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Introduction and Outlook on Conflict Scenarios

Chaesung CHUN: Let me start with the first question. We are now nearly two months into the conflict with the fragile ceasefire that President Trump has called highly unlikely to be extended indefinitely. Ongoing U.S. naval operations in the Strait of Hormuz and talks in Pakistan that keep starting and stalling. So from your vantage point, what are the realistic scenarios for the next six months to a year? Is a genuine diplomatic settlement possible or are we more likely looking at a frozen conflict that flares up periodically between Israel and Hezbollah for years?

Brandon IVES: This is a great question. I guess I'll start off by first talking about the U.S. and Iran and potentially talking about the conflict that is currently occurring in Lebanon a little bit. So the million dollar question, what's going to happen? And I think you have to look at this to kind of describe it from the beginning as kind of a game of chicken, right? Both sides are weak. you know, going towards the finish line, trying to finish each other off or get some sort of deal, but who's gonna give first? Now the real question behind this is what are the factors that lead each actor to get off the road? That's the key question here. Now, with regards to the conflict, we have to look at it from an extremely costly conflict for both sides. So the high cost of the conflict to Iran are, of course, the economy, which is not doing so well. Its military has been mainly depleted and they run the real risk of further economic devastation if the U.S. attacks further.

With regards to the United States, United States, they face costs too, especially with regards to the well-being of their Gulf allies. Iran still has capacity to attack civilian infrastructure in the Gulf states, which could be absolutely devastating for some of these countries. And while countries like the UAE have the ability to defend themselves without approximately 90 success rate in Iranian attacks, that still means about 10 of Iranian attacks approximately can hit targets. And if Iran decides to retaliate, or to initiate attacks against civilian infrastructure such as water, desalination plants, that is, it could be absolutely devastating. So I think the high cost of the conflict will drive both actors to seek a negotiated settlement. That being said, is there any bargaining range that overlaps? Is there any sort of mutual agreement that would be acceptable to both sides? The United States, at least under Trump, has discussed the role of enriched uranium, especially at high levels, about 60%.

It should also be noted there is also another location of enriched uranium at about 20%, which is another serious concern. Now, one possibility might be that Iran will allow Russia to kind of take that enriched uranium and that would allow Iran to say, we didn't give it to the United States, we didn't destroy it, we gave it to a third actor. So perhaps a third actor like Russia could potentially intervene and take some of that enriched uranium. Iran will, of course, want the lifting of sanctions, as well as a number of kind of economic benefits and reintegration of Iran into the global economy. And that's what a potential negotiation might look like. Other big concerns right now are, of course, the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has rather drastically said they wanted to toll people, impose tolls on people across the Strait of Hormuz, and they say they want to do this in the future.

That will be probably unacceptable to the United States, the free passage through the seas has been a key cornerstone to the global economy under the United States hegemonic system. So those are kind of two key pressing issues that I think both sides will pursue. It's not clear they'll be able to reach that agreement. Iran appears to have some level of fragmentation amongst its leadership. There are major negotiating logistical challenges, getting people in Iran to be able to talk to each other, getting people to be in the same room in Pakistan. These are all major, major challenges. And even though the costs of war are extremely high for both sides, which makes me think they'll push for a negotiated settlement, we'll see if there's actually kind of an overlapping bargaining range. Now, other issues such as a support for proxies such as Hezbollah, I think, are kind of secondary. We'll see what Trump does with regards to pushing them as any sort of negotiated deal.

But I think those are kind of secondary beyond the enriched uranium and that's as well as a strength of our news. I think that's where the kind of key issues will lie with any negotiated settlement.

The Strategic Role of China and Russia

Chaesung CHUN: That was an excellent explanation. Let me follow up with the questions about China. You touched upon Russia's strategic advantage that came from this war. So some people say China had really strategic advantage by looking at U.S. position which has been quite much weakened in terms of its alliances, relationship and so on. So some people say China can win by just waiting. So what do you think about China's loss and advantage that comes from this war?

Brandon IVES: Yeah, the role of China is a very tough question because we're looking pretty far out into the future. There's a couple of things. One is, and this kind of gets into the role of the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, which has a security deal with China, as well as other potential countries in the Gulf, mainly Iran. Qatar in particular, who may reach out to countries like Pakistan. Now this is relevant because Pakistan has a pretty close alliance both with the United States but also with China too. And that might be an opportunity for China to have a bit of an influence in the region through Pakistan. Now, with regards to kind of the broader impact on China, one is, of course, energy. China gets a fair amount of oil sources from Iran as well as from the Gulf region, as much as East Asia and other parts of the world do. So we'll see how China is affected by that. And then there are other issues related to the idea of tolls with regards to the seas.

Now, if Iran is able to both develop and then maintain a tolling system, the effect that has on other areas in the world could be very damaging potentially to the United States as well as other places. China has some key seaways, obviously the South China Sea and other places have been point of contention with regard to China and its neighbors. And if this opens the doors for a new institutionalized tolling system, it would be interesting to see how that actually either benefits or hurts China in the future, but it might push them to partake in these sort of activities. Other potential issues of concern or of interest perhaps are what exactly is the U.S.-Iranian position going forward? I think it's a little bit unclear whether or not the U.S. is relatively strengthened or weakened by this conflict. And we still have to wait for the dust to sort of settle to kind of understand that.

If the result of this conflict is an emboldened Iran that feels that they can act and threaten their neighbors in a manner that kind whenever they want basically or at least that the deterrence posed by the U.S. is reduced, then that might present an opportunity for China to push their interests too through Iran, through Pakistan, through other allies. Because simply U.S. deterrence is reduced, U.S. military bases might not serve the same purpose that they did in the past. So I think it's somewhat of an open question and it's gonna depend somewhat on how this current conflict is resolved. But I think a lot of it will depend on what U.S. deterrence looks like. Now, another key question, too, in the short term is U.S. military supplies. There's been a big question related to the military map that people have discussed. How much money and weaponry does it take to blow up a very cheap weapon coming from the opposing side?

And I think in the short term, China probably, you know, the U.S., you know, has a lot of their resources devoted to this conflict, right? Now, what does that mean for the long term? I'm not sure because I don't think China's going to do anything drastic in the near term. And so I think the U.S. will have time to rebuild their arsenal. So I think in the long term, the military supplies will not be so much of a concern.

Responses of Gulf States and Intermediary Countries

Chaesung CHUN: Next, let me ask questions about countries in the middle between the U.S. and Iran. The countries in the Middle East, you touched upon that. When the war began, Iran retaliated, not just Iran and Israel, but against U.S. bases in Gulf states like Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. So how are the Gulf states navigating the impossible position of hosting U.S. forces while sharing a neighborhood with Iran? And some other countries like Turkey and Pakistan, how do you think they will position themselves as this conflict drags on?

Brandon IVES: Yeah, another great question related to the Gulf states. And here, I think we have to think a lot about geography. Geography really matters here. Obviously the Strait of Hormuz provides Iran an excellent opportunity to punch above their weight a little bit. They can do things that they wouldn't be able to do otherwise. And conversely, it kind of puts the Gulf states in a bit of a difficult position. I think again, some of it's very much geographic. You look at a country like Kuwait, for instance, and Kuwait is right next to Iran just geographically. They have to be very concerned about what Iran can do. Other countries like Iraq share a long border with Iran. The northern part of Iraq has a federal Kurdish area with a number of rebel groups that make some claims related to Iran's self -determination movement claims. They too face a delicate balancing act when it comes to Iran.

Now, other countries like the UAE have taken a much more aggressive stance to Iraq. And it should be noted that the UAE has a territorial dispute with Iran with regards to a couple of islands. So there is kind of some historical precedent of rivalry between the two states. Now, the UAE has taken the brunt of Iranian attacks. And it should be noted, too, that Iranian attacks were not limited to military sites. They attacked U.S.-based military sites, but they also attacked a number of civilian and energy infrastructure sites too. And states like the UAE and Saudi Arabia are very concerned about things like desalination plants. This is a major concern. Now we're seeing, we're probably going to see, and let me backtrack for a second. I think the big question is, will we see some more kind of cooperation and coordination between the Gulf states or will we see a divergence in responses?

And as I hinted at before, I think we're going to see probably all the Gulf states are threatened to a certain degree, but the question will be what tactics will they use to deal with that sort of threat. I think countries like Kuwait, Qatar will try to use more of a balancing sort of act in terms of dealing with Iran. I think the UAE in particular has been a little bit more aggressive in what they do. I think Saudi Arabia too will try to balance that. Now it should be noted that the UAE has a very different relationship with Iran compared to Saudi Arabia. You look at Saudi Arabia, they have a lot of energy infrastructure on the eastern portion of the country, but then they also have population settlements out there in the west. And they also have more pipelines that they can use to export oil. So they have somewhat of a different relationship, just geographically speaking, with Iran compared to the UAE. So I do think we'll see somewhat of a divergent response.

Now with regards to security, I think we'll see some of these states continue their security relationship with the United States. But I imagine that they will probably try to diversify to a certain extent. And that might mean looking towards Pakistan a little bit more. That might mean looking towards China at various times for some of the states, as well as actors. So perhaps not subtract, you know, take the U.S. away from their security apparatus, but perhaps add to it to a certain degree. I think geography will be a key factor that will be influential for how these states respond. And it'll be a mix of states like the UAE and Bahrain that will want to perhaps bolster their ties with the U.S. and Israel and other states like Qatar and Kuwait that will probably want to pursue more of a balancing act.

Long-term Regional Order and Future Outlook

Chaesung CHUN: Great. about the long -term impact of this war. You know, sea lane safety, maritime safety and security is highly crucial to South Korea and other East Asian countries like Japan who are importing a lot of oil from the Gulf states. So what will the region look like in five or ten years when Iran economies in collapse and they had a lot of you know military damages so what do you expect the future U.S.-Iran relations and are we witnessing the emergence of a new regional order?

Brandon IVES: Yeah, what is the future of the region in the next five to ten years? Again, a fantastic question. I think a lot of it will depend on how this current conflict is resolved to a certain extent. And again, if Iran is allowed to, allowed as well as other countries, namely the United States, are unable to deter Iran from charging tolls for using these straits, then I think that we'll see other countries try to pursue this new institutionalized north. So I think a big question will be, is the United States, which is in their interest, able to get Iran to stop charging tolls, or trying to charge tolls at least, for people in the Strait of Hormuz. So that's a major issue right there.

The second major issue, I think, is: does this current conflict come to a negotiated settlement, or do kind of kinetic military aggressive acts resume? And again, that's going to be a big picture, because if kinetic military attacks resume, it's going to be very devastating. A lot of civilian energy infrastructure are going to be hit, both in the Gulf states as well as Iran, and it's hard to see which direction that goes. But it could be very devastating for both sides. I don't see the United States and Iran really coming to entering great, great friendly relationship going forward. Even if negotiated settlement is conducted, I imagine it'll be something that looks like the kind of Obama deal that occurred back in the Obama administration, perhaps with some more restrictions on what Iran can do. But I don't think they're going to restore relations anytime soon. I think there will be continued ongoing conflicts that will emerge at low-grade levels.

And I imagine that Iran will have a significant windfall in terms of economic gains. And my guess is that they're going to kind of rebuild in a certain way. That means their ballistic missile programs. That means their drones that they're going to rebuild. That means potentially going continuing to fund proxies throughout the region. So I imagine it will deter Iran to a certain extent but we'll see something of the same going forward. Now the wild card in all of this is: can the Iranian regime survive? Now the Iranian regime has taken some drastic steps to survive. They have attacked the civilian, the military bases of the U.S. and the region, military sites in the Gulf states, but also civilian and infrastructure sites in the Gulf region. They have also kept the internet off in their country for going on I think over 50 days at this point, approaching 60 if not 60. Their economy is not doing so good.

They also killed anywhere from 6 to 30 ,000 people in the recent protests that occurred in their country and it's looking more to be around 30,000 people. So they're going to have to find some way to rebuild their economy. As I mentioned before, any sort of a negotiated deal, they're going to probably have some big economic booms as they get reintegrated into the world economy. But the wild card is, does the regime survive? Of course. These things are hard to predict. Are there massive protests that break out? How do they deal with that? And maybe they will survive. The economic booms will help them rebuild, provide jobs to people, and they'll be able to move on from this. And then I think it will kind of look like what we've seen before. The Iranian regime since the Islamic Revolution has had a pretty contentious relationship with both Israel and the United States, although to varying levels. Sometimes there's been degrees of coordination and cooperation. I imagine we'll start to see the slow rebuilding of what Iran did previously.

That is: build up the proxies, build up the conventional weapons programs, build up the drone weapons programs, and even if the nuclear program isn't there, as evidenced by the recent conflict, they will still have a lot of ability to threaten and conduct damage on their neighbors as well as the key economic waters for the world economy. The final thing I'll mention for the next five to ten years is I think warfare is changing. What we're seeing with Iran and their use of drones in particular with regards to the Gulf states and the waters, the Strait of Hormuz, is essentially dumb drones. But what we're seeing in Ukraine is smart drones, drones that have more beginning capacity for autonomous actions.

Now in the next five to ten years as technological warfare changes, as Iran develops autonomous drones more and more, as the world develops autonomous drones, what does that look like for warfare? At the same time, with the Gulf states and the United States, I think are going to look at this conflict and say, wow, drones were a key tool in the Iranian arsenal. Autonomous drone activity will be key feature going forward. What technologies do they build to try to address that? So I think the kind of warfare that we're seeing now will develop even further in the next five to 10 years. And I think both sides will develop the tools that they have and then they'll, we'll see how it affects how they view their own relative capacity, in any future conflict zone.

But I imagine, to sum up, I think we'll see somewhat similar dynamics if there is negotiated settlement and we'll see how the change in warfare technology affects, if at all, the belligerents or participants in this current conflict views on their success.

U.S. Domestic Politics and Historical Evaluation

Chaesung CHUN: One real additional question is, from American perspective, do you think President Trump gained something in comparison with pre-war situation in Iran? So how do you think the future history will evaluate the Iran war from the perspective of U.S. national interests? Any final words about that?

Brandon IVES: Wow, the U.S. and the domestic interests. That's a very tough question. So, you know, most of the previous administrations that we've seen, going back to Biden, going back to President Obama, Bush, all these presidents have described the Iranian regime as a major threat to U.S. interests. And you can go back to a number of these presidents, as well as presidential candidates like Hillary Clinton, who described the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran as something the United States doesn't want to live with. So it seems to be a kind of key and constant feature of U.S. presidents and presidential candidates. A nuclear-armed Iran is very threatening. But as we can see with this current war, dealing with the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran is very, very costly. So it raises a huge challenge.

Now with regards to how will the history books talk about Trump's war with Iran, I think it will depend a little bit on how the war goes to a certain extent and what the Democrats do after. If there's a negotiated settlement between Iran and the United States, and let's say for instance that Iran gives up some of their enriched uranium, perhaps to Russia, that doesn't mean Iran can't restart their program. And it might take more time, of course, if they give up their highly-emersed uranium at both 60 and 20 percent. But they, you know, technology is out there. They have the resources to potentially do this to restart their programs. They have a highly developed, you know, scientific community. There's a lot of great physicists in Iran. They have the ability to do this. And it would potentially take future U.S. presidents, you the capacity and will to restart the war in subsequent years.

So I think if Iran is able to get some deal, if they're able to get the economic booms that will come from any deal, if they're able to resume and rebuild their conventional weapons stockpile, if they're able to build their proxies with their economic votes. And if they're able to kind of still keep their nuclear weapon in their back pocket, I think history will look on this poorly. And again, Iran did all this right now without any nuclear weapon. Even with conventional weaponry, they are able to impose huge costs on the world, on the economy. So if it's kind of just more in the same in the future, this will just be kind of a matter of buying time. And I think it will be a question of: Will we see a repeat of this in future years if it has not fully solved the problem? I think that's kind of how history books will look on this. We'll look back on this.

So my thought is that probably not. Probably Iran will probably, It kind of depends on trajectories, I should say. But if Iran is able to maintain their regime and maintain their economic, receive future economic booms and redevelop some of their key programs, then I think this will be a problem that will be revisited in the future.

Chaesung CHUN: Okay, that's it. Thank you very much. ■ 

■ Brandon IVES is a Professor of International Relations as Seoul National University .

■ Edited by Sangjun LEE, EAI Research Associate
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