Analyst Warns of Shifting Global Dynamics Amid U.S. Midterm Elections, Nuclear Competition, Regional Security Debates

“Amid worsening Sino-Japanese relations, the solidification of North Korea’s nuclear status, and increasing instability in Northeast Asia’s security order, it is crucial to monitor how the strategic competition and arms race between the U.S. and China over nuclear weapons will unfold.”

Chun Chaesung, director of the East Asia Institute (EAI), identified Northeast Asia as the region requiring the most attention in next year’s international landscape on the 17th. Beyond U.S.-China tensions, he noted that Sino-Japanese conflicts over Taiwan, which began last month, could become a “trigger” for the international community.

Chun predicted that a key variable for next year would be whether President Trump’s “unconventional diplomacy” continues, stating, “If the U.S. pursues negotiations with China, South Korea and Japan may feel heightened security concerns, fearing a weakening of their alliances with the U.S.” The interview was conducted for two hours in the director’s office of the EAI, which opened in September 2022 on Sajik-ro, Jongno-gu, Seoul. Later, after President Lee Jae-myung’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Unification briefing included significant remarks on North Korea, and Japan’s ‘nuclear armament’ theory emerged, additional interviews were conducted via KakaoTalk multiple times.

Lazy Liberalism, Lack of Effort to Maintain Order

- You earned a Ph.D. studying classical realists like Reinhold Niebuhr. Why do you think the world has become so chaotic?

“After the Soviet Union collapsed, ‘end of history’-style outlooks gained traction in the 1990s. Liberalism then excessively delayed compromises and transactions to preserve the international order. The U.S. effectively shouldered public goods alone, but this became unsustainable. Europe should have shared more of the burden and controlled how China and Russia exploited the system. The past 80 years since World War II were an unusually peaceful, exceptional period. Global order is now reverting to a disordered, survival-of-the-fittest jungle.”

― Former Foreign Minister Song Min-soon forecasts that U.S.-China conflict will last as long as the Cold War.

“I don’t see it lasting that long. However, this doesn’t mean South Korea will find itself in a comfortable position. Unlike U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, current U.S.-China economic interdependence is extremely high. ‘Trying to live a day without Chinese goods’ is practically impossible for Americans. The two will compete fiercely but cannot return to the past. A competitive phase of roughly 10–20 years is likely, similar to the lifespans of ‘strongmen’ like Putin and Xi Jinping.”

― Trump’s second-term National Security Strategy (NSS) has drawn attention.

“Two-thirds of the NSS focuses on hegemonic realignment strategy, while the remaining third resembles typical great-power strategy. The U.S. intends to retain nuclear hegemony and firmly hold the Indo-Pacific. The core is an economic security strategy aimed at maintaining hegemony. It clearly expresses the intent to treat state relations as commercial and transactional. It also reflects a view that securing the Western Hemisphere and South America means ‘we can thrive alone.’”

Whether ‘Peak Trump’ Spreads Is Key

― Ultimately, should the ROK-U.S. alliance also become transactional?

“South Korea has become indispensable to the U.S. in semiconductors, shipbuilding, and other sectors. While assisting the U.S., we must also assert our needs. This requires not only ‘burden-sharing’ but also ‘authority-sharing.’”

― Trump-like policies will likely continue post-Trump.

“Future cost issues in ROK-U.S. relations should be seen as investments in the future liberal order both nations must build. South Korea should not be a dependent variable in power bloc or great-power order but a core state in ‘collective hegemony.’ We possess not only military strength but intellectual capacity, soft power, and manufacturing capabilities. The U.S. must recognize that listening to South Korea’s advice helps create a desirable future order.”

Chun stated he would compile a list of demands to present to the U.S. in early next year, based on this perspective.

- This year saw a ‘Trump frenzy’ worldwide. Will next year’s international landscape also hinge on Trump? How do you view the upcoming U.S. midterm elections?

“‘Peak Trump’ theory—suggesting Trump’s influence has peaked and will decline—is spreading. In U.S. domestic politics, ruling parties rarely perform well in midterms since 1932. During Trump’s first term, the Democrats regained the House in the 2018 midterms. Current polls suggest the Republicans may lose the House again. Since the House holds budgetary and legislative power, domestic politics could face gridlock. This may drive Trump to focus more on diplomacy to achieve results.”

― Trump has caused chaos in U.S. politics and economy.

“The U.S. is stronger than any historical power, yet its citizens feel unhappy. Take Americans born in 1990: they experienced 9/11 in their teens, faced the financial crisis during college and job searches, and endured the COVID-19 pandemic after marriage. The perception of not reaping the benefits of being citizens of a hegemonic power birthed Trump. His approval ratings will depend on how well he taps into this sentiment.”

No Need to Fear China and Abandon Cooperation

― Prospects for a Russia-Ukraine war ceasefire?

“I believe a ceasefire is increasingly likely soon. Ukraine’s independent war-fighting capacity was limited from the start. Mobilization is sluggish, and hundreds of thousands have fled. President Zelenskyy’s approval ratings are also declining. Whether the war ends or continues, his chances of long-term rule have diminished.”

― How would a ceasefire impact South Korea?

“Post-war discussions about Russia’s return to normalcy will intensify. This could reduce Russia’s focus on North Korea. From our perspective, there may be tangible benefits. Sino-Russian relations will also be affected.”

― Should South Korea seek to restore relations with Russia despite North Korean troop deployments there?

“Russia has tolerated North Korea’s illegal nuclear development and nuclear threats against South Korea. It also allowed North Korean troops to gain battlefield experience. Responsibility must be addressed.”

― President Lee Jae-myung’s imminent visit to China: what about ROK-China relations?

“Economically, the relationship has shifted from mutual complementarity to competition. However, cooperation is not impossible. Developing agendas that allow competition and collaboration is key. There is room for cooperation in AI. South Korea’s competitiveness in semiconductors and advanced manufacturing remains valid. There is no reason to fear China and abandon collaboration.”

― How should South Korea respond to Sino-Japanese conflicts over Taiwan?

“The basic principle is non-interference. Maintaining peaceful Sino-Japanese relations aligns with South Korea’s national interest. There is no need to disrupt existing principles.”

- On the day a senior Japanese official advocated for nuclear armament, the January 2025 issue of Japan’s monthly magazine ‘Bungei Shunju’ featured a dialogue titled ‘Nuclear possession is also an option for Japan against China.’ Has Japan begun to feel the need for nuclear armament?

“Japan has long maintained that ‘Plan B’ is unnecessary as long as the U.S.-Japan alliance (‘Plan A’) exists. However, observing Trump’s transactional strategy toward China and excessive economic demands on Japan, elite discussions on nuclear armament as a ‘Plan B’ are gradually emerging. Key variables include potential changes to the Trump administration’s extended deterrence strategy (nuclear umbrella) and shifts in public opinion among Japanese citizens, the only population to have experienced nuclear attacks.”

- China strongly opposes Japan’s nuclear armament theory.

“I am more concerned about China than Japan. Alongside the uncertainty of Trump’s security strategy, a critical variable is China’s accelerated nuclear weapon development. By 2035, China aims to increase its nuclear arsenal to 1,550—matching U.S. deployments—and enhance attack capabilities with third-generation SSBNs (nuclear submarines) that can bypass the First Island Chain.”

North Korea Unlikely to Engage in Dialogue

- Are we entering a U.S.-China nuclear competition akin to the Cold War?

“Within the next decade, if mutual assured destruction between the U.S. and China is achieved due to China’s growing nuclear capabilities, Beijing may pursue structural changes to exclude the U.S. from Northeast Asia and alter the status quo. Leveraging nuclear parity with the U.S., China could adopt more aggressive postures in Taiwan and the South China Sea. Japan faces a structural shift where it must question whether the U.S. would risk nuclear attacks to defend Japan or intervene in the East China Sea.”

- Will the U.S. agree to ‘friendly nuclear proliferation’ for South Korea and Japan?

“We must assess whether U.S. future strategy remains hegemonic or shifts to typical great-power status. If hegemonic, it will retain nuclear primacy. Allowing nuclear armament in Germany, South Korea, or Japan would render alliances unnecessary for those states. This would eliminate the economic benefits the U.S. gains from providing security, making it a typical great power—a scenario Trump would avoid.”

- The Lee Jae-myung administration uses the term ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’ instead of North Korean denuclearization and aims to lower sanctions ‘hurdles’ to engage Pyongyang. Will this ‘knee-on-the-ground’ approach work?

“North Korea’s likelihood of responding is ‘very low.’ Unless a ‘nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’ implies South Korea officially recognizing North Korea’s nuclear status and accepting Pyongyang’s demands—such as removing the U.S. nuclear umbrella—there is little chance Leader Kim Jong-un will engage in inter-Korean dialogue, regardless of how low we set the hurdles.”

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