The refugee crisis came to a head in the international community with the rise of the Syrian civil war. The number of Syrian refugees has continued to increase over the past decade, and they have relocated around the world to countries like Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Although the majority of the refugee population is from the Middle East and Africa, the Myanmar coup in 2020 has made it evident that Asia is not an exception to the refugee crisis. Currently, Myanmar, with 1.1 million displaced citizens, is in the top five countries where the refugees originate from.[1] It is urgent and crucial for Asian countries to cooperatively propose joint responses to tackle issues that directly and indirectly link with human rights and human security.   The Refugee Situation in Asia   Like Europe, many countries in Asia have different attitudes towards the refugee issue. Through the study of five country cases, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Thailand, Japan, and Korea, it is possible to observe that each country possesses a unique situation. In Japan, the refugee issue holds importance due to two reasons. First, there is a significant number of refugee seekers and settlers that are granted refugee status in Japan. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of December 2020, there are approximately 1,390 refugees in Japan.[2] Second, Japan has a strict refugee acceptance policy which is evident through the notoriously low acceptance rate. In 2017, a record number of 19,629 people applied for refugee status in Japan but only 20 (0.1%) were accepted. Under the pandemic situation, the number of refugee seekers has declined. Most recent data shows that in 2020, 47 people out of the 3,936 applicants (approximately 1.2%) were granted refugee status. This is an improvement compared to the 0.4% acceptance rate in 2019 but it is still far from sufficient. [3]   Korea also exhibits a similar case to Japan. A total of 72,800 refugee applications were received in South Korea from 1994 to September 2021. However, in 2020, the rate of recognition in South Korea was 1.1 percent, which is the lowest record in history. From 1994 to December 31, 2020, the largest nationalities that applied for refugee status, were China, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, and Egypt.[4] In Korea, Myanmar is the most represented country of origin among refugee status holders comprising 33% of all refugees from 1994 to 2020, followed by Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Iran.   South Korea and Japan are state parties to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Both are developed democracies with good human rights records. Nonetheless, they have shown passive refugee policies under conventionally strict immigration control. As both countries’ major cities have high population density, they allow foreign laborers to stay only for a contract period. Public sentiments in South Korea and Japan are also not favorable towards taking in foreign workers or refugees with an exception to the foreigners who are married to their own nationals.   On the other hand, Bangladesh, Thailand, and Indonesia, countries that are not state parties to the Convention and the Protocol, host the most Asian refugees. This is geographically inevitable since Bangladesh and Thailand are bordering on Myanmar. In the case of Rohingya refugees, the Bangladeshi people are more sympathetic to them due to the same religious background. Hosting refugees since 1981, currently, there are about 902,947 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh.[5] Throughout the genocide, Bangladesh has done a wonderful job in providing the Rohingya refugees with shelter and the civil society offered whatever support they could. As a result, 1.5 million unofficial refugees are recorded to reside in the country. Overwhelmed by this size, Bangladesh started to relocate some of the Rohingyas to a remote island called Bashan Char, and now about 19,000 refugees are living on the island.[6] However, the island is a cyclone-prone area and not a livable place. Therefore, Bangladesh debated on this issue with UN agencies. There were also some local NGOs that protested the relocation.   Thailand also hosts many refugees. According to UNHCR Thailand, as of current, there are 96,411 refugees in Thailand with 9 refugee camps.[7] Most of the refugees are ethnic Karen and Karenni minorities who fled from Myanmar since the 1980s. Recently, there has been a number of border-crossing asylum seekers from Myanmar due to the military coup. The conditions of refugee camps have been deteriorating with the increasing number of refugees. This is evident through the staggering mental health of refugees as there were 28 cases of suicide and 66 cases of attempted suicide recorded from Mae La camp, one of the largest of the nine refugee camps in Thailand. [8]   Indonesia has also displayed problems with displaced foreign nationals and refugees for a long period of time. 7,458 people, which is the majority of the refugee population, came from Afghanistan. 1,364 refugees are reported to have originated from Somalia. 707 were reported to be from Myanmar, and 677 and 506 were reported to have come from Iraq and Sudan respectively.[9] Although these numbers are smaller than that of other countries, the number is perceived as large since the entire Indonesian population is huge.   Domestic Legislation and International Conventions   The question that must then be addressed is, how different is the domestic law in these countries? In the case of Japan, the country has imposed very strict domestic measures in recognizing refugees. To improve the situation and increase the protection of refugees, the Bill for the partial amendment to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act was submitted to the 204th Diet by the Immigration Services Agency (ISA) of Japan.[10] Although this was met with criticism, it is possible to observe the government’s attempt to deal with the refugee issue. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, the leading opposition party, also submitted a bill on the protection of refugees to the Diet in February 2021. The goal was to better protect the rights of refugees by separating the provisions on refugee status from the current Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act. This would first allow a third-party committee, independent from the Immigration and Refugee Recognition Agency, to determine refugee status. Second, this bill revised the standard that determined the refugee status so that it is in accordance with international norms. In Japan, this has been deviating from international standards. Third, it ensured the transparency and appropriateness of the examination process. Lastly, it called for livelihood support for asylum seekers to be included in the law. Although both bills have not been passed, these actions show that consistent effort is being made internally to improve the current situation in Japan. [11]   Similar to Japan, efforts have been made to improve the situation of refugees and displaced foreign nationals. In South Korea, the government acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Ten years later in February 2001, the government recognized its first refugee and in July 2013, the government enforced the Refuge Act of Korea. In, December 2015, the government launched the pilot resettlement program for refugees. Legal rights and treatments include ‘F-2 Resident Visa and Permission for Employment’, ‘Issuance of Refugee Travel Document and Exemptions of Re-Entry Permit’, ‘Permission for Family Reunification for the Spouse and Minor Children’, ‘Guarantee of Social Security at the same level as Korean citizens per the Framework Act on Social Security, ‘Allowances pursuant to the National Basic Living Security Act (if eligible)’, ‘Health Insurance Benefits pursuant to the National Health Insurance Act’ language programs, and vocational programs.[12] Other than legal rights, the Korean government also provides protection such as permission to stay in Korea until the circumstances connected to the humanitarian status recognition ceases to exist, no forcible return to the country of origin or country of habitual residence, permission to work with a “comprehensive employment activity permit,” access to assistance services, and access to medical care services provided under the “Medical Care Service Support Project for Marginalized People including Migrant Workers.”   Though Indonesia is not a party of the Refugee Convention it approaches the refugee issue as a humanitarian policy. Therefore, the government authorizes the UNHCR and International Organization for Migration to play a big role in protecting refugees and identifying possible solutions for refugees in Indonesia.[13] In May 2015, however, The Andaman Sea Crisis triggered a substantial increase in Indonesia’s attention to asylum seekers and refugees. Although the government, at first refused to accept the Rohingya asylum seekers, as the situation worsened the government agreed to accept the displaced people stranded at sea.[14] In 2016, Presidential Regulation No.125 concerning the Treatment of Refugees was enacted. The regulation listed key definitions and also outlined the process in detecting, offering shelter, and safeguarding refugees.[15] Despite Indonesia is not being a party of any international convention to protect refugees, the government does not turn a blind eye in times of crisis.   Although legislation to protect refugees exists in many countries, this does not apply to the whole of Asia. Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and has very limited policies protecting refugees. Therefore, refugees and displaced foreign nationals are treated as illegal immigrants as they do not have a legal right to remain in the country.[16] Consequently, on November 14, 2021, when Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen requested Thailand to send back the members of the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) who fled to Thailand in 2017, the Thai government consented. However, embassies intervened to send the remaining refugees to the 3rd party countries (e.x. Canada, Switzerland, U.S.).[17] Despite the urgent push by multiple international organizations and treaties, Thailand has yet to ratify the Refugee Convention. The UNHCR’s role also remains limited because, without the Thai Government’s approval, it cannot take any action. Thus, UNHCR works at a very low profile in Thailand.   Participation of the Civil Society and the Government’s Relationship with International Institutions   The active role of civil society organizations (CSOs) at the national level strongly influences the success of the recognition and protection of refugees. The CSOs work together with the UNHCR, IOM, international and national NGOs, and other UN agencies. A two-level approach is usually adopted. At the first level, academics mostly come up with policy recommendations. At the second level, NGOs and CSOs usually work on how to provide medical assistance, care for the special needs of children, distribute cash allowance to the most vulnerable refugees, and provide educational assistance along with other types of assistance.   In Japan, the consciousness of the civil society that they must take part in protecting and recognizing refugees has increased. Therefore actions to support and protect refugees have increased at the civic level. For example, this year, the Refugee Vocational Education Programme was implemented by the UNHCR and Japan Evangelical Lutheran Association to support refugees in Japan through scholarships and organizing crowdfunding campaigns for monetary support.[18] In fact, since 2010, universities have invited Syrian refugees to complete their graduate studies in Japan. [19]   A similar trend was also noticeable in South Korea as civil society organizations for refugees have become very active in recent years. A coalition of major Korean law firms called NANCEN Refugee Human rights center has become very prominent in the country. The organization offers financial assistance and provides professional legal assistance to asylum seekers in Korea. The Korean civil society had focused on providing legal assistance for asylum seekers but has now expanded its role to assist the resettlement of refugees.[20] The NANCEN Refugee Human Rights Center has been influential and also helpful for many scholars and activists.   However, it is difficult to say that the role of CSOs independent from the UNHCR is as big in Indonesia and Bangladesh. In Indonesia, independent CSOs are cautious in dealing with refugee issues due to the conflict between Islam and Hinduism and the overall lack of understanding on the issue.[21] In Bangladesh, the refugee issue has been dominated by UN organizations or international NGOs while the local CSOs serve as a consultant. This is in part because CSOs in Bangladesh are partisan and lack neutrality.[22] Additionally, as Bangladesh cannot accommodate the large number of refugees, the local attitude towards refugees has also changed for the worse. As citizens claim that refugees are taking away jobs and engaging in illegal acts such as drug trafficking, it has been difficult for the Bangladesh civil society to prioritize the rights of Rohingya refugees.[23]   As previously mentioned, due to the lack of domestic policies, the UNHCR is the main actor in dealing with refugees as it cooperates with the Royal Thai Government, NGOs, and donors.[24] CSOs are also actively working with and independently from the UNHCR. Thailand-based and Asia-Pacific-based CSOs such as the Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRN), Asylum Access Thailand, People Empowerment Foundation, and Refugee Rights Ligation Project submit a joint periodic review of Thailand under the name of Refugee Rights Network in Thailand. This review describes the most current status of refugees and refugee policies in Thailand and offers recommendations to improve not only humanitarian aid but also to advocate an environment that allows stronger CSO engagement in creating and applying refugee policies. [25]   Possible Improvements   Improvements can be made at both domestic and regional levels. Firstly, each country needs to come up with proper legal and institutional measures to support refugees. The biggest challenge for Japan resides in the refugee emergency response. Currently, the Japanese government does not have an appropriate scheme when a larger number of refugees flow in. Program diversification to aid refugees is also needed. In this effort, Indonesia has tried to increase access to education, especially for child refugees. Also, it aims to improve access to health and capacity-building development.   Second, refugee-hosting Asian governments should share roles with their own local CSOs in dealing with refugee issues. As the South Korean civil society is divided regarding the refugee issues, the government officials dominate the refugee policy and protection. Instead, the government should collaborate and provide financial assistance to the local CSOs to carry out more effective assistance programs. Bangladesh and Thailand have worked with international organizations to manage big refugee inflows. With this international linkage, their local CSOs providing services to the refugee camps are more experienced. They need to raise their voices to push their government to ratify the UN Refugee Convention.   Lastly, the issue needs to be tackled at the international level and regional level at the same time. Asian democracies need to share international responsibilities in assisting refugees and displaced foreign nationals and protecting their human rights. For that matter, they need to collect more reliable data on refugees and share the information regionally. Therefore, a sort of Asian consortium will be desirable as its cooperation with the UN and other international agencies would enhance the chance to practice the universally shared norms and rules.      [1] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). “Refugee Statistics.” The UN Refugee Agency, [n.d] https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/ [2] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 2021. “Factsheet: Japan.” https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/JAPAN%20Fact%20Sheet-June%202021.pdf [3] Japan Association for Refugees, “Refugees in Japan,” [n.d] https://www.refugee.or.jp/en/refugee/#section03 [4] The Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea, 2020. “Refugee Statistics” https://www.moj.go.kr/moj/145/subview.do [5] Government of Bangladesh-UNHCR. 2021. “Joint Government of Bangladesh-UNHCR Population Factsheet.” https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/89093 [6] Ruma Paul. “Bangladesh Signs U.N. Deal to Help Rohingya Refugees on Island.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, October 9, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladesh-signs-un-deal-help-rohingya-refugees-island-2021-10-09/. [7] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 2021. “Factsheet: Thailand.” https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/89215 [8] Auethavornpipat, Ruji, “Thailand`s Weak Reaction to the Myanmar Coup.” East Asia Forum, April 22, 2021. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/04/22/thailands-weak-reaction-to-the-myanmar-coup/#more-344838. [9] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 2021. “Fact Sheet: Indonesia” https://www.unhcr.org/id/en/fact-sheets [10] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “UNHCR comments on the Bill for partial amendments to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act submitted to the 204th Diet session of year 2021 Based on the Recommendations of the Sub-Committee on Detention and Deportation (SCDD), 7th Immigration Control Policy Discussion Panel 9 April 2021.” [n.d.] https://www.unhcr.org/jp/wp-content/uploads/sites/34/2021/04/20210409-UNHCR-Full-Comments-on-ICRRA-Bill-English.pdf [11] Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, “Submit Refugee Protection Bill/ Immigration Law Revision Bill to the Upper House [in Japanese].” February 18, 2021. https://cdp-japan.jp/news/20210217_0768 [12] Department of Refugees at the Immigration and Foreign Policy Headquarters of the Ministry of Justice. “Refugee Status Determination Procedures in Korea” March 9, 2016. https://www.immigration.go.kr/immigration_eng/1833/subview.do?enc=Zm5jdDF8QEB8JTJGYmJzJTJGaW1taWdyYXRpb25fZW5nJTJGMjMwJTJGMzc4NTk0JTJGYXJ0Y2xWaWV3LmRvJTNG [13] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). “UNHCR in Indonesia.” [n.d] https://www.unhcr.org/id/en/unhcr-in-indonesia [14] McCaffrie, Caitlin, “Andaman Sea Crisis: Is the region really better off in 2020?”UNSW Sydney, August 6, 2020. https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/andaman-sea-crisis-region-really-better-2020 [15] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). “UNHCR in Indonesia.” [n.d] https://www.unhcr.org/id/en/unhcr-in-indonesia [16] Harrison, Jennifer. UNHCR Welcomes Thai Cabinet Approval for National Screening Mechanism. Bangkok, Thailand: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2019. https://www.unhcr.org/th/en/16791-unhcr-welcomes-thai-cabinet-approval-of-national-screening-mechanism.html [17] Human Rights Watch. Thailand: Cambodian Refugees Forcibly Returned. Bangkok, Thailand.: Human Rights Watch, 2021. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/12/thailand-cambodian-refugees-forcibly-returned [18] The UN Refugee Agency. 2021. “Factsheet: Japan.” https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/JAPAN%20Fact%20Sheet-June%202021.pdf [19] Hebecker, Dirk. “Protection and Solutions for Refugees,” in A Profile of Japan’s International Cooperation, eds JICA (Tokyo: Hitotsubashi University 2018), 42. https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-dsp/english/university/pdf/01_02_HitotsubashiUniv_attachment.pdf [20] NANCEN Refugee Rights Center. [n.d.]. “What is NANCEN Refugee Rights Center?” https://nancen.org/1894 [21] Legido-Quigley, Helena, Leh Hoon Chuah, Fiona, and Howard, Natasha. 2020. “Southeast Asian health system challenges and responses to the ‘Andaman Sea refugee crisis’: A qualitative study of health-sector perspectives from Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand.” PLOS Medicine 17 (11) (November) https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1003143 [22] Tasnim, Farhat. 2017. “Politicized Civil Society in Bangladesh: Case Study Analyses.” Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: an Interdisciplinary Journal 9(1) (March): 98-123. https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i1.5247 [23] Ansar, Anas and Md. Khaled, A.F. 2021. “From Solidary to Resistance: Host comminites’ evolving Response to the Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh.” Int J Humanitarian Action 6(16) (July). https://doi.org/10.1186/s41018-021-00104-9 [24] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 2021. “Factsheet: Thailand.” https://www.unhcr.org/th/wp-content/uploads/sites/91/2021/10/UNHCR-Thailand-Fact-Sheet_30-September-2021.pdf [25] Refugee Rights Network in Thailand. Refugee Rights Network in Thailand Joint Submission Universal Periodic Review of Thailand: Thailand Cycle 3, 39th Sessions. Thailand [n.d.] https://asylumaccess.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Refugee-Rights-Network-in-Thailand_en.pdf     ■ Jinkyung Baek is the Director of the Research Department at East Asia Institute. She received her M.A. in International Relations from the University of Warwick in the United Kingdom. Currently, she supervises all the research projects at EAI, but her individual work mainly focuses on national security, governance, and regional cooperation and democracy in Asia. Her research interests include North Korea, international relations, and international security. Her recent publications include “South Korean Perception of North Korea and Unification: The Future of the Korean Peninsula, Neighbor rather than Brother” (EAI Issue Briefing, 2020), “Present and Future of the Four-Point Strategy Toward North Korea” (Global NK Commentary, 2020), “Mid-term Assessment of the Moon Jae-in Administration’s Diplomatic Security Policy through Public Opinion: The Drive for North Korea Policy to Realize Peace and Prosperity on the Korean Peninsula” (Global NK Commentary, 2019), and “North Korea’s Biological and Chemical Weapons and the Path to Denuclearization” (Global NK Commentary, 2019).   ■ Ha Eun Yoon is a Research Associate at the East Asia Institute. She received her Master of International Studies from Seoul National University. Currently, at EAI her work focuses on international cooperation, Korea-Japan relations, and democracy in South Korea. Her research interest includes governance, EU-Korea relations, and democracy.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Asian and European Democracies Need to Cooperate to Help Make the New Summit Process a Success   After much build-up during 2021, the U.S. administration held its Summit for Democracy on 9-10 December. President Biden succeeded in attracting 100 leaders to the online event and convinced states to make commitments to deepen democracy. After the success of the summit, details are now awaited on the follow-up. Governments will submit their reform commitments by mid-January, and decisions will then be needed on how progress on these will be monitored.[1] Work is also due on broader international initiatives of democracy support beyond the national-level commitments. A ‘year of action’ will now lead up to a second in-person summit in December 2022. The intention is for a more permanent process and set of initiatives to flow out of the two summits. Rolled together this set of developments can be referred to as an incipient ‘summit process’.   Shared Commitment?   If this process is to be a success and have any impact at all on the acute challenges facing democracy around the world, then democracies other than the U.S. will need to engage fully, proactively, and with creative ideas. In this sense, much will depend on Asian and European democracies. If the process is to be genuinely international and not dependent on U.S. primacy, then a major push and commitment must come from these two regions that house many of the world’s most powerful democracies outside North America – and are also those regions where there is some interest in international democracy support.   Yet, it remains unclear for the moment how much effort and political capital the two regions’ democracies will invest in the summit process. Both European and Asian democracies engaged positively in the summit process but did so with many concerns. Countries from both regions were initially skeptical[2] about the Biden administration’s initiative, worrying that it might add to global geopolitical tension or alternatively end up lacking operational substance. Still, most democracies in the two regions ultimately participated and broadly supported the call for more effective international coordination between democratic states.   As the process moves forward into its next phase, European and Asian outlooks and aims share many features. Several democracies in both regions can be prickly about having to labor in the U.S.’s strategic shadow and yet then have a tendency not to step forward to take on more responsibility in a way that would soften U.S. primacy. Geopolitically, Asian and European democracies have long been uneasy about any notion of a highly political, exclusive alliance or concert of democracies. They both seek a middle way between an ‘alliance of democracies’ and a ‘great power concert’ – the first having democracy as the main organizing principle of international relations, the latter seeing pragmatic cooperation between all major powers leaving no room for democracy considerations. Both rather dislike the U.S. tendency to posit democracy as being at risk mainly from active ‘autocracy promotion’ efforts from China and Russia.   In the run-up to the summit, both Asian and European democracies pushed for an inclusive process and raised eyebrows at the U.S. administration’s seemingly ad hoc and expedient choices over who to invite and who not to invite. Both thought the issues selected by the U.S. for discussion at the summit were a good first step but too narrow and too tailored to U.S. priorities rather than inclusive of other powers’ concerns. Both warned against replicating the already-existing Community of Democracies, an international organization set up in 2000 to which many European and Asian democracies belong.   Despite these shared concerns, however, there are still significant differences between Asian and European approaches to democracy support. In some sense, the two regions came to the summit from opposing directions. Many European states have more structured democracy policies than their Asian counterparts, and a longer record of working with U.S. agencies on democracy support. The EU saw this initiative as the U.S. coming ‘back on board’ after the Trump years and catching up with commitments to democracy support that the EU had already been developing for some time. While President Trump had been undoing much of the democracy agenda between 2016 and late 2020, the EU had in fact been adding modestly to its battery of democracy support budgets and policy instruments. Whether fairly or not, a common European sentiment was that the U.S.-led summit might simply go through the motions of reinventing the wheel in this sense.   In contrast, Asian democracies have pursued cautious democracy strategies and worried more about being bumped into overly politicized commitments driven by a geopolitical U.S. agenda - Pakistani prime minister, Imran Khan did not attend the summit citing a desire not to be dragged into either a U.S. or China-led block. Well-performing Asian democracies are still generally punching well below their weight in support for global civil society and the defense of pro-democracy actors. They espouse democracy support but usually in very oblique and indirect forms and have done little to look beyond their own immediate region to address more global democratic challenges. They would need to develop a more global perspective if they are to be prominent within the summit process and work alongside their European democratic counterparts.   If these differences over international democracy promotion could complicate future coordination under the summit process, so too could both regions’ internal democracy problems. Several democracies in both Europe and Asia have suffered democratic backsliding in recent years. Democratic quality has worsened even in countries run by mainstream, supposedly liberal-democratic, non-populist political forces. This both added to the rationale for the summit, while also making several of these states nervous about external intrusion into their own domestic affairs – especially, intrusion coming at the behest of the United States, whose own democracy has been so evidently dysfunctional for some years.   After the U.S. did not invite Hungary, the latter vetoed the EU’s formal participation. From a European perspective, the U.S. decision to exclude Hungary but include Poland looked curious and seemed to confirm fears that the process was driven by geopolitics: just as the EU is locked in bitter legal proceedings with Poland related to its democratic backsliding, the U.S. seemed to be giving priority to the Polish government’s robust line against Russian actions. Moreover, in Asia, the U.S. invited India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Philippines, all of whom have lower Freedom House scores for 2021 than Hungary (67, 59, 51, 37, and 56 respectively, compared to Hungary’s 69 out of 100).[3]   Common Agendas?   In the ‘year of action’ ahead in 2022 and indeed over the longer term, the summit process offers Asian and European democracies a new opportunity to work together – and to start giving some substance to their longstanding rhetorical commitments to such democratic cooperation. It would benefit the EU and Asia to work directly together on democracy issues, and not just mediate their democracy cooperation with the U.S. There is a risk that the emerging cooperation over democracy will take on a hub-and-spokes structure, where each set of partners around the world relates to the U.S. but not much with each other. Asian and European democracies share an interest in making sure this does not happen and that they build ties and democracy initiatives with each other as strong as those that both have with the United States.   There is much Asia and Europe could work on together. Cooperation on democracy would flow naturally from efforts in recent years to deepen the EU-Asia relation more generally. New strategic partnerships have been signed between the EU and Japan, India, and ASEAN. The EU’s just-published Global Gateway Initiative promises huge financing to underpin democratic norms and builds on the achievements of the 2018 EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy and recently concluded Connectivity Partnerships with Japan and India. Several European governments have bolstered their security presence in Asia. Some Asian democracies have also begun to engage in cooperation with problems in the EU’s neighborhood. Indeed, democracy is a curiously absent piece in this jigsaw of burgeoning EU-Asian cooperation and partnership.   Asian and European democracies can work together to ensure that the summit process does not become about siding with the U.S. in a binary U.S.-China rivalry. To some extent, they may already have pulled the U.S. back partially from using the process primarily in this way. But they must also take on board the quid pro quo of this: the need for a more robust effort to defense rights in China. Asian and European partners can both work to show that keeping a robust focus on human rights abuses in China is a matter of global concern and not a purely U.S. fixation or cover for U.S. geostrategic interests. They can show that even states well disposed towards cooperating with China are not willing to turn a blind eye to the increasingly brutal repression inside China. They could, in this way, help delink the democracy and human rights agenda from the U.S.-China rivalry.   Asian and European democracies could use the summit process to grasp the thorny issue of military intervention undertaken in the name of democracy – something the U.S. is not well placed to do. They could together draw up a Do-No-Harm approach to democracy support and set of principles to ensure that military intervention does not again in the future undermine democracy. States should be obliged to sign this as much as the internally focused commitments that dominated preparations for the first summit. Effective democracy support in the future is not only about countering autocrats but also ensuring democracies do not continue to act in a way that damages the cause of democracy.   European and Asian democracies could also jointly lead efforts on more specific themes. One of these could be sanctions. Both regions tend to feel that U.S. sanctions (especially extra-territorial measures) are overly heavy-handed and counter-productive. They could coordinate work on a nuanced template for the use of sanctions, to ensure that pressure on democracy and human rights is robust but more sensitive than U.S. measures often are. This would involve finding some middle ground as well, given that Asian democracies have so far been more reticent over the use of sanctions than European democracies.   Another theme ripe for coordination is the need to rethink democracy funding mechanisms – and this is another area where Asian and European approaches have some affinities. They could join forces to push to make the UN Democracy Fund more high profile and active. Both regions have been more open to different democratic innovations and practices than U.S. politicians have traditionally been and this could be explored through some kind of Europe-Asia ‘new democratic actors’ initiative under the summit process. The two regions could lead ways to fund digital activism projects as a means of democratic empowerment. They could also both work to bring in civil society actors more fully to the summit process - for example, they could charge CSOs with providing an independent assessment of how far states meet the commitments to reform that they made at the summit as a basis of deciding who gets invited to the next summit (to make sure the invitee list is not once again drawn up unilaterally by the U.S.).   In short, there is much the two regions’ democracies can contribute in concert with each other – both to help take the burden off the U.S. and to spread the number of states that have practical influence over the new global summit process. In a very general sense, they can both help each other. The European democracies might help activate more Asian engagement in the summit process to the extent that they can show this process is not about a uniquely U.S. assault on China. In return, Asian democracies can help re-energize European democracy policies by showing that democracy support is not Western-centric. One very concrete proposal to close: they could support each other to run the process, with perhaps one European state then one Asian state taking over the lead in turn.      [1] Feldstein, Steven. 2021. “The Future of Biden’s Democracy Agenda” Persuasion, Deciber 11. https://www.persuasion.community/p/the-future-of-bidens-diocracy-agenda?r=f0zo&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web   [2] Yeo, Andrew. 2021. “Will Asia buy into the Summit for Diocracy” Summit for Diocracy, Deciber 1. https://summit4diocracy.org/will-asia-buy-into-the-summit-for-diocracy/   [3] Freedom House. 2021. “Countries and Territories” Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores     ■ Richard Youngs is a Senior Fellow in the Diocracy, Conflict, and Governance Program, based at Carnegie Europe. He is the author of 15 books on different issues related to EU foreign policy and international diocracy. Youngs is also a professor of international relations at the University of Warwick. Prior to joining Carnegie in July 2013, he was the director of the European think tank FRIDE. He has held positions in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and as an EU Marie Curie fellow. He was a senior fellow at the Transatlantic Acadiy in Washington, D.C., from 2012 to 2013.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

[Editor's Note] Climate change, being one of the most pressing issues today, has been addressed by many countries at the local, regional and global level. In this issue briefing, Dr. Kevin Casas-Zamora, Secretary-General of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance discusses the challenges, strengths, and opportunities that democracy faces in tackling climate change. He states that the main challenges in tackling climate change are based on short-termism, self-referring mechanisms, and elements of governing capacities. Furthermore, he argues that democracy shows strength in this sense as a system of governance that allows for a strong civil society, free flow of information, societal consensus, and peaceful transformations of conflicts.     Climate change is one of the most pressing issues facing the world today. However, after decades of warnings from scientists, there is still a wide gap between the recommendations made by the scientific community, global and national commitments, and actual implementation. This can be partly explained by the fact that climate change constitutes what is described as a “wicked problem” - a problem that is difficult or impossible to solve due to its complex and interconnected nature. This becomes evident from the plethora of climate impacts such as more frequent and intense weather events, food insecurity, financial instability and worsened conflicts (Lindvall, 2021). These consequences pose new challenges to democracies and to the stability of democratic institutions and systems, which in many cases were already under strain (International IDEA, 2021).   However, democracies are making significant efforts to tackle climate change. Countries are working through multilateral initiatives spearheaded in the Conference of the Parties (COP), the latest iteration of which was held in Glasgow in November 2021. Despite the COP26 keeping the 1.5 degrees Celsius target alive, the need for rapid and far-reaching actions is more pressing than ever. The disproportionate power relations between the Global North and South became visible in the global negotiations and debates around climate change. The Director of the think tank Power Shift Africa noted that “the needs of the world’s vulnerable people have been sacrificed on the altar of the rich world’s selfishness” (Harvey, Carrington, and Brooks, 2021). The inherently unequal consequences of climate change call for climate justice to be adequately addressed. In this context, citizens are growing increasingly skeptical of democracies’ ability to address the crisis and whether governments are equipped to deal with it. This issue briefing addresses the challenges, strengths and opportunities that democracy faces in tackling climate change.   The Potential Challenges for a Democracy’s Response to Climate Change   Democracy faces many obstacles to protect the environment and mitigate climate change. Scholars have identified short-termism, self-referring mechanisms, governing capacities elements such as policy capture or corruption, and weak multilateralism as key barriers to effective action (Held, Harvey and Theros, 2011. Lindvall, 2021; Tham, 2021).   Short-termism refers to the tendency of agenda-setting in democracies being highly influenced by political and electoral cycles as well as the tendency to focus more on day-to-day and short-term issues instead of long-term ones such as climate change. One reason for this is the imperative of governments to be reelected. Political actors in democracies face weak institutional incentives to consider the rights and needs of future generations and may be reluctant to implement strong climate policies such as a carbon tax, bearing in mind possible electoral repercussions. Similarly, self-referring mechanisms are linked to the accountability which governments face towards current voters and to political debates focusing on the national level. This mode of operating in democratic politics risks disregarding inter-generational justice, the planet’s ecological boundaries and the link between humanity and life-supporting ecosystems (Tham, 2021). Such incentives to prioritize immediate political gains might put democracies at a disadvantage in starting the inclusive discussions needed to find more sustainable models of economic growth.   In addition, democratic politics is frequently permeated by the powerful lobbyist sector and the challenges of corruption which impede the capacity of democratic administrations to effectively and inclusively take the required climate actions. Democracies, as well as non-democracies, often remain economically dependent on fossil fuels. Decarbonizing society is a challenge with large societal and industrial implications, including citizens’ resistance to drastic changes to their way of life, or strong interests from the fossil fuel sector to preserve the status quo. The fossil fuel industry, which has been aware of the dangers of climate change for many decades, has been working to delay and prevent climate policies and used its privileged business status to its advantage (Banerjee, Song, and Hasemyer 2015; Supran and Oreskes, 2017). Such policy capture can at times also be accompanied by an undermining of the democratic political arenas and institutions. Democracy’s ability to mitigate the crisis is also limited by corruption as it weakens the capacity to properly reach targets, implement policies, and conduct inspections (Povitkina, 2018). The presence of lobbyism and corruption undermine the performance of democracies in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Not a single country is currently on track to reach its commitments under the 2015 Paris Agreement (Lindvall, 2021), which reflects both the gap between commitments and implementation and constitutes a sign of weak multilateralism. Not only are countries unable to deliver on agreed national commitments but there are also tensions between countries with different socioeconomic development levels and between countries that are more or less dependent on fossil fuels.   These factors jeopardize democracies’ ability to efficiently fight climate change. However, democracies are equipped with their unique strengths and institutional mechanisms that enable rapid mobilization of the political will and adequate decisions required for effective climate action.   The Strengths of Democratic System in Solving Climate Change   Democracies possess several characteristics that set them apart from other regime types in their ability to address the climate crisis. Several scholars suggest that democracy is better at responding to climate change than authoritarian regimes (Li and Reuveny 2006, Bättig and Bernauer 2009). Similarly, democracies tend to emit less carbon than their non-democratic counterparts (Povitkina, 2018). In an open democratic society, civil and political rights enable citizens to cooperate, join organizations, engage in peaceful protest, voice their interests and articulate their views. Greta Thunberg and the Fridays for Future movement, originating in one of the world’s leading democracies, shows the impact that youth-led mobilization and young people’s movements can have on a global scale. Moreover, it is only in democracies that citizens enjoy freedom of expression and can exchange information without censorship measures aimed at protecting an incumbent regime or the interests of a ruling elite. A free flow of information enables policymakers to debate and identify adequate solutions, just like it enables citizens and civil society to use their creativity and knowledge to participate in the discussion and come up with new ideas (Lindvall, 2021). Democracy can generate social consensus on the difficult policy decisions such as how the costs of the climate change mitigation should be distributed. Such collective policy-making is less likely in authoritarian regimes in which the opposing and divergent voices are suppressed, creating a stagnant and curtailed public debate. The citizens living under such regimes also cannot scrutinize the activities of authorities and businesses due to a lack of transparency where the mechanisms to hold the government accountable are out of the citizens’ reach. The democracies’ unique system of checks and balances increases accountability and the likelihood that crises will be resolved.   The research on climate change and democracy has identified many viable options for democracies to pursue in tackling the climate crisis. According to Willis (2020), the answer to climate change is “more democracy”. Democracies need inclusive politics, stronger engagement from civil society and youth, and the creation of intra- and inter-generational solidarity to ensure climate justice. In this discussion, solidarity refers to societal ties that bind different people together and which prioritizes collective well-being.   Constitutions have a unique role to address climate change by creating and embedding robust institutional structures that transcend political cycles and safeguarding the rights of future generations. Constitutions can create limits to short-termism, preserve inter-generational rights, and give power to the citizens by acknowledging the environment as a fundamental right. The right to a healthy environment is widely recognized and accepted, and more than one hundred countries such as Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia have included it in their constitutions (Boyd, 2012). It creates a dimension where citizens are the rights-holders and can legally hold their governments accountable for delivering basic environmental rights. In a report from the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment (2018), it was concluded that such rights would lead to stronger environmental laws and policies and improved implementation, increased citizens involvement, reduced climate injustice, and better environmental performances. The right to a healthy environment which was recently declared a human right by the UN Human Rights Council (UN News, 2021), can present an opportunity to act boldly and generate meaningful transformations to protect the climate and citizens. By integrating the newly adopted right into their constitutions, democracies can showcase their will and seriousness in addressing the climate crisis.   Deliberative democracy research also presents innovative forms of participation for representative democracies to give citizens a voice in transitions towards net-zero societies. Citizen assemblies and participatory budgeting are solutions that can lead to more legitimate and sustainable outcomes. The idea of citizen assemblies has gained in popularity in recent years and allows randomly chosen citizens to make informed decisions on topics such as climate change. It can ensure high-quality decisions, a high level of consent, innovative solutions, and transparency (Gerwin, 2018). In the United Kingdom, the Climate Assembly published a report on how to reach the net-zero target and provided detailed recommendations such as transparency, transitioning to green energy sources, or avoiding that emissions are transferred to a different nation (Climate Assembly UK, 2020). This represents a concrete way for democracies to engage in a dialogue with their citizens on concrete actions. Citizen assemblies can be implemented at various levels of governance, from cities up to the supranational level.   Participatory budgeting presents another innovative avenue for citizens to engage and potentially create stronger communities, reduce inequalities, and improve climate justice by giving control over financial planning to citizens. Proponents of this democratic practice claim that it may increase civic engagement, build better relations between citizens and their governments, and lead to more effective spending (Participatory budgeting, n.d.). In the case of climate change, participatory budgeting can be implemented to discuss and collectively move forward on complex challenges such as disaster risk management in vulnerable communities or environmental and social resilience of cities.   Other solutions that could have an impact on how democracies can address climate change include the regulation of money in politics, adopting climate laws, increasing the reliance on science-based evidence in policymaking, the creation of climate change advisory boards, improving citizens’ knowledge by protecting public debates from disinformation campaigns, reforming public institutions, and tackling corruption.   The Way Forward for Democratic Climate Action   As highlighted above, the main challenges of democratic systems include short-termism, self-referring mechanisms, governing capacities, and weak multilateralism. Yet, democracy has considerable strengths as a system of governance that allows for a strong civil society, free flow of information, societal consensus, and peaceful transformations of conflicts. The democratic innovations and possibilities outlined in this issue brief cover only some of the future paths that democracies need to explore. Several important fields of research could contribute to strengthening the actions taken by democracies in addressing the climate challenge, with further research on climate litigation and climate justice needed. Further studies could deepen the existing knowledge about how climate policies can better redistribute resources, reduce inequality, and involve communities and marginalized groups in the comprehensive social and economic transitions that an effective response to climate change needs.      References   Banerjee, N., Song, L., and Hasemyer, D. (2015). Exxon’s Own Research Confirmed Fossil Fuels’ Role in Global Warming Decades Ago. Inside Climate News, September 16th. Online: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/16092015/exxons-own-research-confirmed-fossil-fuels-role-in-global-warming/, Accessed 19-11-2021.   Bättig. M., and Bernauer, T. (2009). National institutions and global public goods: are democracies more cooperative in climate change policy? International Organizations 63(2): 281-208.   Boyd, D. (2012). The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment. Environment Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 54(4): 3-15.   Climate Assembly UK. (2020). The path to net zero: Climate Assembly UK, Full report. London, United Kingdom: Climate Assembly UK.   Gerwin, M. (2018). Citizens’ Assemblies: Guide to democracy that works. Krakow, Poland: Otwarty Plan.   Harvey, F., Carrington, D., and Brooks, L. (2021). Cop26 ends in climate agreement despite India watering down coal resolution. The Guardian, November 13th. Online: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/nov/13/cop26-countries-agree-to-accept-imperfect-climate-agreement, Accessed 17-11-2021.   Held, D., Fane-Harvey, A. and Theros, M (Eds). (2011). The governance of climate change: science, economics, politics and ethics. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity.   International IDEA (2021). The Global state of Democracy Report 2021: Building Resilience in a Pandemic Era. Stockholm, Sweden: International IDEA.   Li, Q. and Reuveny, R., 2006. Democracy and environmental degradation. International Studies Quarterly 50 (4), 935–956.   Lindvall, D. (2021). Democracy and the Challenge of the Climate Change. International IDEA Discussion Paper 1. Stockholm, Sweden: International IDEA. Online: https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/democracy-and-challenge-climate-change   Participatory Budgeting. (n.d.) Impacts of Participatory Budgeting Project. Online: https://www.participatorybudgeting.org/impacts/, Accessed 19-11-2021.   Povitkina, M. (2018). The limits of democracy in tackling climate change, Environmental Politics 27(3), 411-432.   Supran, G., and Oreskes, N. (2017). Assessing ExxonMobil’s climate change communications (1977-2014). Environmental Research Letters 12, 084019.   Tham, J-C. (2021). The Climate Crisis & Democracy: From Democratic Debilitation to Innovation. Governing During Crises, Policy Brief No.14. University of Melbourne.   United Nations. (2018). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment (A/73/188) . New York, United States: United Nations.   United Nations News. (2021). Access to a healthy environment, declared a human right by UN rights council. UN News, October 8th. Online: https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/10/1102582, Accessed 18-11-2021.   Willis, R. (2020). Too Hot to Handle? The Democratic Challenge of Climate Change. Bristol, United Kingdom: Bristol University Press.     ■ Kevin Casas-Zamora is the Secretary-General of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), with over 25 years of experience in democratic governance as a researcher, analyst, educator, consultant and public official. He is a Senior Fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue and was previously Costa Rica’s Second Vice President and Minister of National Planning and Secretary for Political Affairs at the Organization of American States. He holds a Law degree from the University of Costa Rica, a Masters in Government from the University of Essex, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Oxford.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구원연구실장     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Introduction   In 2021, Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) selected pandemic crisis and democratic governance as the common challenge that continue to plague and hinder democracy in Asia.   Against this background, ADRN published this special report to evaluate the effect the COVID-19 pandemic had on democratic governance in the region by studying the phenomenon and its impact within different countries in Asia, as well as their responses. The report investigates pressing, contemporary questions such as: What are the challenges that each country faces amid the COVID-19 pandemic? What are common challenges that the world face? What are the responses of the public and private sector of each respective country? How did COVID-19 change the behavior and domestic and foreign policy of major countries?   Drawing on a rich array of resources and data, this report offers country-specific analyses, highlights areas of improvement, and suggests policy recommendations for ensuring democratic governance during times of crises and emergencies.   Quotes from the Paper   “Democracies with successful COVID-19 containment measures, such as Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Taiwan, handled COVID countermeasures based on science, as well as transparency which allows the public to analyze government policies scientifically. These countries held press conferences almost every day until the virus was under control to increase the public’s trust in the government and to guide the regulations.” – Japan Center for International Exchange.   “The tendency towards autocratic governance was spreading around the world prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis. However, the pandemic exacerbated this tendency. In many countries, the pandemic provided an opportunity for authoritarian leaders to expand their powers. As the pandemic raged, these elected chief executives demanded and received even more authority from the legislature to manage the health crisis… The revival of democratic institutions is crucial in fighting corruption in a judicious and systematic manner.” - Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance   “The pandemic period has seen not only a public health and economic crisis but an acceleration of the anti-democratic trends which exacerbated these crises. Sri Lanka’s COVID-19 response has been characterized by a lack of regard for minority rights, the suppression of protests, increased militarization, a move towards autocracy, and an accompanying lack of accountability. Each of these processes, in addition to being worrying in and of themselves, have contributed to the various inadequacies of the COVID-19 response.” - Centre for Policy Alternatives   Authors   Various researchers from Japan Center for International Exchange, Academy of Political Education, East Asia Institute, Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, King Prajadhipok’s Institute, Manusher Jonno Foundation, Society for Participatory Research in Asia, Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency, Samata Foundation, and Centre for Policy Alternatives contributed to the research and writing of each report.   EAI provided support in the form of typesetting and proofreading for the production of the reports     ■ Typeset by Ha Eun Yoon Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]  

Introduction   In 2020, Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) selected an efficient system of checks and balances of the constitutional division of powers as the key element to assess the state of judicial freedoms in Asia.   Against this background, ADRN published this special report to evaluate the current state of the trends and trajectories of judicial powers in the region by studying the phenomenon and its impact within three different countries in Asia, as well as their key reforms in the near future.   The report investigates contemporary questions such as: What are the key constitutional and legal provisions ensuring judicial independence? What are key mechanisms to ensure judicial accountability? Have the courts or judicial processes tuned themselves to modernization and technological transformations such as e-courts or online arbitration? How can we evaluate the performance of judiciary on key parameters like upholding separation of powers? What are the major challenges to judicial independence in the country?   Drawing on a rich array of resources and data, this report offers country-specific analyses, highlights areas of improvement, and suggests policy recommendations to strengthen the autonomy and effectiveness of the judiciary in their own countries and the larger Asia region..   Quotes from the Paper   “The long established constitutional “separation of powers” is under great stress today notwithstanding several landmark judgments by some individual judges in recent times. In addition, there are equally critical concerns with regard to reforms in terms of the manner that judges are appointed and the growing backlog, accountability, corruption, pendency, issues of access and affordability of justice for average citizens, and so on. In short, India’s judiciary is in the spotlight today, albeit for many of the wrong reasons.” – Observer Research Foundation   “Judicial independence is an important concept in modern day democracy. It heralds the principle of separation of powers, and serves as a check on the possible abuse of executive and legislative action through judicial review. But if the judiciary is independent, are they free to do anything? To what standard should they also be held accountable in order to ensure proper behavior and fealty to the rule of law?” – International Center for Innovation, Transformation and Excellence in Governance   “With the evolution of democratic values, the judiciary has taken on a wider role as a key institution that serves as a custodian of public power and a protector of the people’s sovereignty. Thus, the judiciary is expected to safeguard human rights and function as the sole arbiter of legal disputes (Swart 2019). Therefore, both positive and negative duties are cast on political and non-political actors to respect and promote judicial independence and integrity.” – Verité Research   Authors   Various researchers from Observer Research Foundation, International Center for Innovation, Transformation and Excellence in Governance, and Verité Research.   EAI provided support in the form of typesetting and proofreading for the production of the reports.     ■ Typeset by Juhyun Jun Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Introduction   In 2020, Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) selected transparent political finance as the common requirement to prevent corruption and abuse in Asian democracy.   Against this background, ADRN published this special report to evaluate the current state of political finance systems in the region by studying the phenomenon and its impact within four different countries in Asia, as well as their key reforms in the near future.   The report investigates contemporary questions such as: What is the legal mechanism in place to assure transparent political finance? Does the legal framework on political finance place a bar on the use of money in politics? Is money in politics effectively designed with a built-in oversight mechanism of political finance laws? How much transparency is established in the legal framework? What are the key areas requiring reform in the political finance systems to achieve transparency?   Drawing on a rich array of resources and data, this report offers country-specific analyses, highlights areas of improvement, and suggests policy recommendations for ensuring transparent political finance systems with integrity.   Quotes from the Paper   “In order to have more transparent and accountable governance of the political party, financial control should be based on the use of a regulatory approach and financial subsidies from the state as the legal basis of political party governance. Without the provision of adequate funds to parties, party finance regulations will not be effective and cannot be enforced in the process of managing political party finance” – Indonesian Institute of Sciences   “Voter education equips citizens with healthy democratic habits instead of encouraging emotion and rhetoric-influenced decision making. Voters have a right to demand that political parties disclose the sources of their funding. Thus, enough pressure from the public can help to create a domino effect of eradicating corrupt practices in politics..” – Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs   “The role of money in financing politics is neither a new phenomenon nor relevant to a country or region. Money has always been an integral part and a key vehicle for financing politics, political participation, campaigning, and representation around the world. However, without effective regulation, the use of money in politics can undermine representation and representative democracy.” – Pakistan Institute for Legislative Development and Transparency   “While part of legislature and presidential elections subsidies are transferred to parties who are required to file accounting reports each year, those subsidies that are given to candidates themselves are not require to disclose their use. Since these funds are from taxpayers, the use of these funds should be disclosed regardless of the amount, just like political donations, and the items purchased should be truthfully disclosed.” - Academia Sinica/Asian Barometer   Authors   Various researchers from Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs, Pakistan Institute for Legislative Development and Transparency, Academia Sinica/Asian Barometer.   EAI provided support in the form of typesetting and proofreading for the production of the reports.     ■ Typeset by Juhyun Jun Research Associate     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

[편집자 주] On October 31, the general election was held in Japan. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) secured a comfortable majority in the lower house, winning 261 seats. Professor Jaeun Yun states this election shows that the majority of Japanese people tend to approve of the Kishida administration. He also points out that the Kishida administration, albeit securing a comfortable majority, needs to address two issues: to recover democracy in domestic politics and to carry out realistic foreign policy for the promotion of democracy in world politics. In order to promote and contribute to democracy domestically and internationally, he suggests that “reluctant realism” could turn out to be “realistic proactive pacifism.”     Kishida and the Lessons from His Predecessors   Obuchi’s success story is an intriguing case to utilize as a lens for understanding the new Japanese prime minister, Fumio Kishida. Obuchi’s inauguration in July 1998 seemed similar to that of Kishida’s in the light of his poor level of popularity among Japanese voters. Keizo Obuchi, dismissed as “cold pizza” by a Japanese political analyst for his political opportunism (he belonged to the same faction (Heiseikenkyu-kai, 平成研究会) as Ryutaro Hashimoto, the former prime minister), has come to be remembered as a success story among moderate politicians in the Japanese political arena. This is due to his notable political and diplomatic achievements such as forming a coalition government between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)’s and Komeito that, to this day, remains highly effective in winning over opposition parties (with the exception of the 2009 general election), and the reconciliation with its neighbors, South Korea and China. Obuchi’s approval rating nearly doubled during his term, from 24.8% in August 1998 to 47.6% in October 1999.   Why is this success story of the “cold pizza” meaningful for the new Kishida administration? It is said that Kishida has learned lessons from his predecessors—especially those who graduated from the same school, Waseda University. Not only were they alumni at the same school but they were also members of the school’s oratorical society (早稲田雄弁会). The administrations led by Waseda alumni prime ministers, however, have been short-lived ; Obuchi died at 62, less than two years into his term after a stroke. Kishida’s seniors had to address the political predicaments and controversies within the opposing parties and inside the LDP.   During the LDP presidential election held last September, Kishida, like his predecessors, was recognized as a “moderate politician,” and some critics underestimated his political potential to handle various problems faced by Japan, such as the COVID-19 crisis, the economic downturn, and foreign relations in East Asia, especially China. “A lukewarm reaction” to his winning was evidenced in the relatively low approval ratings, and thus many political experts proclaimed that there was no “celebratory mood” for Kishida since approval rates tend to be high for the first cabinet of a new prime minister. Furthermore the “3A (Abe, Aso, Amari),” elderly politicians who have had powerful influence on the LDP, known as supported him in the run-off vote, which was viewed as a sign not to expect change anytime soon. The first cabinet makeup in October was overshadowed by his efforts to pay respect to LDP elders.   The general election on October 31, however, showed that the majority of Japanese people seemed to approve of the Kishida administration; the LDP secured a comfortable majority in the lower house, winning 261 seats. Although the LDP lost fifteen seats before the election, the coalition party, Komeito, increased by three seats. According to several election polls led by the media, the LDP was expected to lose its independent majority. Kishida’s strategy to hold an early election was so successful that he was able to push his domestic politics and diplomacy agenda. Rather than when he was first elected as PM, he can now be called “the second Obuchi.”   The Recovery of Democracy in Domestic Politics   Maintaining a comfortable majority, Kishida needs to address two issues that are likely to collide: the first is the recovery of democracy in domestic politics, and the second is the carrying out of a realistic foreign policy for the promotion of democracy in world politics. These two issues are associated with the legacy of the Abe–Suga administration, with the former having been overlooked for almost a decade. Several indices suggest that democracy in Japan has been in retreat even though many Japanese, especially politicians and political scholars, did not perceive it as a serious problem.   The Democracy Index, compiled annually by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), shows that Japan continued to decline in overall scores—scoring 8.08 points (22nd) and ranking as a “full democracy” in 2010, to scoring 7.99 points (24th) ranking as a “flawed democracy” in 2019. Japan recaptured its full democracy ranking last year, in the aftermath of Abe’s resignation . A series of political scandals might have been connected with Abe, such as the Moritomo–Kake and cherry blossom scandal, but LDP leaders, including Kishida, have denied the reopening of detailed investigations.   A more serious problem is the freedom of the press, as confirmed in the ranking of The Press Freedom Index, presented by Reporters Without Borders (RSF). Since 2012, the year the Abe administration entered office, Japan has always ranked lower than 50th place. In 2010, Japan was ranked in the top 20 (11th) . RSF continuously urges the Japanese government to lift restrictions on reporters and foreign correspondents’ access to press conferences and government officials. However, so far no policy changes have been made.   Henry Laurence, a scholar of Japanese politics, points out that “Abe’s war on the media” is symbolized by the legislature, the 2014 “Protection of Specially Designated Secrets Act.” This undermined the free coverage of the press, including the Japanese media, to contact government officials, as those who leak state secrets would be imprisoned for up to ten years, while reporters and journalists who published such secrets could face five years in jail. Laurence observes that “Abe was particularly overbearing in his attempts to wield influence over NHK,” adding that he did not expect that the situation would improve in the short term. Therefore the Japanese were barely surprised by the news in July 2020 that The New York Times would relocate its Hong Kong-based digital news operation to Seoul, not Tokyo.   In sum, it is challenging for Kishida to handle this sort of problem in domestic politics because, as mentioned above, Abe is one of his allies among LDP politicians. To go against his decision would mean a “political adventure” for Kishida. Nonetheless, given the situation in which the LDP retains a comfortable majority, Kishida has more political room for the recovery of democracy within Japan, and he could play a major role in ordering the reinvestigation of two political scandals.   Of course, such an order would be accompanied by serious political risk. Although this is not a simple, easy decision, it is more likely to occur now than right before the election or if the Japanese voters call on him to overcome his predecessors. A survey conducted by Asahi Shimbun in December 2020 shows that 75% of voters believe that Shinzo Abe should explain his involvement in the cherry blossom scandal at an open hearing in the Diet. Another survey presented by Kyodo News the previous month reported that 69.7% of respondents “do not want the new cabinet to inherit the legacy of Abe and Suga." The process of democracy restoration is intimately linked to realistic foreign policy in terms of the promotion of democracy around the world, especially in Asia.   Japan’s Role in the Promotion of Democracy in Asia   Kishida declared that he would inherit his predecessor’s diplomatic legacy, which means that the agenda proposed by Abe (and also Suga) would continue to be developed. Two publications of the Abe administration in December 2013, when Kishida was foreign minister, were recognized as “the turning point” in Japan’s foreign policy: the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG). According to the new security strategy, Tokyo declared that “proactive pacifism” would be a new agenda, shifting from “idealistic pacifism.” The values Japan aims to seek in foreign policy to enhance regional and international stability are democracy, human rights, and the rule of law while easing military constraints, such as a 1% GDP cap on defense spending. Thus, it can be said that Tokyo had begun to drive toward its “new diplomatic realism.”   A major change in the Asia Pacific region is the new “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” framework and its enhanced version, “Quad,” composed of the U.S., Australia, India, and Japan which has intensified security and economic ties due to tension from the Chinese threat. Although it is not a formal alliance, Japan has emphasized the democratic identity of the four nations. In November 2020, the four countries’ navies participated in their first joint exercise in over a decade. A virtual Quad meeting was convened in March 2021, where four leaders agreed to form working groups on COVID-19 vaccines, climate change, technological innovation, and supply-chain resilience. In his debut on the international stage in the COP 26 UN Climate Change Conference, held in Glasgow, Kishida pledged up to $10 billion in funds over a five-year term to assist Asia on the path to zero carbon emission. This shows Kishida’s steadfast will to contribute toward the promotion of international cooperation, which might come from the original liberalism stance of his faction (Kouchi-kai, 宏池会). Kishida seems well aware of his role in international society.   As part of the Asian liberal democracy, however, Japan has not been able to prevent the collapse of democracy from dictatorship in the regional area—for example, in Hong Kong and Myanmar—even when the U.S. warned both President Xi Jinping and the Myanmar military junta to calm their violence. The aforementioned warnings and the efforts to improve the situation were futile as no meaningful changes were made. Nonetheless, there has been optimism in the Japanese media, especially in the case of Myanmar, suggesting that a compromise could soon be reached because Tokyo has its own “pipe (an interlocutor who has a route to communicate with his counterparts of Myanmar military)” toward Myanmar's armed forces. Consequently, however, Tokyo has been unable to respond to such humanitarian crises, and the violence grew much more serious. In August, a person identified as “the pipe” by the media emphasized that Myanmar military officers understand democracy, and the incident was not a coup, but his insistence seemed unconvincing in light of the miserable reality.   The Hong Kong problem is more serious and complicated than just Myanmar, as it is associated with China’s fundamental political sys-tem; and China is one of the most important counterparts in terms of economic cooperation. Agness Chow, a symbolic figure often called the “goddess of democracy” by the Japanese media, planned to go to Hokkaido University as a research fellow last year, but her dream was unrealized because of the investigation and incarceration by the Hong Kong law enforcement. It is unknown whether Tokyo tried to aid her entrance into Japan as a foreign student or “political refugee,” but she has never left Hong Kong since the establishment of “Patriotic Oath Law” in Beijing. Her call for help was left unanswered even though although she always tweeted in Japanese.   The Way to Raise the Prestige of Japan in the International Society   It is an undeniably onerous task for Japan to maintain and promote democracy in internal and external spheres, and it is nearly impossible to address the problems only by spending large amounts of money or deploying military troops (certainly the latter is not a simple decision for Japan at all, compared to other democracies). The major setback in Kabul, Afghanistan, last August confirmed this. Thus, if Tokyo’s new realism has a core value of promoting democracy in Asia, then Kishida needs to provide a clear sign that he will be “realistic” in diplomatically and peacefully resolving the crisis of democratic values, and not resort to military means. This suggests that “reluctant realism (albeit referring to a more active role in the military alliance)” could turn out to be “realistic proactive pacifism,” which could be a way to contribute to democracy in both domestic and international politics. This is also likely to raise the prestige of Japan soon. ■     [1] New York Times, July 23, 1998 (“Cold Pizza Hits the Spot in Japanese Politics”). [2] Central Research Services (中央調査社) (「小渕内閣支持率の推移」 https://www.crs.or.jp/backno/old/No506/5062.htm). [3] Asahi Shimbun, October 7, 2021 (「（岸田文雄研究）『自分は石破政権の次』　安倍氏に仕えた苦悩」). [4] Ishibashi (65 days), Takeshita (576 days), Kaifu (818 days, the longest term), Obuchi (616 days), Mori (387 days), Fukuda (Yasuo, 365 days), Noda (482 days). [5] Asahi: 45%, NHK: 49%, Yomiuri: 56%, Nikkei: 59%, Sankei: 63.2%. [6] Economist Intelligence (Democracy Index, https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2020/). [7] RSF: Japan (https://rsf.org/en/japan). [8] Henry Laurence, “After Abe, Will Press Freedom Improve in Japan?” (The Diplomat, October 10, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/after-abe-will-press-freedom-improve-in-japan/). [9] New York Times, July 14, 2020 (“New York Times Will Move Part of Hong Kong Office to Seoul”). [10] Asahi Shimbun, December 21, 2020 (English version, “Poll: 70% want Abe to explain scandal in open hearing at Diet”) [11] Kyodo News, October 5, 2021 (「岸田内閣支持率、55％　「安倍・菅路線転換を」69％」) [12] Alexandra Sakaki, “Japan’s Security Policy: A Shift in Direction under Abe?” SWP Research Paper, March 2015, pp.16-17 (https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2015_RP02_skk.pdf). [13] Michael Auslin, “Japan’s New Realism: Abe Gets Tough,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2016 (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2016-02-16/japans-new-realism). [14] Bloomberg, November 2, 2021 (“Japan’s Kishida Pledges Up to $10 Billion in New Climate Finance”). [15] Asahi Shimbun, August 24, 2021 (「政変をクーデターと認めぬパイプ　記者が感じた国家主義」). [16] Michael J. Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 2003.     ■ Jaeun Yun is an assistant professor at Hitotsubashi University and a research fellow at Atsumi International Foundation, Tokyo, Japan. After studying Sociology and Economics at Yonsei University, He worked as a reporter at Maeil Business Newspaper. He received his Ph.D. at Hitotsubashi University specializing in domestic politics, foreign policy, and media in East Asia, especially Japan and Korean Peninsula.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장     문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

[Editor's Note] Afghan women’s life expectancy increased, mortality during child decreased, and participation in social and political activities increased during the 20 year-long War on Terror as the rights of women were provided for during this time. However, despite the encouraging statistics, the idea that women are inferior and should not have the right to freedom remained within the country. Dr. Sanchita Bhattacharya, a Research Fellow at the Institute for Conflict Management, India points out that despite the absence of the Taliban, Afghan women still suffered due to male members of their family or tribe. Before the Taliban disbanded, violence against women was legalized in the country under the justification of preserving religion and the Taliban way of life. With the "come back” of the Taliban, the author states that violence against women will be normalized and it will be difficult to measure the degree of exploitation and harassment.     Introduction   Since 9/11 and the US-NATO’s War on Terror in Afghanistan, the Taliban were officially deposed. But, more pertinently it can be said that the Taliban took a back seat,until they could regroup and gather their lost strength to capture Kabul, as they did on August 15, 2021. It took the Taliban 10 days to capture major cities in Afghanistan (with little resistance), a ‘success’ that was never anticipated even by the US intelligence. Unfortunately, however, the two decades of the War on Terror in Afghanistan gave enough time and space for the Taliban to display its strength over a substantial period of time. This ‘come back’ of Taliban as the governing force of Afghanistan has proved fatal for the marginalized sections of the country: women, children, religious minorities, ethnic minorities, journalists, artists, etc.   As the focus of this discussion is on the women of Afghanistan, the Blue Burqas, rarely visible in open spaces and often associated with fear, segregation, silence, and even death, must not be ignored nor forgotten.   There has been a rise in the fatality count of women this year. Alarmingly, women comprised 14 percent of all civilian casualties during the first six months of 2021, with a total of 727 women casualties recorded (219 killed and 508 injured), an increase of 82 percent, compared to the first six months of 2020. Between January 1 and June 30, 2020, UNAMA documented 400 women casualties (139 killed and 261 injured) (UNAMA, 2021). Out of desperation and fear, the women anxiously have started burning and destroying their certificates, professional degrees and diplomas, and other official documents, so their faces and names remain hidden from Taliban scrutiny.   Though the Taliban was officially overthrown from Afghanistan, their ideals remained at the core of the country’s society and culture. Most Afghan men in the traditionally conservative society still hold the view that women are inferior and have no right to freedom. Some of the women have been killed in so-called “honor” killings carried out by their own families; others have been killed by the Taliban insurgents and their affiliates. They oppose women participating in public roles and those who speak for Women’s rights. Therefore, the deep-rooted social condition has caused a large proportion of women to stay away from the political, social, and economic discourse of the country considerable period of time (Bhattacharya, 2019).   Why Afghan Women Suffer Violence?   The reasons why women sufer violence are extremely complicated and most of the time they result in rampant violence against women. Afghanistan is a country with a lethal concoction of tribal norms, Sunni Islamic practices, and patriarchy. These combined three factors are the major force behind atrocities meted out on the female population of the country. Resultantly, violence is manifested in various ways.   Factors contributing to this violence include the failure to deal decisively with perpetrators; a culture of impunity; perceptions that violence against women is ‘normal’; illiteracy and low levels of public awareness; traditional patterns of marriage; corruption and abuse of state positions; women’s limited access to justice; the lack of security; and weakness of state authority in the districts and provinces. According to UNAMA’s 2021 Mid Year Report, “women appeared to be targeted for the following reasons: (1) professional affiliation (ANP officers, penitentiary staff, judges, media professionals); (2) accused of supporting the Government or ANSF, spying for ANSF; (3) accused by the Taliban of “immoral conduct”, adultery” (UNAMA, 2021).   Women’s Place under the Pashtunwali   Pashtunwali, or, “the way of life of the Pashtuns,” is said to be the unique and shared way of the people. The code of Pashtunwali is based on honor (izzat), chivalry (ghayrat or nang), hospitality (melmastia), gender boundaries (purdah or namus), and council (Jirga), the legislative authority in the public domain. With respect to women’s position in the tribal society, Purdah and Namus are compulsory components of Pashtunwali that are related to the honor of the family, especially, of women. The veil or a curtain is often used as a boundary and segregates men and women’sspace (Naz and Rehman, 2011).   According to the code, the sexual honor and general conduct of females are crucial elements for male honor. The girls and women for whom a Pashtun man is responsible for, must always act in a manner in keeping with Pashtun social traditions (Margolis, 2021). Under the pretext of preserving and honoring these norms and customary laws, the Taliban have once again started on a rampage to assert their power and presence over the female population of Afghanistan. Like the 1990s the faces of Afghan women are gradually vanishing both literally and metaphorically from the public domain once again. The Taliban decides whether or not women and girls should receive education, income, employment etc. The degree of intolerance is increasing with each passing day and the women are sacrificed at the altar of the Pashtun Code by Taliban militia.   Justifying Violence in the Name of Islam   Violence against women is deep-rooted in human civilization. Every society and state in this world has experienced such brutality in some way or other. What makes the Taliban’s rigid and horrid treatment of women different is their justification in the name of Islam. In medieval Europe and parts of the U.S. women were branded and killed in the name of witch-hunting. The Indian sub-continent also experienced the gory custom of burning widows along with their dead husbands. But these practices are the reality of the past and contemporary societies do not justify such crimes in the name of religion.   The Taliban version of Islam and Sharia law are completely anti-women. This vicious version was formed to demonstrate power of Talib who has once again marked out his territory in each province, district, city, and village in Afghanistan. Sharia laws are based on permutation and a combination of various sources- Quran, Sunnah, and Hadith (sayings and deeds of Prophet Mohammad) and other scriptures. There is no standardized Sharia Law, and it varies according to different sectarian interpretations within Islam. Therefore, Taliban’s extreme and conservative version of Sharia Law does not essentially match with Sharia Law of Saudi Arabia or Iran, even though these two countries are also known for their anti-women policies.   A Peep into the 1990s   In order to explicate the current situation, it is crucial to look back at the notoriety of Taliban rule during the 1990s and their treatment of Afghan women. During the 1990s, the Taliban not only brutally imposed social restrictions on women such as mandatory head-to-toe Burqa coverings, but, more primarily and deleteriously, controlled their access to health care, education, and jobs. It barred women from appearing in public spaces without a Mehram (male chaperon), indirectly, sentencing widows and their children to starvation (Allen and Felbab-Brown, 2020).   Women and girls could not pursue education, work, or be treated by a male doctor. To enforce the strictest form of restrictions on women, the Taliban established the Department for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice in the year 1996. It was Afghanistan’s most feared and hated Ministry. Its vigilantes would stone women publicly for adultery, flog women for not wearing Burqa, or for applying make-up, chop off their fingers for painting their nails. Its forces would patrol the streets and beat up women for showing their hands or wrists. Afghan girls would be stopped from attending schools, women’s access to health care would be limited, among many other vicious measures. The sight of public execution of women in open fields was well documented.   Afghan Women during the 20 year-long War on Terror   The post-Taliban Constitution in 2004 gave Afghan women all kinds of rights, and the post-Taliban political dispensation brought social and economic growth that significantly improved their socio-economic condition. In comparison to 2003, with fewer than 10 percent of girls enrolled in primary schools; in 2017, that number had grown to 33 percent. Additionally, female enrollment in secondary education grew from six percent in 2003 to 39 percent in 2017. Thus, Afghanistan had 3.5 million female students with 100,000 studying in universities. Women’s life expectancy grew from 56 years in 2001 to 66 in 2017, and their mortality during childbirth declined from 1,100 per 100,000 live births in 2000 to 396 per 100,000 in 2015 (Allen and Felbab-Brown, 2020). By 2020, 21 percent of Afghan civil servants were women (compared with almost none during the Taliban years), 16 percent of them in senior management levels; and 27 percent of Afghan members of parliament were women (World Bank, 2020). During this period, a section of Afghan women joined various services like the Police force, held government offices, performed on stage, took part in the Olympics, pursued careers in science and technology. Also, girls who were forbidden under the Taliban regime from attending school flooded into classrooms.   Interestingly, four years after the disappearance of the Vice and Virtue Ministry, the Ulema Council of Afghanistan suggested the then-President Hamid Karzai, to bring back the ministry. The Karzai Cabinet also advised the same, but this suggestion did not see the light of the day.   As encouraging the above mentioned statistics might be, still many women experienced trauma, torture, and brutality in Afghanistan during those years. In 2011 and 2018, Afghanistan ranked at the top of the list of most dangerous countries. The women especially in rural parts of Afghanistan suffered beating, rape, murder, and other forms of physical violence even during these 20 years. Many still lived in fear of persecution. Even though the Taliban was absent, these women suffered at the hands of their father, brother, husband or other male members of their family and tribe.   Taliban 2.0 and their new Modus Operandi   Unlike the 1990s, the Taliban is somewhat playing a double game. It wouldn’t be incorrect to state that in its first ‘term’ the fanatics were open and straightforward about their anti-women approach. However, this time around, they are tryingto maintain a ‘moderate’ image, but their trademark brutal practices of public flogging, lashing, beating, killing, etc are in continuation. Since the signing of the Doha Agreement on February 29, 2020, the Taliban attained international political legitimacy. This shameful and unfortunate event increased Taliban atrocities on women and other minorities.   Although the Taliban continue to insist that women are ‘safe’ under their rule, they are in reality, causing violence against Afghan women in two ways: first by public lashing, whipping, beating of Blue Burqa clad women in the rural areas of Afghanistan and second by target killing working women who have a voice and opinion in the urban center.   It is not possible to go through the actual count of such horrid incidents (as most are unreported due to fear of retribution from the Taliban), but it is possible to look into couple of incidents to understand how, independent and assertive women are sys-tematically targeted. Moreover, due to the Taliban’s new policy of deceit, these violent incidences are unclaimed, and fall under the category of death caused due to personal enmity. A few such unfortunate instances of women killed are:   ㆍ A pregnant Policewoman, Banu Negar, was mutilated and killed in front of her husband and children in Firozkoh, capital of Ghor Province in September 2021 (Doucet, 2021).   ㆍ 24 years old Fatima ‘Natasha’ Khalil, an employee of Afghanistan`s Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) was killed in June 2020. Afghan security sources before the August 15 episode, believed the Taliban or groups aligned with it are conducting a covert strategy to send chills through civil society (Shalizi and Sediqi, 2020).   ㆍ Malala Maiwand, an Afghan TV anchor working with Enekaas TV, a privately-owned TV channel of Afghanistan was killed in December, 2020 in Jalalabad. She was also the Jalalabad representative of the Centre for the Protection of Afghan Women Journalists (Reporters Without Borders, 2020).   Moreover, the Taliban replaced the Ministry of Women`s Affairs with the Ministry for Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, which was disbanded in 2001, on September 17, acting contrary to the promise of safeguarding women’s rights. 20 years later the Taliban have reinstated this ministry to remind the world that Afghanistan has re-entered the dark days of horror and torture, all in the name of the Taliban’s version of Islam. Most importantly, this Ministry is a reminder to the world that the Taliban have not changed.   Conclusion     The Taliban are composed of and legitimized by Sunni Muslim conservative clerics and their followers, from the Pashtun tribes of southern Afghanistan. These men cause havoc under the justification of preserving the religion and their way of life. After 20 years of basic exposure of the outside world, the women of Afghanistan are in a worse situation than in the 90s.   Moreover, the Taliban’s way of governance or justice, in a way amplifies the intrinsic ‘trigger happy’ culture within the tribal set-up of Afghanistan. The decades of war have completely ruined the social fabric of the country which is very well manifested towards the heinous treatment of women. The violence against women has been completely legalized by the Taliban and their re-entrance to the political center of Afghanistan displays the massiv support of people, who have complete faith and adherence for the militia.   The official presence of the Taliban will normalize violence against women. It`s hard to measure the degree of exploitation and harassment, particularly of women, across this country. Dreadful incidents may be isolated but now there’s an everyday tension pervasive in the lives of many Afghan women.      Reference Allen, John R. and Vanda Felbab-Brown (2020), “The fate of women’s rights in Afghanistan”, The Brookings Gender Equality Series,https://www.brookings.edu/essay/the-fate-of-womens-rights-in-afghanistan/ Bhattacharya, Sanchita (2019), “Afghan Men in This Conservative Society Still Hold the View That Women Are Inferior and Have No Right to Freedom”, New Age Islam, https://www.newageislam.com/islam-women-feminism/sanchita-bhattacharya/afghan-men-this-conservative-society-still-hold-view-that-women-inferior-no-right-freedom/d/118909 Doucet, Lyse (2021), “Afghanistan: Taliban accused of killing pregnant police officer”, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58455826 Margolis, Maxine L. (2021), “It is not just Sharia law: The Taliban, Pastunwali and Afghan Women”, Newswise, https://www.newswise.com/articles/it-is-not-just-sharia-law-the-taliban-pastunwali-and-afghan-women Naz, Arab and Hafeez-ur-Rehman (2011), “Pakhtunwali and Islam: A comparative analysis of women’s rights in Islam and their violation under Pakhtunwali”, International Journal of Humanity and Social Sciences, Volume 1, Issue 2, pp. 22-32. Reporters Without Borders (2020), “Afghan women journalists rep shot dead in Jalalabad”, https://rsf.org/en/news/afghan-women-journalists-rep-shot-dead-jalalabad Shalizi, Hamid and Abdul Qadir Sediqi (2020), “Gifted young Afghan returnee is victim of campaign attacking civil society”, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-attacks-rights-idUSKBN2412Y8 UNAMA (2021), “Afghanistan 2021 Midyear Update on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict”, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_poc_midyear_report_2021_26_july.pdf The World Bank (2020), “Afghanistan’s Developmental Gains: Progress and Challenges”, https://doi-org.brookings.idm.oclc.org/10.1596/33209     ■ Sanchita Bhattacharya is a Research Fellow in New Delhi based Institute for Conflict Management, India. Her core area of research is Madrasa Education in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. She focuses on terrorism and socio-political issues of Pakistan. She also has an avid interest in the Af-Pak region. Her articles and commentaries have been published in the East Asia Forum, The Kabul Times, The Outlook, The Pioneer, South Asia Monitor etc. She has written research papers in national and international journals and also contributed chapters in various edited volumes. She can be reached at [email protected].     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]