The G20 summit in Hamburg is a timely venue for major country leaders to show their commitment to the liberal international order. Following the global disturbance caused by Brexit, U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s “America First” foreign policy has the potential to weaken global governance. Trump’s revival of protectionist trade measures, reduced willingness to support collective security, and decision to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement on climate are threatening the open and liberal order. Now is the time for other major countries to provide additional leadership in response to numerous transnational challenges, including peace and security, terrorism, refugees, and environmental problems.   Against this backdrop, German Chancellor Angela Merkel is committed to seizing the opportunity by hosting the summit, with hopes to strengthen the world economy and enhance its stability and resilience through multilateral cooperation. The fifteen agenda items that fall under the broader goals of building a resilient economy, improving sustainability, and assuming responsibility for physical and human security are all worthy of serious attention and require collective effort to make meaningful progress. Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to assume a greater role by filling the gap left by U.S. retrenchment. French President Emmanuel Macron will likely bring a spirit of liberal progressivism aligned with the current G20 goal of promoting inclusive and sustainable growth. For this summit to prove successful, it is crucial for leaders to demonstrate their solidarity and willingness to combat economic and sociopolitical threats together. At the same time, leaders should develop resilient, cooperative frameworks that can provide members with greater flexibility when weighing domestic policy options.   With seven Asian countries in the G20, China, India, and Japan are expected to increase their roles by assuming responsibilities in line with their respective comparative advantages. Middle powers like South Korea and Indonesia can also promote G20 goals by incorporating them into their regional multilateral initiatives. Asian countries have been relatively insulated from the rise of extreme populism and believe that their futures lie in a more open and interconnected world. Asian members should contribute more to the G20 to further strengthen the forum.   The G20 was created to make economic global governance more democratic and effective. Major states should now assume more responsibility in making the world safer, as well as more economically inclusive and politically harmonious. Each member country must remember that they owe their power and international standing not only to national achievements, but to the global community as a whole. Since no single country can replace the United States, which has provided public goods for the last quarter century, all G20 members should assume their share of the responsibility to manage global challenges. ■       Author Sook Jong Lee is president of the East Asia Institute and professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan University. Currently, she holds advisory positions in the South Korean government, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Unification, and Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA).           EAI Column presents fresh, constructive opin-ions and policy sugges-tions on Korean society and politics as well as East Asian security and interna-tional relations issues from recognized experts.   Please acknowledge the source of this article if used as a citation.   The EAI is a nonprofit and independent research organization in Korea. The contents of this article do not necessarily reflect the views of EAI.

North Korean nuclear weapons serve multiple purposes. First, North Korea repeatedly states that its nuclear weapons are to deter a U.S. nuclear attack, arguing that the United States excluded North Korea from the object of nuclear no-first-use policy.   Second, Kim Jong-un wants to perpetuate a totalitarian regime and consolidate his power by personalizing control over North Korea. Given the country’s struggling economy, nuclear weapons provide Kim with political legitimation of his economically ineffective rule by showing his militant resolve to fight the prime enemy, the United States. By continuing to enhance the North’s nuclear capability, Kim sends the message to his people that increased external security threats justify the military expenditure and the poor attempt to revive the economy.   Third, when political use of nuclear weapons for power consolidation is no longer required, Kim can begin to deal with outside powers to elicit economic assistance. This is an old pattern: North Korea nuclearizes, then receives generous economic assistance for denuclearization and requires more rewards in peace negotiation vis-à-vis South Korea (Republic of Korea, or ROK) and the United States.   Fourth and final, Kim could use nuclear weapons purely for offensive purposes. North Korea could start an all-out war using nuclear weapons with the confidence of being able to control the crisis and win it if it is confident of U.S. reluctance to retaliate with nuclear weapons. It is also probable that Kim relies on the slim chance of continuing his dictatorship even after a disastrous nuclear confrontation and war.   North Korea obviously wants to progress toward a more developed nuclear arsenal and sophisticated missile force and ultimately toward intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). It is almost certain that Kim will try to muddle through to the point of attacking the U.S. homeland with nuclear missiles, perhaps even acquire second strike capability. At that point, Washington would be forced to negotiate, and Kim would come to the negotiation table asking for comprehensive economic rewards, a peace treaty with the United States to include nuclear arms reduction talks, and recognition of North Korea as a nuclear power. The situation would raise significant decoupling concerns for South Korea and Japan, which could lead to an increased possibility of their obtaining nuclear arms.   President Donald J. Trump considers “every option on the table,” and pressuring China on more cooperation is the first. China, anticipating the party congress later in 2017, needs a favorable international environment and successful crisis management, which requires mutually beneficial relations with the United States. Washington pressuring Beijing on its trade and currency policy, a worsening North Korean nuclear problem, a strengthening U.S.-ROK alliance, and U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral security relations will hurt President Xi Jinping’s political situation. Using military options to solve the North Korean nuclear problem will drive China into a far more difficult position. After the U.S.-China summit meeting in April, Xi seems to have put more pressure on North Korea, persuading Kim to come to the negotiation table for gradual denuclearization and to conclude a peace treaty with the United States, which meets the Chinese expectation of the so-called parallel negotiation.   However, it is hard to predict whether North Korea will come back to discuss denuclearization. That will be decided by how painful international sanctions on North Korea will be and whether Kim will think that diplomacy would be beneficial to the preservation of his personal power and regime. China could suggest a complete or partial cut of oil supply, implicitly recognize U.S. surgical strike, disregard its alliance obligation to North Korea in case of military clashes, and support more severe economic sanctions. Kim will not change his strategic calculus if he can maintain his totalitarian rule under severe Chinese sanctions to the point where he succeeds in developing ICBMs.   Despite China’s efforts to conform to Trump’s requests, it will be extremely careful not to let North Korea collapse and be absorbed by South Korea, which has strong alliance ties with the United States. Being uncertain of ROK and U.S. intent toward a denuclearized—and consequently weaker—North Korea, China will try to prevent North Korea from collapsing due to severe economic sanctions.   More strategic dialogues and consensus on the post-sanction, even post-denuclearization, stage among China, South Korea, and the United States will therefore be critical. Details regarding the initial point for reopening the negotiation for denuclearization and the conditions for a peace treaty could differ among them, which could turn the situation back to the pre-sanction period.   When, or if, North Korea comes back to the negotiation table, negotiations will be long and painful. The South Korean government has been skeptical of the parallel tracks. North Korea will take full advantage of both negotiations and establish a link between two games. The North will propose unacceptable conditions for peace, such as the elimination of anti-North Korean campaign by the United States, the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces Korea, mutual reduction of arms and personnel, and the termination of joint U.S.-ROK military drills. North Korean allegations that conditions are not met for peace could stall the denuclearization process. Because the peace process affects the posture of the alliance, the parallel tracks will not be an easy process.   North Korea under Kim Jong-il reversed the course of denuclearization negotiations several times after receiving economic assistance. Only an unacceptably high cost of reversing the course of negotiations will ultimately eliminate a repeat of such betrayal. It will therefore be necessary to maintain a particular level of economic sanctions, particularly in close coordination with China. If Kim Jong-un is fully aware that severe sanctions await if North Korea continues its nuclear ambitions—countered by incentives of development assistance if he reverses course—he will pursue a genuine course of negotiation.   On the other hand, both South Korea and the United States need to make clear that peace talks should not only demand North Korea’ denuclearization but also guarantee the regime’s survival if it denuclearizes, as well as include trust-building measures in security affairs and guidelines for arms control. Durable peace will be possible only if South Korea guarantees the survival of a denuclearized North Korea and pursues a plan to engage with it. The strategy of engagement comprises several elements. First, the country that wishes to engage should reassure the other country that it is neither threatening nor antagonistic. Second, it should initiate a policy of reconciliation and peaceful exchange to invite the other to cooperate. Third, the gradual building of trust will create structural bases that will foster changes in the system and behavior of the target country.   Last, a scenario in which North Korea succeeds in developing ICBMs, making the U.S. mainland vulnerable to nuclear missile attacks, is possible and the United States should be prepared for it. Combined efforts to deter the North Korean threat by denial and massive punishment, to minimize the possibility of decoupling the U.S.-ROK-Japan security alliance, and to show the military futility of North Korea’s nuclear missiles would weaken Kim Jong-un’s expectation for entirely beneficial negotiations after developing viable nuclear weapons. ■           Author   Chaesung Chun is chair of the International Relations Studies Center at the East Asia Institute. He is also professor of the department of political science and international relations at Seoul National University. He received his Ph.D. in international relations from Northwestern University.         EAI Column presents fresh, constructive opinions and policy suggestions on Korean society and politics as well as East Asian security and international relations issues from recognized experts. Please acknowledge the source of this article if used as a citation.   The EAI is a nonprofit and independent research organization in Korea. The contents of this article do not necessarily reflect the views of EAI.      

[Editor’s Note] What does a Trump administration mean for global governance? What direction should President-elect Donald Trump take toward the Korean Peninsula? In this briefing, Sook Jong Lee looks at the implications of the Trump administration for the Asia-Pacific region, specifically with regard to the nuclear threat posed by North Korea. Lee ends on a positive note, stating that hope remains for the new administration to prove doubts that the U.S. might lack the domestic support to maintain a leading role in global affairs ill-founded.                 Countries in the Asia-Pacific are anxious to see how the Trump administration will form its policy toward the region. During his cam-paign, President-Elect Donald Trump did not support conventional commitments to the security of the United States’ Asian allies. His isolationist policies, if made into reality, will greatly affect a region where the U.S.-led hub-and-spoke alliance system has maintained stability and peace for decades. Of particular concern is the possibility that right-wing voic-es in Japan and South Korea, which have called for nuclear armament or more self-reliant defenses, will be amplified if faith in U.S. defense commitments begins to waver. A rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership or free trade renegotiations with South Korea would also bode ill for the region’s already troubled economic growth. A rollback of the Obama administration’s strategy of rebalanc-ing to Asia would leave a vacuum China is likely to fill. Most Asian countries do not want to lose the region’s most effective balancer against an assertive China.     The nuclear threat posed by North Korea will require immediate policy responses from the Trump administration. Two decades of failed denuclearization efforts have led to new proposals, such as a military strike or, on the other extreme, unconditional negotiations that would aim to freeze nuclear and missile tests in order to open the path to peace treaty talks. It is uncertain which Trump will pursue.     A rekindling of diplomatic efforts is highly preferable to a dramatic military solution, but the worst scenario would be one in which Trump neglects to act. If the United States sits idly by, there will be no time left to reverse North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. Trump must focus on innovative policies to push North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to see that nuclear weapons possession undermines his survival rather than guarantees it. This path will only be possible if the Trump administration consults with and takes joint action with South Korea.     The Trump administration needs to reaf-firm the role played by the United States in global governance. The isolationist sentiment and sharp social rifts revealed by the presiden-tial campaign have left many in the world doubting whether the United States has the domestic support it needs to maintain a lead-ing role in global affairs, but there remains hope that the new administration proves these doubts to be ill-founded. ■               Author Sook Jong Lee is president of the East Asia Institute and professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan University. Currently, Lee holds advisory positions in the South Korean government, including the Presidential National Security Advisory Group, Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation, and councils for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Unification, and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA). Since 2015, she is serving as a Steering Committee member of the World Movement for Democracy. She holds Ph.D. in sociology from Harvard University.       EAI Column presents fresh, constructive opinions and policy suggestions on Korean society and politics as well as East Asian security and international relations issues from recognized experts.  Please acknowledge the source of this article if used as a citation.   The EAI is a nonprofit and independent research organization in Korea. The contents of this article do not necessarily reflect the views of EAI.    

Editor’s Note What explains the surge of populism, and how does this political phenomenon vary across countries and regions? What challenges does populism present for international order? What steps can international institutions take to address the backlash against globalization? Arguing that the failure of mainstream political parties to account for the social discontent is a more immediate cause of the rise of populism, Sook Jong Lee points out that while right-wing populism in Europe tends toward nationalism with a focus on immigration and national identity issues, left-wing populism in southern Europe and Latin America is opposed to austerity and other neoliberal policies of international institutions. Regardless of ideology, however, populist movements attack the political establishment as illegitimate and destabilize democracy based on mainstream parties. In response to economic insecurity that inevitably accompanies globalization and domestic problems, Lee suggests that changing both mainstream party politics and global governance is necessary. Specifically, Lee calls for three actions: first, mainstream political parties should operate at the grassroots level in order to weaken the anti-establishment sentiment of the supporters of populism; second, international institutions should be more flexible to the political atmosphere in member states; third, international institutions should be more aggressive in solving the root causes of populism.             Populism is not a new phenomenon. It is a form of direct democracy that arises when people think that they are not being represented by their mainstream parties. The discourses of populism are divisive: juxta-posing us with them, friends with enemies, and the common public with corrupted elites. Populists tend to refuse compromise and instead demand radical solutions. What is distinctive about populism in Europe and the United States today is that it threatens conventional democratic politics. Despite lacking a coherent political ideology, populist parties and movements are adept at appealing to people with pro-vocative messages. Consequently, these actors have been quite successful, emerging either as major parties or successfully pressing the government for changes to trade or migration policies.     The Surge of Populism     Globalization is not the sole culprit behind the rise of populism. While many of the negative social changes attacked by populists stem from globalization, there are other economic, cultural, and political explanations for the rise of populism. Global market integration and technological developments have sped the flow of goods, money, and people across national borders. The integrative and innovative forces of globalization have intensified competition and broadened economic inequalities between the skilled and adaptable labor forces and the unskilled and less adaptable remainder. Therefore, a majority of people currently feel insecure about their jobs; their incomes are insufficient to support their families. Convinced that migrants inside their country or workers abroad are taking their jobs, insecure workers support reducing or even halting immigration and enacting other protectionist measures.     Two new developments – increasing terrorist at-tacks and the Syrian refugee crisis – are adding to the fear surrounding this economic insecurity. Right-wing populists, in particular, have come to identify ethnic and religious diversity as a threat to national security and a homogeneous cultural identity. Politically, deepening globalization means decisions are increas-ingly made by transnational organizations. The Euro-pean Union (EU), the world’s most successfully inte-grated regional organization, has tried to balance transnationalism with member-country sovereignty.     However, both the euro crisis and the refugee cri-sis have made EU citizens resentful of policy decisions coming from Brussels. The rise of left-wing parties in Greece and Spain, the strengthened right-wing popu-list parties in Austria and Hungary, and the British vote to leave the EU all stem from and share in this resentment of Brussels, whether in response to imposed fiscal austerity or refugee quotas. For those who believe the distant EU authority compromises their local interests, national autonomy is gaining favour at the expense of multilateral cooperation.     The failure of mainstream political parties to ac-count for the social discontent is a more immediate cause of the rise of populism. Disenchantment with the government or major parties is not a new phenomenon. Political scientists have observed a mistrust of political elites and the establishment since the 1980s. What distinguishes recent years from the past is that populism is more focused and effectively mobilized to influence politics. Right-wing populists have founded new political parties that have gained substantial sup-port. Furthermore, new political parties tend to weaken support for the existing majority parties. Even in the United States, where two major parties dominate, the Tea Party movement and the rise of Donald Trump embody the intra-party populism of the Republican Party, just as the rise of Bernie Sanders reflects the populism in the Democratic Party.     In an article for Foreign Affairs, Michael Bröning points out that mainstream liberal and conservative parties in Europe alienated traditional supporters as they moved closer to the ideological center in the last decade, which left their disenchanted supporters as easy targets for populists. The white male working class in economically declining areas is turning away from the Democratic Party and toward Donald Trump in the United States and to the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in Britain. In the recent Australian elections, the far right won working-class areas that used to side with the Social Democrats. Around the world, the more ideologically charged traditional party supporters of the older generation believe that they have lost their place in the leftist parties, which have tended to move toward the center by embracing lower taxes, free trade, and immigration – for example, Tony Blair’s New Labour, Gerhard Schroder’s Neue Mitte, and Barack Obama’s liberal social policies. Conservative parties have also moved toward more liberal policies to attract more vot-ers, such as Angela Merkel’s giving up of nuclear energy and adoption of a more open immigration policy. While this shift to the center has allowed major parties to achieve some success, a significant chunk of their traditional supporters feel disconnected and are ready to embrace the appeals of populism.     Populism across Countries and Regions     Populism in the twenty-first century began in Latin America with the 1998 election of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. Later, the post-euro crisis in southern Europe joined this leftist populism. In Latin America, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela have all been led by presidents who adhere to varying degrees of leftist ideology and populist styles of governance. Jonathan Bissell writes that while 64 percent of Latin American presidents were from a “right” or “right-center” politi-cal party in the early 1990s, 71 percent – fifteen out of twenty-one countries – were from a left or center-left political party by the beginning of 2009. Bissell diag-nosed this leftist shift as rooted in historical social ine-quality and a desire for a political reversal from the previously failed conservative governments. Despite their anti-American rhetoric, leftist populist leaders promoted regional institutions, such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, the Union of South American Nations, the Common Market of the South (Mercosur), and the Andean Community of Nations. Accordingly, Bissell advised the U.S. gov-ernment to use soft power and the West to deliver development and improve social inclusion.     The leftist populism of southern Europe is rooted in the belief that the recent economic crisis was poorly managed by the EU institutions; therefore, it is more critical of multilateral transnational institutions. Both Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain emerged amid the euro crisis. Their leaders, Alexis Tsipras and Pablo Iglesias, respectively, are critical of the EU’s austerity and neoliberal policies. They believe they speak in the name of the people, and that two groups of illegitimate elites stand opposite the people: the corrupt Greek political-economic elite and the international and European political-financial elite. Even as they oppose austerity, they want to receive ongoing financial sup-port from the EU to distinguish themselves from eu-roskeptics.     Compared to the leftist populism that exists in Latin America and southern Europe, the populism in western and eastern Europe is right-wing and remains more concerned with cultural identity than economic insecurity. For decades, Jean-Marie Le Pen of the Na-tional Front pushed an extreme right-wing message with anti-Semitic elements. To broaden the party base, his daughter, Marine Le Pen, shifted the party toward an anti-immigration, anti-Islam stance and embraced anti-EU nationalism. Austria’s old right-wing party, the Freedom Party, took on an anti-immigration, anti-EU agenda under the leadership of Jörg Haider. Newly founded right-wing parties are even adopting openly racist positions. Nigel Farage, the leader of the UKIP, founded in 1993, uses race-baiting rhetoric and blames immigrants for increasing crime and stealing British jobs. The Alternative for Germany party, founded in 2013 to protest the EU’s bailout politics in the euro crisis, has increased anti-establishment, anti-immigration, and anti-Islam populist messages under the new leadership of Frauke Petry. Conservative populist parties have been moving toward authoritari-anism in Hungary and Poland as well. In the United States, Trump’s Mexico-bashing rhetoric and anti-immigration supporters share similarities with right-wing European populism.     While populism operates differently depending on the national context, it can be divided into two po-litical views. Right-wing populism in Europe tends toward nationalism with a focus on immigration and identity issues. Left-wing populism in southern Europe and Latin America is opposed to austerity and other neoliberal policies of international institutions. However, populist movements, regardless of ideology, attack the political establishment as illegitimate and destabilize democracy based on mainstream parties.     Challenges to International Order     The leftist populism in Latin America is not threaten-ing multilateral cooperation itself; rather, it challenges the liberal values of the existing international eco-nomic order. Leftist leaders in Latin America have pursued intra-regional cooperation that can assist the region’s economic development. They have also shown flexibility in working with the United States. They are neither a threat to security nor are they anti-immigration. While their protectionist tendencies of leftist leaders have the potential to diminish free trade, supporters of leftist populism can adapt rather easily when populist rule leads to poor economic perform-ance. The real threat is to the consolidation of liberal democracy in the region. For example, Mitchell Selig-son writes that nearly all surveys of Latin America have found that citizens hold their national legislatures and judiciaries in low regard, and the younger generation is more likely to support populist measures at the expense of liberal democracy.     On the other hand, populism in Europe seems to be more focused on challenging multilateral coopera-tion. Both leftist and rightist populists in Europe op-pose multilateral cooperation. They are critical of the EU and want to strengthen their own governments’ power vis-à-vis EU decision-makers in order to steer their country from the economic crisis. While sharing an antagonistic relationship with the EU, right-wing populists in western and eastern European countries are more concerned about their cultural identities and homogeneity. Accordingly, their political discourses are not simply limited to opposing refugee quotas im-posed by EU leaders or existing immigration policies. Their messages are extreme and visceral and threaten cultural diversity and the rights of minorities, includ-ing Muslim immigrants. Racial prejudice has declined in Europe, but the current hostility accompanying the influx of new refugees is rekindling it. The exclusion-ary attitudes of rightists against Muslim communities isolate young Muslims and push them toward terrorist groups. As a result, terrorist attacks in Europe are committed increasingly by Muslim immigrants, not just by foreign terrorists.     Steps to Address the Backlash against Globaliza-tion     The economic insecurity that accompanies globaliza-tion can only be ameliorated by international institu-tions better managing economic crises and national governments creating more inclusive economic poli-cies. Unfortunately, the number of jobs will likely con-tinue to shrink and the costs of welfare will rise. As countries grow more concerned about their domestic problems, European integration is likely to be weak-ened. If the United States falls for the “America First” slogan, the liberal international order will be seriously destabilized. Rather than dismissing populists as demagogues, smarter responses are needed. Changing both mainstream party politics and global governance seems to be the best option.     First, mainstream parties should change strategies for curbing the surge of populism. In a 2011 Chatham House report, Matthew Goodwin suggests that strate-gies of “engagement” (countering populist campaigns at the grassroots level) and “interaction” (supporting contact and dialogue between different ethnic and cultural groups within a given community) are more effective and sustainable than “exclusion” (blocking populist parties), “defusing” (shifting the focus to the issues where mainstream parties have an advantage), “adoption” (embracing more restrictive politics on immigration and integration), and “principle” (debat-ing with populist parties using evidence). Mainstream parties need to operate at the grassroots level in ways suitable to their national contexts in order to more directly weaken the anti-establishment sentiment of the supporters of populism. Inviting a populist party to join a coalition government is a risky but worthwhile option. Countries with proportional representation systems will have more chances to form a coalition government with a populist party than countries with majoritarian systems. Inviting populist parties to participate in governing exposes their performance to judgment from the voters. For example, after bringing down the Dutch government in 2012, Geert Wilder’s Freedom Party lost nine of its twenty-four seats.     Second, international institutions need to be more flexible and accommodating to the political at-mosphere in member states. This need is particularly acute for countries experiencing economic crises. Left-wing populist parties oppose particular policies rather than the roles of international institutions themselves. Nationalistic populism is salient in the case of right-wing populism. On immigration and integration issues, right-wing populists are more anti-EU than leftist populists. As seen in the case of Brexit, right-wing populism can be more of a threat to the EU. To counter this disintegrative force, the EU needs to be more flexible in its immigration policies and allow member states greater discretionary power.     Third, international institutions should act more vigorously to solve the root causes of populism. The current wave of populism has strengthened due to failures of global governance. For example, if the Syr-ian crisis had ended quickly, the refugee crisis would not have occurred. If financial monitoring were more effective, the euro crisis could have been prevented. There is no way to counter the forces of globalization, but it is possible to manage its dark sides. For that rea-son, international institutions and forums should con-tinue to make efforts to reform global governance so that it is more democratic and effective. ▒             Authors Sook Jong Lee is president of the East Asia Institute and professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan University. Currently, Lee holds advisory positions in the South Korean government, including the Presidential National Security Advisory Group, Presidential Committee for Unification Preparation, and councils for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Unification, and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA). Since 2015, she is serving as a Steering Committee member of the World Movement for Democracy. She holds Ph.D. in sociology from Harvard University.