the president has the ultimate authority, particularly when it comes to the promotion of high-ranking government officials. To avoid administrative conflicts that may consequently arise, the independence and empowerment of governmental departments must be strengthened.   A Government Works Together   The president must direct the government to work in unison. The degree of the government’s commitment toward the president differs with each department. Unlike the departments focused on domestic affairs, those agencies related to finance tend to value their own judgment. The government officials in the finance-related agencies also tend to be less motivated to stay in office. Because the senior-junior relationship is more important for high-ranking officials after retirement, a government official’s commitment towards his or her senior outweighs that shown toward the president. In addition, this seniority structure and the partition between departments limit the effectiveness of the president’s management of human resources.   It is therefore crucial to have in place a mechanism that ensures the loyalty of government departments. Such a mechanism does not seek to place the departments under the president’s direct control, but to make the government officials consider that they work for the benefit of the nation. In order to resolve such issues and promote effective management of human resources, the Roh administration introduced the Senior Executive Service. Under the current government though, this initiative seems to have stalled.   Strengthen the Role of the Prime Minister   In order to manage the various administrative tasks, inter-departmental cooperation must be more efficiently organized. Such a reform of the administrative system will depend upon the role of the prime minister’s office which can only be defined by the president. Ideally, the president is expected to assign appropriate duties and grant a certain degree of authority to the prime minister. One way this could be done is to let the Blue House primarily focus on foreign affairs and defense as well as the president’s own agenda, while the prime minister focuses on more domestic issues. But as power has always been concentrated upon the president, empowering the prime minister has always been a difficult challenge. For example, during the Roh administration, despite granting certain powers to the prime minister, the Blue House intervened in order to overcome certain obstacles. The role of the prime minister also depends heavily on the prime minister himself. People who are familiar with policy issues and can successfully carry out the role as a coordinator, such as former Prime Minister Lee Hae Chan, are likely to achieve many accomplishments. In reality though, due to the high expectation citizens have toward the president, even the smallest problems usually results in the president intervening.   One possible solution would be to select the prime minister from the ruling party. Such an option would detract presidential intervention as well secure governmental responsibilities from the ruling party. Still, in reality this too would be difficult to accomplish. Another option would be the creation of a committee of relevant government departments organized as a task force which would help to make progress in policy issues. Such a committee though would not possess any decision making rights or the right to introduce bills to the National Assembly, as its effectiveness can be secured by enabling relevant ministers to participate as members of the committee.   Enhance Consultations between the Government and the Ruling Party   When general elections or even by-elections are held during the president’s term in office, they often create an obstacle toward effective governance. In particular, the period before and after the elections are usually ridden with conflict between the government and the ruling party over policies. As the president’s popularity declines at the end of the “honeymoon period,” the ruling party faces a disadvantage during the off-year election. In such a situation, the president tends to avoid promoting policies which are at odds with those advocated by the ruling party. After the elections, the blame game between the government and the ruling party hinders effective government administration. Also, when policies disapproved by the opposition party are promoted, they often become subject to public criticism.   Given such disadvantages, policy negotiations between the government and the ruling party are crucial for enhancing effective governance. It is important to point out that the president cannot wield his power over the ruling party, since he does not have the authority to nominate members within his affiliated party. As such, without proper consultations between ranking administration and party officials, managing policy issues only becomes more difficult. Towards the end of the president’s term, the so-called “lame-duck season,” the authority of the president weakens considerably while the political parties wield a relatively stronger influence. If the relationship between the ruling party and the president sours during this period due to political differences, it is almost impossible for the administration to be effective at all. What is needed then is administrative reform that will facilitate effective governance. Measures to consider include making the president’s term equal to that of the National Assembly or limiting the presidency to four years.   Political parties must train policy experts, who can concentrate on the bigger picture and map out clearly policy issues. In order to reinforce the administrative responsibilities of the ruling party as well as those of the president, it would be more effective to bring members of the ruling party into the Blue House. However, the lack of skilled policy experts in the party often results in bureaucrats filling up positions in the Blue House. The lack of capable policy experts is what makes South Korea’s political system different from other countries.   Distinguish Long-Term National Issues from Administrative Tasks   Political polarization is a severe issue in South Korea that needs to be addressed. Although tackling political polarization was set as part of the national agenda during Roh administration, the severity of the problem means that it has yet to be resolved. Polarization is beyond the capacity of any single administration; it is a deeper problem. Given this challenge, the president must be capable of distinguishing between long-term national issues from administrative issues within his term. Selfish administrative decisions to boost his performance as president may waste the resources of the national budget and will only result in policy failure. The public must also stop using the president as a scapegoat for every administrative failure. Policies must be designed under the premise that individuals show support only for those that will benefit them. The public looks at the outcome rather than the purpose behind the efforts. Thus, devising a system that can benefit the majority is critical. It is therefore imperative that we form a working system that can maximize public benefit. ■         About the Speaker Professor Byong-Joon Kim received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Delaware, and is currently a professor in the Department of Public Administration and Public Policy at Kookmin University. Professor Kim was the chairman of the special committee on local self-government for the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice and policy advisor to former President Roh during the 2002 Campaign. Professor Kim also served as the chairman of Presidential Committee on Government Innovation and Decentralization, Chief policy secretary, Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister of Education and Human Resources Development under the Roh administration. Kim is currently the Director of Social Design Institute and Director of Institute for Public Policy and Management. His recently published books include There is No President for the 99% (2012).     Moderator Sook-Jong Lee, President of the East Asia Institute Discussants Wonchil Chung, East Asia Institute Kyou-Sup Han, Seoul National University Yong Suk Jang, Yonsei University Han Wool Jeong, East Asia Institute Won-Taek Kang, Seoul National University Nae-Young Lee, Korea University Jaeyeol Yee, Seoul National University Kon Su Yi, East Asia Institute Seong-I Yoon, Kyung Hee University 

Globalization, the advancement of democracy, and the growth of social media are all increasing the need for new governance. In addressing the challenges of this era, the East Asia Institute has been seeking new institutional recommendations for the desirable role, power, and responsibility of the president in South Korea. These efforts have been undertaken through the projects The Presidency in Korea in 2002 and Presidential Transitions in Korea in 2007. In particular, these projects have shown ways in which to secure leadership through stable statecraft or “the quality of governance.” In recent years, statecraft has become an important yet undervalued task in South Korean politics. With a new president due to be inaugurated in January 2013, the EAI launched The Presidency in Korea 2013 in order to look into the methods of statecraft and look back at the outcomes from previous presidential administrations in South Korea. Through this analysis, it hopes to understand the formation of governability and qualities needed to perform as a successful president in the context of this new political environment.   For this project, the EAI invited a wide range of speakers who have served in the presidential administrations of the post-democratization period in South Korea for roundtable discussions with scholars and experts. On February 22, 2012, Yeojoon Yoon, Chairman of the Korea Research Institute for Local Administration, was invited to speak at the first roundtable on the importance of statecraft for the South Korea presidency. The following is a summary of the main contents of the meeting.   The Lack of Statecraft in South Korea   Since democratization in 1987, successive South Korean presidents have received mostly negative evaluations of their performance in office. This has been mainly due to the fact that presidential candidates tend to focus solely on winning the election and rarely prepare themselves for what comes next. More often than not, they have overlooked the importance of statecraft or the ability to govern, which can determine the success or failure of a president as well as the performance of a nation.   The core elements which constitute statecraft is the ability to propose a suitable vision by recognizing the most urgent tasks and then to realize that vision as policies. Efforts in this regard include: creating or modifying policies; appointing the right personnel; and managing divisions within society. In order to achieve such efforts, it is important for a president to possess workable knowledge through comprehensive studies and experiences. Until now, the lack of effective statecraft among former presidents in South Korea has made it difficult for them to be successful.   The Importance of Publicness   A president’s lack of knowledge on publicness, which is the basis of the nation’s authority to exercise executive powers, results in a privatization of presidential power. This sense of private ownership of power by a president spreads to those who serve closely with him and to his family which usually results in cases of corruption. The failure of past presidents in South Korea was largely caused by this sense of private ownership of power. There is a misconception that state power won through an election is akin to a war trophy. This kind of thinking has led to harmful consequences where state power is treated as if it is the president’s own family fortune or so-called patrimonialism. Furthermore, a negative impact upon publicness can come from failed policies which bring economic and security instability and then generates mistrust from the people to believe that the state is unable to protect citizens and their property. This was very much the case for President Lee Myung-bak who had a negative impact upon publicness through similar policies.   It is important then that one of the main tasks for the next president is to rebuild publicness and a practical starting point would be in the selection of administration officials. This process should seek to avoid personal preferences which have often created distrust among the public. Rather administration officials should be selected carefully and based on a person with the right talent for the right position according to the official standard. If a talented person who does not have a personal relationship with the president is selected for the right position, it will earn the trust from all sectors of society.   Rethink Democracy   Next is a president’s understanding of the workings of democracy. It has been twenty-five years since the democratization of South Korea and yet even among the leaders who struggled for democracy during the authoritarian period such as former Presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, democracy has not been properly exercised.   It is ironic that those who devoted their lives for democracy against the military regime of the past have exercised a kind of authoritarian statecraft. This is because they did not fully understand how to operate a government in a democracy. In this case they focused only on procedural democracy rather than statesmanship. This lead to a lack of understanding related to parliamentary politics, relations with opposition parties, and the media. It has also resulted in these presidents having become heavily involved in parliamentary elections in order to favor the ruling party. This lack of consensus in the decision-making process by exercising power arbitrarily goes against the principles of democracy.   In this vein, it is difficult to categorize Presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung as leaders who operated through democratic institutions. Alongside them, President Lee Myung-bak has had problems in the way he has communicated with society because he disrupted the political party system which is supposed to serve as the indirect communication channel in a democracy.   Economic Democratization leads to Political Democratization   As part of the foundation for political democratization, economic democratization is also an important agenda which requires effective presidential statecraft. Although the Park Chung Hee era was authoritative, checks and balances on the chaebols or business conglomerates were possible. However, after democratization, the rapid expansion of the chaebols and the sharp decline of the state’s ability to control them are considered as roadblocks toward the development of democratization in South Korea. In this context, former President Roh Moo-hyun once remarked that “power had crossed to the market.” Furthermore, the lack of presidential statecraft has led to a dependency among policy makers on the chaebol-affiliated economic research institutes for policy ideas. As a result, the nation’s policy has more or less become a tool that serves the interests of the business community.   The people’s discontent has grown as they see the chaebols failing to invest in new jobs despite earning large profits under the Lee administration’s pro-business policies. As the polarization of South Korean society grows wider, economic democratization will be the main agenda for the next president. In the case of the four presidents since democratization, we have seen that without electing a president, who possesses the right sense of statecraft, it becomes an immensely difficult task to run the country. The future of South Korea will depend upon effective presidential statecraft. The hope is that the future president will set publicness as a core value and utilize effectively statecraft based upon good knowledge and awareness of democracy. ■         About the Speaker Yeojoon Yoon was a reporter at Dong-A Ilbo and Kyunghyang Shinmun. Since 1977, he has devoted himself as a Public Information Officer and has served as the Special Assistant to the Director for Public Affairs and the President’s Senior Communication Secretary. In 1997, he served as the Minster of Environment and in 2000, was elected as an assemblyman for the 16th National Assembly. He served two terms as the head of the Youido Institue and currently is the Chairman of the Board for the Korea Local Development Institute. He has recently published the book Statecraft (2011).   Moderator Sook-Jong Lee, President of the East Asia Institute Discussants Wonchil Chung, East Asia Institute Kyou-Sup Han, Seoul National University Yong Suk Jang, Yonsei University Han Wool Jeong, East Asia Institute Won-Taek Kang, Seoul National University Nae-Young Lee, Korea University Jaeyeol Yee, Seoul National University Kon Su Yi, East Asia Institute Seong-I Yoon, Kyung Hee University