Sri Lanka, Asia’s oldest democracy, is at a critical inflection point in its history. The island nation of 22 million people is facing unprecedented economic and political crises. Sri Lanka is currently engulfed with massive anger and intensifying street protests over the Gotabaya Rajapaksa government’s bungling of the economy that has triggered a near-collapse. The spontaneous protests, which started in early March with small numbers engaged in candlelight marches, soon intensified and transformed into massive, nationwide agitation against the ruling Rajapaksa clan and their misdeeds. With popular slogans like “Go Home Gota” and “Go Home Rajapaksas,” the protestors, comprising students, teachers, doctors, women, and people from every walk of life, poured onto the streets against the Rajapaksa government. When the supporters of Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa launched gruesome attacks on protestors on March 9, it led to a spontaneous and massive counter-attack from the protestors, resulting in the death of a ruling party MP and several civilian deaths. [1] To quell the rapidly spreading violent unrest, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa persuaded his elder brother and Prime Minister Rajapaksa to resign from their posts. The continued unrest, which resulted in angry protestors attacking properties owned by ruling party leaders and burning down the ancestral home of the Rajapaksas in Hambantota city, prompted the former Prime Minister to flee along with his family to the naval base for safety. [2] The island nation seems to be on the cusp of an Arab Spring. [3]   The country is under its second emergency within a month, and protests show no sign of abating. President Gotabaya in the meantime has reconstituted a bipartisan government with the surprise induction of the opposition leader Ranil Wickemesinghe as the new Prime Minister to steer the country toward a safer horizon. Yet, with the economic crisis persisting as fuel and other essential commodities run out of stock (resulting in a 13-hour power cut) due to the balance payment crisis and protestors still at large on the streets demanding the resignation of President Gotabaya, it is difficult to see how the current crisis will pan out.   What led to Sri Lanka’s Economic Collapse?   What has really driven this relatively prosperous island nation (which incidentally had achieved upper-middle income status) to this mess? The most immediate factors that took the country into financial crisis are the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. Starting in early 2020, the pandemic hugely affected island nation’s main revenue earning sector: tourism. Millions of people have lost their livelihoods as tourist footfalls were reduced dramatically over the past two years, resulting in an overall loss of as much as 12% of the country’s economic output. [4] In addition, the pandemic negatively impacted other key revenue earning sectors including the garment industry and tea exports while also squeezing earnings from remittances. [5] Thus, the country’s fragile economy, already reeling from the shock of the Easter Sunday bombings in 2019, [6] became further exposed through these pandemic-related impacts. As the pandemic began to recede in early 2022, there were some signs of economic revival. However, the Russian attack on Ukraine led to a surge in global fuel and food prices. [7] This further impacted the country’s already precarious balance of payment situation, forcing the leadership to scramble for foreign aid to meet its immediate needs. With the country in no position to arrange foreign exchanges, it has cut down on essential imports including fuel, food items, and medicines. This has led to essential fuels like petrol running out of stock in addition to frequent power cuts, long queues for gas stations, and a shortage in many shops of essential goods, medicines, and other basic items. The crisis is so deep that despite immediate support from countries like India and China, Colombo defaulted on all of its external debt on April 12 while seeking an urgent bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).   Deeper Structural Factors behind the Economic Crisis   While the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine greatly exposed Sri Lanka’s economic fragility bringing the country to its worst economic crisis since the 1930s, the crisis in fact has deeper structural roots and can be traced back to the first Rajapaksa government (2005-2014). [9] In the aftermath of its historic victory over the Tamil Tigers in 2009, the Mahinda Rajapaksa government embarked on ambitious infrastructure projects. On the heels of the global financial crisis, the government tapped easily available loans from China to build big-ticket infrastructure projects like Hambantota sea port, Mattala Rajapaksa Airport, and Colombo Port City. While the infrastructure push helped the non-tradable sectors such as construction and real estate and provided temporary growth, several mega-infrastructure projects such as the Hambantota port and Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport emerged as poor investment choices as they earned little foreign exchange for the island nation. [10] In the meantime, Sri Lanka rapidly became one of the most indebted nations, with commercial debt (largely taken from Chinese sources) shooting up from a mere 7% in 2006 to a mammoth 55% in 2019. [11] International sovereign bonds increased as much as 38% (excluding another 10% held by China) by early 2019, while successive governments paid little or no heed to the monstrous level of debt accumulation. With foreign exchange earnings from exports remaining poor (partly due to the Easter Sunday bombings in 2019 hugely impacting the country’s key sector of tourism), the government heavily relied on selling bonds to maintain its foreign exchange reserves. However, with the pandemic squeezing economic activities and much of capital markets, bond markets suffered heavily, further eroding the country’s financial stability.   Populist Policies   The economic mismanagement was furthered by a number of populist policies before and during the pandemic. As soon as the Rajapaksas won the 2019 polls, the first major economic decision they took was to make deep tax cuts despite experts warning that such cuts would badly hit government revenue. [12] The Sinhala-nationalist government followed this with a sudden decision to switch to organic farming in the country without consulting any agriculture experts. [13] In the middle of the pandemic in 2021, the Rajapaksa government embarked on an ambitious roll out of this program by imposing a ban on the import of synthetic fertilizers while forcing 2 million farmers to make the change to organic farming. The outcome of this ill-conceived and populist decision was a drastic fall in the output of staples such as rice and tea. For instance, rice production fell by as much as 20% in the first six months of the program, forcing the country to import USD $450 million worth of rice from international markets while the domestic prices of this national staple surged nearly 50%. [14] The fertilizer ban had devastating effects on tea crops as well, which was the nation’s main source of foreign exchange.   While the government partially removed the ban on export crops such as tea and rubber, the pre-ban momentum has been difficult to achieve. Faced with rising inflation, soaring prices, and massive protests from angry farmers, the government finally reversed its decision on organic farming and associated measures, but with few positive outcomes. From being proudly dubbed an “upper middle income country” a few years ago, more than half a million people have fallen back into grinding poverty. The Rajapaksas’ brazen and populist decisions were aptly summed up by Foreign Policy, which said, “The farrago of magical thinking, technocratic hubris, ideological delusion, self-dealing, and sheer shortsightedness that produced the crisis in Sri Lanka implicates both the country’s political leadership and advocates of so-called sustainable agriculture: the former for seizing on the organic agriculture pledge as a shortsighted measure to slash fertilizer subsidies and imports and the latter for suggesting that such a transformation of the nation’s agricultural sector could ever possibly succeed.” [15]   Nepotism and Corruption   Experts link nepotism to the current economic and political crises facing Sri Lanka. [16] Average Sri Lankans blame the economic mess on the corrupt, wasteful, and oligarchic rule of the Rajapaksa family. As many as six members of the family were holding key portfolios in the government. [17] While Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the third of the brothers, is holding the post of president, the elder brother Mahinda Rajapaksa held the post of prime minister until March 9. Brother Basil Rajapaksa held the key ministry of finance, and Mahinda’s son Namal was Minister of Sport and Youth. While the family’s iron grip over politics began during the civil war years (2005), their real grip on Sri Lanka began in 2010, when Mahinda Rajapaksa was re-elected with a greater majority. Following his re-election, Mahinda not only appointed his brothers and relatives into key positions, he also aggressively solicited investments from China to build many vanity projects in his hometown at great cost to the state exchequer. [18] While the Rajapaksas lost power in 2015 in the face of charges of corruption and nepotism, they won a massive mandate in 2019 against the backdrop of the Easter bombings.   When Gotabaya became President, he appointed his elder brother Mahinda as prime minister. Four other members of his family were allotted key ministries, giving the family a complete hold on Sri Lankan politics. With few checks on their power, the family is at the root of many of the brazen decisions that have accentuated the present economic crisis. For instance, the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, which opened in 2013, is being mocked as “the world’s emptiest airport.” [19] Even the decisions to opt for organic farming and to initially not seek an IMF bailout were made purely by the Rajapaksas. Recently, President Gotabaya accepted that these mistakes had led to the current economic turmoil. [20] In other words, family rule and unchecked power and impunity have greatly aided the current mess in the island nation.   Where Does Sri Lanka Go from Here?   Can Sri Lanka weather the crisis without any major political earthquakes? Will the appointment of five-time Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe bring an end to the continuing political unrest? What is the future of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and the Rajapaksa family? Will this protest movement facilitate a more tolerant and inclusive democracy in Sri Lanka? At this point, it is very difficult to predict what direction that Asia’s oldest democracy will take. However, there are a few things that appear certain. First, the persistent nationwide protests despite the resignation of Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa are likely to bring an end to the long grip of the Rajapaksa family on political power in Sri Lanka. While President Gotabaya is valiantly fighting to hold onto power, he may not have much longer considering the fragile economic situation and ongoing, widespread protests. Such a development may be a good thing for Sri Lankan democracy, as it would create an opening for new political actors in the democratic process. Second, the continuing political unrest may bring an end to the executive presidency and restoration of the 19th Constitutional Amendment, which debarred the president from dismissing the prime minister at his discretion. [21] These are the top demands of the protest movement, and the current dispensation led by Gotabaya is open to these measures. Incidentally, before he was forced to resign, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa had proposed a 21st constitutional amendment repealing the 20th Amendment to the Constitution and reviving the key clauses of the 19th Amendment. [22] This amendment would put an end to the much-abused executive presidency and revive the powers of parliament, which would be an important milestone for Sri Lankan democracy. [23]   Third, the crisis has brought new hope of solidarity and inclusion among minorities such as Tamils, Muslims, and Christians with the Sinhala majority. In a pragmatic show, alienated minorities have joined hands with the Sinhala majority to throw out the Sinhala-nationalist government that has assiduously thrived on polarization and minority alienation. The protest site that Mahinda Rajapaksa’s supporters tried to destroy, “GotaGoGama,” has aptly been called the “secular shrine of democracy” by noted political scientist Jayadeva Uyangoda. [24] The protest site continues to be visited by thousands of people cutting across all faiths and ethnicities to express their solidarity in support of democracy and inclusion. Many powerful Buddhist monks are openly showing solidarity with Muslims and Christian minorities. In short, the crisis portends well for Sri Lanka’s secular and multi-cultural future.   Finally, the crisis offers a rare chance for Sri Lanka to re-assess its excessive dependency on China and expand and deepen its engagement with key democracies in Asia and the West. As has been stated earlier, Sri Lanka’s current economic crisis has a long Chinese shadow. The Rajapaksas have aggressively solicited Chinese involvement in the island nation’s economic and political matters with grave consequences. However, now that the country is in deep financial trouble, China has been less dexterous and taken a more hard-nosed approach toward debt repayments, showing little sensitivity to the suffering of ordinary people. [25] In contrast, Asian democracies like India and Japan, which have been subjected to discriminatory policies particularly under the Rajapaksas’ rein, have shown greater sensitivity and alacrity in providing financial and material assistance. For instance, India was quick to open two lines of credit of USD $1.5 billion each for food, medicine, and other essential goods and has provided USD $2 billion in deferred payments from the Central Bank of Sri Lanka to India’s Central Bank. [26] This critical geopolitical juncture in which both China and the Rajapaksas face increasing scrutiny from a united opposition and the masses is an opportune time for New Delhi and Washington to fill the void and steer the island nation away from Chinese influence [27] . With the pendulum swinging away from China, Sri Lanka must be encouraged to turn to the international community and multilateral institutions to recover from the current crisis. ■     [1] [6] Nisha Arunatillake, https://www.ips.lk/talkingeconomics/2020/04/03/easter-attacks-in-2019-vs-covid-19-outbreak-of-2020-what-lies-ahead-for-sri-lanka/ [7] Gerry Shih, “How war in Ukraine turned Sri Lanka’s economic crisis into calamity,” April 17, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/17/sri-lanka-crisis-default-ukraine/ [8] Mujib Mashal, NYT, 17 May 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/17/world/asia/sri-lanka-fuel-economic-crisis.html [9] S.D. Muni, The roots of Sri Lanka’s economic and political turmoil, The Hindustan Times, April 9, 2022. https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/the-roots-of-sri-lanka-s-economic-and-political-turmoil-101649428821069.html [10] Dushni Weerakoon, “Sri Lanka on the Brink: How the Pandemic and war in Ukraine led to Economic Collapse,” Foreign Affairs, April 14, 2022.https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/sri-lanka/2022-04-14/sr [11] Devaka Gunawardena and Ahilan Kadirgamar, “The Political Economy of the Crisis in Sri Lanka,” Economic and Political Weekly, April 30, 2022. https://www.epw.in/journal/2022/18/perspectives/p [12] Ted Nordhaus and Saloni Shah, Foreign Policy, March 5, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/05/sri-lanka-organic-farming-crisis/ [13] Ibid [14] Ibid [15] Dilrukshi Handunnetti, "The Fall of the House of Rajapaksas: How Unbridled Nepotism let Sri Lanka Down," The Wire, May 10, 2022,[25] Ibid [26] C. Raja Mohan, Across South Asia, US and India Pushback against China, Foreign Policy, April 6, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/06/us-india-china-sri-lanka-south-asia-geopolitics/     ■ Niranjan Sahoo is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek , Director of the Research Department∙Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Introduction   Indonesia, as a democratic country, has laws that regulate the working implementation of democracy. One of these laws stipulates that Indonesia acknowledges the practice of direct democracy[1] . Indonesia has implemented direct democracy in the past in the form of referendums. Notable examples are the referendum to amend the 1945 Constitution and the referendum held by East Timor province to vote on their affiliation to Indonesia (Pereira, C.B., 2006). During the referendum, the people of East Timor were asked to determine their citizenship status (Soares, D.B., 2003). East Timor voters were asked whether they would like to remain affiliated with Indonesia or become independent. The East Timor area was historically annexed by Indonesia during Soeharto's presidency back in the New Order period. The referendum was a consequence of UN resolutions calling for the right to self-determination (Pushkina, D, & Maier, P, 2012). The 1997 Indonesian economic crisis and political reforms in May 1998 facilitated the Indonesian government's decision to hold a referendum in East Timor under UN supervision.   In this regard, this paper will analyze the implementation of direct democracy in the Indonesian context. It will examine the mechanism of direct democracy in Indonesia, the historical context behind the call for the East Timor referendum, and its legal basis. We find that Indonesia practices two forms of direct democracy: referendums and general elections. We focus particularly on the referendum to amend the 1945 Constitution and referendum held in East Timor, later called Timor-Leste. In general elections, Indonesia directly elects its executives of the president and vice president, the governor and vice governor, the mayor and vice mayor, the regent and vice regent, and the head of the village and also the representatives in national and local level.   Theoretical Overview     Direct democracy is the implementation of democracy without proxy (Matsusaka, John, 2005). The most prominent form of direct democracy today in Indonesia is referendum and election in which citizens allowed to express and choose their preferences (Liddle, R.W., 2000). Regarding to referendum types, the electorates determine the political will by choosing to answer simple questions offered by the referendum committee whereby people choose their executive candidates directly.   A popular referendum empowers citizens to make a petition that calls a popular vote over existing legislation. A special committee for hosting referendum formulates the timeframe for a valid petition and the required signatures. They may require signatures from diverse communities to protect minority interests. This form of direct democracy effectively grants the public the option to veto laws adopted by the elected legislature   According to Pew Research’ survey, at least 38 countries show a preference for committing to representative democracy (Wike, Simmons, Stokes, and Fetterolf, 2017). These long-list of number showing that counties support democratic representation as well as direct democracy by considering some advantages of the well-functioning democracy. The advantages of the direct democracy practices ranging from the feasibility of mass gatherings which require voters to gather in one place, enabling specific issues to be discussed and debated directly, ensuring the inclusiveness by engaging society to influence the decision making-process, allowing the majority support to be considered and being a winner, facilitating community meetings to assign or appoint government officials who hold administrative posts, allowing voters to submit the legal drafts as well as to propose amendments the constitution based on community support.   However, aside with the advantages, there are also the disadvantages of direct democratic practices that endanger the democratic transition in the future. First, elections incur costs for printing, election supervisor salaries, the General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum/KPU) salaries, and other reason that make local legislator members powerless. Second, money politics is something that will always be there when someone hungry for power engages in corruption or seeks a return on investment. Third, frequent horizontal social conflicts occur due to political elites who deny their supporters, triggering attacks on one other. Fourth, it is difficult to engage in direct democracy in a large population because doing so consumes a lot of time and energy. Moreover, the direct democracy has tendency to be expand the authoritarianism by empowers populist to rise and make used of popular votes such as using referendums to be an effective mechanism to get into the power (Collin, 2019).   The Referendum to Amend the 1945 Constitution   1) The Legal Perspective   Presidential Decree No. 5 issued in 1985 laid out the requirements for amending the 1945 Constitution, stating that such amendment would only be allowed through a referendum. In this decree, a referendum is defined as an activity to directly ask whether the people agree with the wishes of the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/MPR) to amend the 1945 Constitution. The decree states that the people's opinion must be conveyed in the form of a statement by the People's Opinion Giver, where The People's Opinion Giver is a citizen of the Republic of Indonesia who meets the requirements set out in the law.   The consideration for the amendment of the 1945 Constitution is in the following: The MPR resolves to uphold the 1945 Constitution, does not intend and will not make changes to it, as stated in the MPR Resolution of the Republic of Indonesia Number. I/MPR/1983 on the MPR Rules of Procedure, and MPR Resolution of the Republic of Indonesia Number. IV/MPR/1983 on the referendum. However, the MPR will implement Article 3 of the MPR Resolution of the Republic of Indonesia Number. IV/MPR/1983 on the referendum, and therefore it is necessary to establish a law in governing the referendum. Referendums are held through direct, public, free, and secret public opinion polls. Public opinion is polled using the people's opinion letter.   The decree further stated that the public would be declared to agree with the wishes of the MPR to amend the 1945 Constitution if the results of the referendum as referred to in Article 17 show that at least 90% of the total number of registered Public Opinion Givers have exercised their right to give public opinion, and at least 90% of the People's Opinion Givers who exercise their rights express agreement with the will of the MPR to amend the 1945 Constitution.   2) Mechanism of the Referendum for the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution   In 1985, Indonesia acknowledge the law Number 5, Year 1985 for amending the 1945 Constitution through referendum. The mechanism of the referendum should comply with the following mechanism. The referendum shall be held within a maximum of 1 (one) year from the commencement of the registration of the People's Opinion Giver until the submission of the results of the referendum to the President as stipulated in the Law number 5 year 1985. According to article 7 of law number 5 year 1985 stated that the people's opinion poll is conducted in 1 (one) day and simultaneously done in all territories of the Republic of Indonesia. The implementation of the referendum is led by the President. To implement the law, the President shall appoint a committee to conduct a referendum, which shall be chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs.   Further, to carry out the referendum, the Referendum Implementation Committee is formed at the Provincial, Regency/ Municipality, Subdistrict, Kelurahan/Village level, and at the Representative of the Republic of Indonesia abroad. For this purpose, the Governor, Regent/Mayor, Sub-District Head, Village Head, and Head of Representative of the Republic of Indonesia abroad, due to their respective positions, shall be the Chairman of the Referendum Executive Committee.   The Referendum Implementation Committee consists of elements of the Government. To help the implementation of the referendum, a Referendum Supervisory Committee shall be established. The composition, duties, functions, working procedures, and other matters concerning the Referendum Implementation Committee and the Referendum Supervisory Committee shall be further regulated by a Government Regulation.   To exercise the right People's Opinion Giver must be registered in the People's Opinion Giver Register. To be registered in the Register of Public Opinion Givers, the following conditions must be met:   a. not a former member of a prohibited organization of the Indonesian Communist Party,   b. not crazy person   c. person who still have the right to vote or the right to vote is note being cancelled by court decision.   A People's Opinion Giver who, after being registered in the List of People's Opinion Givers, if they are no longer meets the requirements, they cannot exercise the right to give the people's opinion. Citizens of the Republic of Indonesia who are former members of prohibited organizations of the Communist Party of Indonesia, including mass organizations of the Indonesian Communist Party are not registered in the People's Opinion List.   Immediately after the people's opinion poll is over, a people's opinion poll is held at the people's polling place. The People's Opinion Giver may be present to follow the implementation of counting the people's opinion. The results of the calculation of public opinion shall be submitted to the the referendum committee. Therefore, the Referendum Implementation Committee collect all the result from each level committee of their respective work areas.   3) The Referendum of East Timor   3-1) Background of the Referendum   Timor-Leste is located in the eastern part of the island of Timor with an area of 15,007 km2, and was previously a colony of Portugal known as Portuguese Timor. Due to the struggle of the Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste (Fretilin), the region declared independence from Portugal on November 28, 1975.   Under the leadership of Soeharto, Indonesia carried out a military invasion that ended in the annexation or forcible incorporation of Timor-Leste into Indonesian territory. Soeharto gained this momentum by taking advantage of the situation in Timor-Leste, which was divided between left and right-wing groups. East Timor was declared the newest province of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.   Indonesia attacked Timor-Leste with a military operation known as Operation Seroja, the largest military operation ever carried out by the Indonesian army. Thousands of troops were mobilized to invade Dili City. They captured and destroyed Fretilin. Around 15,000 Indonesian troops were deployed to secure the second largest city, Baucau. On July 27, 1976, Indonesia officially declared East Timor its 27th province (Handoyo, S, 2014)   Changes in global and domestic politics in Indonesia have implicated the Indonesian policy on Timor-Leste. When Habibie became president, the autonomy of East Timor became a crucial issue. Demands were made by countries beyond Europe and ASEAN for Indonesia to carry out political reforms and particularly to help Timor-Leste determine its own destiny. In this regard, Portugal as a former clone of Timor-Leste, demand the Indonesian government jointly determining the future of Timor-Leste. As a result, Indonesia and Portugal concluded an Agreement on May 5, 1999 in New York under the UN corridor (Braithwaite, J, 2012). The Agreement laid out a procedure for hosting public opinions in a confidential, direct and universal manner.   3-2) The Mechanism of the Referendum of Timor Leste   The significance of the change in East Timor began in January 1999 when President Habibie announced a “second option” for East Timor to choose between regional autonomy or independence. Habibie asked the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Anan, to bridge the disagreement between Indonesia and Portugal over East Timor. An agreement was reached to use the popular opinion poll in consultation with the East Timorese community (Agussalim, 2019). At the suggestion of the United Nations, President Habibie held a referendum on August 30, 1999, under the supervision of the United Nations Mission for East Timor (UNAMET) attended by the people of East Timor. The police and Indonesian Military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia/TNI accompanied UNAMET, which was the UN mission formed based on the UN Security Council Resolution No. 1246 dated May 5, 1999, to carry out the task of polling in Timor-Leste. The climax of the referendum was on August 30, 1999 (Puspita, 2008). Simultaneous polls were held throughout Timor-Leste and outside Timor-Leste. In the referendum, the people of East Timor answered two questions (Anderson, B, 1993).   a. Do you accept special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia?   b. Do you reject the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, which will lead to the separation of East Timor from Indonesia?   The results were announced in Dili on September 4, 1999. A total of 451,792 East Timorese attended the event where the results were announced. Out of a total of 438,968 valid votes, 344,580 (78.5%) people voted for independence, while 94,388 (21.5%) people chose to remain with Indonesia. The participation rate in the referendum was very high, with 451,792 people representing 98.6% of all registered voters. The results of the referendum led to the official separation of East Timor from Indonesian control, and the territory was temporarily placed under the authority of the United Nations.   As many as 78.5% of the population of East Timor rejected the special autonomy offered by Indonesia, choosing independence instead. After the referendum results were announced, riots broke out in East Timor. Armed militia groups supported by the Indonesian Military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia/TNI) went on a rampage and burned the city of Dili and other places (Crouch, H., 2003). Records show that around 1,400 people died and 300,000 people fled to Atambua. This also tarnished Indonesia's credibility in the eyes of the international community since the Republic of Indonesia had guaranteed security during the referendum. On October 19, 1999, the results of the East Timor referendum were approved by theMPR, which confirmed that East Timor was no longer Indonesian territory.   Historical records reflect that Timor-Leste separated itself from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia on August 30, 1999 through the implementation of an independence referendum. On May 20, 2002, Timor-Leste was officially declared an independent and sovereign country. The leader of the liberation struggle, Xanana Gusmao, was elected the first president of East Timor.   4) Direct Democracy in the form of General Elections   4-1) The Background of Political Change   In Indonesia, direct democracy is also practiced in the form of direct elections. During the New Order political reign, the governor and vice governor, regent and vice-regent, and mayor and vice mayor were elected by the people’s representatives at the local level (Dhakidae, D,, 2003). Law No. 22 of 1999 proscribed that regional heads were elected by legislative members at the local level. During this time, candidates were mostly assigned by the central government. Candidates were elected by the people’s representative. However, many people believe that the elected candidates win because of the economic transaction behind the election mechanism by the people’s representative. Therefore, it was generally assumed that candidates were politically “supported” by the central government. Through Law Number. 32 of 2004, this mechanism to elect regional heads was changed from legislative member proxy elections to direct elections by the people.   The phrase "democratically elected" in Article 18 paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution is interpreted to mean that regional head elections must be conducted directly by the people. This paper will discuss the provisions in the mechanism for selecting regional heads as well as the dynamics of regional head elections (including in special regions) in Indonesia. From a normative juridical overview, it is stipulated in the law that local election can be done in the form of direct elections by the people or elections by the Regional People's Representative Council. Both normative view derived from the assumption that the selection of the regional head as long as it is consider as democratically elected, it is considered as comply with the 1945 Constitution.   There are several arguments as to why local elections should be conducted directly by the people (Kosasih, A., 2018). First, direct local elections are needed to break the oligarchic chain of party leadership in determining the pair of regional heads and deputy heads elected by the legislative members at the local level. In addition, the election by a handful of legislative members at the local level also tends to be oligarchic because legislative members can potentially fight for the interests of the political elite. Second, direct elections are expected to improve the quality of sovereignty and people's participation because they allow the public to directly determine and choose the candidate pair who will best fight for their interests. Third, direct elections accommodate the bottom-up leadership selection process while minimizing the portion of leadership that is appointed by the central government. Fourth, direct local elections are expected to minimize money politics, which generally occur transactionally when elections are conducted by the legislative members at the local level. Because they are assumed to be relatively free from money politics, regional leaders who are the product of direct regional elections are expected to be able to institute good governance and enforce clean regional governments. Fifth, direct local elections are expected to improve the quality of regional executive political legitimacy, encourage political stabilization, and improve the effectiveness of local government.   4-2) The Mechanism of Direct Election for the Executive   Following Article 18 paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution, regional heads are democratically elected. Before 2004, the regional heads are elected by legislative members. However, it is changed to direct election. Law Number. 32 of 2004 concerning regional government stipulates that the head and vice head of a region are directly elected by the people. Their candidacies should be proposed by political parties or coalitions of political parties.   Conclusion   Various literature studies revealed the advantage of direct democracy. However, the democratic transition in Indonesia shown the pathway to consolidation by emerging the direct election not only for president and vice president, but also the local governors and regency in the local level. The strengthening of direct democratic practices thus deemed the democratic institution to ensuring the well-functioning of civil society organizations and other interest groups to engage in decision making-policy. In the end, these direct democratic practices have successfully brought Indonesia to be resilience from democratic setback whereas at the same time have to fight back for reducing the popular votes raising populism to expand their power. ■   References   Agussalim, Agussalim. "Rekonsiliasi Indonesia–Timor Leste terhadap Kes Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia Pasca Referendum." PhD diss., Universiti Utara Malaysia, 2019. Anderson, Benedict. "Imagining'East Timor'." Arena Magazine (Fitzroy, Vic) 4 (1993): 23-27. Braithwaite, John, Hilary Charlesworth, and Adérito Soares. Networked governance of freedom and tyranny: peace in Timor-Leste. ANU Press, 2012. Crouch, Harold. "The TNI and East Timor Policy." Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor (2003): 141-167. Dhakidae, Daniel. Cendekiawan dan kekuasaan dalam negara Orde Baru. Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2003. Halperin, Morton, Joe Siegle, and Michael Weinstein. The democracy advantage: How democracies promote prosperity and peace. Routledge, 2009. Handoyo, Sri. "A Brief History of the Boundary Mapping Between Indonesia and Timor-Leste." In History of Cartography, pp. 165-180. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2014. Kosasih, Ade. "Menakar Pemilihan Umum Kepala Daerah Secara Demokratis." Al Imarah: Jurnal Pemerintahan dan Politik Islam 2, no. 1 (2018). Lake, Silverius CJM, and Frederikus Fios. "To Become Indonesian: Experience, Perception, and Hope of East Timor Refugees after Referendum (1999-2009)." (2021). Liddle, R. William. "Indonesia in 1999: Democracy restored." Asian Survey 40, no. 1 (2000): 32-42. Matsusaka, John G. "Direct democracy works." Journal of Economic perspectives 19, no. 2 (2005): 185-206. Munhanif, Ali. "Democratization and The Politics of Conflict Resolution in Indonesia: Institutional Analysis of East Timor Referendum in 1999." In ICSPS 2019: Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Social and Political Sciences, ICSPS 2019, 12th November 2019, Jakarta, Indonesia, p. 23. European Alliance for Innovation, 2020. Nugroho, Rahmat Muhajir, and Anom Wahyu Asmorojati. "Simultaneous Local Election in Indonesia: Is It Really More Effective and Efficient?." Jurnal Media Hukum 26, no. 2 (2019): 213-222. Pereira, Celestino Boavida. "Kesepakatan tentang referendum di Timor Timur." PhD diss., Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2006. Collin, Katherine. "Populist and authoritarian referendums: The role of direct democracy in democratic deconsolidation." Brookings policy brief, Democracy and Disorder (2019). Pushkina, Darya, and Philip Maier. "United Nations Peacekeeping in Timor-Leste." Civil Wars 14, no. 3 (2012): 324-343. Puspita, Nina Yudhi. "Upaya United Nations Transitional Administration In East Timor (Untaet) dalam Menjaga Keamanan Perbatasan Indonesia-Timor Leste (2000-2002)." PhD diss., Universitas Airlangga, 2008. Soares, Dionisio Babo. "Political developments leading to the referendum." Out of the Ashes (2003): 53. Tahir, Amirullah, Syamsul Bachri, Achmad Ruslan, and Faisal Abdullah. "The Local Election and Local Politic in Emboding the Democracy." JL Pol'y & Globalization 44 (2015): 138. Zurbuchen, Mary Sabina, ed. Beginning to remember: The past in the Indonesian present. NUS Press, 2005.     [1] Law No. 5/1985 on Referendum     ■ Devi Darmawan is a researcher at the Research Center for Politics, National Research and Innovation Agency. She holds a law degree from the University of Indonesia and has successfully pursued a master's degree in political science at the School of Public Affairs, American University. Her studies focus on election, democracy, and comparative politics. She has been involved in research on: "Alternative Design of the Election System in the scheme of the Presidential System in Indonesia," "Evaluation of the 2014 Legislative Election," and "Mapping of Political, Legal, Economic, Social and Cultural Conditions ahead of the 2019 election." Devi can be reached by email at [email protected] ■ Dr. Sri Nuryanti is currently a senior researcher of the research Center for Politics, National Research and Innovation Agency. She is the former Election Commissioner of the Indonesian General Election Commission 2007-2012, where she successfully oversaw the Parliamentary election and Presidential election 2009, as well as local elections from 2007-2012. She is an active participant in various academic activities at the national as well as the international level. She is a council member of APPRA (Asia Pacific Peace Research Association) and IPRA (International Peace Research Association). Dr. Sri Nuryanti can be contacted by email at [email protected]     ■ Typeset by Juhyun Jun , Research Associate     For inquiries: 82 2 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Introduction   Direct democracy is a form of democracy beyond representative democracy. It is the basic political process which allows ordinary citizens to not only vote for their representatives in the parliament, but also participate in political activities and policy decisions (John G. Matsusaka 2005, 187). Moreover, direct democracy is used by the communication technology revolution, and is the better tool when policymakers require deep information that experts do not know (John G. Matsusaka 2005, 186). Nowadays, popular initiatives and referendums are the key mechanisms of direct democracy. According to the V-Dem Institute’s report (2015), the use of direct democracy has been increasing worldwide. However, citizens still face challenges in accessing their right to participate in direct democracy due to a lack of measures to participate in direct democracy and a lower capability in assessing its quality (David Altman 2015). In the V-Dem Institute report, direct democracy (DD) refers to the institutionalized process by which citizens of each country register their opinions on a specific issue via a ballot, consisting of initiatives, referendums, and plebiscites. This definition excludes recall elections and deliberative assemblies. Figure 1 illustrates the score of Direct Democracy Practice Potential (DDPP) around the world. [1] Darker shades indicate higher DDPP. The maximum score is 0.849, the minimum score is 0, and the mean score is 0.162. Thailand’s score is 0.088, among which its obligatory referendums (OR) score is 0.306, and its popular initiative (PI) score is 0.048 (David Altman 2015).   Since 1932, Thailand has changed from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. This means that Thailand has moved forward with democracy. In ninety years, Thailand has had 20 constitutions and charters with a series of intervening military coups. In the events of 1997, the National Assembly elected a Constitution Drafting Assembly to hold a public hearing over what the new constitution should contain. This 1997 Constitution is called the “People’s Constitution,” and included a section related to law initiative in which by 50,000 eligible voters can propose a law. In the 2007 Constitution which followed, just 10,000 eligible voters can propose a law. The 2017 Constitution also mandates law initiative by eligible votes at both the national and local level. At the local level, residents can propose local ordinances. So far, in addition to the law initiative implemented in Thailand, popular direct democracy through unconventional political participation has appeared. One example is the use of artificial intelligence (AI) by young people and social media to engage in direct democracy. Direct democracy in Thailand is accordingly more important and widely experienced compared to the past. A greater number of people are participating in direct democracy. In this study, the authors would like to study the current state of direct democracy in Thailand and explore how it might be strengthened.   Figure 1. Direct Democracy Practice Potential (DDPP) around the world (2000)   Source: Photo by David Altman, [12] orchestrated the constitution drafting process and the process of referendum was marred by severe restrictions on people’s ability to debate and criticize the content of the draft charter. Moreover, a draft constitution written by an army-appointed committee and has content entrench military control by proposes that the appointed senate should be involved in selecting a prime minister.   Figure 2. Provinces of Thailand colored according to referendum results (Charter)     Year 2006 Year 2016 Source: Photo from Wikipedia, February 10, 2022, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Thai_constitutional_referendum; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Thai_constitutional_referendum   The first referendum showed a turnout rate of 57.61 percent of registered voters. Of those who voted, 57.81 percent approved and 42.19 percent disapproved. Thus, the military government would have had the freedom to choose any previous constitution to adapt and promulgate instead. For the second time, the charter offered only semi-democracy and was seen to tighten military rule in Thailand. However, it was approved by 61.35 percent and disapproved by 38.65 percent of voters, with a voter turnout of 59 percent. Moreover, a second proposal for the next Prime Minister to be jointly elected by Senators and MPs was also approved (the Secretariat Office of the House of Representatives, 2022). Below are the referendum results on the draft charter, with a comparison of the provinces of Thailand between 2006 and 2016.   2) Law initiatives   Under the 1997 Constitution and the 1999 Initiative Process Act, there are many conditions for participating in law initiatives that make it more difficult to fulfill the process. Examples include the number of names of qualified eligible voters required, supporting documents, and methods of by which the names must be entered. During implementing the 1997 Constitution, sixteen bills were proposed, with only one legal draft being adopted and promulgated by the parliament. Under the 2007 Constitution, there were 51 draft laws submitted to the parliament, with eight of them being adopted by the parliament and enacted into law. In addition, the number of eligible voters who can propose a law has been reduced from 50,000 to 10,000, although 50,000 are still required for a proposed constitution. Under the 2017 Constitution, people can more easily submit a bill by using only one copy of their identity card. It is not necessary to provide a copy of one’s household registration. As of February 23, 2022, there have been 71 law proposals put forth under this method, but none of them have been passed into law yet. However, the process of initiating the law under the Initiative Process Act C.E. 2021, which was promulgated May 27, 2021, makes it easier for people to bring in legislation. Admitting the entry into the introducing bill without having to sign in the case of submitting a bill proposal through the online system. [13] With the previous law requires signature on the specified from along with a copy of the identity card. Because the current legal initiative system is electronic, it is more practical than systems of the past, and people are therefore more likely to proposed laws. The trend of public participation and the government's ability to allow people to directly participate in politics through the channels of law initiatives are positive signs of direct democracy. However, there are some constraints to consider, such as political will and the prime minister's endorsement of the public's proposed bills related to demanding financial support from government, concerns taxation or government spending so-called money-bill” [14] . In addition, legislative amendments to the bill may also distort the intent of the bill's proponents.   3) Recalls   In Thailand, the recall mechanism is frequently used as a political tool by authoritarian dictatorships rather than to promote democracy. This is because there has never been a recall mechanism that can remove a person from office under democratic governments, whereas a recall mechanism has been used to remove people from political office or high-level positions in order to maintain authoritarianism by the legislature that stems from appointment after a coup. The first was the recall of a member of the Human Rights Commission by resolution of the National Legislative Assembly appointed after the coup in 2006. There was also the recall of former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra by resolutions of the National Legislative Assembly, which was appointed after the 2014 coup, and so on. Furthermore, while the recall mechanism for political office holders and high-ranking positions is not endorsed by the existing constitution, there are political movements to recall incumbents through a signature campaign on the website www.change.org. For example, Ms. Parena Kraikup, a member of the House of Representatives from the Palang Pracharath Party, received more than 75,196 signatures on a petition demanding her recall for inappropriate behavior and not setting a good example for the people. The petition for the Election Commission's recall has more than 861,843 supporters. These campaigns are symbolic representations of the people's political will, although such signatures have no legal effect (the Secretariat Office of the House of Representatives, 2022).   4) Unconventional political participation   The other form of direct democracy is unconventional political participation (UPP) (King Prajadhipok’s Institute, 2014). Examples include getting together with others to raise an issue or sign a petition, attending a demonstration or protest march, and using force or violence for a political cause. The following figure shows responses from the Asian Barometer 2018 survey to those asked whether they had ever attended a demonstration or protest march.   Figure 3. Percentage of people attending a demonstration or protest march, by year Source: Data adapted from King Prajadhipok’s Institute, Asian Barometer Survey, 2018   According to Figure 3, most people have never attended a demonstration or protest march before. However, this percentage decreased after 2006. It seems that after Thailand had the first referendum in 2006, people participated more in political activities. In May 2014, there was a coup d’état in response to the political situation after months of political demonstrations, a disrupted and ultimately invalidated election, and accusations of government mismanagement. Thus, it can be said that unconventional political participation has become a signal that the temperature of politics is high and more government attention should be paid to the voices of the public.   Problems of Direct Democracy in Thailand   1) Referendums have become a political mechanism and no longer reflect the will of the public.   2) While the number of people proposing bills through the law initiative mechanism has increased, not many bills can pass the parliament and become law because bills related to the budget have to be endorsed by the Prime Minister. In addition, people have a limited amount of the Civil society helps strengthen direct democracy and supports law initiatives.   3) Recalls seem to be impossible.   4) The other form of direct democracy is popular democracy.The importance of this mechanism appears to be increasing because of the application of social media and websites like www.change.org, which have become tools through which to send a signal to the government, especially on important issues. Unconventional forms of political participation, like demonstrations on the streets through car mobs or other such forms, and the application of social media, have become an increasing role, more than conventional forms. However, people who join in acts of popular democracy risk violating the law.   The Trend of Direct Democracy in Thailand   The authors see positive signs of direct democracy in Thailand, especially in law initiatives, because the new law promulgated according to the 2017 Constitution allowed for the application of social media in lawmaking, while the previous law did not. With the adoption of technology to support law initiatives, the authors think that forms of direct democracy, especially law initiatives, will increase in their importance. However, without political will and support for these mechanisms, the law initiatives will not be realized. Since both representative democracy and direct democracy are a foundation of democratic regime, which consistent and support each other. Therefore, the stability of representative democracy and intention of promoting direct democracy from the government and the politicians are important. Otherwise, if people could not participate in direct democracy via the legally conventional channels, it may lead people to have the movement along the road or the unconventional political participation. Thus, the direct democracy’s drive (conventional form) in Thailand may encounter unceasing obstacles, as same as ‘walking to the pointless’ under the unsteady Thai democratic regime in the current.   References   Altman, David. “Measuring the Potential of Direct Democracy Around the World (1900-2014)” V-Dem Working Paper 2015:17 (December 1, 2015), SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2701164. Beramendi, Virginia, et al. Direct Democracy: The International IDEA Handbook. Stockholm: International IDEA, 2008. https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/direct-democracy-international-idea-handbook. Bobbio, Norberto. Liberalism and Democracy. Translated by Martin Ryle, and Kate Soper. London: New Left Books, 1990. Bulmer, Elliot. Direct Democracy: International IDEA Constitution-Building Primer 3. Stockholm: International IDEA, 2014. https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/direct-democracy. Bureekul, Thawilwadee, and Ratchawadee Sangmahamad. Value Culture and The Thermometer of Democracy. Bangkok: King Prajadhipok’s Institute, 2014. Bureekul, Thawilwadee, Tossapon Sompong, and Somkiet Nakratok. The Study of Citizenship Behavior for Thai Society. Bangkok: King Prajadhipok’s Institute, 2020. Collin, Kathy. “Populist and authoritarian referendums: The role of direct democracy in democratic deconsolidation.” The Brookings Institution, (2019). https://www.brookings.edu/research/populist-and-authoritarian-referendums-the-role-of-direct-democracy-in-democratic-deconsolidation/. International Federation for Human Rights. Roadblock to Democracy: Military repression and Thailand’s draft constitution, 2016. https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_report_thailand_roadblock_to_democracy.pdf. Kurlantzick, Joshua. “Thailand’s August 7 Referendum: Some Background.” Council on Forieng Relations. August 3, 2016. https://www.cfr.org/blog/thailands-august-7-referendum-some-background. Kyburz, Stephan and Stefan Schlegal. “8 Principles of Direct Democracy.” Center for Global Development. July 29, 2019. https://www.cgdev.org/blog/8-principles-direct-democracy. Matsusaka, John G. “Direct Democracy Works.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 19, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 185-206. “Thai referendum: Why Thais backed a military-backed constitution.” BBC. May 11, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36972396. The Secretariat Office of the House Representative. Kan khao Chuea Sanoe Kotmai Khong Prachachon Phu Mi Sitthi Lueaktang Tam Ratthathammanun Haeng Ratcha anachak Thai B.E.2560 [Summary of the voter's law initiative, according to the 2017 Constitution of the Kingdom (B.E.2560)], February 23, 2022. The Secretariat Office of the House Representative. Sarup Phon Kan Damnoen Ngankan Khaochue Sanoe Kotmai Tam Ratthathammanun Haeng Ratcha anachak Thai B.E.2550 [The result of the law initiative, according to the 2007 Constitution of the Kingdom (B.E.2550)], February 23, 2022. The Secretariat Office of the House Representative. Sarup Phon Kan Damnoen Ngankan Khaochue Sanoe Kotmai Tam Ratthathammanun Haeng Ratcha anachak Thai B.E.2540 [Summary of the result of the law initiative, according to the 1997 Constitution of the Kingdom (B.E.2540)], February 23, 2022. Wikipedia. “Direct Democracy.” Last Modified February 25, 2022. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_democracy. Wikipedia. “2007_Thai_constitutional_referendum.” Last Modified February 25, 2022. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Thai_constitutional_referendum. Wikipedia. “2016_Thai_constitutional_referendum.” Last Modified February 25, 2022. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Thai_constitutional_referendum.     [1] The results from the addition of the scores of each type of popular vote studied (popular initiatives, referendums, plebiscites, and obligatory referendums). The maximum score of two results from ease of initiative and ease of approval. Each of these terms obtains a maximum value of one and works as a chain defined by its weakest link. The maximum possible overall DDPP is 8 (scale it to a 0-1 range for graphical purposes). [2] Section 43, the 2017 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand. [3] Section 133, the 2017 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand. [4] Section 254, the 2017 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand. [5] Section 256, the 2017 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand. [6] Section 57 (2), the 2017 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand. [7] Section 57 (1), the 2017 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand. [8] Section 63 and 78, the 2017 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand. [9] Section 178, the 2017 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand. [10] Section 252 and 253, the 2017 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand. [11] Section 77, the 2017 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand. [12] The military junta that ruled Thailand between its 2014 Thai coup d'état on 22 May 2014 and 10 July 2019. [13] Section 8 Initiative Process C.E. 2021. [14] Section 113, the 2017 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand.     ■ Thawilwadee Bureekul is the director of the Research and Development Office at King Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI) where she is involved in the planning, management, implementation, and coordination of the Institute’s research projects. In addition to her role at KPI, Dr. Bureekul is a professor at several universities in Thailand, including the Asian Institute of Technology, Thammasat University, Burapha University, Mahidol University, and Silpakorn University. She succeeded in proposing “Gender Responsive Budgeting” in the Thai Constitution and she was granted the “Woman of the Year 2018” award, and received the outstanding award on “Rights Projection and Strengthening Gender Equality” in the Year 2022 as a result. ■ Ratchawadee Sangmahamad is a senior academic of the Research and Development Office at King Prajadhipok’s Institute. Her research focuses on gender, citizenship, election studies, and conducting the quantitative research. She has published books as a co-author, such as Value Culture and Thermometer of Democracy, Thai Citizens: Democratic Civic Education, and many articles, and Thai Women and Elections: Opportunities for Equality. ■ Arithat Bunthueng is an Academic of the Research and Development Office at King Prajadhipok’s Institute. He graduated in public law with an interest in and worked on projects related to law and society, decentralization of local government, Indigenous peoples' rights and human rights.     ■ Typeset by Juhyun Jun , Research Associate     For inquiries: 82 2 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

The vote of no confidence that led to the ouster of Imran Khan marks another major event in Pakistan’s political and constitutional history. This has also considerably transformed the country’s political landscape. This is the first time that the country’s national parliament has voted out its leader since Pakistan’s de facto restoration of democracy in 2008. This move left a notorious parliamentary record — the premature conclusion of the prime minister’s rule.   Historical perspective   This is not the first time a vote of no confidence was initiated in Pakistan’s National Assembly. Nonetheless, this was the only successful one. The practice was first initiated in 1957 against then prime minister I.I Chundrigar, who resigned before the vote could take place. The vote of no confidence has also been moved against former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Shaukat Aziz, both of whom survived the vote. There have also been many cases of no confidence and the defection of parliamentarians from within a ruling party in Pakistan’s provincial assemblies; the latest was the ouster of Balochistan’s former chief minister Jam Kamal Khan, who was then replaced by Abdul Qudoos Bizenjo last year.   These votes of no confidence have a tendency to result in major constitutional crises, allowing un-elected state institutions to step in and intervene both during and following the process. What differentiates Khan’s ouster from its precedents is that by the time he faced the vote, relative constitutional safety for the parliament had been in place following the 18th amendment as well as the elimination of Article 58-2B.   Khan tried measures which earlier prime ministers might have pulled off: get the vote rejected through a ruling by the speaker, immediately dissolve the assembly, and announce fresh elections. With constitutional firewalls in place, the Supreme Court stepped in and declared all these actions to be contrary to the Constitution.   New Crises   Following the success of the no confidence vote against Khan and the election of Shehbaz Sharif as Pakistan’s new prime minister, a variety of new crises have started to take shape. First, a war of narratives pertaining to the emergence and execution of this vote have unfolded. Khan’s argues that a foreign country conspired against him, the opposition abetted this adventure, and state institutions failed to come to his rescue – he claims that the only closure to this crisis lies in fresh elections. Even though the National Security Committee confirmed that there was no evidence of an alleged foreign conspiracy and the Supreme Court also declared Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)’s actions of rejecting the motion and dissolving the national assembly unconstitutional, there have been a series of massive rallies and processions where the PTI continues to call for fresh elections.   The new government, however, says that Khan lost the trust of the House as his government failed on socio-economic fronts. Inflation has skyrocketed, pushing the public to look for alternatives. The PTI has now pinned its hopes on mobilizing the masses to demand fresh elections. They believe that they can come back with a two-thirds majority, something largely unprecedented in Pakistan’s history. They believe that this would be possible, provided that the public perceives this as a conspiracy. The protests on the streets of Lahore and Karachi included slogans against the establishment, especially Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa. This was the first time such open criticism against the establishment took place on the streets of Pakistan’s urban centers since General Musharraf’s rule.   But does the PTI actually think that such support will help its cause? It might betrue that the PTI’s conspiracy narrative has grained traction among people, but to believe that this will result in a landslide electoral victory seems highly farfetched. Indeed, the PTI has managed to re-mobilize their urban middle-class support base, but there is little evidence to suggest that their narrative serves to expand this base, especially in areas where they did not have political presence earlier. This is also coupled with the fact that key allies and electables, who allowed the PTI to form a government despite having a low number of seats in the Punjab, defected and allied with the opposition parties to make PML-N’s Hamza Shehbaz, the chief minister of Punjab. 25 defected members of the PTI have now been deseated by the election commission following the Supreme Court’s verdict on defection.   Despite this, Khan’s position on re-election remains firm; he recently said in a TV interview that he would prefer sitting in the opposition until he has a two-thirds majority in the parliament. The issue of a fresh election is dented by two major aspects of the current electoral landscape. First, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) has already stated on record that they are currently not in a position to conduct fresh elections because of the pending delimitation following the new census and the merger of tribal districts into Khyber Pukhtunkhwa. Given that the issue of delimitation will persist until October 2022, it seems unlikely that fresh general elections will be conducted within this year. Furthermore, a case against the PTI for allegedly accepting foreign funding has come close to a conclusion at the ECP. There is a looming possibility that the PTI, as a party, might be disqualified if the ECP confirms evidence of foreign funding. This decision would severely dent the PTI’s narrative and will inevitably impact the execution and outcomes of the next general elections.   There has also been talk regarding emerging cracks within the establishment following the failure of the so-called hybrid regime. Despite the PTI’s failures on the economic front, Khan was able to establish major campaigns in terms of Pakistan’s foreign policy following his tirades against Islamophobia and Pakistan’s involvement pre- and post-U.S.’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. Some view that General Bajwa lost his trust in Khan, which is why he mobilized the opposition against him. Supporters of the PTI supporters have also used this narrative in their protests. However, some also view that the PTI continues to enjoy the support of some factions within the establishment, particularly those led by General Faiz Hameed, Pakistan’s former Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence. Even Khan recently said in a podcast that his decision to give an extension in the tenure of his Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence (DG ISI) was something that did not sit well with his opponents.   Regardless of how this war of narratives will end, the new government, despite its recent victory, stands at a crossroads. It now has to try and maintain control over a setup that they have alleged, has been considerably destroyed by Khan’s policies and, while they are at it, try and deliver on various fronts so that they do not lose the public’s trust before the next elections. For example, as soon as the new cabinet was sworn in, the government faced a major challenge in terms of fuel prices. The PTI’s deals with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) included an increase in fuel prices. Since the PTI had maintained fuel prices through large subsidies, the new government now bears the cost of $12 million per day to keep fuel prices where they are.   Finance Minister Miftah Ismail has tweeted that the talks with the IMF are underway in a positive manner and hoped that the economic situation in the country would improve soon. Government is seeking the revival of the stalled $6 billion loan programme, for which the finance minister will also travel to Doha on May 24 to participate in the final round of negotiations. Nonetheless, it may remain stuck between the devil and the deep sea. It is left with two choices – to maintain fuel prices and keep the subsidies, not risking any public outcry by, or to let go of fuel subsidies to relieve massive pressure on the economy, causing fuel prices to increase substantially. In the latter case, the government will receive massive uproar from the public, which may cause a massive PR failure.   Elite War Detached from People’s Life   For Pakistan’s masses, the crisis plays out in an entirely different way. For an average Pakistani citizen, what does this crisis mean? Surely, they must make a choice in the next elections, but what’s more to it? Did their lives transform for the better under the PTI’s rule? Is there any hope for a better future under either Khan’s or Sharif’s rule?   It hasn’t yet been a quarter since the vote of no confidence against Khan succeeded in the parliament and the Pakistani public is already facing electricity outages, rise in inflation. It is the people that will have to bear the eventual brunt arising from the government’s decision on May 24th; both in the case of rising fuel prices or in the case of a rise in inflation due to massive fuel subsidies. Speaking entirely in these terms, it seems as if the entirety of this vote of no confidence and its outcomes do not mean anything more than an elite infighting within Pakistan’s power echelons, which have no utility for the masses other than a constant political drama taking majority of the airtime on mainstream media.   The main reason behind this massive lag between what happens in power centres and at its margins is that no political force, until now, has emerged with a clear-cut plan regarding how to solve the major fault lines that have come to define Pakistan’s crisis of inequality and deprivation. There has been a historical tension between the center and disproportionately developed federating units. Pakistan’s economy has largely remained anti-people and drenched in IMF’s structural programs. Inflation has hit a historic high while wages have remained as they were. On top of it, levels of danger consequent of dissent have also remained at an inhumane level. Cases of enforced disappearances have continued and speaking truth to power still poses an existential threat. In this context, what difference would it make if the PTI is replaced by the Pakistan Muslim League (PML)-N or the Pakistan Peoples Party loses power to PML-Q? The PTI leadership has carefully constructed a narrative over how and why their government was ousted by a foreign hand. But they are unlikely to claim that that they deserve a two-third majority in a fresh election because they are actually able to deliver what the people mandated through their vote. Similarly, the earlier opposition and the new government also do not seem to have a radical plan of action to rid Pakistan of the fundamental ills that pose a threat to the dignity of the people.   Their best bet is to remain functional until the next election, whenever they are conducted. The recent vote of no confidence has led to a clear infight between Pakistan’s major power sharers; be it the establishment or political parties. But, as history suggests, the dispossessed people of Pakistan has always been the consistent victims in this fight for power regardless of the victor.■     ■ Haider Kaleem is the manager of the Nigar Ahmad Research and Advocacy Fund at the South Asia Partnership - Pakistan. After studying Journalism at the Beaconhouse National University, he has worked as a reporter and producer in various leading print and digital media outlets in Pakistan as well as a Researcher at the Institute of Development Studies (UK) with a focus on human rights, political movements, judiciary, gender-based violence, local governance, and development.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department∙Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

  As the May 2022 election approaches in the Philippines, many fear that, as Borja and Hecita recently put it in another ARDN briefing, the results will mark “a critical juncture in the history of Southeast Asia’s oldest democracy.” [1] Polls indicate significant leads for presidential aspirant Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr and vice presidential candidate Sara Duterte, a tandem many view as a threat to the legacy of the 1986 “People Power” revolution and liberal democracy in the country. Observers worry that civil society, the press, political opposition, and human rights protections will face further rollbacks, after the tumultuous term of current-President Rodrigo Duterte.     Religious leaders and networks were one part of the People Power coalition that brought down the Marcos dictatorship during democracy’s global “third wave.” The Roman Catholic Church, representing roughly 4 in 5 Filipinos, was central to this effort, and recent statements resemble the advocacy for democratic institutions in that period. Prominent Catholic leaders like Lingayen-Dagupan Archbishop Socrates Villegas have declared that the church “cannot be neutral when we talk about good or evil.” [2] However, while this role as moral defender of democracy remains important, there may be limits on religion’s role in preserving liberal democracy in 2022 and beyond. Changes in both the religious and political landscapes present new challenges to religious leaders hoping to serve again as democracy’s guarantors.   Religion and Philippine Politics from People Power to Daang Matuwid   In the three decades after the fall of Ferdinand Marcos’s regime in 1986, a rough consensus emerged over the political role of religion, and especially the Catholic Church, in Philippine politics. The post-authoritarian constitution announced the separation of church and state to be “inviolable,” [3] but courts clarified that this would be a form of “benevolent secularism” which preserved extensive room for what sociologist José Casanova calls “public religion.” [4] Various government programs, from public health to education to disaster relief and response, involve close partnership with religious organizations, and religious leaders enjoy what Grzymała-Busse and Slater have termed “institutional access” to local and national politicians, the ability to influence policy informally via direct ties to elected officials and career civil servants. [5] Cory Aquino owed a portion of her political rise to Manila’s Cardinal Sin in 1986, and her son, Bengino ‘Noynoy’ Aquino III, appointed clergy to his cabinet after his election roughly twenty-five years later.   When it comes to election season, this benevolent secularism is most visible in the close collaboration between religious networks and organizations working to strengthen electoral integrity. Domestic citizen election observation was tied to religious networks even in the last years of the authoritarian period, with the National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) deeply embedded in religious networks, particularly tied to prominent Catholic institutions of higher education and business associations. [6] Since that time, NAMFREL and the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV) have continued to mobilize hundreds of thousands of local poll watchers, both in Catholic parishes and via other Christian and Muslim networks. Religious organizations are regular participants in good governance coalitions in partnership with organizations like the Legal Network for Truthful Elections (LENTE), and at times via programs tied to particular religious orders, such as the Jesuits’ Simbahang Lingkod ng Bayan apostolate. Combatting online disinformation, a major challenge in the Philippines and abroad, has become a new priority for many religious leaders in public statements during this campaign. [7]   Limits of Religious Influence?   This recent history may make it seem that religious networks are key guarantors of Philippine democracy during this troubled election season. To an extent this is true. Domestic citizen election monitoring will again take place in large part through religious mobilization, and various religious leaders have issued statements calling for morally upright candidates to serve the nation. But these initiatives are taking place in a new Philippines, changed both religiously and politically since the mythologized days of 1986.   Religiously, while the Philippines remains known (inaccurately) [8] as “Asia’s only Catholic country,” the past several decades have seen pluralization of religious leadership that has challenged coordination in favor of liberal democracy. Some of this has taken place outside of the Catholic majority, as various evangelical and Pentecostal Christian communities have taken on prominent roles through gleaming megachurches and extensive media presences. [9] Even within the Catholic majority, pluralization is a reality. The Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) may speak for the bishops as a group, but individual members of the clergy at times adopt their own stances, for instance the 500 men and women religious who formally endorsed candidate Leni Robredo in February 2022. [10] The lay founder of the Catholic charismatic El Shaddai movement, which claims several million members, in contrast endorsed Marcos and Duterte in the same week. [11]   Politically, this pluralization has led some to question the political heft of religious elites. Even before the controversial Duterte presidency, many Catholic leaders were surprised when Noynoy Aquino prioritized a Reproductive Health Law that the CBCP long opposed. He pressed it through the legislature, and clergy denouncing those they dubbed Team Patay [Team Death] in the subsequent election seemed to have little effect. [12] Duterte has an even more contentious relationship with the CBCP. As his campaign surged in 2016, the then-CBCP president denounced candidates showing “indifference if not dislike and disregard for the Church,” speaking of Duterte in all but name. [13] Yet Duterte romped to victory. His signature “war on drugs” has left thousands dead and attracted further condemnation from many religious leaders. While congregations have provided localized protection, the campaign continued and Duterte’s popularity remained largely intact. [14] He lobbed populist attacks at “hypocritical” religious critics throughout his tenure, and in the process garnered support from smaller but politically significant religious denominations like the Iglesia ni Cristo. [15]   Doubts about religious influence, especially from the country’s Catholic bishops, have played out on the 2022 campaign trail. Without naming the Marcos candidacy directly, the CBCP’s pre-election pastoral letter in February 2022 denounced “radical distortions in the history of Martial Law,” and called on Filipinos to “stand up for truth.” [16] Some individual bishops, and more clergy, have appeared in public with pro-Robredo groups. But the ultimate effect remains unclear. In keeping with precedent, the CBCP will not endorse a particular candidate, and some bishops have even warned clergy against using the pulpit for endorsements. [17] Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Marcos camp has complained that Catholic clergy are ”meddling” in politics, while happily receiving the endorsement from other religious leaders. But even another prominent candidate, Manila Mayor Francisco ‘Isko’ Moreno, has claimed to be ‘offended’ that churches might be used to directly rally voters for a particular candidate. [18] This seems a long way from Cardinal Sin’s call for protesters to rally in the streets against the Marcos dictatorship.   Impacts and Implications   So where does this leave the likely role for religious organizations, particularly the Catholic majority, in stabilizing democracy in the Philippines? And what comparative lessons might this hold for the troubled future of democracy in other corners of Asia and beyond? Three stand out. All operate quite differently than directly calling supporters into the streets in the latest installment of People Power.   First, religious influence is local. While headlines naturally gravitate to declarations from national clerical leaders, the political influence of religion is strongest where it crosses levels of analysis, from local to national to even international networks. In research on the Philippine drug war, for instance, coauthors and I find strong localized effects of religious congregations in protecting communities from violence, even though, at the national level, the drug war raged throughout Duterte’s term. [19] This is precisely why domestic citizen observation efforts, both in the Philippines and elsewhere, are so commonly tied to grassroots religious infrastructure. [20] Religion’s ability to strengthen democratic institutions should be strongest when initiatives draw on these sorts of dense localized networks.   Second, speaking out in defense of democracy may strengthen religious authority, but also introduce internal division. Research from a variety of scholars has demonstrated that religious involvement in politics can generate backlash when religious leaders are seen to be looking out for narrow self-interest rather than the common good of society. [21] However, advocating for free and fair elections may represent a form of public religion that actually rebuilds the moral authority of religious leaders. In recently collected data, for example, coauthors and I find that criticizing human rights abuses associated with the Philippines’ drug war strengthened the moral authority of religious leaders in the minds of Catholic Filipinos. Revitalized advocacy in defense of democracy could plausibly have a similar effect. With that said, our data also indicates some resistance to these interventions among some non-Catholic Filipinos.   Third, on a less optimistic note, religion is not immune from the forces challenging democratic consolidation. Religion, especially in combination with conspiratorial beliefs, has become a central factor predicting support for illiberal political violence in the United States. [22] In the Philippines, illiberal forces have rallied under the banner of a populism that features a heavy dose of anti-elite politics. Because organized religion, especially the Catholic Church, is closely tied to broader patterns of political and economic authority in the country, these anti-elite attacks have fallen squarely on religious leaders as well. This helps explain why Duterte has paid limited political cost for rhetoric attacking clergy in one of Asia’s more devout countries. [23] Pope Francis seems aware of this challenge, particularly when encouraging global bishops to be “shepherds with the smell of the sheep.” [24]   Religion was not the sole cause of third wave transitions to democracy in places like the Philippines, although it did play an essential role. As democratic institutions face challenges in the Philippines and beyond, religious leaders and networks retain capacity to play a part in strengthening elections and civil liberties. However, they must respond to a new political reality in which myths of the 1980s provide incomplete guidance.■     [1] Borja, Anthony L. and Ian J. Hecita. 2022. “The 2022 Philippine Elections Primer: A Democratic Citizenship Perspective.” ADRN Issue Briefing March 4. http://www.adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?at=view&idx=236 [2] Esmaquel II, Paterno R. 2022. “‘Church cannot be neutral about good or evil’ – Archbishop Villegas.” Rappler March 5. https://www.rappler.com/nation/elections/video-catholic-church-cannot-be-neutral-good-evil-archbishop-soc-villegas/ [3] https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Philippines_1987?lang=en [4] On benevolent secularism, see Buckley, David T. Faithful to Secularism: The Religious Politics of Democracy in Ireland, Senegal, and the Philippines. Religion, Culture, and Public Life. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2016. For Casanova’s work, see Casanova, José. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. [5] For application of this concept to the Philippines, see Grzymala-Busse, Anna, and Dan Slater. "Making Godly Nations: Church-State Pathways in Poland and the Philippines." Comparative Politics 50, no. 4 (2018): 545-64.   [6] See for example Youngblood, Robert L. Marcos against the Church : Economic Development and Political Repression in the Philippines. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990; Hedman, Eva-Lotta E. "Mapping the Movement: Namfrel in Six Philippine Cities." South East Asia Research 7, no. 2 (1999): 189-214. [7] Moses, Paul. 2018. “Fake News, Murder & the Philippine Bishops.” Commonweal Feburary 13. https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/fake-news-murder-philippine-bishops [8] In purely demographic terms, Timor-Leste is more overwhelmingly Catholic than the Philippines. The Philippines contains significant religious minorities, particularly Muslim and non-Catholic Christian denominations. [9] See for example Cornelio, Jayeel Serrano. "Jesus Is Lord: The Indigenization of Megachurch Christianity in the Philippines." In Pentecostal Megachurches in Southeast Asia, 127-55: ISEAS Publishing, 2018. [10] Dagle, Robbin M. 2022. “More than 500 priests, nuns endorse Robredo for president .” Rappler Feburary 15. https://www.rappler.com/nation/elections/priests-nuns-endorse-robredo-for-president-2022/ [11] https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1554734/velardes-endorsement-of-marcos-jr-personal-not-representative-of-whole-el-shaddai-says-bacani [12] Dionisio, Eleanor R. "Catholic Partisanship in the 2013 Elections: 'Churchifying' Democracy or Democratizing the Church?". Philippine Sociological Review 62 (2014): 11-40. [13] Buckley, David T. 2016. “Can the Catholic Church work with the Philippines’ new president?” America: The Jesuit Review of Faith & Culture June 23. https://www.americamagazine.org/issue/dutertes-tough-talk [14] Brooke, Steven, David T Buckley, Clarissa C David, and Ronald U Mendoza. "Religious Protection from Populist Violence: The Catholic Church and the Philippine Drug War." American Journal of Political Science Forthcoming (2021). [15] The Philippine Star. 2016. “It's Duterte-Marcos for Iglesia ni Cristo.” May 5. https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/05/05/1580114/its-duterte-marcos-iglesia-ni-cristo [16] David, Pablo Virgilio S. 2022. “The Truth Will Set You Free (John 8:32).” Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines Feburary 25. https://cbcpnews.net/cbcpnews/the-truth-will-set-you-free-john-832/ [17] Lalu, Gabriel Pabico. 2022. “Cebu archbishop to priests: Don’t use pulpit to campaign for poll bets .” Inquirer Feburary 11. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1553577/cebu-archbishop-to-priests-dont-use-pulpit-to-campaign-for-poll-bets [18] Gonzales, Cathrine. 2022. “Isko Moreno tells candidates: Don’t use Catholic church for campaign rallies.” Inquirer March 05. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1563846/isko-moreno-tells-candidates-dont-use-catholic-church-for-campaign-rallies [19] Brooke, Steven, David T Buckley, Clarissa C David, and Ronald U Mendoza. 2021. “Religious Protection from Populist Violence: The Catholic Church and the Philippine Drug War.” American Journal of Political Science. [20] Montevecchio, Caesar. 2019. “CENCO Statement on Elections.” Catholic Peacebuilding Network January 07. https://cpn.nd.edu/news-events/news/cenco-statement-on-elections/ [21] Grzymała-Busse, Anna. 2015. Nations under God : How Churches Use Moral Authority to Influence Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hout, M. and C. S. Fischer. 2002. “Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Politics and Generations.” American Sociological Review 67: 165-90.   [22] Armaly, Miles T, David T Buckley, and Adam M Enders. 2022. “Christian Nationalism and Political Violence: Victimhood, Racial Identity, Conspiracy, and Support for the Capitol Attacks.” Political Behavior: 1-24. [23] For more on religion, anti-elitism and populism, see David T. Buckley, Steven Brooke and Bryce Kleinsteuber, “How Populists Engage Religion: Mechanisms and Evidence from the Philippines,” Democratization, Forthcoming. [24] Gomes, Robin. 2021. “Pope to priests: Be "shepherds with 'the smell of the sheep.” Vatican News June 7. https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2021-06/pope-francis-priests-students-church-louis-french.html     ■ David T. Buckley is Associate Professor of Political Science, and Paul Weber Endowed Chair in Politics, Science & Religion at the University of Louisville, where he serves as the Interim Director of the Center for Asian Democracy.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department∙Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Introduction   Transitional justice in South Korea resolved the anguish of the unjustly victimized and their families, and moreover, raised the social awareness for human rights and the level of expectation for the responsibility the state should hold in protecting human rights. This was achieved through official apologies made by the government, the amendment of history textbooks and government documents, the restoration of the honor and reparation through retrials, the excavation projects for the remains of the victims and the commemoration of them, the establishment of memorial foundations, the financial and social support for the victims and their families, and the designation incidents as days for national commemoration.   This report is as follows: First, a summary of incidents of human rights violations since South Korea’s liberation, followed by a summary of transitional justice measures carried out to resolve the related issues will be given. Second, an analysis will be made on the fulfillment, challenges, and prospect of transitional justice centering on the work of transitional justice mechanisms.   Human Rights Violations and Transitional Justice in South Korea   The modern history of South Korea follows the periods of liberation from Japanese colonialism (1910-1945), rule of the US Army Military Government in Korea (1945-1948), the Korean War (1950-1953), Rhee Syngman regime (1948-1960), the Second Republic after the April 19 Revolution (1960-1961), the May 16 Military Coup and dictatorial government of Park Chung-hee (1961-1979), the assassination of President Park Chung-hee by his subordinates and Seoul Spring (1979), December 12 Military Coup of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, May 18 Gwangju Democratic Uprising and Authoritarian regime (1980-1988), June Democratic Struggle in 1987 and finally, democratization. Throughout this period, innumerable cases of human rights violations such as torture, disappearance, arbitrary detention, and extrajudicial killing took place through the Jeju 4.3 Incident, mass killings of civilians during the Korean War, brutal suppression of the May 18 Gwangju Democratic Uprising, and dictatorial and authoritarian rules.   The families of and the victims of all these atrocities have continuously demanded an investigation to attain the truth, punish the responsible, provide reparations, and restore honor from the government. However, their demands were totally repressed by the anti-communist and dictatorial regimes which claimed that the participants and the leaders of the uprising were communists. Furthermore, secondary victimization was committed to victims and their family members in search of truth and the restoration of honor.   As a result, proper investigation could only be started after institutional democratization took place in 1987, and more specifically after the civilian government was established in 1993. Some argue that a proper and meaningful process for the investigation of truth began only after 1998 when President Kim Dae-jung took office. This argument is based on the fact that the first civilian government of Kim Young-sam was a vestige of the military dictatorship and authoritarian rule and that the government was established with the cooperation of the Democratic Justice Party, which was a ruling party during the authoritarian and anti-communist regimes between 1980 and 1988. Nonetheless, even with the limitations, some progress, including the criminal trials of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, was accomplished. The investigation process included many mechanisms such as criminal trials, reparation, and truth commissions as the most frequently practiced.   1. Human Rights Violations under the Japanese Colonial Rule   Japanese colonial rule, marked by political repression and economic exploitation, ended in 1945. Korean suffering was exacerbated during and after World War I and II. In 1919 a nationwide independence movement led to 7,500 Koreans killed, 16,000 wounded, and 47,000 arrested. The Japanese forces brutally killed innocent civilians and burned down their houses and churches. Japanese vigilante groups, under the auspices of the government, accused Koreans of terror and arson which led to the killing of 6,000 to 20,000 civilians.   The period that Koreans suffered the most was between the beginning of the second Sino-Japanese War (1937) and Korea’s liberation in 1945 when the country became a reservoir of manpower and resources for the Japanese military and industry. Thousands of Korean women were forced to work as sex slaves, known as “comfort women,” for the Japanese military and some 140,000 men and women were victims of forced labor.   Shortly after the Republic of Korea was established in 1948, Special Act 3/1948 created the Special Committee and Court to investigate and punish collaborators with the Japanese colonial rule. Sang-Deok Kim, a respected leader of the independence movement, headed the ten-member Committee, which had its own enforcement unit and ten regional offices. The Special Court was composed of sixteen judges with the authority to sentence collaborators to death for crimes of treason or murder. Within four months, the Committee arrested 305 suspects and named 1,000 others it planned to investigate.   However, the Committee and Court were doomed to fail because they lacked the support of President Rhee Syngman’s government, which included colonial-era elites. Rhee was the Committee’s most vocal opponent, refusing to remove identified collaborators such as Roh Deok-sul from his administration. With his protection, collaborators vehemently accused the committee and court members of being communists who threatened national security by evaluating the past. The members were constantly under the threat of assassination, and in 1949 the police raided their offices. The activities of the Committee and Court withered due to strong resistance from powerful collaborators and a lack of support from Rhee. By the time the Special Act was annulled in 1951, the Committee investigated 688 collaborators and prosecuted 293, while the Court considered 79 cases and convicted only 10 collaborators.   Because of this first institution’s failure, the issue of collaborators consistently reemerged. At the request of civil society groups, this Special Committee for the Investigation of Pro-Japanese Collaborators was established by Special Act 7203 in 2004. The eleven-member committee, headed by a history professor named Seong Dae-gyeong, had a mandate limited to investigating and identifying collaborators. In 2010, the Committee published its twenty-five volume report, consisting of 21,000 pages in total and naming 1,005 collaborators. Many of the former collaborators were already deceased by the time the report was published.   The Investigative Commission on Pro-Japanese Collaborators’ Property was created by the Special Act 7769 in 2005. The nine-member commission was headed by Kim Chang-kuk, a prominent human rights lawyer. The Commission had a four-year term and was mandated to investigate the properties acquired by collaborators and revert them to the state. The Commission investigated 168 collaborators and ordered them to return 1,114 square meters of property worth 211 billion KRW.   The Committee to Support the Victims of Overseas Forces Mobilization and Investigation of Forced Labor under the Japanese Rule was set up by Special Act 10143 in 2010 by amalgamating the Special Committee for the Investigation of Forced Labor under the Japanese Rule (created by Special Act 7174/2004) and the Support Committee for the Victims of Overseas Forced Mobilization during the Pacific War (set up by Act 8669/2008). The Committee finished its mandate in December 2015 and confirmed a list of 585,937 victims, including soldiers and civilian employees in the military, sex slaves, miners, and other industry workers. The Committee provided compensation to victims and support for their medical expenses.   2. Human Rights Violations during the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea   Jeju 4.3 Incident and Yeosu-Suncheon Incident are the most representative cases of human rights violation that occurred after liberation and during the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea. Countless civilians suffered innocent deaths during the repression process of the uprising. It is found that the victims of the Jeju 4.3 Incident are as many as 25,000 to 30,000 people (4.3 Committee 2003, 381).   As of 2021, the number of victims confirmed by the committee is 15,483, of which about 10,890 were killed, 4,046 missing, 245 suffering from some form of stress disorder, and 302 imprisoned (Ministry of Interior and Safety Department of Support for Historical Affairs, 2020). The 4.3 Committee also identified 61,030 people who lost their family members. However, the committee estimated that the actual number of casualties ranges from 25,000 to 30,000, as the figure 15,483 is solely based on the review of petitions filed by a surviving family member. More than 80 percent of the human rights violations were committed by the military, police, or right-wing organizations such as the Seobuk Cheongnyeondan (Northwest Youth League) (4.3 Committee 2003, 388).   The Yeosu-Suncheon Incident also resulted in about 2,000 civilian casualties during the repression process (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2010, 93). The Commission confirmed that 1,340 suffered unjust deaths caused by the state. However, as in the Jeju 4.3 Incident, this figure only represents the approved cases of filed applications, and as a result, families without a survivor were not included. The commission estimates there to be about 2,000 killed in the Yeosu-Suncheon Incident (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2010, 93-94).   Regrettably, a proper investigation was carried out by neither the dictatorial nor authoritarian governments which continued to claim that they were justly fighting against the communist revolt against the government. Rather, the government stigmatized the victims and the bereaved as ‘ppalgaeng’i (the Reds)’ or ‘pokdo (mobs)’ and socially discriminated against them. Both the Jeju 4.3 Incident (1948~1954) and the Yeosu-Suncheon Incident (1948) were investigated by the Special Investigation Committee for Civilian Massacres for the National Assembly after the April 19 Revolution in 1960 but there were no meaningful outcomes due to the outbreak of the May 16 Military Coup in 1961.   The field investigation for the Jeju 4.3 Incident took place over the course of merely two days and even during this absurdly short period, a proper investigation did not take place due to a claim about the statute of limitations. While the Park and Chun governments did not make any efforts in uncovering the truth, victims and activists continuously tried to find the truth. After democratization, social movements led by students, journalists, and local communities demanded an investigation, and this led to the movement of regional assemblies after 1993. The investigations at the national level only started after the 4.3 Committee was established under the Special Law for Investigation of the Jeju 4.3 Incident and the Honoring of Victims (Act No. 6117, 2000) during the Kim Dae-jung administration. Another ten-year period had to pass before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established during Roh Moo-hyun’s term in 2005.   3. Human Rights Violations during the Korean War   The Korean War (1950~1953) has left a deep scar in Korean history, not only with the 640,000 fallen and wounded soldiers but also with countless innocent civilian deaths. Massacres of civilians were committed on both sides of the 38th Parallel, by the North Korean, South Korean, and American armies. Significant cases include the Geochang Massacre in which about 700 were killed by the South Korean army, the Nogeun-ri Incident during which about 400 refugees were killed by the US army, the Bodo League Massacre in which at least 300,000 were killed nationally, the trials and punishments at People’s Courts (inmin jaepan) which took place in areas occupied by North Korea, the indiscriminative bombing by the US army, the slaughter of inmates at Daejeon Prison, the slaughter of collaborators after the reclaim of Seoul by South Korea, and the National Defense Corps (gukmin bangwigun) Incident, among others.   Of all the incidents, the Geochang Massacre was the only case in which a joint investigation committee was formed by the National Assembly, Ministry of Home Security, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of National Defense, immediately after the incident to reveal the truth and punish those responsible for the atrocity. This even led to the formation of a general court-martial five months after the incident, which sentenced Oh Ik-gyeong, Han Dong-seok, and Kim Jong-won on the charges of participating in the massacre of civilians and concealment of the truth. However, the three convicted were pardoned by President Rhee Syngman (Geochang Massacre Memorial Park, 2020). The way in which this investigation process unfolded had an enormous influence on the bereaved families of other civilian victims. These people were completely dissuaded to pursue and demand any kind of investigation, punishment of the responsible, and restoration of honor during the Rhee administration (Kim, 2014).   A struggle to take the overdue measures fully began immediately after the April 19 Revolution (1960). The Rhee regime, which was primarily responsible for many previous massacres, was overturned by student-led democracy demonstrations which were directly caused by corruption that occurred during the election for the prime minister. An association of the bereaved families across the country formed and demanded the revelation of the truth and the restoration of honor as a group. The association excavated the site of the slaughter, which was located based on the testimonies of the military and police personnel at the time, and collected the remains of the dead.   As a result of the continuous effort, the Special Investigation Committee for Civilian Massacres was established at the 4th National Assembly. The Special Committee was formed with nine members of the National Assembly, including Choi Cheon, a congressman whose goal was to collect evidence of the massacre of innocent civilians through investigations and ultimately legislate new policies based on the findings. However, the bereaved suffered disappointment as the Special Committee carried out poor investigations and disbanded without any accomplishments. The disappointing outcome can be said to be due to the fact that the 4th National Assembly`s term was coming to an end when the committee was first established. Moreover, committee members either had a military or police background or a close relationship with the aforementioned two groups.   Furthermore, the efforts of the association of the bereaved faced the backlash of the May 16 Military Coup (1961). Military authorities extensively oppressed victims and activists, and the leaders of the association were sentenced to capital punishment or life imprisonment. The military police cold-heartedly destroyed memorial monuments and parks across the country (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2010, 77-82). Instead of transferring power to civilians, the military leader retired, ran for president, and was elected. This dictatorship of Park Chung-hee lasted for eighteen long years, and, under this anti-communist regime, any discussions about the mass killings of civilians by the Korean army and police during the Korean War were completely forbidden.   It was after the commencement of the civilian government of Kim Young-sam in 1993 that issues regarding the massacre of civilians were openly but cautiously discussed again. During his presidential campaign, Kim pledged for an investigation to provide truth and the restoration of honor for the Geochang Massacre, and a Deliberation Committee for the Restoration of Honor of the Persons Involved in the Geochang Incident and Other Similar Incidents was established according to the Act on Special Measures for the Restoration of Honor of the Persons Involved in the Geochang Incident and Other Similar Incidents (Act No. 5148, 1996). The committee concluded its research on who was responsible for the massacre on the military and acknowledged 548 victims and 785 bereaved. As evidently found in its name, the Act was enacted to inclusively investigate not only Geochang Massacre but other incidents as well. Unfortunately, however, the bereaved of other incidents were hesitant to push forward their agenda during Kim Young-sam administration because the military, police, and anti-communist forces were still strong under his regime.   Only after the year 2000 were bereaved families able to form a National Bereaved Family Association for Civilian Victims of the Korean War. Through their effort, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established in 2005. However, the significance and role of the commission’s existence were unclear and faded as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was assigned to investigate unusual and odd matters such as ‘the deaths of overseas Koreans who heightened national power’ and terrorism, infringement of human rights, violence, slaughter, and deaths under suspicious circumstances committed by hostile forces, in addition to the investigation into the massacre of civilians, through a compromised negotiation made between the ruling and opposing parties.   4. Human Rights Violations by the Dictatorial and Authoritarian Regime   The dictatorial and authoritarian states, which was started during Park Chung-hee’s rule in 1961 and were followed by the Chun Doo-hwan administration, also committed various violations against human rights. Even though they were no large-scale massacres such as those found in the Jeju 4.3 Incident, the Yeosu-Suncheon Incident, and the Korean War, innumerable innocent citizens were killed over a long period of time. The most symbolic case is the 1980 May 18 Gwangju Democratic Uprising which left 223 killed, 140 killed from injury, 448 missing, 5,928 wounded, and 2,146 taken into custody and detained (May 18 Memorial Foundation 2020). After democratization in 1987, the National Assembly formed the Special Investigation Committee for May 18 Gwangju Uprising and held a hearing for which sixty-seven witnesses, including the former President Chun Doo-hwan, were summoned. The hearing held significance in that it was the first time that a former President was investigated publicly by the National Assembly. However, this hearing was met with many limitations.   The operation of the commission occurred during Roh Tae-woo’s administration, an accomplice of Chun’s crimes. Therefore, nothing could be done to collect the testimonies of those called to participate. As a result, unfortunately, the hearing did not lead to any form of legal prosecution. It ended with a public apology from Chun and his promise to live a secluded life, as well as President Roh’s special public statement.   Regardless of the unhopeful circumstance, there was a continued demand for the revelation of truth and the punishment of the responsible. This led to the human rights attorneys to initiate a criminal lawsuit against Chun and Roh immediately after Roh finished his term in 1992. In 1995, Seoul District Public Prosecutors’ Office admitted that a massacre had been committed in Gwangju. Sadly, however, it did not indict anyone on the grounds that the incident was merely the result of a coup, a highly political action.   Not only did citizens fiercely resist this outcome but Roh’s secret slush fund was also revealed, resulting in the legislation of the Special Act on the May 18 Democratization Movement (Act No. 5029, 1995). In the end, Chun and Roh were prosecuted and convicted to life imprisonment and seventeen years of imprisonment, respectively, on charges of rebellion, attempted murder of a senior officer, and bribery, according to the additional punishment law on specific crimes.   During the dictatorial and authoritarian regimes, besides the May 18 Gwangju Democratic Uprising, various violations of human rights, such as deaths under suspicious circumstances, disappearance, torture, collective detention, and extrajudicial killing were committed. During Park Chung-hee’s dictatorial regime (1961~1979), after his Yushin (revitalizing reform) constitution in 1972, students, professors, and other dissidents who participated in the Yushin opposition movement were arrested, tortured, and were killed or went missing.   The abduction of Kim Dae-jung, the suspicious deaths of Professor Jang Jun-ha and Professor Choi Jong-gil, and the National Democratic Association of Youth and Students Incident were only just some of the brutal acts committed by the Park dictatorship. During Chun’s administration since 1980, which followed Park’s ruling, there were continued cases of human rights violations such as the Samcheong Re-education Camp, forced conscription of student activists, suspicious deaths in the military, fabricated spy incidents, and the death of a university student, Park Jong-cheol, due to torture.   After assuming office in 1998, President Kim Dae-jung enacted the Special Act to Find the Truth on Suspicious Deaths (Act No. 6170, 2000) pursuing the revelation of the truth and the restoration of honor. As a result of this, the Commission on Suspicious Deaths was formed in 2000 and performed investigations for two terms until it was dissolved in 2004. This commission investigated cases of suspicious deaths in which the government was closely involved, and aimed to find the cause of deaths that had been presumed to be a suicide or an accident.   When the first term of the Commission on Suspicious Deaths came to an end in 2002, there were still many unsolved cases. This resulted in the initiation of a second term in 2003. In addition, between 2004 and 2005, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of National Defense, and the National Intelligence Service formed individual commissions to investigate human rights violation cases committed by their own organization. In addition, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was created in 2005 investigated unsolved suspicious deaths and disappearance cases, and the Commission on Suspicious Death in the Military was formed to inspect suspicious deaths in the military in 2006.■    Bibliography   4.3 Committee. 2003. Jeju 4.3 Incident Investigation Report. Seoul: National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju 4•3 Incident and Honoring Victims. 4.3 Committee. 2008. Reconciliation and Coexistence: White Paper of Jeju 4.3 Committee. Seoul: National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju 4•3 Incident and Honoring Victims. Commission on Suspicious Deaths. 2004. A Hard Journey to Justice: Investigation Report of Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths: Term 2 (July 2003 ~ June 2004) [1]: Occurrences of State violence and Suspicious Deaths. Seoul: Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths. Deliberation Committee for Restoration of Honor and Reparation for Persons Involved in Democratization Movement. 2015. White Paper for Democratization Movement - Commissions. Seoul: Deliberation Committee for Restoration of Honor and Reparation for Persons Involved in Democratization Movement Geochang Massacre Memorial Park. http://www.geochang.go.kr/case/Index.do (Retrieved 2020.9.28). Kim, Dong-Choon. 2010. “The Long Road Toward Truth and Reconciliation: Unwavering Attempts to Achieve Justice in South Korea.” Critical Asian Studies 42(4): 525-552. Kim, Hun Joon. 2014. Massacres at Mt. Halla: Sixty Years of Truth-Seeking in South Korea. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. May 18 Memorial Foundation. http://www.518.org/main.php (Retrieved 2020.9.28). Ministry of Interior and Safety Department of Support for Historical Affairs. 2020. Settlement for Jeju 4.3 Incident. http://pasthistory.go.kr/ (Retrieved 2020.9.29). Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 2010. Comprehensive Report of Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Seoul: Commission for Verification of Historical Events for Truth and Reconciliation.     ■ Hun Joon Kim_ is a professor of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. His publications relevant to this field include The Massacres at Mt. Halla: Sixty Years of Truth-Seeking in South Korea (2014), Transitional Justice in the Asia Pacific (ed. 2014), “Are UN Investigations into Human Rights Violations a Viable Solution? An Assessment of UN Commissions of Inquiry” (2019), and “The Prospect of Human Rights in US-China Relations: A Constructive Understanding (2020).”       ■ 담당: 윤하은 EAI 연구원    문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]  

The end of the armed ethnic conflict in 2009 brought the issue of transitional justice to the forefront in Sri Lanka. Transitional justice has come to be seen as integral to reconciliation between communities on the grounds that the culture of impunity has to be reversed and the truth acknowledged.   The war ended with the military defeat of the Liberation Tigers for Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by the forces of the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL). However, the government maintained as did most other stakeholders that the military victory over the LTTE had to be followed by a political settlement between the predominantly ethnic Sinhala government and the minority Tamil ethnic community. The previous attempt at a political settlement was ushered in following the Indo- Sri Lanka Accord in 1987, which also led to the stationing of Indian troops on Sri Lankan soil. The political settlement came with the Provincial Council Act of the same year which established a system of provincial devolution throughout the country and in the north and east, a merger of the two provinces until a referendum was held in the east to decide on the permanence of the merger. However, the referendum was never held – as the President was empowered to postpone it – and the powers of the provincial councils never fully devolved. In particular, land and police powers are yet to be devolved in any province. Subsequent legal action in the Supreme Court abolished the merger of the two provinces and in 2013 the first Provincial Council was elected in the Northern Province. The 5 -year term of the Council has ended, but new elections are yet to be held.   On the basis of the inadequacy of the devolutionary powers and the Centre’s control over finances, the argument of Tamil political parties has been for greater devolution and therefore sometimes termed as Thirteen Plus – the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution being the amendment introducing devolution. This demand has been raised in all attempts for constitutional reform and continues to be on the table in the current regime’s attempts at promulgating a new constitution.   Transitional justice for the alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by both GOSL and LTTE forces are associated with the aforementioned political and constitutional demands. The allegations in this respect pertain to the bombing of self-proclaimed no-fire zones and hospitals during the last days of the war and the disappearance of thousands of civilians throughout the nearly three decades duration of it. The latter category of the “disappeared” includes those who surrendered to the armed forces at the end of the war.   Events   In October 2009, five months after the end of the war, in a joint communique issued by the Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa and the UN Secretary-General Ban-ki Moon, Sri Lanka pledged to investigate the aforementioned allegations and to hold accountable those responsible. This did not happen and the UN Secretary-General established a Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka headed by the Indonesian politician Marzuki Darusman and Yasmin Sooka and Stephen Rapp as members. The members of the panel were not allowed into Sri Lanka for investigations but published their report in March 2011 and found that there was evidence to further investigate alleged violations of war crimes and violations of international humanitarian law. This in turn led to the GOSL establishing the Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), which in its report of 2012, reported that war crimes or violations of international humanitarian law were not part of government policy but further stated that there could have been particular incidents which should be investigated. The failure of the government to launch further investigation brought about the U.S.-led resolution on Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council in 2012 which was followed by two more resolutions. The 2014 resolution called on the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to commission a report under its aegis to look into allegations of war crimes and violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. The report known as the OISL report was to be submitted to the Council in March 2015 but at the request of the new government in Colombo, was deferred to September 2015. The expectation of a robust mandate from the people in anticipation of the report was a factor in the Rajapaksa government’s decision to call for a presidential election. The opposition too was not keen on the publication of the report during the general election, especially after their victory in the pre-election presidential polls.   The September 2015 session of the UNHRC marked a watershed in the process of transitional justice. The Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka, Mangala Samaraweera announced to the Council that the GOSL would establish four mechanisms for transitional justice. This included the Office of Missing Persons (OMP), the Office on Reparations, a Truth and Justice Mechanism, and an Accountability mechanism – all of which were incorporated into a resolution that Sri Lanka co-sponsored. There was immediate controversy regarding the accountability mechanism such as the participation of international actors, including judges and prosecutors.. Domestic criticism mounted on the grounds that this constituted a violation of Sri Lanka’s sovereignty.   In response to this and the inadequacy of information in the public realm regarding transitional justice, the government set up a Consultative Task Force (CTF) in 2016 to ascertain public views on the four mechanisms introduced at Geneva. The CTF was an entirely civil society body in its composition and conducted hearings throughout the country through zonal task forces and through the format of focus group discussions and town hall-style meetings.   Despite initial suspicion and distrust that the CTF was yet another government body to seek public support and not much else, the response improved over time with the CTF receiving some 7,500 submissions. The 900-page Final Report of the CTF contained over forty-five recommendations and endorsed the view on the basis of opinions expressed by the public. An example of such a recommendation is that the Accountability Mechanism should have at least one foreign judge on every panel or bench dealing with accountability and once trust in the judicial system is established for victims and survivors, this could be phased out. The government deemed the recommendations unacceptable and the recommendations have largely been unacknowledged.   Whilst the CTF was conducting its hearings, the government decided to go ahead and set up the Office of Missing Persons (OMP) 2016. There are some 22,000 case files of disappeared persons and in order for families to have access to funds and other resources, the government issued Certificates of Absence (COA). This, however, has not been welcomed by the families of the disappeared on the grounds that the COA could constitute acceptance that their loved ones are no longer on this earth. An additional concern with respect to the OMP is the appointment of individuals to the Office due to their past associations and record in previous positions. The Office of Reparations has also been established. However, the remaining mechanisms on accountability and truth and reconciliation are yet to be resolved.   The Mahinda Rajapaksa regime appeared to be interested in a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and looked to South Africa for assistance. The current president of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, was appointed by then-President Zuma as his Special Envoy to Sri Lanka in 2014. The attraction of South African assistance was largely based on a misunderstanding of the South African experience and the belief that amnesty played a key role in it. Amnesty was posited as key to the process by the Sri Lankan regime, arguing that what was needed was restorative as opposed to punitive justice. In the South African case, amnesty was granted to 849 out of 7,112 applications after full confession and testimonies by perpetrators and victims. The South Africans for their part maintained that the TRC could not be cherry-picked from a series of recommendations for a political settlement and reconciliation.   The key mechanism that aroused the most amount of uproar and outrage was the accountability mechanism and the provision for the proactive participation of international judges and prosecutors. There is no legal impediment in the laws of Sri Lanka regarding this. Nonetheless, the objection to it was framed on the basis of the violation of national sovereignty and most importantly from a political standpoint that Sri Lanka could not agree to a process in which war heroes would be turned into war criminals. This was the work of traitors and on both sides of the political divide, protestations were made that no soldier would ever have to face war crimes proceedings. The Prime Minister pointed out that Sri Lanka was not a signatory to the Rome Statute that set up the International Criminal Court.   Once the government changed with the 2019 presidential election and the 2020 general election, which saw the return of the Rajapaksa family to power with Gotabaya Rajapaksa as president and a two-third majority in parliament, pressure continued with regard to the establishment of the remaining mechanisms, in particular, in the 2015 UNHRC resolution from local civil society and internationally. The unwillingness of the new government to go ahead with the implementation of the resolution but rather to defy it led to another UNHRC resolution in 2021 which called for the establishment of a Unit within the Office of the High Commissioner to collect and collate information on war crimes and crimes against humanity in Sri Lanka.   In order to hold their Sinhala Buddhist constituency together, the Rajapaksas have taken a hardline stance with respect to accountability and emblematic cases involving members of the armed forces have been dismissed. In one particular case, Sergeant Ratnayake was convicted by all courts for murder, including the slashing of the throat of a five -year old child, only to be pardoned by the president. Memorialization is another issue in which the government has taken a hardline stance, disallowing memorialization of family members in the north on the grounds that it constitutes as glorification of the LTTE.   The fact that Sri Lanka has remained on the agenda of the UNHRC, informed by local civil society, has been the one motivating factor for the government to make move toward transitional justice. In the March 2022 sessions of the Council, the government claimed to have taken some measures in this regard. A key measure was that the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 43 years, first introduced as a temporary measure in 1979, was to be amended. Critics and other states in the Council pointed out that the proposed amendments do not go to the heart of the draconian legislation which allows for confessions and facilitates torture in obtaining confessions from victims. The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, in response to a number of petitions filed against the amendments, has ruled that some amendments would require a two-thirds majority and some would require a referendum in the entire country to be made law. Other criticisms in Geneva have been of the increased militarization of the government and governance, the appointment of unsuitable individuals to the reconciliation mechanisms established, and hostility towards civil society.   In addition to the thirty-year war, transitional justice on the treatment of the Muslim community following the Easter Sunday bombings of 2019 should be focused on. The attack was made by Muslim extremists, killing over 250 persons in churches and hotels. However, it should be noted that violence against the Muslim community preceded the Easter Sunday atrocity. Under the presidency of Mahinda Rajapaksa in which his brother, the current president Gotabhaya was the Defense Secretary, Sinhala Buddhist violent hostility was unleashed against the Muslim community in a number of areas. These attacks and hate speech were spearheaded by Ven Gnanasara Thero, a Buddhist monk who now heads a Presidential Task Force for One Country; One Law. Gnanasara Thero was found guilty of contempt by the Court but was pardoned by President Sirisena. The issue of the hijab has also been raised by the current government on the grounds of security. The reform of the Muslim Marriages and Divorce Law, which allows for child marriages and polygamy, is being firmly resisted by the conservative elements within the community. Another issue in the context of the pandemic was the requirement that only cremation was permitted and that burial could take place only in one location in the east. This was in defiance of the local and international medical opinion but burial is now permitted throughout the country.   The Challenge   There are a number of reasons for the impediments to transitional justice in Sri Lanka. Some have already been mentioned, stemming from the Rajapaksa family, in particular, presenting themselves to the masses as the defenders of the Sinhala Buddhist nation who defeated the LTTE; forces seen as the most bloodthirsty terrorist group in the world causing three decades of damaging armed conflict. The Rajapaksa’s political legitimacy is derived from the Buddhist clergy, or Sangha, and the security forces. Neither of these powerful groups in the Sri Lankan polity is willing to consider the possibility of accountability for war crimes. As far as they and the other Sinhala nationalists are concerned, war crimes are a fabrication by the remnant LTTE sympathizers and the West, who in turn are dependent on Tamil diaspora votes to stay in power in their own countries. There is also the cultural issue of whether full confession will be possible in a society based more on shame than guilt. Societies where TRCs have been established have had a strong Christian influence with a focus on guilt.   Another argument made is that accountability will only rake up old wounds and be divisive when the overarching objective is to heal and reconcile. It is argued that accountability leads to punitive justice, whilst what is needed is restorative justice. The government instead favors focusing on economic development and is open to the charge that they believe that reconciliation can be best achieved through amnesia and the building of toilets. What the government fails, or indeed refuses, to accept is the simple demand of the families of the disappeared, for example, of what happened to their loved ones, especially when they were witnesses being taken in by the security forces. The demand is for the truth and the acknowledgment of the state. This was echoed in the consultations of the Consultation Task Force in 2016. Those who appeared before the Task Force made this point repeatedly as well as insisting on being included in the mechanisms for transitional justice. Furthermore, they requested that the mechanisms would not be Colombo-based or work in a language unfamiliar to them.   Sri Lankan demand confronts the barrier of impunity that has been erected over the years and cloaked in a notion of narrow patriotism and nationalism. This leaves the Human Rights Council in Geneva as the only forum in which arguments for transitional justice are taken seriously and, if possible, advanced in terms of implementation. In addition, the international community has issued travel bans on leading members of the security forces. However, a real movement has to take place in Sri Lanka with the majority opinion shifting out of the narrow nationalist paradigm to a realization of the importance of accountability for reconciliation and the pivotal role of reconciliation for national unity and prosperity. This in turn is being severely inhibited by the shrinking of space for civil society to function through intimidation by the security and intelligence services and the generally confrontational role of the current government towards civil society.■   References   Centre for Policy Alternatives, “Benchmarks and Issues to Consider when Exploring Transitional Justice in Sri Lanka”, Discussion Note (March 2015) Centre for Policy Alternatives, ”Transitional Justice in Sri Lanka and Ways Forward”, Discussion Paper, (30 July 2015) Centre for Policy Alternatives, “Revisiting Ten Emblematic Cases in Sri Lanka: Why Justice Remains Elusive, Centre for Policy Alternatives (January 2021) de Alwis Radheena and Anketell Niran,” A Hybrid Court: Ideas for Sri Lanka, SACLS (2015) Final Report of the Consultation Task Force on Reconciliation Mechanisms (November 2016) Fonseka, Bhavani (ed) “Transitional Justice in Sri Lanka: Moving Beyond Promises, Centre for Policy Alternatives, (March 2017) Fonseka Bhavani, “The Need for a Comprehensive Reparations Policy and Package”, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Discussion Paper (April 2015) Fonseka Bhavani and Ganeshathasan Luwie, “Hybrid vs Domestic: Myths, Realities and Options for Transitional Justice in Sri Lanka”, Centre for Policy Alternatives (2016) Fonseka, Bhavani, “Ideas for a Road Map for Truth and Justice in Sri Lanka”, Groundviews (19 January 2015) Gowing, Richard, “War by Other Means? An Analysis of the Contested Terrain of Transitional Justice under the ‘Victor’s Peace’ in Sri Lanka”, LSE Working Papers Series No 13/138 ( 2013) Gunatilleke Gehan, “Confronting the Complexities of Loss: Perspectives on Truth, Memory and Justice in Sri Lanka”, Law and Society Trust, (2015) Haniffa Farzana, Amarasuriya Harini and Wijenayake Visakha, “Where Have All the Neighbours Gone? Aluthgama Riots and its Aftermath: A Fact Finding Mission to Aluthgama, Dharga Town, Valipanna and Beruwela,”, Report of Law and Society Trust (2015) International Commission of Jurists, “Authority without Accountability”: The Crisis of Impunity in Sri Lanka”, (November 2012) International Crisis Group, “Reconciliation in Sri Lanka, Harder than Ever”, Crisis Group Report No.28 (2011) Leebaw, Bronwyn Anne, “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice”, Human Rights Quarterly (2008) 30(1), 95-118, John Hopkins University Press, 2008 Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission Report in Sri Lanka (November 2011) Paige, Arthur, “How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice”, Human Rights Quarterly 21 (2009), 321-367, John Hopkins University Press, 2009 Saravanamuttu, Paikiasothy “Victory Celebration and the unmaking of diversity in post-war Sri Lanka”, in Elcheroth Guy and de Mel Neloufer (eds) “In the Shadow of Transitional Justice: Cross -national Perspective on the Transformative Potential of Remembrance, Routledge (2022) Senaratne, Kalana, “The ‘Mad Monk’ Phenomenon: BBS as the Underside of Sinhala- Buddhism”, Groundviews, 15 April 2014), http://groundviews.org/2014/04/15/the-mad-monk-phenomenon-bbs-as-the-underside-of-sinhala-buddhism/ Teitel G Ruti, “Transitional Justice Geneology” (2003) 16, Harvard Human Rights Journal 69 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Report of the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights Investigations on Sri Lanka (OISL)”, UN Doc. No. A_HRC_30 _CRP_2 (September 2015) United Nations Report of the Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka (March 2011) Van Schaak Beth, “More than a Domestic Mechanism: Options for Hybrid Justice in Sri Lanka”, Stanford Law School, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Stanford Public Law Working Paper No.2705097 (2016) Zuhair, Ayesha, “Dynamics of Sinhala Buddhist Ethno -Nationalism in Post War Sri Lanka”, Centre for Policy Alternatives (2016)     ■ Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu is the founding Executive Director of the Centre for Policy Alternatives. He was the Secretary of the Consultation Task Force on Reconciliation Mechanisms and the first winner of the Citizens Peace Award presented by the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka. He was a founder of the Transparency International Sri Lanka Chapter and has been nominated for numerous peace awards. He is quoted widely in the local and international media on Sri Lanka.     ■ 담당: 윤하은 EAI 연구원    문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]  

Briefing the History of the 228 Incident and the White Terror   The "228 Incident" occurred shortly after World War two and the 50-year colonial rule by Japan. When the Kuomintang (KMT) government came to Taiwan, native Taiwanese and newly arrived Mainlanders shared rather different social values and national identities. In the first half of the twentieth century, the Taiwanese enjoyed a relatively higher level of law and order and better infrastructure and public service, while China suffered from prolonged civil wars and a decade of Japanese aggression. On the ground, the Chief Executive Officer Chen Yi appointed by the Nanjing government was stubborn and closed-minded, therefore, he could not understand the common people. In addition, the KMT government officials and army were corrupt and ill-disciplined, which made the relationship between the KMT government and the local people extremely tense. In terms of the economy, due to the civil war that is going on in Mainland China, the government imposed various control measures, industrial production was interrupted and the inflation and unemployment rates were high.   The immediate fuse of the "228 Incident" was triggered by the mishandling of a cigarette-smuggling case by the police officers. This led some Taipei citizens to go out to the streets and protest on February 28, 1947. The conflict quickly spread across the whole island, turning into a large-scale political and armed uprising. Local leaders took the opportunity to demand comprehensive reforms and self-governance. Armed conflicts broke out in many parts of the island.   Taipei City was the epicenter of this political storm but spread to almost all counties including Taichung, Chiayi, and Kaohsiung. Violence broke out on the streets and many islanders and mainlanders were either killed or injured. Because the KMT’s well-trained army was trapped in the civil war in mainland China, the local troops alone could not effectively suppress the uprisings. Therefore, the central government in Nanjing sent larger and better-equipped troops to Taiwan to suppress the uprisings. This came to an end when soldiers and police shot and killed people in the streets. The number of victims has never been accurately counted but the estimated range is from 1,000 to 100,000 people. The 2021 "Report on the Truth and Transitional Justice of the February 28 Incident" (published by the Memorial Foundation of 228) shows that the number of death and disappearances ranges from 8,324 to 11,841. In the list of reparation filed by the Foundation, there are merely 686 death and 181 disappearance cases.   Unlike the 228 Incident, which lasted only for a short period of time, the White Terror lasted 38 years. This includes the thousands of judicial trials that occurred in the period from 1949 to 1987 under martial law. Situated in the Cold War period, the KMT implemented a special criminal law, the Regulations on Punishing Rebellions, with the aim to eradicate hidden spies and agents from Mainland China and arrest their local allies. Later on, the series of laws were used to target political dissidents and even left-leaning intellectuals. Moreover, the law was implemented with little respect for due process and thereby often violated human rights. The Taiwan garrison command and other intelligence agencies arrested, killed, tortured, beat, force-disappeared, and confiscated property to take total control over the island, resulting in a large number of unjust deaths, imprisonment, injuries, and property and health damages. The military courts dealt with nearly 30,000 to 70,000 political cases and there is an estimate of 200,000 victims.   The Development of Transitional Justice in Taiwan   Taiwan's transitional justice mainly began after the lifting of martial law in 1987 which ushered in a decade of democratic transition. The KMT still maintained the ruling power until 2000. During the 1988 presidential inauguration, President Lee Teng-hui called on people to “forget the past and move forward.” Since the lifting of the law, there had been persistent voices calling for redressing judicial wrongs from the civil society, rebuilding a new constitutional order, convening an inclusive national meeting, and proposing a timetable for democratic reforms. For example, the Wild Lily student movement in 1991 demanded democratic reforms and the dissolution of the two-layer National Assembly system.   In response to the demands from social movements, President Lee Teng-hui pushed for a series of reforms. One of which was to set up an investigation committee on the 228 incident, combining the capacity of the government, civil society, and academia, to conduct a large-scale investigation and research on the 228 Incident. On February 28, 1992, the "228 Incident Investigation Report" was published and this is often considered the starting point of Taiwan's transitional justice process. Taiwan has undergone three party turnovers after lifting martial law. Therefore, in this article, we divide the development of Taiwan’s transitional justice into four stages: from 1988 to 2000 (KMT President Lee Teng-hui in power), from 2000 to 2008 (DPP President Chen Shui-bian in power), from 2008 to 2016 (KMT President Ma Ying-jeou in power), and after 2016 (DPP President Tsai Ing-wen in power).   (1) From 1988 to 2000 (KMT President Lee Teng-hui in Power)   In addition to launching the investigation for the 228 Incident, Lee Teng-hui's contributions toward transitional justice also included announcing amnesty for the prisoners of the Formosa Incident, responding positively to several large social protests that demand democratic reforms, and passing three legislations on reparation and restoration of rights for political victims during the authoritarian era.   The Lee Teng-hui era can be characterized as the transition period from an authoritarian regime to full democracy in Taiwan. His attitude towards transitional justice shifted during his 12 years in power. From the beginning, he called on the people to forget the past and look forward. In the middle of his tenure, in response to the pressures from civil society, he launched a transitional justice measure for victims and their family members of the 228 incident. However, for White Terror in Taiwan, it was only toward the later stage of his tenure that he apologized to the political victims of this incident. These changes also signaled the attitude change of the Kuomintang’s attitude from denial to admitting the political mistakes made during the martial law period.   Several legislative proposals championed by civil society organizations were also adopted by the Lee Teng hui administration. [1] Three pieces of legislation regarding transitional justice were passed by the parliament: The 228 Incident Disposition and Reparation Act (1995), Regulations on Restoration of People's Injured Rights during the Martial Law Period (1995), and Reparation Act for Wrongful Trials on Charges of Sedition and Espionage during the Martial Law Period (1998). The latter two legislations are related to the White Terror, and all the three legislations were proposed by the legislators of the opposition party and accepted by the ruling party.   The president himself also admitted the critical role of civil society in Taiwan's democratization process. [2] The 228 incident involved large-scale ethnic conflict and government crackdowns on local elites in a compact period of time. In contrast, the cases of the White Terror took place over a span of three decades during the Martial Law era; the state's violation of human rights spread over time and space targeted individuals of different ethnic backgrounds. Due to the wide range and length of the White Terror, identifying and vindicating the victims of this incident is relatively harder than the 228 Incident. Therefore, Lee Teng-hui's transitional justice effort to redress the 228 incident is deemed to be more successful than efforts regarding the White Terror (Wu, Chun-ying, 2021).   (2) From 2000 to 2008 (DPP President Chen Shui-bian in power)   During the Chen Shui-bian government, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was the largest political party but did not hold more than half of the seats in the parliament. The KMT and the People First Party (PFP), the opposition, formed the KMT-PFP coalition, or the so call pan-blue. The coalition held more than half of the legislative seats, rendering the Chen Shui-bian eight-year government a minority government.   In 2002, the Chen Shui-bian government implemented measures to restore the 228 and White Terror victims’ reputations. The victims submitted applications and those who passed the review were issued "Reputation-restoration Certificates" by the President. In the same year, the Chen Shui-bian government also designated two sites, "Jingmei Detention Center" and "Lyudao Prison", as historical injustice heritages to commemorate the White Terror. The government then build Human Rights Memorial Parks on these two sites a few years later, which was later converted into an exhibition space to show visitors how the authoritarian governments suppressed human rights, and promote human rights education.   President Chen Shui-bian's transitional justice work task duties included the investigation into the KMT’s illegal party assets. In 2004, the Ministry of Finance established the “Special Management Committee on Party Assets as the State Assets” to deal with improper party assets that KMT garnered during its authoritarian rule. At the end of the same year, the ruling party (DPP) tried to pass the legislation, “Act of Ill-gotten Properties by Political Parties Settlement” in the Legislative Yuan but was blocked by the opposition, the KMT-PFP coalition.   As the DPP did not hold majority seats in the parliament and the transitional justice projects did not garner high attention and support from the public, achieving transitional justice during this period was difficult. Chen Shui-bian once changed the name of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall into the "Democracy Memorial Hall" in 2007. However, after the KMT returned to power in 2008, the name was changed back to the “Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall.” During this time, many of Chen Shui-bian's transitional justice reforms proposals were postponed.   (3) From 2008 to 2016 (KMT President Ma Ying-jeou in power)   During Ma Ying-jeou's administration, there were several important developments in Taiwan's transitional justice. In 2009, the government expressed its willingness to re-open the investigation into the Lin I-hsiung’s Family Massacre case and the Dr. Chen Wen-cheng's Murder case, both were prominent cases during the martial law period. The Prosecutor's Office of the High Court set up a "special investigation unit" to be in charge of the two cases. However, the result of the investigation still concluded non-prosecution of all the perpetrators in Dr. Chen Wen-cheng's Murder case. [3] In 2011, Ma Ying-jeou's administration established the National Human Rights Museum Preparatory Office under the Ministry of Culture to supervise the Lyudao Prison and Jingmei Human Rights Cultural Parks, both sites being former prison and detention centers.   In the 228 Commemoration of 2021, the Taipei City Government invited former President Ma Ying-jeou, a second-generation Mainlander, to attend. However, one of the event co-organizers believed that "Ma Ying-jeou has never expressed regrets or apologies for the 228 incident", so they withdrew from the event. Hearing this news, the former President Ma immediately said that he had "apologized for 30 years" for the 228 incident, and was therefore "very aggrieved." Looking back, the former President has repeatedly apologized on behalf of the Kuomintang for the 228 Incident and the White Terror victims. It can also be argued that he apologized repeatedly the most among the politicians. However, there are still many people in Taiwan who think that apologies from the "perpetrators" were not sincere as President Ma did not support measures that truly redressed the aftermath of the human rights abuse. [4]   Some Taiwanese transitional justice scholars argue that for Ma Ying-jeou, transitional justice is just political rhetoric that lacks substantive meaning. [5] Ma Ying-jeou, after taking office, continued to apologize to the bereaved families of the 228 victims every year and received some understanding from them. However, some consider his apology as just lip service and deny it. [6]   During this period, advocating for the commemoration of political victims of the White Terror also emerged on two large university campuses, National Cheng Kung University (NCKU) and National Taiwan University (NTU). On February 28, 2012, the statue of Chiang Kai-shek at the NCKU campus was splashed with red paint, and the actions were found to be affiliated with the NCKU student association. After the incident, the "NCKU Removal of the statue of Chiang Kai-shek from University Campus Alliance" was formed. In June of the same year, the NTU students lobbied to rename the campus square where Dr. Chen's body was found, and a formal proposal was on the agenda of the NTU’s administration meeting. In 2013, a proposal by NCKU students to name "Nylon Square" in memory of human rights defender Mr. Nylon Cheng, a pioneer in advocating for freedom of speech and Taiwan independence, was rejected by NCKU. In 2015, the NTU officially approved the name of the campus square to the "Dr. Chen Wen-chen Incident Memorial Square” to memorize Dr. Chen Wen-cheng.   (4) After 2016 (DPP President Tsai Ing-wen in power)   On May 20, 2016, Taiwan elected its first female president, Dr. Tsai Ing-wen, and experienced a political turnover for the third time. After the election, the DPP controlled both the executive branch and the parliament, allowing it to push ahead with its transitional justice agenda. The DPP first passed the "The Act Governing the Settlement of Ill-gotten Properties by Political Parties and Their Affiliate Organizations" and created the Ill-gotten Party Assets Settlement Committee. At the end of 2017, the Legislative Yuan passed the "Act on Promoting Transitional Justice." In May 2018, the Transitional Justice Commission was officially launched and in July 2019 the Legislative Yuan passed the Political Archives Act. This period ushered in a new phase of Taiwan’s transitional justice development that began to deal with the perpetrators beyond reparation. The aforementioned two acts and other bills aimed at confiscating improper or illegal party assets acquired during the authoritarian rule, as well as removing authoritarian symbols, disclosing historical truth and investigating crimes, and making institutional corrections to the authoritarian party-state system's legacy. [7]   In 2021, President Tsai Ing-wen proposed the next three tasks for Taiwan's transitional justice. First, ramp up efforts to investigate political archives, in particular, the archives of intelligence agencies to clearly reveal the authoritarian government's repression and surveillance of the people. Second, with the disclosure of these political archives, the government seeks to investigate the historical truth. Only by restoring the process of layer-by-layer persecution during the authoritarian rule, publishing reports, and proposing follow-up policies and legal systems, can Taiwan’s transitional justice be brought to end the "no-perpetrator, only victims" criticism. Third, enhance cooperation among various government agencies. For example, discussing the reparation plans, dealing with authoritarian symbols, and taking care of the senior victims require cooperation among various government agencies, in addition to the Transitional Justice Commission.   The Implementation of Transitional Justice Mechanisms in Taiwan   The concept of Transitional Justice emerged along with the third wave of democratization from the 1980s to the 1990s. In Taiwan, the initiation of transitional justice efforts can be said to have started after the lifting of martial law in 1987. However, it was not until May 18, 1992, that the two laws that define political crimes, the "Betrayers Punishment Act" and "Article 100 of the Criminal Law" (the crime of rebellion), were officially abolished. This move denotes the end of the White Terror and ushers in the agenda of transitional justice.   Thousands of cases of human rights violations that occurred during the martial law period (from 1949 to 1987) in Taiwan were collectively referred to as "White Terror political cases." The exact number of political victims during the White Terror period still cannot be accurately calculated. According to the government's official data and estimates, there were more than ten thousand cases and more than two hundred thousand victims during the 38 years of the White Terror. [8] In 2021, Taiwan's Transitional Justice Commission released the "Taiwan Transitional Justice Database," which compiled the data of people who were prosecuted during the authoritarian period. The total number of cases stands at 13,683 with some individuals being involved in more than one case. This database is now the most complete quantitative document of the White Terror victims.   In order to restore the political, ethnic, or racial cleavage caused by the authoritarian government’s violations of human rights, government policies sought the forgiveness of victims and attempted to achieve social harmony, reconciliation, and peace. Transitional justice involves fact-finding, prosecution of perpetrators, reparation for victims, commemorations, reconciliation initiatives, and other institutional reforms. [9] Although the transitional justice process in Taiwan has developed over three decades, some parts of the development are still weak. As the political victims gradually wither away, the pace of transitional justice remains slow, especially in the aspects of fact investigation and the prosecution of perpetrators.   The Current Trends Regarding Transitional Justice in Taiwan   In Taiwan, there is not much research on the topic of transitional justice in political science. Wu (2006) mentioned that compared to other countries, Taiwan's achievements in transitional justice are not worthy to be proud of. [10] The characteristic of Taiwan's transitional justice is "compensating the victims and forgetting the perpetrators." The extent to which the perpetrators should be held accountable is the issue of morality, the moral line of transitional justice. He quoted the perspective of Huntington (1991) that the characteristics of the third wave democratization countries' transitional justice are initiated from the top, so retrospective punishment or historical justice is impossible. The KMT government continued to rule for the following decade after the transition. Since KMT continued to control the presidency (1986-1999; 2008-2016) and the parliament (1986-2016), it was able to block many transitional justice initiatives. [11]   Jiang (2007), [12] based on the International Center for Transitional Justice's definition, suggests that the specific work of transitional justice includes establishing the truth about the past, prosecution of the perpetrators, reparation of the victims, memoir and memorials, reconciliation initiatives, reforming institutions, vetting and removing abusive public employees. Taking the transitional justice work of the 228 Incident in Taiwan as an example, until 2007, Taiwan has (more or less) established the truth about the past, repaired the victims, published memoirs and memorials, established reconciliation initiatives, and reformed institutions. However, no effort has been made on prosecuting the perpetrators, nor on vetting and removing abusive public employees. One direct reason is that the 228 Incident occurred more than seventy years ago and almost all the perpetrators have passed away. Similarly, most of the White Terror cases took place in the 1950s, the beginning of the cold war era. Most of the perpetrators have also passed away or retired long ago. There are, indeed, a few prosecutors and judges that were involved in prosecuting dissidents in the 1970s, who are still alive or even in position. However, it is too sensitive to predict how much political and social unrest will be caused by removing or punishing these people and it is uncertain where to set the scope of the investigation.   In 2016, when Tsai Ing-wen took office as president, the Legislative Yuan passed the first draft of the "Act on Promoting Transitional Justice," and one month later, the Ill-gotten Party Assets Settlement Committee began to deal with the KMT's party assets. At this time, there seemed to be a dual-pronged approach to "punishment" and "reconciliation" on both ends of the spectrum (Yeh, 2017). However, the Tsai Ing-wen government, which pledged to ramp up the transitional justice process, had not succeeded in Taiwan's transformational justice as no progress in the aspects of prosecution of the perpetrators and vetting and removing abusive public employees were made in his second term. Even the White Terror fact-finding report promised by the president in 2016 has been overdue until now. One main reason is that the KMT filed a lawsuit to delay the process. The other reason is that the DPP does not want the implementation of transitional justice to leave the general public with an impression of political persecution, which may harm its election performance.   Taiwan's transitional justice since the lifting of martial law has shied away from holding the individual perpetrators accountable. The DPP government chose to prioritize holding institutional perpetrators accountable and postponed pursuing individual perpetrators to avoid social unrest. Taiwan does not plan to prosecute or purge individual perpetrators. The DPP government in 2018 set up the Transition Justice Commission to deal with the transitional justice issue. The mission of the committee is to “[make] political archives more readily available, removing authoritarian symbols, redressing judicial injustice, and producing a report on the history of the period which delineates steps to further promote transitional justice.” [13] Theoretically, it includes both institutional and individual perpetrators. Focusing on institutional perpetrators, the DPP targets KMT, KMT’s ill-gotten assets, and the social organization that affiliated with the ruling party during the authoritarian rule. For individuals, the authoritarian strongmen have long passed away and their descendants do not participate in politics. The high-ranking officials who are acclaimed for stringing economic development have less to do with the conduct of the two political events and have also passed away. As indicated, most of the low-level officials who enforce the crime have almost all gone. The first remaining issue is a few judges and prosecutors who dealt with the participants of the Formosa Incident in the early 1980s. The DPP government has no intention to deal with them. A more important issue is the symbols of the strongmen which include monuments, historical descriptions, and some political symbols. In Taiwan, dealing with the two authoritarian leaders tends to arouse the sensitive nerve of ethnic antagonism between native Taiwanese and Mainlanders. Therefore the government chose to postpone the issue.   In the 1990s and 2000s, the idea of transitional justice does not resonate strongly with many people. As the first DPP president, Chen Shui-bian’s transitional justice plan does not receive much political and social support. During that period, most people still hold certain levels of Chinese identity and many people still identify with the KMT. In addition, the experiences of fast economic growth during the authoritarian period induce them to approve of the governance of the KMT rule. As a result, people are less willing to criticize the KMT. In the past decade, the percentage of Taiwanese who identify themselves as Taiwanese gradually becomes the absolute majority, and the percentage of people who identify with KMT declines. This is especially because the young generation receives a history education that focuses much more on Taiwan and less on China and has more coverage of the authoritarian rule, a version different from the parents’ generation. To them, KMT is synonymous with the old authoritarian regime. In addition, they grew up in the democratic period and did not experience rapid economic growth during the authoritarian rule. They tend not to have authoritarian nostalgia. Instead, they are exposed more to many liberal ideas and dislike authoritarian values. In short, in the future, the legacy of authoritarian rule such as monuments, organizations, symbols and will face greater pressure to be demolished or transformed.   To hold the perpetrators to account, one needs to adequately access the responsibility they have to take. To do this, clarifying the international political context will be the key. The White Terror took place during the Cold War. In the 1950s, the political and military threats posed by communist China were immense and imminent. The KMT government lost all its territory on the mainland and fled to Taiwan in 1949. Many western governments believed that the Republic of China would not be able to survive and that communism would soon be the only doctrine on the island. The Korean War in the early 1950s induced the U.S. to recognize the importance of Taiwan in the East Asia islands chain and decided to help Taiwan defend itself. Soon afterward, Taiwan experienced the Kinmen Bombs in 1958 in which China heavily bombed the island of Kinmen for two months which was followed by much smaller scale bombings that continued until 1979. Given the background, some of the harsh measures to stabilize the regime on the island are likely to be understandable. Actually, the number of cases and severity of punishment were also the most pronounced in this phase of the authoritarian rule. Of course, there is no due process for the trials at that time and many of the victims are innocent, but such an international political context should also be part of the conversation. So far, this dimension is still missing in the discussion.   After the 1960s, the tension between the communist camp and the non-communist camp was less severe and the political and military situation in Taiwan Strait had been mostly stabilized. International conflicts between the camps in East Asia still exist such as the military conflicts between North and South Vietnam in the 1960s to 1970s and eventually the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, and the confrontation between South and North Korea. The necessity of imposing political repressions to ensure the security of Taiwan was reduced significantly. Repressions in this period serve to a significant degree only to secure authoritarian rule. In short, when pursuing transitional justice, the levels of external threats Taiwan faced in different periods should be taken into consideration when accessing the responsibility that government decision-makers and law-enforcers should bear.   So far, the discussion and redress of transitional justice focuses mainly on the legacy of KMT’s authoritarian rule and largely ignores the aftermath of Japanese colonial rule. Although Taiwan experienced Japanese rule before the end of WWII the reparation of the Taiwanese who served in the military of Imperial Japan and the Comfort women issues have not been properly redressed. Few political parties and CSOs seem to be very interested in pointing out the issue of redressing the wrongdoing during the Japanese rule. To avoid irritating Japan, an important ally of Taiwan, and counter China’s military threats, both parties in Taiwan, to a different degree, appear to choose to omit the issue. As most of the victims are aging, this is an issue that needs to be addressed soon.■     [1] Wu, Chun-ying (2021, August 28–29). A Framework for Transformational Justice in the Lee Teng-hui Era. Symposium on "Lee Teng-hui and democratization in Taiwan," Taipei, Taiwan. https://www.drnh.gov.tw/var/file/3/1003/img/23/526263652.pdf (in Chinese) [2] In President Lee Teng-hui’s opening remarks for the seminar on "The 20th Anniversary of People's Direct Presidential Election and the Development of Democracy in Taiwan." [3] The two cases were kept being investigated by the Transitional Justice Committee, which was established in 2018; however, in the press conference of the results of the investigation released in 2020, the committee only came up with the conclustion that “the possibility of the authoritarian government being involved in the cases cannot be excluded.” [4] Central News Agency. (2013, February 28). President apologizes again for 228 Incident. Taiwan News. https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/2160065, (2013, July 16). Ma apologizes to White Terror victims. Taiwan Today. https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2&post=3077, and Vince Tai. (2021, February 27). Ma Ying-jeou's lack of sincerity in his apology on 228 is common sense. Up Media. https://www.upmedia.mg/news_info.php?SerialNo=107280 (in Chinese) [5] Wu, Rwei-ren. (2015). Transitional Justice as Politics. Taiwan Human Rights Journal 3(1), 93-102. (in Chinese) [6] Cheng, Chung-Lan. (2017, December 14). Taiwan promotes "transitional justice" again. Which other countries have tried it? BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese-news-42349290 (in Chinese) [7] Arata Hirai. (2020). Rethinking Transitional Justice in Taiwan from the comparative perspective. Journal for the Study of the Party Assets, (5), 25-61. (in Chinese) [8] Chiu, Rong-jeo, "Review on Political Cases During the Martial Law Period in Taiwan", in Zixiu Ni ed., Law and History of Political Cases during the Martial Law Period, (Taipei: the Compensation Foundation for Improper Verdicts, 2001 ), pages 143-144. (in Chinese) [9] Bassiouni, M. C. (1996). Searching for peace and achieving justice: The need for accountability. Law & Contemp. Probs., 59, 9. [10] Nai-Teh Wu (2006). Transitional Justice and Historical Memory: The Unfinished Business of Taiwan's Democratization. Reflection, (2), 1-34. (in Chinese) [11] The experiences of transitional justice in the third wave of democratization are heterogeneous. After the Philippines was overthrown, it did not talk about transitional justice at all; while in Korea, which peacefully transferred its power, active engagement in transitional justice was taken. [12] Yi-huah Jiang (2007). Transformational Justice in Taiwan and Its Reflections. Reflection, (5), 64-81. (in Chinese) [13] Veteran democracy advocate to lead transitional justice work. https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/201803270025     ■ Chin-en Wu is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, Taiwan. He received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Michigan. His main research interest includes the impact of economic development on political regime dynamics and how regime type influences economic performance.   ■ Shih-fen Peng is now a PhD student in Sociology at National Chengchi University in Taiwan. She has also worked for the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, assisting the grant program mainly in South Asian Countries. She learned much from the working partner, Trial International in Geneva, about tracing the progress of transitional justice all over the world every year. Her research interests also lie in the area of gender equality, family sociology, and migration study.     ■ 담당: 윤하은 EAI 연구원    문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | [email protected]