EAI는 아시아 지역의 민주적 거버넌스와 인권 증진에 관련된 연구를 진행하기 위해 2013년 11월 아시아민주주의연구네트워크(Asia Democracy Research Network: ADRN)를 발족했다. EAI는 국내 싱크탱크의 대표기관인 동시에 아시아 지역 싱크탱크의 직능대표로서 소속된 연구기관들의 민주주의 관련 연구지원 및 관리를 담당하고 있다.

ADRN은 아시아 지역이 직면한 민주주의 위협 요인을 분석하고 민주주의 전환 및 공고화에 기여할 수 있는 실무형 연구과제를 논의하고 확산하고자 창립되었다. ADRN은 연구에 기반한 정책 제시를 목표로 아시아 민주주의의 위협 요소와 당면과제를 점검하고 지역적 차원에서 바라보는 민주주의 발전을 위한 실천적 의제를 발굴하고 연구하고 있다. 네트워크에는 한국의 EAI를 비롯하여 대만, 말레이시아, 몽골, 미얀마, 방글라데시, 스리랑카, 인도, 인도네시아, 일본, 태국, 파키스탄, 필리핀 등 아시아 14개국 22개의 주요 싱크탱크들이 참여하고 있다. 

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[ADRN Working Paper] The Majoritarian Challenge to Minority Rights in India: The Case of Muslims

Background   India is a deeply diverse and plural country. Although more than two-thirds of India’s population (80.7%) is from the Hindu community, it still has large minority populations. According to the statistics published by the Ministry of Minority Affairs, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and Zoroastrians or Parsis are considered minority communities. [1] As per the last census (2011), the percentage of minorities in the country is about 19.3% of the total population. The population of Muslims is 14.2%, Christians 2.3%, Sikhs 1.7%, Buddhists 0.7%, Jains 0.4%, and Parsis 0.006% of the total population. [2] In other words, every fifth person in India belongs to a minority community. With 142 persons in every 1,000, Muslims remain the biggest minority community in India.   Given India’s bloody partition experience (the country was split into India and Pakistan based on religion in 1947), the word “minority” and any special privileges granted to minorities have been subject to intense contestations and interpretations. The clearest proof of this is the contentious debates that took place in the Constituent Assembly (1946-49) over who should be considered minorities and what special rights they should enjoy. For example, a major demand among the representatives from minority groups during the making of the constitution was political representation for these communities. Qazi Karimuddin, a prominent Muslim voice in the Constituent Assembly (CA), advocated for proportional representation to escape what he called the “pervading evil of democracy (that) is the tyranny of the majority.” [3] Another member of a minority group, Z.H. Lari, also supported the idea of proportional representation so that the parliament can become “the mirror of the national mind” and “minorities will not have grievances about their representation.” [4] Although several members of the CA were sympathetic to the arguments for political representation for minorities, in the end the Assembly decided to scrap all suggestions on political presentation for minorities, particularly Muslims, while it retained the provision of reserved seats for the Scheduled Castes belonging to the Hindu community. The CA offered minorities, including Muslims, a package of “rights” [5] as part of the bargain.   The Constitution and Minority Rights   While the Constituent Assembly denied minorities representational power in legislatures and services, it formulated various provisions and laws in 1948 under the name “Special Provisions Relating to Minorities” in part XIV of the Constitution. No special rights except cultural and educational rights were offered to minorities. [6] The fundamental rights of the constitution under various sections guaranteed and protected the educational and cultural rights of minorities. Article 29 protects the interests of minorities by making a provision that any citizen/section of citizens having a distinct language, script, or culture have the right to conserve the same. Article 29 also mandates that no discrimination may be performed on the ground of religion, race, caste, or language. [7] Whereas, Article 30 provides a host of rights to protect the interests of minorities. [8] Article 30(2) states that the government should not discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language, while giving aid. There are additional provisions that safeguard and protect the religious freedom of minorities. For example, Article 25(1) ensures freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion—subject to public order, morality, and other fundamental rights. Significantly, Article 350(A) makes a provision for a special officer for linguistic minorities to be appointed by the president. [9]   Minority Commissions   To ensure better protection of minority rights, the National Congress government in 1992 enacted the National Commission for Minorities Act. Accordingly, a National Commission for Minorities was established in 1993. As per Section 9(1) of the Act, the Commission is mandated to safeguard the rights enshrined in the Constitution for minorities and laws enacted by Parliament and the State Legislatures. [10] This apart, it looks after any specific complaints regarding discrimination and denial of rights and entitlements of minority groups. Apart from the center, state governments have set up their own minority commissions, too.   State Policies and Institutions for the Minorities   Beyond constitutional and legal provisions, the central and state governments run a number of schemes and initiatives for the betterment of these communities. Several schemes including scholarships, free coaching, concessional loans, and grant-in-aid for minority educational institutions among others are available for minorities. These apart, there are half a dozen schemes addressing the skills and infrastructural challenges facing minority communities. A noteworthy scheme under the current government is Pradhan Mantri Jan Vikas Karyakram, a multi-sectoral program which covers minority-concentrated blocks and districts and minority-concentrated towns and villages for infrastructural development. [11] A major skill development scheme “Garib Nawaz Skill Development” training for minorities has been created to provide short-term job-oriented training to youths belonging to the six minority communities mentioned above. In short, there are scores of schemes and policy initiatives have been adopted by governments to address the needs of minorities. [12] However, these initiatives in reality have grossly failed to fulfill the demands/needs of vulnerable minorities, particularly the largest minority (Muslims) who continue to remain at the bottom of India’s socio-economic pyramid. Weak enforcement, poor state capacity, and structural barriers have gone on to erode the potentials of these schemes, which will be discussed in further detail in the next section. What is more concerning is the fact that minorities routinely face the growing majoritarian onslaught[13] on every aspect of their lives including food, dress, profession, and place of worship.   A Case Study of Muslims in India   With more than 14% of India’s population, Muslims are only slightly lower in number than the seventh-most populous country (Nigeria). [14] According to a recent Pew report on population growth and religious composition, India has the world’s second largest Muslim population (more than 200 million), surpassed only by Indonesia. Pakistan’s Muslim population is roughly the same size as India’s. [15] Yet, they are a minority in a predominantly Hindu country. Muslims, however, are not a monolithic community. They are deeply diverse, with differences in ethnicity and language, and surprisingly with caste identities similar to Hindus as well as differences in access to political and economic power. [16]   Once part of the ruling class for several hundred years including the Mughals, Muslims today remain the most marginalized among all minority communities. One of the most authoritative studies on the socio-economic conditions of Muslims in recent years was the report prepared by the Sachar Committee in 2006. [17] The government-tasked committee placed Muslims lower than historically oppressed Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in backwardness. In terms of socio-economic parameters such as education, employment, and literacy, Muslims were nowhere near other designated minorities. Among some of the more startling findings, the report revealed that as many as 31% of Muslims were living below the poverty line, that their representation in the elite civil services, particularly the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and Indian Police Service (IPS), was a mere 3% and 4%, respectively. Further, the literacy rate for Muslims was far below the national average, and as many as 25% of Muslim children were found to not have access to school education. Acting on the findings and recommendations of the Sachar Committee, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government in 2007 adopted a series of measures to address the social, economic, and educational backwardness of Muslims. [18] The UPA government set up an Expert Group to propose a diversity index and modalities to address issues of discrimination and backwardness among minority social and religious groups, particularly Muslims.   However, the conditions of Muslims with regard to key indicators have barely improved even though more than more than 16 years have passed since this report was first issued. On the contrary, some key indicators have deteriorated. For instance, while the share of Muslims in India’s police forces was 7.63%, it fell to 6.27% in 2013. After this became a media issue, the government decided to forego the releasing of data on police personnel by religion. [19] The most striking figures are with regards to the IAS and IPS. While the Sachar Committee had noted 3% and 4% of Muslims in the IAS and IPS respectively in 2005, these numbers were 3.32% and 3.19% respectively on January 1, 2016. [20] In short, Muslims are precariously positioned on most key socio-economic and educational indicators compared to other religious groups. Even the historically oppressed Scheduled Castes (belonging to the Hindu religion) have moved up on several crucial indicators compared to India’s Muslims. Much worse is Muslim political representation, which has seen a sharp decline in recent years, particularly with the rise of the pro-Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party. Since the 2014 general elections, Muslim representation in the Lower House of India’s Parliament (Lok Sabha) and several state assemblies has gone down dramatically. [21]   Although Muslims represent more than 14% of India’s population, in 2018 they held just 4% of the seats in the Lok Sabha, the lowest since 1957. [22] In the 2019 national elections, the number of MPs from the community improved marginally. Only 27 MPs are present in the current Lok Sabha, and the ruling party does not have a single member from the largest minority community. [23] While the BJP fielded just six Muslim candidates from different states, none of them were victorious in the election. [24] While poor socio-economic indicators and under-representation remain issues of serious concern for India’s largest minority community, the acceleration of majoritarian politics and resultant “othering” [25] of Muslims poses the gravest threat to their identity.   The Rise of Hindu Majoritarianism and Muslim Marginalization   Despite facing neglect and discrimination on various counts as vividly documented by the Sachar Committee in 2006, Muslims still enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy and state protection until the Hindu right came to prominence. Successive Congress governments since the 1950s have tried to moderate the majoritarian tendencies of the Hindu right. [26] While the Congress indulged in the symbolic appointment of a handful of Muslims to higher positions, the party by and large failed to address the core aspects of Muslim backwardness. However, its tendency to appoint token Muslims into certain higher positions (president, cabinet ministers, etc.) created the rare opportunity for the BJP to accuse the party of “minority appeasement” and anti-Hinduism. [27] In fact, the well-meaning Sachar Committee report to alleviate the conditions of Muslims was fiercely opposed and politicized by the BJP, which accused the Congress government of simply trying to appease minorities. [28]   However, the tables turned against Muslims and other minorities, including Christians, when the pro-Hindu BJP won by a massive electoral landslide in 2014. The BJP’s unprecedented electoral victory in the 2014 national elections, where it secured a majority of seats in the lower house on its own, gave a new lease on life to its Hindu majoritarianism agenda.   After the 2014 electoral landslide, the BJP under Prime Minister Narendra Modi emerged as an unapologetic advocate of Hindutva and the majority community’s primacy in social, political, and economic life. The real game changer was the spectacular rise of Modi, who skillfully combined promises of economic development with Hindu nationalist appeals. [29] Not only has Modi reversed the gradual slide of the Hindu right from its back-to-back electoral defeats in 2004 and 2009, the BJP under his leadership has witnessed an unprecedented surge across many regions of the country. [30] The pro-Hindu party under Modi won another spectacular mandate in 2019, cementing the base of majoritarianism.   Implications of Rising Majoritarianism   The rise of divisive political rhetoric and increasing deployment of polarization tactics by the Hindu right have brought sharp changes in the national conversation. However, the most troubling outcome is rising incidences of religious violence and gradual marginalization of minority groups, particularly Muslims. For instance, as the portal IndiaSpend indicates, as many as 97% cow-related violence reported between 2010 and 2017 has occurred since the BJP government assumed power in May 2014. In 2017 alone, 11 Muslims were killed in incidents of cow vigilantism across the country, the highest toll on record in recent years. [31] While the number of cow-related lynchings have declined over the recent years, violence in other spheres (hate crimes) have gone up since 2019. [32]   However, intolerance is not restricted to mere discord over the status of cows. Even personal lives and individual liberty are under attack. This is most vividly seen in the spate of legislation brought by the BJP that ruled states must regulate inter-religious marriages in the name of Love jihad[33]. Love jihad is used to discourage inter-faith relationships and marriages by claiming that Muslim men are deliberately wooing Hindu women in order to force them to convert to Islam upon marriage. Similarly, the extreme Hindu groups in recent months have raked up the hijab issue by demanding a uniform dress code for Muslim girls in state-run educational institutions. [34] In an effort to appease these extremist Hindu groups, Karnataka state recently banned the hijab in educational institutions, thereby depriving thousands of Muslim students of the ability to access education. Ironically, the state High Court ruled in favor of the ban, creating anxiety among minority communities and people fighting to restore their constitutional rights.   The exclusionary tactics adopted by the Hindu right have also recently been deployed in the economic sphere. In response to legitimate protests by Karnataka Muslim traders against the hijab ban, many Hindu groups from the state called for a boycott of Muslim vendors near temple areas. [35] This has been echoed by Hindu groups in multiple states ruled by the BJP. [36] Given the fact that Muslims overwhelmingly work in informal sectors in small business, street vending, and random low-paid jobs, the economic boycott can become a death blow to their livelihoods. While the vast majority of the Hindu community has not signed on to the boycott, the fringe groups in the community continue to weaponize these tools against the Muslim minority. The latest act targeting Muslims is over disputed religious sites. The Indian Parliament created a law called the Places of Worship Act in 1991 disallowing conversion of a place of worship and mandating that its religious character as it existed on August 15, 1947 be maintained. However, groups of Hindu activists have filed petitions in the courts demanding the restoration of religious places (currently Gyanvapi mosque[37] in Beneras, Uttar Pradesh) in their favor. While these cases are being heard by the Supreme Court and lower courts, these acts have revived the memory of Babri mosque and its demolition by a Hindu mob in 1992. [38] In short, while India’s Muslims were socially and economically marginalized in the past, the recent rise of majoritarianism has translated to exclusion and violence over their right to eat, worship, dress, and engage in business, to name a few.   Towards a Majoritarian State through Constitutional Routes   Beyond exclusionary policies and actions, the Hindu right has been systematically altering the nature and character (secularism) of the state in India. Since the party won a second mandate in 2019, it has taken a slew of legislative measures that attack the diversity and pluralism of the country. The first major legislative move was the passage of the Triple Talaq Bill (The Muslim Women Protection of Rights on Marriage Bill) in 2019. The bill, which criminalized instant divorce by Muslim men, was one of the core agenda items of the BJP and its sister organizations, Sangh Parivar, for many decades. [39]   However, the most radical step towards a true majoritarian state came in August when the Hindu right government repealed Article 370 of the constitution, which had granted the only-Muslim majority state Jammu and Kashmir semi-autonomy and certain specific constitutional guarantees. [40] The state was dismantled into three Union Territories, and the key leaders of the state were put under detention for more than a year. In the same month (August), the BJP-led central government implemented a National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Assam, which required all the residents of the state to furnish physical proof of citizenship. Many analysts suspect the NRC is a tool to deprive Muslim migrants from Bangladesh of citizenship and render them stateless. [41] However, the much bigger constitutional changes towards the majoritarian project came in December 2019 when the central government passed the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) which allowed the fast-tracking of citizenship to all Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Parsis, Jains, and Christians facing religious persecution in neighboring countries. Analysts claim that by dividing alleged migrants into Muslims and non-Muslims, the new law openly discriminates against citizens based on their religion. [42] In short, the CAA and NRC combo have the potential to turn India into a majoritarian state.   The Way Forward   India’s democracy, which once evoked praise and worldwide admiration for its preservation of diversity and pluralism, is on the cusp of becoming a majoritarian state. The BJP has become the central pole of Indian politics with a hegemonic presence in every aspect of the republic, particularly the religious and cultural spheres. The politics of religious polarization successfully deployed by the BJP and its affiliates against minorities is keeping India in a permanent state of tension and chaos. India’s civic sphere resembles a war zone in which opposing groups, particularly religious minorities, are seen as enemies. This divide is taking a heavy toll on the fragile social relations in the country, which had weathered riots, ethnic skirmishes, and inter-religious conflicts in previous decades. The worse sufferer of this polarization is vulnerable Muslims. Even at the height of the polarization resulting from the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, which caused many deaths and rioting, the divide was never as deep as it is now. While India’s strong culture of interfaith dialogue and plural and tolerant Hindu faith may offer some resistance to majoritarianism, these may not endure in the longer run. This is because the Hindu nationalist government and a slew of institutional and legislative changes that it has mounted are steadily altering the secular character of the Indian state. What is aiding the Hindu right’s majoritarian project is the divided opposition. Rather than putting up a united front against divisive politics and the daily targeting of minorities by right-wing forces, the opposition parties are now aping the “soft Hindutva” tactics of the BJP.    References   Adak, Srijita. “Minority rights in the Constitution of India.” IPleaders. January 25, 2021.https://blog.ipleaders.in/minority-rights-constitution-india/. Ahmad, Irfan. “Are India’s Muslims a minority?” Aljazeera. June 5, 2014. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/6/5/are-indias-muslims-a-minority. Ananthakrishnan, G. “Explained: Who is a ‘minority’ in India? What the Constitution says, how Supreme Court has ruled.” The Indian Express. March 28, 2022. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-who-is-a-minority-in-india-supreme-court-7840064/. “Babri Masjid: The Timeline of a Demolition.” The Wire. December 6, 2021. https://thewire.in/communalism/babri-masjid-the-timeline-of-a-demolition. Biswas, Soutik. “Gyanvapi masjid: India dispute could become a religious flashpoint.” BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-61476741. Changoiwala, Pooja. “India’s Muslims are terrified of being deported.” Foreign Policy. February 21, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/21/india-muslims-deported-terrified-citizenship-amendment-act-caa/. Chaturvedi, Arpit. “The Need for Institutional Reform at the National Minorities Commission, India.” Cornell Policy Review. 2017.http://www.cornellpolicyreview.com/need-institutional-reform-national-minorities-commission-india/?pdf=3933 Chowdhury, Debashis Roy. “Laws against ‘Love Jihad’ are yet another serious attack on India’s once secular Democracy.” Time. November 30, 2020.https://time.com/5915872/love-jihad-india-democracy/. “Citizenship Amendment Bill: India’s New anti-Muslim law explained,” BBC December 11, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-50670393 Daniyal, Shoaib. “Congress appeasement has never helped minorities.” Scroll. July 4, 2014.https://scroll.in/article/668775/congress-appeasement-has-never-helped-minorities. Dutta, Prabhash K. “Triple Talaq Bill in Rajya Sabha: Do you know why it is controversial?” India Today. July 30, 2019. https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/triple-talaq-bill-in-rajya-sabha-do-you-know-why-it-is-controversial-1575100-2019-07-30 Dutta, Prabhash K. “Who is a minority citizen in India?” India Today. March 30, 2022. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/minority-citizen-in-india-supreme-court-minorities-1931455-2022-03-30. “Economic boycott of Muslims from Karnataka temple fairs unconstitutional: Lawyers Forum.” The News Minute. March 25, 2022. https://www.thenewsminute.com/article/economic-boycott-muslims-karnataka-temple-fairs-unconstitutional-lawyers-forum-162272. Government of India, Ministry of Minority Affairs. “Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) in respect of Multi-sectoral Development Programme (MsDP) for Minority Concentration Areas.” https://www.minorityaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/MsDP%20%28FAQs%29.pdf. Jaffrelot, Christophe and Gilles Varniers. “The Dwindling Minority.” The Indian Express. July 30, 2018. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/muslims-politicians-in-india-bjp-narendra-modi-government-5282128/. Jha, Shefali. “Defending Minority Interest in the Constituent Assembly: Rights vs Representation.” Economic and Political Weekly 38, no. 1 (April 2003). https://www.epw.in/journal/2003/16/special-articles/rights-versus-representation.html. “Karnataka hijab row: Explained.” The Times of India. March 15, 2022. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/karnataka-hijab-row-explained/articleshow/90214058.cms. Khan, Sameer. “Lok Sabha Election Results 2019: Here’s the list of newly-elected Muslim MPs.” The Siasat Daily. May 24, 2019. https://www.siasat.com/lok-sabha-election-results-2019-heres-list-newly-elected-muslim-mps-1499820/. Kidwai, Rasheed. “Need for CVE Program to Engage with Muslim Community.” Observer Research Foundation. June 20, 2018. www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/need-for-major-cve-programme-to-engage-with-muslim-community/. Kramer, Stephanie. “Population growth and religious composition,” in Religious Composition of India. Pew Research Center, September 21, 2021. https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2021/09/21/population-growth-and-religious-composition/. Lalwani, Vijayta. “In A Riot-Torn MP Town, Hindus Organise an Economic Boycott of Muslims.” Article14. April 29, 2022.https://article-14.com/post/in-a-riot-torn-mp-town-hindus-organise-an-economic-boycott-of-muslims-626b0b188f64b. Lobo, Kieran and Gulal Salil. “The Exclusion Explainer: How the Hindu Right ‘Others’ Muslims.” Economic and Political Weekly.https://www.epw.in/engage/article/exclusion-explainer-how-hindu-right-others-muslims Mahmudabad, Ali Khan. “Indian Muslims and the Anti-CAA Protests: From Marginalization Towards Exclusion.” South Asia Multidisciplinary Journal [Online] 24/25 (2020). https://doi.org/10.4000/samaj.6701. Maizland, Lindsay. “India’s Muslims: An Increasingly Marginalized Population.” Council on Foreign Relations. August 20, 2020.https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/india-muslims-marginalized-population-bjp-modi. Ministry of Minority Affairs. “Socio-Economic Facilities to Minorities.” Government of India Press Information Bureau. July 25, 2018. https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=181032. “Most Sachar Committee recommendations implemented by Centre.” The Economic Times. June 2, 2013. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/most-sachar-committee-recommendations-implemented-by-centre/articleshow/20394362.cms?from=mdr. Palshikar, Suhas. “Towards Hegemony: BJP beyond Electoral Dominance.” Economic & Political Weekly 53, no. 33 (2018). https://www.epw.in/journal/2018/33/indias-democracy-today/towards-hegemony.html. Sachar, Rajindar et al. Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India. Government of India. November 17, 2006. https://www.minorityaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/sachar_comm.pdf. Sahoo, Niranjan. “Mounting Majoritarianism and Political Polarisation in India,” in Political Polarization in South and Southeast Asia, edited by Thomas Carothers and Andrew O’ Donohue. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 18, 2020. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/08/18/mounting-majoritarianism-and-political-polarization-in-india-pub-82434. Saldanha, Alison. “2017 Deadliest Year for Cow-Related Hate Crime Since 2010, 86% of Those Killed Muslim.” IndiaSpend. December 8, 2017. www.indiaspend.com/2017-deadliest-year-for-cow-related-hate-crime-since-2010-86-of-those-killed-muslim-12662/. Shaikh, Zeeshan. “Ten years after Sachar Report.” The Indian Express. December 26, 2016. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/ten-years-after-sachar-report-no-major-change-in-the-condition-of-indias-muslims-4444809/. “US government report flags attacks on minorities in India took place throughout 2021.” Scroll. June 3, 2022. https://scroll.in/latest/1025373/us-government-report-says-attack-on-minorities-in-india-took-place-throughout-2021. Milan Vaishnav, “The BJP in Power: Indian Democracy and Religious Nationalism”, Report, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/BJP_In_Power_final.pdf Varshney, Ashutosh. “2014, like 1952.” The Indian Express. May 19, 2014.https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/2014-like-1952/. “What is Article 30 of the Indian Constitution.” Business Standard. https://www.business-standard.com/about/what-is-article-30-of-the-indian-constitution#:~:text=What%20is%20Article%2029%20of,right%20to%20conserve%20the%20same. “2019 Lok Sabha election results: Only 27 Muslim MPs elected to Parliament, none from the BJP.” Scroll. May 24, 2019. https://scroll.in/latest/924627/2019-lok-sabha-election-results-only-24-muslim-mps-elected-to-parliament-none-from-the-bjp.     [1] Although the Constitution does not define what “minority” means, they are conventionally categorized into two [2] For more, see Government of India, Ministry of Minority Affairs, https://www.minorityaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/MsDP%20%28FAQs%29.pdf [3] Shefali Jha, “Defending Minority Interest in the Constituent Assembly: Rights vs Representation,” Economic and Political Weekly 38, no.1 (April 2003). [4] Ibid. [5] Irfan Ahmad, “Are India’s Muslims a minority?”, Aljazeera, 2014. [6] Srijita Adak. “Minority rights in the Constitution of India,” IPleaders, 2021. [7] “What is Article 30 of the Indian Constitution,” Business Standard. [8] Ibid. [9] G. Ananthakrishnan, “Explained: Who is a ‘minority’ in India? What the Constitution says, how Supreme Court has ruled,” The Indian Express, 2022. [10] Arpit Chaturvedi, “The Need for Institutional Reform at the National Minorities Commission, India,” Cornell Policy Review, 2017. [11] Under this scheme, 340 multi-purpose community centers, 67 gurukul-type residential schools, 436 market sheds for farmers and artisans, 11 degree colleges, 163 girls’ hostels, 53 it is, and 925 school buildings have been built by the government of India in minority-concentrated localities. In the financial year 2019-20, INR 14.70 billion was allocated for this scheme. For more, see Government of India, Ministry of Minority Affairs, Ibid op.cit [12] Ministry of Minority Affairs, “Socio-Economic Facilities to Minorities,” Government of India Press Information Bureau, 2018. [13] Ali Khan Mahmudabad, “Indian Muslims and the Anti-CAA Protests: From Marginalization Towards Exclusion,” South Asia Multidisciplinary Journal 24/45 (2020). [14] Prabhash K. Dutta, “Who is a minority citizen in India?”, India Today, 2022. [15] Stephanie Kramer, “Population growth and religious composition,” in Religious Composition of India (Pew Research Center, 2021). [16] Lindsay Maizland, “India’s Muslims: An Increasingly Marginalized Population,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2020. [17] Rajindar Sachar et al., Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India, Government of India, 2006. [18] “Most Sachar Committee recommendations implemented by Centre,” The Economic Times, 2013. [19] Zeeshan Shaikh, “Ten years after Sachar Report,” The Indian Express, 2016. [20] Ibid. [21] Christophe Jaffrelot and Gilles Varniers, “The Dwindling Minority,” The Indian Express, 2018. [22] Rasheed Kidwai, “Need for CVE Program to Engage with Muslim Community,” Observer Research Foundation, 2018. [23] “2019 Lok Sabha election results: Only 27 Muslim MPs elected to Parliament, none from the BJP,” Scroll, 2019. [24] Sameer Khan, “Lok Sabha Election Results 2019: Here’s the list of newly-elected Muslim MPs,” The Siasat Daily, 2019. [25] Kieran Lobo and Gulal Salil, “The Exclusion Explainer: How the Hindu Right ‘Others’ Muslims,” Economic and Political Weekly. [26] For more, see Niranjan Sahoo, “Mounting Majoritarianism and Political Polarisation in India,” in Political Polarization in South and Southeast Asia, eds. Thomas Carothers and Andrew O’Donohue (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020). [27] Shoaib Daniyal, “Congress appeasement has never helped minorities,” Scroll, 2014. [28] Ibid [29] Ashutosh Varshney, “2014, like 1952,” The Indian Express, 2014. [30] However, the Saffron Party received a major jolt in 2018 when it lost three key Hindi heartland states to the Congress. The BJP’s tally now comes down to sixteen states. See also Suhas Palshikar, “Towards Hegemony: BJP beyond Electoral Dominance,” Economic & Political Weekly 53, no. 33 (2018). [31] Data have been collected since 2010. See Alison Saldanha, “2017 Deadliest Year for Cow-Related Hate Crime Since 2010, 86% of Those Killed Muslim,” IndiaSpend, 2017. [32] “US government report flags attacks on minorities in India took place throughout 2021,” Scroll, 2022. [33] Debashis Roy Chowdhury, “Laws against ‘Love Jihad’ are yet another serious attack on India’s once secular Democracy,” Time, 2020. [34] “Karnataka hijab row: Explained,” The Times of India, 2022. [35] “Economic boycott of Muslims from Karnataka temple fairs unconstitutional: Lawyers Forum,” The News Minute, 2022. [36] Vijayta Lalwani, “In A Riot-Torn MP Town, Hindus Organise an Economic Boycott of Muslims,” Article14, 2022. [37] The Gyanvapi mosque was built on the ruins of the Vishwanath temple, a grand 16th century Hindu temple. The shrine was partially destroyed in 1669 by the sixth Mughal emperor Aurangzeb. Now Hindu groups want to restore the temple, similar to what they did in the Babri Masjid row in the 1990s. See Soutik Biswas, “Gyanvapi masjid: India dispute could become a religious flashpoint,” BBC. [38] “Babri Masjid: The Timeline of a Demolition,” The Wire, 2021. [39] Prabhash K. Dutta, “Triple Talaq Bill in Rajya Sabha: Do you know why it is controversial?”, India Today, 2019. [40] Milan Vaishnav, “The BJP in Power: Indian Democracy and Religious Nationalism”, Report, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/BJP_In_Power_final.pdf [41] Pooja Changoiwala, “India’s Muslims are terrified of being deported,” Foreign Policy, 2020. [42] “Citizenship Amendment Bill: India’s New anti-Muslim law explained,” BBC, 2019.     ■ Niranjan Sahoo is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department∙Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Niranjan Sahoo 2022-06-29조회 : 10689
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[ADRN Working Paper] Protection of Minority Rights in Bangladesh Requires Stronger Commitment

Introduction   Bangladesh is a densely populated country of 164 million people. Minorities constitute roughly 10% of the population. Among them, religious minorities form the major portion with Hindus comprising 8% followed by Buddhists and Christians. The rights of minorities are protected under the Constitution, which guarantees equality in the eyes of the law for all citizens. However, due to several factors, minority rights are often violated. These include economic factors, religious fanaticism, and general negative attitudes. Weak response by the state against violence, intimidation etc. also contributes to violations of the rights of minorities. There are several categories of minorities in Bangladesh. However, the dominant minority communities are ethnic, religious, and other (linguistic, refugees etc.)   Historical Background and the Present State of Minority Rights     Hindus have been the majority and dominant religion in South Asia for centuries. Buddhism is also a homegrown religion of the sub-continent, and are now the majority in Sri Lanka and Myanmar. Muslims came to the sub-continent about 600 years ago from Afghanistan, Iraq, Turkey, and other such places. A massive conversion from Hinduism to Islam took place from the 16th to 17th century.   After 200 years of British rule, the sub-continent was divided into Pakistan and India in 1947. Pakistan became a Muslim majority country and India a Hindu majority, though millions from both religions remained in the two countries. Pakistan was geographically divided into East and West Pakistan, with India in between. East Pakistan was characterized by the Bengali speaking people, who were majority Muslims by religion but with a distinct cultural identity which was different from West Pakistan. In 1971, after a brutal war, this part of East Pakistan emerged as an independent country which is now Bangladesh. Ninety percent of the population of Bangladesh is Muslim, and the remaining 10% are religious and ethnic minorities.   Bangladesh, right after independence, emerged as a secular polity with a constitutional embargo on religion in politics. The first Constitution, passed on November 4, 1972, abolished (a) all kinds of communalism; (b) political recognition of religion by the state; (c) exploitation of religion for political purposes; and (d) discrimination on religious grounds. [1] The preamble of the Constitution emphasized secularism as one of the fundamental principles of state policy. Article 9 of the Bangladesh Constitution (1972) defined Bengali nationalism as: “The unity and solidarity of the Bengali nation, which deriving its identity from its language and culture, attained sovereign and independent Bangladesh through a united and determined struggle in the war of independence, shall be the basis of Bengali nationalism.” [2] The insertion of the above clauses ensured the political and cultural dominance of Bengalis within the state. However, many claim this was a denial of the cultural identity and distinctiveness of the other groups.   Other religions are, however, are recognized under Article 41 of the Constitution, which gives citizens the right to practice and promote religious beliefs. Further provisions of Article 41 guarantee each individual’s right to refuse to practice a religion, or to be compelled to be educated in a religion other than their own. [3] Sections 295, 296, 297, and 298 of the Penal Code deal with offenses against religious places or practices. [4] (Bangladesh Penal Code 1860). The only protective provision for ethnic minorities is Article 28(4), which states that “Nothing in this article shall prevent the state from making special provision in favor of women and children or for the advancement of any backward section of the citizens.” [5]   Bangladesh has categorically maintained that there are no Adivasis or indigenous people in Bangladesh. The debate continues whether the ethnic minorities are Adivasis or migrants. As it transpired, Bengalis and Bengali Muslims are the culturally homogenous majority population, while the minority/weaker communities are expected to assimilate themselves with the “mainstream,” i.e. the dominant majority community.   Though Bangladesh broke away from Pakistan and emerged as a secular nation-state in 1971, it still bears signs of majoritarian politics, especially after the assassination of the country’s first president Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975. Post-1975 Bangladesh has witnessed the rise of Islam as the state religion. However, the situation improved for rights of minorities when in 1996 secularism was restored in the Constitution of 2011. However, Islam remains the state religion. This ambiguity[6] shows the divided nature of the country’s population, which impacts the principles of secularism and rights for minorities as equal citizens.   Through a gazette notification, on October 4, 2018, the government abolished its reservation for indigenous peoples along with other quota categories for first and second class government services. The decision came in response to a series of countrywide protests against the quota system. Instead of reforming the existing system, the government completely abolished it, which resulted in the direct deprivation of the most underprivileged groups, including indigenous peoples.   In the past 20 years there has been a rise in religious extremism in Bangladesh. Some reasons include increasing globalization, use of social media, and the global rise in religious fanaticism, especially in Middle Eastern countries. Moreover, international Muslim scholars have taken control over the interpretation of Islam, which sometimes clashes with the spirit of multi-faith harmony in the country.   Feelings of victimization are one of the top causes of radicalization. Neighboring India and Myanmar are accused of persecuting Muslims. Videos of this persecution are rampant on social media, which generates feelings of proxy-victimization. [7] A study on radicalization in Bangladesh revealed that Muslim persecution in India and Myanmar, in addition to the situation in Palestine and other Middle Eastern countries, have helped to radicalize youths. [8]   The recent spasm of violence against religious minorities, especially Hindus and Buddhists, in response to fake blasphemy allegations are the result of a negative attitude towards them. Many religious attacks on minorities are actually done in the guise of attempts to steal land and assets belonging to Hindus. [9] Local politics are also at play. As the ruling Awami League has consolidated power and is now effectively without a viable opposition, there are indications that rivalry over resources (including land grabs) within the ruling party is becoming entrenched. In one local district, two rival groups within the Awami League have reportedly blamed[10] each other for the attacks on Hindu houses and temples. [11]   Status of Ethnic Minorities   Bangladesh is a country of cultural and ethnic diversity, with over 54 indigenous peoples speaking at least 35 languages, along with the majority Bengali population. According to the 2011 census, the country’s indigenous population numbers approximately 1,586,141, [12] which represents 1.8% of the total population of the country.   The majority of the indigenous population lives in the plains districts of the country, [13] and the rest in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). The government of Bangladesh does not recognize indigenous peoples as “indigenous” and refers to them as “small anthropological groups.” Major issues related to indigenous peoples’ economic and political rights, such as rights to ancestral land, remain ignored. The CHT region was in conflict until the signing of the Peace Accord in 1997. However, many clauses in the peace agreement remain to be implemented, such as the devolution of power to the Regional Council and the removal of all army camps.   Dominant Religious Minorities in Bangladesh   Religious minorities are the largest group of minorities in Bangladesh and number about 8% of the population. They are Hindus, Buddhists, and Christians. The Hindu minority population is well integrated into mainstream social, cultural, and political life in Bangladesh. There is no overt discrimination against them as such, and they enjoy their right to practice their religion, obtain employment, and other such activities. However, discreet and insidious rights violations still occur .   Reasons and Challenges behind the Violations of Minority Rights   Weak Response of the State   Often, authorities do not initiate a strong enough response to attacks on minorities. The most recent attacks occurred during Durga Puja in 2021 (the most important Hindu religious festival in Bangladesh). Although the government expressed its intention to stop these communal attacks and punish the perpetrators, justice was not swift enough and neither was compensation for victims. If this is a sincere promise, then the government should start by implementing the recommendations given in the Judicial Commissions report submitted three years ago. Such sporadic attacks such as looting and vandalizing of temples and property belonging to Hindus occurs regularly during religious festivals.   Political Indemnity   After every such incident, the two main political parties, the Awami League and BNP, start to blame each other and ultimately try to shelter any of their activists who were involved with the violence. This sort of political indemnity is a big reason why incidences of communal attacks are repeated in Bangladesh. Sections of the Bangladesh Penal Code fail to protect the rights of minorities, and perpetrators are most often not punished.   Land Grabbing   Making a profit from grabbing the land and assets of minorities, particularly those belonging to Hindus and ethnic minorities, is the most common form of rights violation that occurs. These land grabbers are often influential people who enjoy immunity, and their actions are not questioned. In the CHT, settlements by majority Bengalis have changed the demography of the region, and indigenous people are no longer in the majority. The same is true of plain land Adivasis as their land continues to be grabbed for the construction of resorts and parks. The Hindu population has lost most of their land to influential Muslims, either through intimidation, forced sales at prices far below market value or through illegal land grabbing.   Propaganda and Rumors: Violence due to Rumors Spread by Vested Quarters   In Bangladesh today, especially in rural areas, rumors are spread deliberately by vested interest groups to create negative perceptions about minorities. Many incidents of atrocities against religious minorities have been due to false rumors spread on purpose to unleash violence against them with the intention of grabbing their land or property or forcing them to migrate to India. Social media is used to create distrust and disharmony between minority and majority populations, and new technologies are used to disrupt social harmony. The result has been attacks against not only Hindus but also Buddhist communities.   Prolonged Justice System   The prolonged delay in ensuring justice for victims is one of the reasons why perpetrators are emboldened to carry on their activities with impunity. They are not usually held accountable for their actions. The entire justice system is stacked against the weak and the powerless. The saying “justice delayed, justice denied” is true in this present context. Those belonging to low income groups are even more marginalized in terms of getting justice.   Negative Attitude towards Minorities   Often, members of the majority population have a preconceived negative attitude towards minorities and believe they are inferior in terms of their social status, culture, and way of life. This negative attitude results in violence and rights violations.   Recent Incidents of Minority Right Violations   In 2013, the numbers of human rights violations against indigenous peoples grew. Incidents of rape, murder, and land grabbing and looting of property occurred. The Kapaeeng Foundation’s “Human Rights Report 2013 on Indigenous Peoples in Bangladesh” reports that at least 47 houses, including one from the plains, were set on fire and burnt to ashes, while around 2,000 people from 400 families in CHT fled to the “no man’s land” adjacent to the neighboring Indian state due to communal attacks conducted by Bengali settlers. In some cases, while these violations were committed by influential Bengali miscreants as non-state actors, while state actors, such as members of security forces and law enforcement agencies, played either supportive or passive roles. [14] The situation of the CHT throughout the year 2018 was characterized by very limited freedom of speech, expression, assembly, and association.   Those who have suffered the most are the indigenous human rights defenders (IHRDs), especially those affiliated with local political platforms, as well as many ordinary indigenous villagers. Incidents of criminalization and arbitrary search operations, arrests, detentions, and false charges occurred across the CHT. The Kapaeeng Foundation, a research organization for indigenous people, documented a total of 117 people facing false charges, 75 of whom were arrested in 2018. Additionally, some 90 houses were searched by security forces in the middle of the night without any prior warrant or complaint in 2018. [15]   Violence against Women and Girls   Indigenous women and girls have been targets of violence, intimidation, harassment, and discrimination for years. Indigenous women and girls routinely face sexual, physical, and mental violence throughout the year mostly from Bengali settlers, influential land grabbers, and sometimes even men from within their own communities. The Kapaeeng Foundation documented that at least 53 indigenous women and girls, in 47 incidents, were reportedly killed, raped, assaulted, or violated in 2018. [16] More often than not, the violence that indigenous women and girls face is political, connected to power relations and with the intention of driving them away to grab their land.   International Commitments   Bangladesh is a signatory to all UN Conventions such as ECOSOC, UNCAT etc. that focus on the protection of cultural, political, and social rights. May 2018 was the third time the human rights situation in Bangladesh was reviewed by the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). A 29-member delegation led by the Minister of Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs attended the thirtieth session of the UPR Working Group. The Bangladesh delegation condemned violence against religious and ethnic minorities and claimed that allegations of such incidents had been addressed as promptly as possible during the period under review. In a similar vein, the delegation emphasized a “zero tolerance” policy towards crimes perpetrated by members of law enforcement agencies.   This same government policy statement appeared in the second UPR review of Bangladesh in 2013. Moreover, the delegation reiterated previously made commitments concerning the implementation of the 1997 CHT Accord and existing constitutional provisions on protecting the local culture and traditions of indigenous peoples.   Facebook and Social Media   Almost every year since 2012, religious minorities have been attacked somewhere in Bangladesh after online posts promulgating false allegations. The pattern runs like this: rumors begin within a local community that people from a minority background have defamed Islam, and such orchestrated “fake news” quickly spreads online to incite violence against minorities. While Facebook remains a key platform for inciting hate and violence towards minorities in Bangladesh, three other factors are important to understand why these deadly rumors attract mobs who then attack minorities for alleged blasphemy.   Firstly, studies in recent years have identified shifting trends in Islamic majoritarianism in Bangladesh where blasphemy and atheism are deemed to have deadly implications. [17] Atheist bloggers have been murdered[18] by violent Islamists, for example, and several “blasphemous” writers, cartoonists, publishers, and bloggers now live in permanent exile.   Current Practices to Protect Rights of Minorities   Government Initiatives to Address Violations of Minority Rights   As mentioned above, the Constitution of Bangladesh guarantees equal rights for every citizen of the country without prejudice towards any one. The government’s stated position is “zero tolerance” for crimes against minorities. The government also sets up investigation commissions after every attack and vows that the perpetrators will not be spared. When an attack occurs, the police take action and arrests are made. The National Human Rights Commission has been set up to monitor rights violations against all citizens with a special focus on minorities.   Non-Government Initiatives   Civil society organizations have been active in the protection of minorities. Several NGOs have specific programs and projects to monitor rights violations and provide services to minorities, such as legal and financial assistance. In order to portray an objective situation, parallel reports are submitted by CSOs to concerned international bodies dealing with the rights of minorities. The Human Rights Forum Bangladesh (HRFB) and Citizen Platform for the Implementation of the SDGs are two such national-level platforms with links to grassroots human rights defenders.   Conclusion and Recommendations   Bangladesh is still known as a multicultural and multi-religious country with a culture of social harmony and religious tolerance. The government is committed to upholding the principles of secularism as enshrined in the Constitution of Bangladesh, even though it often fails to act decisively against the perpetrators of violence and rights violations. It must be noted that Hindus do enjoy religious freedom, as Durga Puja is celebrated by everyone annually in a grand manner irrespective of religion. However, incidents of violence should be handled in a stronger way. Other secular festivals, such as the Bangla New Year on April 14, are also universally celebrated.   Sincere dialogue and discussion is needed to address issues such as diversity, cultural, social, political, and religious rights, and acceptance of different opinions and differences. The entire education system needs to be revised to include the above issues in the curriculum, and children should be taught at a young age to celebrate diversity rather than reject it. It is through social, religious, and cultural harmony that Bangladesh will attain the dream with which it was created of a discrimination-free society with the political, social, religious, and cultural rights of every citizen ensured.    References   Bangladesh and Violent Extremism: Resolve Network Research 2016-2017. Resolve Network. 2018. https://resolvenet.org/system/files/2018-10/RSVE_16-17BGD_ResearchCompendium_FINAL.pdf. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). “Population and Housing Census 2011.” Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh. 2011. http://203.112.218.65:8008/WebTestApplication/userfiles/Image/National%20Reports/Population%20%20Housing%20Census%202011.pdf. Barman, Dalem Chandra. Human Rights Report 2013 on Indigenous Peoples in Bangladesh. Kapaeeng Foundation. 2014. http://www.kapaeeng.org/kapaeeng-foundation-launches-its-human-rights-report-2013-on-indigenous-peoples-in-bangladesh. Chowdhury, Mong Shanoo, and Pallab Chakma. Human Rights Report 2018 on Indigenous Peoples in Bangladesh. Kapaeeng Foundation. June, 2019. https://www.academia.edu/42053987/HUMAN_RIGHTS_REPORT_2018_on_Indigenous_Peoples_in_Bangladesh. Mahmud, Iftekhar, and Alam Palash. “Awami League`s Two Groups Blaming Each Other.” Prothomalo. October 23, 2021. https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/crime-and-law/awami-leagues-two-groups-blaming-each-other. “The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh.” People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 1972. http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-367.html. Halim, Sadeka. "Land Loss and Implications on the plain land Adivasis." Shanghati, Bangladesh Indigenous Peoples Forum. 2015. Hasan, Mubashar. “Minorities under Attack in Bangladesh.” The Interpreter. November 18, 2021. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/minorities-under-attack-bangladesh. Hammadi, Saad and Emma Graham-Harrison. “Inside Bangladesh` Killing Fields: Bloggers and Outsiders Targeted by Fanatics.” The Guardian 11, 2016.https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/minorities-under-attack-bangladesh. Mostofa, Shafi Md. “Bangladesh`s Ambiguity on Religion Has Been Expensive for the Country.” The Diplomat, September 8, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/bangladeshs-ambiguity-on-religion-has-been-expensive-for-the-country/. Mostofa, Shafi Md. “Explaining Islamist Militancy: A Pyramid Root Cause Model,” in Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh, edited by Mark Beeson, pp. 163-186. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, September 2, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79171-1_6. “The Penal Code, 1860.” People’s Republic of Bangladesh, October 6, 1860. http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-11.html?lang=bn. Rita, Shamima. “Land Grab: Mayor Ivy`s Family Seizes Temple Property?” Dhaka Tribune, February 6, 2021. https://archive.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/nation/2021/02/06/land-grab-mayor-ivy-s-family-seizes-temple-property.     [1] “The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh,” People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 1972. [2] Ibid., Article 9. [3] Ibid., Article 41. [4] “The Penal Code, 1860,” People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 1860, Sec. 295-298. [5] “The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh,” Article 29(4). [6] Shafi Md Mostofa, “Bangladesh`s Ambiguity on Religion Has Been Expensive for the Country.” The Diplomat, 2020. [7] Shafi Md Mostofa, “Explaining Islamist Militancy: A Pyramid Root Cause Model,” in Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh, ed. Mark Beeson (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2021), pp. 163-186. [8] Ibid. [9] Shamima Rita, “Land Grab: Mayor Ivy`s Family Seizes Temple Property?,” Dhaka Tribune, 2021. [10] Iftekhar Mahmud and Alam Palash, “Awami League`s Two Groups Blaming Each Other,” Prothomalo, 2021. [11] Mubashar Hasan, “Minorities under Attack in Bangladesh,” The Interpreter, 2021. [12] Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), “Population and Housing Census 2011,” Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, 2011. [13] Sadeka Halim, "Land Loss and Implications on the plain land Adivasis," Shanghati, Bangladesh Indigenous Peoples Forum, 2015. [14] Dalem Chandra Barman, Human Rights Report 2013 on Indigenous Peoples in Bangladesh, Kapaeeng Foundation, 2014. [15] Mong Shanoo Chowdhury and Pallab Chakma, Human Rights Report 2018 on Indigenous Peoples in Bangladesh, Kapaeeng Foundation, 2019. [16] Ibid. [17] Bangladesh and Violent Extremism: Resolve Network Research 2016-2017, Resolve Network, 2018. [18] Saad Hammadi and Emma Graham-Harrison, “Inside Bangladesh`s Killing Fields: Bloggers and Outsiders Targeted by Fanatics,” The Guardian, 2016.     ■ Shaheen Anam is the Executive Director at the Manusher Jonno Foundation.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department∙Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Shaheen Anam 2022-06-28조회 : 9001
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[ADRN Working Paper] Protection of Minority Rights in Mongolia

Overview   Mongolia is located in the eastern part of Asia, bordered by Russia to the north and China to the south. It covers an area of 1.6 million square km, with a population of 3.5 million, making it the world's most sparsely populated nation. Mongolia is the world's largest landlocked country that does not border a closed sea, and much of its area is covered by grassy steppe, with mountains to the north and west and the Gobi desert to the south. Ulaanbaatar, the largest city and the capital, is home to roughly half of the country's population.   The Mongols constitute one of the principal ethnographic divisions of Asian peoples. Their traditional homeland is centered in Mongolia, a vast plateau in Central Asia. Physical anthropologists in the 19th century introduced the terms “Mongol” and “Mongolian” as descriptive of “racial type,” even though the Mongols exhibited a wide range of physical characteristics. [1] Today, the Mongols are recognized as a group of peoples bound together by a common language and a common nomadic tradition.   The Mongols have always been nomads; however, nomadism is the seasonal movement of livestock and camps from one pasture to another, not unfettered wandering. Legend and folklore show that among the premodern Mongols, the common people considered livestock to be private property and land to be collective property. Traditional society was based on blood relationships traced through the common male ancestor who gave his name to the clan, though evidence exists of a more ancient system of matrilineal descent. Marriage between members of the same clan was forbidden, giving rise to complicated marriage alliances (and also feuds) among the clans. As clans grew, the most successful families tended to arrogate to themselves claims to ancestry and territory. Weak clans fell to a subordinate but not servile status: they owned their own cattle and had their own headmen, but paid tribute to the ruling clan and moved, camped, pastured, and fought under its orders. Today, approximately 30% of the population is nomadic or semi-nomadic, and horse culture remains integral.   Ethnic Background, Languages, and Religion   The Mongols are ethnically quite homogeneous. There are 24 ethnic groups mentioned in the 2020 National Census. [2] The Khalkh make up the majority and comprise over 84.5% of the population. [3] The Khalkh (also spelled Khalkha or Halh) are the dominant ethnic group of Mongolia. As the majority group that controls the ancestral homelands of all Mongol people, the Khalkh people see themselves as the direct ancestors of Genghis Khan, and therefore the true standard-bearers of authentic Mongolian culture. They uphold Khalkh traditions and beliefs as the official Mongol traditions, and Khalkha Mongol is the official language of the nation since all other Mongol languages are dialects of this common tongue. Considering their history, it is really not surprising to learn that the Khalkh are extremely proud of their heritage, and encourage the preservation and continuation of traditional Mongol, by which they mean Khalkh, culture. For a long time, this led the Khalkh, who dominate Mongolian politics, to shut off Mongolia from outside influences. Today, however, Mongolia is much more open and has even permitted limited entry of Christianity into a nation that traditionally practices Buddhism. Other Mongolian groups, including the Dörvöd, Buryat, Bayad, and Dariganga, account for nearly half of the rest of the population.   Much of the remainder consists of Turkic-speaking peoples, mainly Kazakhs, some Tuvas, and a few Tsaatans (Dhukha), who live mostly in the western and northern parts of the country. There are very small numbers of Russians and Chinese, who are found mainly in the towns. All Mongols recognize their kinship to each other in varying degrees through legend, written history, and especially language. Dialects vary from east to west more than from north to south, but few are unintelligible to other Mongols. Ethnicity is defined by common origins (ethnic groups are descendants of tribes or clans), dialects, and cultural differences. However, except for the Kazakh and Tuva minority groups residing in Western Mongolia, all ethnic groups speak Mongolian dialects that are comprehensible to speakers of Khalkh and to each other. Khalkh Mongolian is the official national language and is used at all levels of administration, is the language of instruction in most schools, and is used in all national exams.   Besides the Tsaatan, the Kazakh, the Tuva, and to some extent the Khoton, cultural differences among ethnic groups are minor. Mobile pastoralism has traditionally been practiced within Mongolia, and this common nomadic way of life has fostered a relatively uniform Mongol culture, with people sharing similar livelihoods, having frequent contact with speakers of other dialects, and developing close social and cultural practices. The majority of Mongolia’s ethnic groups share similar customs, traditions, and systems of production as the Khalkh. Ethnicity is mainly revealed in distinct clothing styles and ways of preparing food, as well as in musical and oral traditions.   Ethnic distinctions can thus be qualified as relatively minor, although some groups may have a stronger sense of their own identity than others. This is the case for the traditionally nomadic reindeer-herding Tsaatan people in Khuvsgul aimag (province); the Kazakhs, who have stronger cultural differences added to language and religious distinctions (Kazakh language and Islam); and the Tuvas (Tuva language). However, Kazakh and Tuva livelihoods are not significantly different from those of the Mongol subgroups; only the Tsaatan are characterized by a specific system of production. Most of the Mongol minority groups, and even many Khalkh people, still live in semi-nomadic pastoral bands that move continually across the Steppe, the high-altitude plains where their ancestral culture originated. However, many worry that nomadic herding is no longer sustainable, as climate change is drying up the land and major cities are developing throughout the nation in places where more economic opportunities are available.   Although Mongolia has a fair amount of ethnic group diversity, this has not led to major problems. The Khalkh people are generally not challenged in their claims to represent true Mongol culture, or in their widespread control that simply comes from having much greater numbers. This does not mean, however, that things are always perfect. Every now and then one of the ethnic minority groups will bring their lack of political representation into national politics or will question decisions made by the government for Mongolia's future. However, while racial tension does exist in these cases, the disputes are almost always resolved peacefully and diplomatically.   The official language of Mongolia is Mongolian, and is spoken by 95% of the population. [4] The government has given increased attention to respecting and protecting the languages and cultural rights of Kazakhs, Tuvas, and other minorities. The vast majority of the population speaks Mongolian, and nearly all those who speak another language understand Mongolian. A variety of Oirat and Buryat dialects are spoken across the country. In the western part of the country, Kazakh and Tuva, both Turkic languages, are also spoken. Mongolian Sign Language is the principal language of the deaf community. Today, Mongolian is written using the Cyrillic alphabet in Mongolia, although in the past it was written using Mongolian script. An official reintroduction of the old script was planned for 1994, but has yet to take place as older generations encountered practical difficulties. Schools are reintroducing the traditional alphabet. In March 2020, the Mongolian government announced plans to use both Cyrillic and the traditional Mongolian script in official documents by 2025. [5]   The Mongols originally followed shamanistic practices, but over time they broadly adopted Tibetan Buddhism (Lamaism), with an admixture of shamanistic elements. On the fall of the Qing in the early 20th century, control of Mongolia lay in the hands of the Javzandamba (spiritual leader) and of the higher clergy, together with various local khans, princes, and noblemen. The new regime installed in 1921 sought to replace feudal and religious structures with socialist and secular forms. During the 1930s, the ruling Communist party, which espoused atheism, destroyed or closed monasteries, confiscated their livestock and landholdings, induced large numbers of monks (lamas) to renounce religious life, and killed those who resisted. [6]   In the mid-1940s, the Gandan monastery in Ulaanbaatar was reopened, and the communist government began encouraging small numbers of lamas to attend international Buddhist conferences, especially in Southeast Asia, as political promotion for Mongolia. The end of one-party rule in 1990 allowed for the popular resurgence of Buddhism, the rebuilding of ruined monasteries and temples, and the rebirth of the religious vocation. Buddhists, predominantly of the school headed by the Dalai Lama, constitute nearly one-third of the Mongolians who actively profess religious beliefs. According to the 2020 National Census, among Mongolians aged 15 and above, around 50% were Buddhists, while 39% were non-religious. Approximately one-third of the population adheres to traditional shamanic beliefs. A relatively small number of Muslims, who are found mostly in the western part of the country, are nearly all Kazakhs, and a much smaller community of Christians live mainly in the capital. A significant proportion of the people are atheistic or non-religious. [7]   Buddhism is the majority religion, with the non-religious being the second-largest group. Islam is the second-largest religion, concentrated among ethnic Kazakhs. Most citizens are ethnic Mongols, with roughly 5% of the population being Kazakhs, Tuvas, and other minorities, who are especially concentrated in the west. Of the Kazakhs in Mongolia, 81.9% practice Islam, while 27% of Tuvans and 60.5% of Tsaatan people practice shamanism. About 95% of all Muslims in Mongolia are Kazakhs. [8]   Minority-related Legislation   The rights of ethnic minorities are guaranteed by the Constitution of Mongolia (1992) which states: “no person may be discriminated on the basis of ethnic origin, language, race, age, sex, social origin or status, poverty, occupation or post, religion, opinion, or education”. [9] The constitution also protects the right of ethnic minorities to practice their own culture and use their own language, guaranteeing “the right of national minorities of other tongues to use their native languages in education and communication and in the pursuit of cultural, artistic, and scientific activities”. [10]   The government of Mongolia has no specific law or regulation related to indigenous peoples or ethnic minority concerns and issues. A few of Mongolia’s laws, such as labor law (Article 7(1)) and the criminal code (Article 5(1)), for example, guarantee equality among ethnic groups. As such, there is no specific branch of government designated as responsible for addressing the concerns of ethnic and indigenous peoples. However, in Article 20(3) of the 2006 parliament law, a standing committee is designated to formulate state policies on ethnic minority languages, cultures, and traditions.     Some Concerning Issues   In the early 2010s, international organizations and UN Special Rapporteur reports included the following comments and concerns. [11]   - The Special Rapporteur commended Mongolia’s efforts to protect the rights of ethnic minorities, including the right to mother tongue education, under the National Human Rights Program, and significant progress has been made in protecting the rights of ethnic minorities.   - In the framework of Mongolia’s regular reports on the implementation of international human rights instruments, the UN Treaty Organization expressed its concern regarding the following issues related to Mongolia’s ethnic minorities. [12]   - Lack of appropriate policies to address challenges for ethnic minorities to ensure their interests, including poverty, unemployment, and lack of access to education in their mother tongue;   - Compared to the national average, fewer people from Kazakh, Tuva and Tsaatan minorities have access to primary, general and higher education;   - In terms of quality, education provided to minorities is not good, as evidenced by the fact that students from ethnic minority and indigenous communities do not perform well in university entrance exams; and   - In Bayan-Ulgii aimag, discrimination still exists for minorities who seek to enter public service.   Mongolia has enshrined the Law on Education, the Law on Primary and Secondary Education, and the Law on the Mongolian Language in the Constitution to ensure and protect the rights of ethnic minorities, including the right to education and the right to mother tongue education. For example:   - Article 8(1) of the Constitution of Mongolia states that the Mongolian language is the official language of the state, and stipulates that Section 1 of this article shall not affect the right of national minorities of population to use their native languages in education and communication, and in their pursuit of cultural, artistic, and scientific activities.   - Article 5(1)(4) of the Law on Education specifies, “conditions to learn in one’s mother language shall be provided,” while Article 30(1)(12) provides that “activities shall be organized to create conditions for ethnic minorities to receive education, inherit their culture and customs, and communicate in their native languages in the school environment.”   - Article 4(1)(1) of the Law on Primary and Secondary Education states that the content of education shall be aimed at teaching students to speak their mother tongue correctly, to express their thoughts clearly, and to read and write in their mother tongue.   - Article 13(1)(4) of the Law on Mongolian Language states that “if the majority of students are ethnic minorities with a different language, learning shall be conducted in a bilingual program and the content of the bilingual program shall be approved,” while Article 13(1)(5) of the law states, “activities shall be organized to create conditions for ethnic minorities to receive education in Mongolian and their mother tongue, to inherit their culture and customs, and pursue scientific activities.”   It can be concluded that Mongolia’s inclusive education policy has shifted from a special education policy to a more inclusive education concept and policy. In other words, we as a country seek to promote inclusive education, regardless of disability status, language, or cultural differences. In this context, the government has actively been implementing reforms to meet the specific educational needs of the Kazakh and Tuva ethnic minorities and to improve access to and the quality of education since the mid-2000s.   Policies and guidelines for ensuring education for children from the Tuva and Tsaatan (Dhukha) minorities were reflected in the “Program for Supporting Reindeer Husbandry and Improving Tsaatan People’s Livelihood” approved by the government in 2007, and the 2013 Presidential Decree titled “Guiding the Government.” For example, the program provides for equal access to education for Tsaatan children and includes the following measures to prevent students from dropping out:   - To make preschool education accessible to Tsaatan people   - To ensure that Tuva language courses are included in the elementary school curriculum by adding the course into the study hours managed by schools   - To provide support for translating some textbooks and teaching materials into Tuva   - To improve educational materials and facilities   - To make sure that university tuition and dormitory fees for Tsaatan children living in the forest and taiga will be covered by the government.   In the resolution “On some measures to be taken to improve the quality of educational services for Kazakh children” approved by the government in 2010, the following actions were included:   - To establish a research unit within the Institute of Education to conduct research on preschool, primary, and secondary education for Kazakh children;   - To review the curricula and syllabi of Kazakh-language secondary schools and improve the quality of education by setting study hours for Mongolian and Kazakh language based on scientific research; and   - To take specific measures to strengthen the management and human resource capacity of educational institutions in Bayan-Ulgii aimag and to improve the Mongolian language skills of Kazakhs.   As part of the implementation of the aforementioned government policies and decisions, some progress has been made by establishing a specific unit within the Institute of Education which is tasked with performing research on education for ethnic minorities and Mongolian children abroad, and translating textbooks for primary school students into Kazakh and Tuva. For example, in most secondary schools in Bayan-Ulgii aimag, students study all subjects in their mother tongue at the primary school level, and start learning the official state language in 2nd grade or after becoming literate in their mother tongue. Primary school textbooks have been translated into Kazakh and Tuva and distributed to primary school children who are being taught in their mother tongue.   In implementing the decree issued by the president of Mongolia in 2013, a university quota was set for Tsaatan people living in Khuvsgul aimag. As a result, five children who graduated from the school in Tsagaannuur soum (county) enrolled in university in 2017. Eleven Tsaatan children studying at universities received grants from the State Education Fund.   Looking at the 2020 Population and Housing Census of Mongolia, it can be concluded that some progress has been made in education as a result of measures taken for ethnic minorities. The 2020 Population and Housing Census of Bayan-Ulgii aimag found that: [13]   - The proportion of the aimag’s population aged 10 and over that is educated is 93%, which is an increase of 7.2 percentage points from the previous census.   - The percentage of illiterate people between ages 15 and 19 in the aimag declined by 0.7 percentage points compared to the previous census.   - 70.4% of children aged 10 to 14 have a primary education, which is an increase of 17.7 percentage points from 2010.   However, the attention should be paid to the fact that the literacy and school enrollment rates of the population in Bayan-Ulgii aimag are lower than the national average, and the majority of children who drop out of school live in this province. According to data collected from 2013 to 2017 by the Research Unit of Education for Children from Ethnic Minorities and Mongolian Children Abroad of the Institute of Education under the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science, there has been no significant change in the quality of education for ethnic groups. For example, according to the data collected by the Research Unit, in the academic year 2016-2017, on average, minority students scored 59% on the Kazakh language test, 58.2% on the Tuva language test, and 38.7% on the Mongolian language test [14] .   According to a UNICEF study, the basic reading skills of Kazakh students are 14 to 17 points lower than that of Khalkh children. [15] A qualitative research study conducted by the “All for Education!” National Civil Society Coalition NGO highlighted the following concerns: [16]   a) In Mongolia, there are currently no didactic or optimal curricula that support children of ethnic minorities with different cultures and languages in learning multiple languages   b) No data specific to children from ethnic minorities and other language and cultural groups was collected to evaluate their school enrollment and academic achievements.   c) There is a lack of effort to educate bilingual and multilingual teachers and improve their teaching skills to make education accessible for ethnic minorities.    References   Ayush, Ariunzaya et al. “2020 Population and Housing Census of Mongolia.” National Statistics Office of Mongolia, 2020. https://1212.mn/BookLibraryDownload.ashx?url=Census2020_Main_report_Eng.pdf&ln=En. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. “Combined twenty-third and twenty-fourth periodic reports submitted by Mongolia under article 9 of the Convention, due in 2018.” United Nations, CERD/C/MNG/23-24, November 12, 2018. https://undocs.org/CERD/C/MNG/23-24. Data collected in 2013-2017 by the Research Unit of Education for Children from Ethnic Minorities and Mongolian Children Abroad of the Institute of Education under the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. Harris, Chauncy D., Owen Lattimore and Alan J. K. Sanders. "Mongolia." Encyclopedia Britannica, last modified November 12, 2021.https://www.britannica.com/place/Mongolia. Human Rights Council. “Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, on her mission to Mongolia (3 to 7 December 2012).” United Nations, A/HRC/23/36/Add.2, May 30, 2013.https://undocs.org/A/HRC/23/36/Add.2. Government of Mongolia. “МОНГОЛ ХЭЛНИЙ ТУХАЙ (About the Mongolian Language)”. МОНГОЛ УЛСЫН ХУУЛЬ (Law of Mongolia), Ulaanbaatar, 2015. https://legalinfo.mn/mn/detail/10932. Government of Mongolia. “Criminal Code.” . Government of Mongolia. “Law on Education.” . Government of Mongolia. “МОНГОЛ УЛСЫН ХУУЛЬ (Law on Labor of Mongolia)” (Mongolian Language). Ulaanbaatar, 2021. https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/111581/139114/F-207036758/MNG111581%20Mng.pdf. Government of Mongolia. “Law on Primary and Secondary Education.” . Government of Mongolia. “Mongolia: Aimags and Soums Green Regional Development Investment Program.” Asian Development Bank, April 2020. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents/49430/49430-005-ippf-en.pdf. Government of Mongolia. "Mongolia Second Sustainable Livelihoods Project: Indigenous Peoples Plan." World Bank. 2007.https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/311561468060540677/text/IPP207.txt. Government of Mongolia. “On some measures to be taken to improve the quality of educational services for Kazakh children.” 2010. . “Khos kheleer surgalt yavuuldag EBS-in baga angiin ekh khel bolon mongol khelnii surgltiin ur dung tandakh. Sudalgaanii tailan Bayan Ulgii aimag (2017-2018)” (Mongolian language). . “Khuni Erkhin Olon ulsiin geree ba Mongol Ulsad ogson Zovlomjiin emkhetgel (1971-2020)” (Mongolian language). NKHR, UN. 2021. . Mongolian National Human Rights Program. . Munkhchimeg, Y. et al. “Equal Education, Good Practice For Child Protection” (Mongolian language). “All for Education!” National Civil Society Coalition. 2020. . National Statistics Office of Mongolia. "Mongolia: Social Indicator Sample Survey - 2018." UNICEF. 2019. . Nyamkhuu, Tserennadmid, et al. “Mongolia Education Fact sheets 2020.” UNICEF, 2020. https://data.unicef.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/MICS-EAGLE_Education_Fact-sheets_2020_Mongolia.pdf. “Presidential Decree on Guiding the Government.” 2013. . “The Constitution of Mongolia.” The Constitutional Court of Mongolia, 1992. https://www.conscourt.gov.mn/?page_id=842&lang=en.     [1] Chauncy D. Harris, Owen Lattimore, and Alan J.K. Sanders, “Mongolia,” 2021. [2] Government of Mongolia, “Mongolia: Aimags and Soums Green Regional Development Investment Program,” Asian Development Bank, April 2020, pp. 5. [3] Ariunzaya Ayush et al., “2020 Population and Housing Census of Mongolia,” National Statistics Office of Mongolia, 2020, pp. 54. [4] Ayush et al., “2020 Population and Housing Census of Mongolia.” [5] “МОНГОЛ ХЭЛНИЙ ТУХАЙ (The Law on Mongolian Language)” (МОНГОЛ УЛСЫН ХУУЛЬ [Law of Mongolia], Ulaanbaatar, 2015), Articles 7.2, 24.2. [6] Harris et al., “Mongolia.” [7] Ayush et al., “2020 Population and Housing Census of Mongolia,” 61. [8] Ayush et al., “2020 Population and Housing Census of Mongolia,” 62. [9] “The Constitution of Mongolia,” Article 14(2). [10] “The Constitution of Mongolia,” Article 8(2). [11] Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, on her mission to Mongolia (December 3 to 7, 2012),” United Nations, A/HRC/23/36/Add.2, 2013. [12] Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, “Combined twenty-third and twenty-fourth periodic reports submitted by Mongolia under article 9 of the Convention, due in 2018.” United Nations, CERD/C/MNG/23-24, 2018. [13] Ayush et al., “2020 Population and Housing Census of Mongolia.” [14] Research Unit of Education for Children from Ethnic Minorities and Mongolian Children Abroad. Data collected in 2013-2017. Institute of Education under the Mongolian Ministry of Education, Culture and Science – Institute of Education. (in Mongolian) [15] Tserennadmid Nyamkhuu et al., “Mongolia Education Fact sheets 2020,” UNICEF, 2020. [16] Y. Munkhchimeg et al., “Equal Education, Good Practice for Child Protection,” ‘All for Education!’ National Civil Society Coalition, 2020. (in Mongolian)     ■ Ukhnaa Tuya is a member of the Academy of Political Education, Ulaanbaatar. ■ Damba Ganbat is the Chairman of Board at the Academy of Political Education, Ulaanbaatar.     ■ Typeset by Jinkyung Baek Director of the Research Department∙Senior Researcher     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Ukhnaa Tuya 2022-06-28조회 : 9742
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[EAI 온라인 세미나] "아시아 7개국의 직접ㆍ숙의ㆍ참여 민주주의를 탐색하다"

동아시아연구원(원장 손열)은 아시아민주주의연구네트워크(ADRN)의 사무국으로서 열다섯 번째 [민주주의 협력] 온라인 세미나 시리즈 "아시아 7개국의 직접•숙의•참여 민주주의를 탐색하다"를 개최하였습니다.   아시아 민주국가들은 간접 민주주의 정치 체제에 직접 민주주의적 요소를 도입함으로써 굿 거버넌스 확립을 위해 노력하고 있습니다. 국가별 역사적 맥락에 따라 갖은 시행착오가 잇따르지만 온오프라인 채널을 가리지 않고 직접 및 숙의, 참여 민주주의 증진 방안을 내놓고 있습니다.   이번 온라인 세미나에서는 ADRN의 필리핀과 인도, 인도네시아, 말레이시아, 태국, 몽골, 스리랑카 멤버 기관이 한 자리에 모여 직접 민주주의 트렌드를 탐색하고 진단하며 보다 나은 민주 거버넌스 확립을 위한 방안을 논의하였습니다.   본 세미나는 ADRN “아시아 내 직접 민주주의 트렌드 동향(Ups and Downs of Direct Democracy Trends in Asia)” 연구의 일환으로 진행되었습니다. 일시: 2022년 6월 23일 (목요일) 16:00 – 17:30 (한국 시간) 패널:    모하메드 아셈(Mohamed Aaseem), 베리테리서치(Verite Research) 애널리스트    덜기엉 알다(Dolgion Aldar), 몽골독립연구소(Independent Research Institute of Mongolia) 컨설턴트 및 대표    커스터브 K. 반디오파드헤이(Kaustuv K. Bandyopadhyay), 아시아참여연구(Participatory Research in Asia) 국장    타윌와디 부리쿨(Thawilwadee Bureekul), 프라차티폭왕립학원(King Prajadhipok’s Institute) 연구개발실장    할미 아즈리 압둘 할림(Halmie Azrie Abdul Halim), 말레이시아 싱크탱크 민주경제연구소(Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs) 연구원    프란시스코 A. 마그노(Francisco A. Magno), 제스 (Senior Fellow, Institute of Governance at De La Salle University)                                                                                           스리 누리얀티(Sri Nuryanti), 인도네시아국립연구혁신센터(Indonesian National Research and Innovation Agency) 연구원     I. Overview   Democratic countries in Asia are incorporating concepts and mechanisms of direct democracy into their political system, but many still face difficulties in implementing good governance. In order to examine the diverse backgrounds and ongoing trends of direct democracy within Asia, the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) hosted an ADRN online seminar, inviting scholars from seven Asian countries to speak about their country’s direct democracy trends.   II. Case Studies: Philippines, Mongolia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, India   Philippines   “Even though there are mechanisms for direct democracy […], the clear challenge is the persistence of political dynasties…and the continuity of authoritarian populism in the country”   Direct democracy in the Philippines is anchored in its constitution. Article 13 of Section 16 of the constitution emphasizes the right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making.   At the center of Philippine direct democracy is a system of initiatives and referendums. For example, a 2019 referendum sought public approval of the Bangsamoro Organic Law and the creation of a new province. Another example is recall elections. There have been instances when a petition made by a certain percentage of voters in a province or local jurisdiction resulted in out-of-cycle recall elections for local mayors.   Local government code also encourages the development of policies for public participation. For example, several local governments have created a local people`s council, adding an additional layer of direct governance to the already-mandated local development councils. People’s councils can observe, vote on, and participate in city government project activities and programs. The people’s council can also designate representatives to all city council committees and suggest and vote on proposed legislation.   A new development in Philippine direct democracy is the use of digital democracy. Mayor Vico Sotto of the city of Pasig is known to actively use digital platforms to gauge public opinion on and get approval for certain policies. For example, new rules on speed limits in Pasig were proposed through online platforms, in what Magno likens to a local online referendum.   Participatory budgeting practices also help to boost accountability. Several mechanisms have been introduced over the past six or seven years (e.g. the Budget Partnership Agreements) to encourage bottom-up budgeting and citizen participatory audits. Village-level residents are also asked to identify budget priorities through a series of workshop assemblies; these priorities are incorporated into the budget of higher levels of government, including national development plans.   Direct democracy requires a combination of government enabling mechanisms and civil society demands. Enabling factors within the Philippines include its democratic political culture after the replacement of authoritarianism in the 1980s; rules and legislation, including local government code and the Philippine constitution; the right to information in the executive branch, the pursuit of open data for citizens, and access to reliable public documents; and ongoing capacity building for government agencies based on public participation.   The Seal of Good Local Governance (SGLG) is a law that provides incentives for participatory governance, aiming to ensure transparency, participation, and accountability across all government functions. The Department of the Interior and local governments are now also providing data ongoing infrastructure project, allowing people to monitor the progress of projects online and provide feedback.   On the demand side of direct democracy, one factor is the availability and accessibility of independent media that enables citizens to discuss public issues. For example, a corruption scandal in which government funds were being funneled to fake NGOs was exposed by the Philippine Daily Inquirer, an independent media organization. This prompted an online petition for the government’s anti-graft agency to probe the 10 billion peso scam, and hundreds of thousands to protest.   Moving forward, Magno recommends passing the Freedom of Information Law, legislating participatory budget mechanisms at national and sub-national levels, integrating citizen participation in civic education, promoting open data and conducting analytics for better government planning, and building a database on citizen participation to aid policy reform efforts. He calls for new mechanisms to make the government’s Full Disclosure Policy (FDP) fully operational, incorporating local knowledge stakeholders to create platforms that better bridge government data and policy advocacy. The persistence of political dynasties, which have been successful in representative democracy elections, and the rise of authoritarian populism in the country.   Mongolia   “Mongolia has the key mechanisms allowing for direct democracy…, but the general observation is these laws are not implemented in practice”   There is very limited space for direct democracy in Mongolia, especially as traditionally defined—people voting directly about the issues that interest them. However, using a broader interpretation and examining whether mechanisms exist for citizen participation, there has been progress on the direct democratic front.   Like many other countries in Asia, Mongolia was ruled by an authoritarian regime for 70 years, transitioning out in the 1990s. In that sense, there has been a great deal of democratic progress. Though Mongolia has yet to hold a national referendum and there is not broader national scale participation, key mechanisms exist to allow public participation in various stages of governance, such as planning, budgeting, and monitoring. 2011 legislation established the right to information and transparency, and there are several mechanisms allowing public hearings, petitions, and complaints, as well as mandating the government to respond to these complaints. 2017 legislation introduced deliberative polling.   The first democratic constitution of 1992 set the foundation for direct democracy, recognizing that the people of Mongolia shall directly participate in state affairs. The role of the public evolved further with the Law on Referendum (1995) and a surge of laws in the 2010s which allowed and expanded the role of public participation in governance. However, these laws and mechanisms have not been fully implemented in practice, or are obstructed by other, contradictory laws.   Over the last two decades, the trend has been toward digital transformation and incorporating technology in the state-citizen relationship. This year, the Parliament of Mongolia released a “Digital Parliament” application, and there is a committee dedicated to digitalizing government services. But whether this digital transformation has contributed to people directly voting or indirectly changing policy is unclear. So far, its primary role has been to amplify state-to-citizen communication, and less so the reverse. The hope is for this digital transformation to provide actual decision-making empowerment for the public.   There have been some concerning setbacks for Mongolian direct democracy over the last decade. For example, laws on state secrets significantly restrict the right to information by allowing the government to classify any type of information as a secret. The current parliament also does not have a dedicated standing committee on petitions and complaints, as the existing committee was dissolved and replaced by the digital parliament application. But given the lack of widespread digital access and Mongolia’s “digital divide,” many citizens are unaware that such an application exists.   Mongolia also lacks proponents of direct democracy. In discussions on promoting democracy, few are saying that people need to directly vote and make decisions about key issues. Instead, Mongolian discussion of democracy focuses on representative democracy; there are many ongoing efforts to introduce another constitutional amendment to change the electoral system and fix the parliamentary system.   There are several popular claims against direct democracy. The first is the nationalist objection, which argues that proponents of democracy, especially direct democracy, are “pro-American liberals” who don’t understand the Mongolian culture and context, leading to pushback against democratic movements. Second, as Mongolia is situated between Russia and China, some have voiced the opinion that talking too much about freedom and freedom issues poses a national security concern. In a similar vein, some argue that civil society organizations (CSOs) should be restricted and regulated by the state. Some believe that democracy begets inequality, and will not contribute to the public’s quality of life. Others argue that Mongolia needs to dedicate its energy to developing a long-term vision for prosperity, rather than wasting time making decisions and getting caught up in discussions of accountability. Finally, a popular belief is that the masses are uneducated, and to have them at the helm of the decision-making process is dangerous.   Indonesia   “Direct democratic practice has successfully [allowed] Indonesia to be resilient [to] democratic setbacks”   Indonesia, as a democratic country, has laws that regulate the working implementation of democracy. One such laws stipulates that Indonesia acknowledges the practice of direct democracy. The most prominent forms of direct democracy today in Indonesia are referendums and elections.   Indonesia has implemented direct democracy in the form of referendums; notable examples are the referendum to amend the 1945 Constitution, and the referendum held by the East Timor province to vote on their affiliation to Indonesia. There are two referendum types. Typically, a referendum committee provides a simple question for citizens to directly answer. There are also popular referendums, however, in which citizens make a petition that calls a popular vote over existing legislation. A special committee for hosting referendums determines the timeframe and required signatures for a valid petition (for example, petitions may require signatures from diverse communities to protect minority interests). This form of direct democracy effectively grants the public the option to veto laws adopted by the elected legislature.   The referendum to amend the 1945 Constitution was crucial because the Constitution had never been changed; a 1985 presidential decree had stated such an amendment would only be allowed through a referendum in which 90% of those voting supported the initiative, and the amendment did in fact pass.   Second, in the 1999 referendum held in East Timor, the people of East Timor were asked whether they would like to remain affiliated with Indonesia or become independent. The area had been annexed—forcibly incorporated—into Indonesia in 1975 under the Suharto presidency. Demands were made by European and ASEAN countries for Indonesia to carry out political reforms, and the referendum came as a consequence of UN resolutions calling for the right to self-determination. Out of a total of 438,968 valid votes, 344,580 (78.5%) were pro-independence, while 94,388 (21.5%) supported remaining with Indonesia. Voter participation was very high—98.6% of all registered voters participated in the referendum. The results of the referendum led to the official separation of East Timor from Indonesia.   Though Indonesia used to have indirect elections, direct elections began in 2005. Indonesia directly elects its executives: the President and Vice President, governors, mayors, regents, village heads, and national and local representatives.   Various literature studies have revealed the advantages of direct democracy, but Indonesia’s democratic transition has shown the pathway to consolidation by merging direct elections for president and vice president with those for local governors and regents. The strengthening of direct democratic practices has allowed democratic institutions to ensure the proper functioning of civil society organizations and allowed other interest groups to engage in policy decision-making. Direct democratic practices have allowed Indonesia to remain resilient to democratic setbacks, though it is still necessary to push back against rising populism being used in popular votes to expand power.   Malaysia   “The age of government-knows-all has basically ended”   Malaysia has had a tumultuous relationship with democracy, moving between three different governments within the span of two to three years. Malaysia’s first democratic transition occurred in 2018, shifting the federal government after 60 years under the former ruling coalition (known as the National Front). Unfortunately, the new government did not last long, only managing to stay in power for about a year and a half due to ideological splits and members of the party changing their party affiliation. The Sheraton Move—the political move carried out by the existing government in which the ruling coalition broke up—notably led to a political and constitutional crisis just before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. The general election had been invalidated by the politicians themselves, leading to frustration among the voters as, after only one and a half years, a new government rose to power that was, in essence, a coalition of the losers of the previous general election.   As voters become more disillusioned and mistrust towards institutions arose, Malaysia underwent periods of uncertainty in terms of leadership. Seated in this context, conversations have arisen about opportunities to explore other forms of democracy, namely direct/participatory democracy, amongst members of civil society. There is also a need for less state intervention and greater empowerment of CSOs (civil society organizations); whereas Malaysia has historically been a top-down country, movements on the ground are now talking about a bottom-up approach.   The three governments that have held power in Malaysia since 2018 are known as the National Front (Barisan Nasional, or BN), the Pact of Hope (Pakatan Harapan, or PH), and the National Alliance (Perikatan Nasional, or PN). The National Front is the former, long-ruling coalition that stayed in power for six decades. The Pact of Hope government, a coalition based on progressive opposition politics, won the 2018 general elections but was short-lived. Finally, the National Alliance is a coalition comprised of the losers of the previous general election and splinter parties who deserted the previous ruling coalitions. The ambiguous self-collapse of the Pact of Hope movement and the undemocratic rise of the National Alliance have led to a fragile, minority government. Though the government has been forced to sign a memorandum of understanding between the National Alliance and the opposition bloc committing the current government to reform, the memorandum has also faced backlash from supporters of both parties due to the failure to consult the public during its creation.   Malaysia has historically practiced a representative/indirect model of democracy in combination with a constitutional monarchy, borrowing from the Westminster Model (an inheritance from the British colonization period). The monarch and royal families also have an internal consultative mechanism. Therefore, Malaysia has a very complex power structures and diverse social makeup. However, the discussion on democracy coming down to the ground level has been very limited, as—of the three branches of government—only the lower house of the Parliament is elected. The remaining positions are filled by appointment. in terms of politics in Malaysia.   Some political science dialogue in Malaysia centers around clientelism and patronage. In Malaysia, members of parliament (MPs) or potential candidates often engage with the public/the local level for political gain by providing citizens with “goodies” or aid and basic necessities to garner votes.   Malaysia, being situated in the center of Southeast Asia, is highly in touch with its surroundings, especially in terms of democracy. Democratic development in Indonesia and the Philippines in particular affect Malaysia, while larger superpowers like China and India—who are also facing challenges in terms of their democratic models—affect Malaysia indirectly as new generations become open to conversations about leadership decisions. In Malaysia, modern discussions of direct democracy are far more advanced than twenty or thirty years ago; whereas earlier generations preferred to pass policy and leadership decisions over to elites and community leaders, younger generations are much more aware and participatory. Technology has also been a major factor in encouraging Malaysian democracy.   Challenges to transitioning to a direct democracy model in Malaysia include getting buy-in from a large portion of rural and semi-urban constituencies—these communities have greater difficulty accessing information and building democratic awareness and tend to prioritize “bread and butter” survival issues, preferring to delegate policymaking and international issues to politicians and local parties. Malaysia also has three rampant, ongoing challenges making discussions about democracy slightly more problematic: race, religion, and corruption. Additionally, the labels ascribed to democracy by conservatives—namely, that democracy, liberty, and human rights are foreign, Western agendas that should be rejected—and the conservative narrative that democracy is a threat to the “social contract” create added difficulty. Finally, though most Malaysians accept that peace and freedom are benefits of democracy and part of the democratic process, there is less focus on principles like good governance and justice. Thus, democratic education needs to be encouraged and advanced, which will take time.   Those who are pro-democracy and support elements of direct democracy in Malaysia often belong to four key groups—those in urban centers, those with a background in activism, those with exposure to multiculturalism, and those belonging to the younger age bracket. People not belonging to these groups tend to want to maintain the status quo, passing policymaking and discussion responsibilities to representatives in lieu of direct involvement. That said, due to social media, there has been growth of civil society organizations supporting deliberation and dissent in public spaces; people are talking about democracy in a robust manner on digital platforms. Malaysia’s volunteer culture is growing. And the current minority government, because it is so weak, has been forced to consult and hold town halls with NGOs; this is an acknowledgement of the societal role of NGOs and CSOs. After the 14th general election, the age of government-knows-all has come to an end; this has been a long process, beginning in 2008 with concerted opposition efforts to create public awareness. These days, rather than bulldozing policies, governments consider opinions from CSOs and community leaders; in many ways, the decision-making process is much more inclusive.   In terms of ongoing efforts in Malaysia, the Better Malaysia Assembly (BMA) is experimenting with a citizen’s assembly similar to that of Ireland and Switzerland; it will be carrying out a pilot project in the state of Johor this coming August. Online petitions (such as change.org) have been very popular, and one CSO (BERSIH – the Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections) is working on recall elections. As for open budget transparency, there are initiatives to invite the public to participate in monitoring state budgets.   Finally, there are a few emerging trends in Malaysia. More parties are being created, and there is talk of decentralization. With regards to political literacy, young groups are engaging in efforts to organize a digital parliament. In conclusion, the current government in Malaysia is a weak majority, and the opposition is in disarray. Though this is an opportunity for public involvement by CSOs, the potential for the return of corruption and previous governments (who are more familiar among voters) poses a threat to democracy.     Sri Lanka   “Although Sri Lanka […] allows citizens to directly engage with Parliament, the successful implementation of all of said instruments is contingent on effective implementation and follow-up by parliamentarians”   Democratic government typically takes two forms—direct, in which individual people participate in decision-making, and representative, in which elected representatives formulate policy. The instruments of direct democracy can be divided into formal instruments—like referendums and voter recalls—and alternative instruments, which also allow for citizen involvement but have not traditionally been seen as instruments of direct democracy.   Instruments of direct democracy exist and are relevant within the Sri Lankan context. When Sri Lanka gained its independence in 1948, the Solbury Constitution was already in effect, having been instated in 1944; the government accordingly had a Westminster parliamentary structure. In 1972, the first Republican Constitution came into effect, and was then replaced in 1978 by the second Republican Constitution. Throughout these three systems of governance, the sole formal instrument of direct democracy was the referendum, which was only introduced in the 1978 constitution. However, within the Westminster parliamentary structure, there were instruments that allowed citizens to directly engage in government, namely: private members’ mills, public petitions, and parliamentary questions. Like the referendum, these instruments have direct democratic features.   A referendum, in which people can directly vote on a law or a proposal, is allowed in three cases under the Sri Lankan constitution: if a constitutional amendment proposes changes to entrenched articles in the constitution, or the Supreme Court determines a proposed bill is inconsistent with entrenched articles in the Constitution, it must go to a referendum. Finally, the president can put forward a referendum for citizens’ approval for any matter of public importance. Sri Lanka has only ever held one referendum (in 1982). The Sri Lankan referendum framework has two critical shortcomings that undermine its efficacy as an instrument of deliberative democracy: first, it can only be called by the president, meaning that there is no means for the people to mandate a referendum. Second, it is limited to approving bills and measures that are at the parliamentary level or of national importance; as such, there is no application for local-level measures, preventing communities from directly participating in matters that will affect their day-to-day lives.   Private members’ bills, public petitions, and parliamentary questions enable citizens or groups of citizens to advocate for a parliamentarian’s support; the member can then sponsor the bill, submit the petition to the public petition committee, or submit a question to the government on the citizens’ behalf. However, research has found that over the last 5-6 years, these mechanisms have been inadequately and ineffectively used for direct engagement with the government. Of the 209 private members’ bills presented in Parliament, only 12 were matters of public interest; private members’ bills have predominantly been used to regulate incorporated bodies rather than for direct democratic engagement. 2,401 public petitions were submitted to the Committee by 181 out of 225 parliamentary members, but approximately half of those petitions were submitted by just 10 parliamentarians. Similarly, 2372 questions were raised by parliamentarians, but 56% were raised by just 10 members. These instruments are being used neither extensively, uniformly, nor effectively by Sri Lankan citizens.   There are three key challenges to using these instruments for direct democratic purposes. First, there are not mechanisms to trigger mandatory action by parliamentarians—instruments are only presented to parliament at the will of the member of parliament the citizens have approached. This is a problem similar to that of referendums, where the power to trigger a referendum rests solely with the President and excludes local issues. Second, accountability mechanisms are insufficient; for example, there is no way to track the status of a submitted petition, and no mandate for parliamentarians to regularly report their progress. Parliamentarians can therefore exercise discretion without sufficient checks, undermining the ability of citizens to fully make use of these instruments. Finally, there are systemic and structural issues inhibiting citizens’ access to mechanisms for direct engagement, including lack of women’s representation and inaccessibility of committee and subcommittee proceedings.   Aaseem provides three suggestions for areas for improvement. First, expanding the scope of the referendum: in Sri Lanka, referendums currently can only be called by the president—this could be resolved by adopting a system similar to Switzerland, in which citizens can trigger the introduction of a referendum upon endorsement/signatures from a sufficient portion of the constituency. He also suggests exploring introducing a referendum mechanism for resolving legislative and policy issues at the local level. Suggestions for areas of improvement. Second, the existing formal mechanisms of direct engagement currently have no threshold or trigger point at which they are mandatory for a member of Parliament to implement; he suggests introducing procedures that trigger automatic implementation of formal instruments under specific circumstances, such as a particular number of citizen signatures. Finally, he suggests introducing mechanisms to increase public representatives’ accountability. Though Sri Lanka currently recognizes these formal instruments, successfully using them depends on effective implementation and follow-up by parliamentarians. Aaseem proposes that Sri Lanka explore the systems to monitor how these formal instruments are being used, as well as to raise awareness of the utility of these instruments among the general public.   Thailand   “Referendums have become a political mechanism and no longer reflect the will of the public, […] and recalls seem to be impossible.”   Though Thailand’s Direct Democracy Practice Potential (DDPP) score is quite low, the country’s communication technology revolution spells out interesting possibilities for the future of direct democracy; direct democracy, in combination with technology, may provide unique opportunities for policymakers to acquire deep information from the public that experts cannot provide.   Thailand transitioned from absolute monarchy to constitutional (democratic) monarchy in 1932, but has since undergone thirteen military coups d’état, most recently in 2014. Prior to 1997, several versions of the Constitution allowed referendums for constitutional amendments. The Constitution of 1997, however, marked the beginning of direct democracy in Thailand by establishing an impeachment process and increasing allowances for citizen’s participation through the introduction of legislative initiatives and the addition of referendums for laws—in addition to the previously allowed constitutional amendments—affecting national interests.   There are now four primary mechanisms through which Thai citizens can participate in direct democracy: referendums, recalls, legislative initiatives, and unconventional political participation. Two referendums have been held in Thailand, each with greater than 50% voter turnout and each demonstrating political cleavage between the North/Northeast region and the rest of the country. The first approved the 2007 draft Constitution, and the second approved the 2016 draft Constitution and allowed senators to be included in the vote for Prime Minister. This decision has had a notable effect on Thai politics by forcing representatives in the Lower House to collaborate with the Senate in order to effectively support a Prime Ministerial candidate, a possibility which is more readily accessible to the pro-military party.   Legislative initiatives strengthen direct democracy by providing another mechanism for citizens to exercise their rights. The Constitution of 1997 allowed 50,000 eligible voters to propose laws related to public policy and the rights and liberty of the people. This number was reduced to 10,000 in 2007. Most recently, the 2021 Initiative Process Act has made it easier for citizens to submit legislation by allowing social media to be used for proposing bills virtually to Parliament. However, though citizens have submitted more than 100 bills to date, only a small fraction of them have been enacted into law. In addition to having to pass through Parliament, any bills that require use of the government budget must be approved by the Prime Minister; this requirement has brought many proposed initiatives to a halt.   Thailand has had two recalls—one of a member of the Human Rights Commission (unsuccessful), and one of the Prime Minister (recalled by the National Legislative Assembly). Political movements have also conducted informal recalls as petitions on change.org, which function as a signal to the Thai government. Finally, unconventional political participation (such as participating in demonstrations, protests, and marches) provides another means for Thai citizens to participate in direct democracy, and Thai law supports the right to demonstrate. However, only ~5% of people engage with democracy in this way.   Bureekul highlights a few key problems with Thailand’s existing direct democratic instruments. Referendums, she posits, have now become a political mechanism, and no longer reflect the will of the public. As for legal initiatives, though many bills are proposed, few pass through Parliament because of the Prime Ministerial endorsement requirement for budget-related bills, and the number of people required to support a bill is too high. Furthermore, people are limited by the amount of time they can dedicate to supporting their initiative. However, civil society helps strengthen Thai direct democracy by supporting law initiatives. Democratic action through change.org is popular and functions as an effective signaling mechanism for important issues, but it is not legal. Similarly, the role of unconventional political participation in Thai society is growing, but participating citizens risk violating the law.   As for positive trends in Thailand’s democratic development, there is already considerable public awareness of the lawmaking process. The use of technology—such as social media—not only for democratic education, but as a means in which to participate in direct democracy, will increase the importance of these direct democratic mechanisms. ■   III. Speakers and Moderators Biographies   ■ Mohomed Aaseem graduated with a degree in Industrial Statistics and Mathematical Finance from the University of Colombo and has a Master’s in Development Practice from the University of Peradeniya. Aaseem has worked on a range of assignments covering electoral reform, parliamentary monitoring, transitional justice, ethnic violence and peace-building He also manages databases and provides support in data analysis for Manthri.lk and other web-based platforms at Verité. He is fluent in English, Sinhala and Tamil, and has extensive experience in working with Northern, Eastern and hill country communities.   ■ Dolgion Aldar is a research professional focused on promoting evidence-based policy making in Mongolia. She spent five years as CEO of the Independent Research Institute of Mongolia (IRIM), one of the first organizations to promote independent and third-party research in the country. Under her leadership, IRIM was awarded the Anti-Corruption Agency’s National Annual Award in 2014 and was recognized as Mongolia’s leading non-government policy research institute in 2015. She was featured in the Forbes Mongolia “Class of 2016: 30 under 30,” an annual list of the brightest young leaders and change agents in country. She currently serves as a board member of the Asia-Pacific Evaluation Association and is a member of the Social Well-Being Consortium in Asia and the EvalGender global network. Dolgion holds a master’s degree in Political Science from the University of Manchester, and both a master’s and a bachelor’s degree in Sociology from the National University of Mongolia.   ■ Kaustuv K. Bandyopadhyay is the director of Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), a pioneer CSO, who has dedicated more than three decades to work on participation, democratic governance, and civil society development. He has twenty-five years of professional experience working with universities, research institutions, and CSOs. He serves on the Steering Committee of the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) and the Asia Democracy Network (ADN). He holds a Ph.D. degree in anthropology for his work with the Parhaiya tribes of Chotanagpur in India.   ■ Thawilwadee Bureekul is the director of the Research and Development Office at King Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI) where she is involved in the planning, management, implementation, and coordination of the Institute’s research projects. In addition to her role at KPI, Dr. Bureekul is a professor at several universities in Thailand, including the Asian Institute of Technology, Thammasat University, Burapha University, Mahidol University, and Silpakorn University. She succeeded in proposing “Gender Responsive Budgeting” in the Thai Constitution and she was granted the “Woman of the Year 2018” award, and received the outstanding award on “Rights Projection and Strengthening Gender Equality” in the Year 2022 as a result.   ■ Halmie Azrie Abdul Halim is a researcher for Democracy and Governance at the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS), a well-known and independent think-tank based in Kuala Lumpur. He was a student activist with the National Union of Malaysian Muslim Students (PKPIM) for over fourteen years, and got familiarized to public policy affairs during his internship at IMAN Research. He holds a Bachelor of Arts (Hons) in International Relations from Staffordshire University, UK. He has posited his thoughts on domestic political trends at various online portals, and represented Malaysia for several international youth conferences in Turkey, Thailand and Germany.   ■ Francisco A. Magno teaches Political Science and Development Studies at De La Salle University (DLSU). He is the Founding Director of the DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance. He served as the President of the Philippine Political Science Association from 2015 to 2017. He finished his PhD in Political Science at the University of Hawaii.   ■ Sri Nuryanti is currently a senior researcher of the research Center for Politics, National Research and Innovation Agency. She is the former Election Commissioner of the Indonesian General Election Commission 2007-2012, where she successfully oversaw the Parliamentary election and Presidential election 2009, as well as local elections from 2007-2012. She is an active participant in various academic activities at the national as well as the international level. She is a council member of APPRA (Asia Pacific Peace Research Association) and IPRA (International Peace Research Association). Dr. Sri Nuryanti can be contacted by email at [email protected]

2022-06-27조회 : 10962
워킹페이퍼
[ADRN Working Paper] The Protection of Dalit Rights in Nepal: Status and Way Forward

Background   Nepali society interacts through a caste-based ideology, system, and structure. However, the discrimination, indignities, and inequalities bred by the caste system get swept under the carpet or shushed by those in power—the dominant caste groups. The caste-based hierarchy excludes the lower caste categories from equal and inclusive representation and access to decision making and justice, and has jeopardized their lives by exploiting their human rights, labor, and skills.   These caste inequalities have infiltrated all aspects of citizenry and state and have further marginalized the already excluded, particularly women, Dalits, indigenous populations, and different gender identities, who have yet to find true meaningful representation and participation in democracy and nation-building. The barriers associated with ethnicity, culture, religion, vernacular, and geographical diversity add an additional layer to the already existing discrimination.   Nepal’s marginalized and excluded communities have long resisted the supremacy of Brahmanical patriarchy and demanded equitable access to resources, allocations, and mobilization. Dalit resistance continues to stand against the unforgiving and unremitting caste-based discrimination to this day. However, the state and the dominant power groups have long neglected them, their voices, and their resistance, forcing them to the margins of society in exclusion. And yet, it is always and only the Dalits at the forefront of the resistance despite the fact that the caste inequalities have in one way or another persecuted every other caste.   Who are the Dalits?   The National Dalits Commission defines “Dalits” as "those communities who, by virtue of atrocities of caste-based discrimination and untouchability, are most backward in social, economic, educational, political, and religious fields, and deprived of human dignity and social justice." The worldwide total population of Dalits is estimated at 36 million, and according to the 2011 census, the Dalits in Nepal comprise 13.6% of the total population, with seven Hill Dalit castes and 19 Madhesi Dalit castes. Of them, 51% are women. Dalits are one of the most marginalized communities of Nepal. Along with less access to resources, they have food insecurity, sustain themselves on daily wages, and have less access to rights and the justice system.   In the specific context of the Dalits, poverty walks hand-in-hand with the practice of untouchability, affecting access to work and meaningful income possibilities. Caste-based discrimination and untouchability (CBDU) continue to be deeply entrenched in Nepalese society. As a consequence of the system based on casteism in many parts of the country, Dalits are still subjected to the worst forms of discrimination. They are subjected to endless humiliation and injustices in their social, cultural, economic, administrative, and political lives; assaulted, raped, and murdered; and denied access to places of worship, common water sources, education, and dignified jobs. The impact of poverty on civil and political rights, as well as on economic, social and cultural rights such as the rights to health, housing, food, education, and social security.   The longstanding discrimination and deprivation of economic benefits by the state and society has left the Dalit community economically backward. The Dalit community is the second lowest in terms of Human Development Index (HDI) ranking, just above the Muslim community in Nepal. Although Dalits work in traditional occupations, a large portion of Dalits have day-to-day problems, contributing to an inadequate standard of living. The Dalit community always struggles with food scarcity. The daily wages they earn are not adequate to cover their nutrition needs.   According to the 2011 Census, there are 1.8 million Dalit women in Nepal, making up 13% of the total female population of the country. Dalit women’s lives are uniquely characterized by exclusion through customary provisions of caste institutions based on the notion of purity and pollution as well as patriarchy and gender discrimination. As a result of such exclusion and discrimination, they endure extreme forms of poverty, humiliation, and denial of social and economic rights and recognition as human beings. Dalit women, like other women from minority communities or indigenous peoples, Madhesi, and Muslims: they tend to remain invisible.   Although Dalit women constitute half of the Dalit population, they face intersectional three-fold discrimination: class, sex, and caste. Dalit women in Nepal continue to endure discrimination in many areas including education, health, employment, and access to economic resources. They are discriminated against not only by dominant castes, but also within their own communities, where men are dominant. Traditional harmful practices against Dalit women include extreme verbal abuse and sexual epithets, physical assault, and rape. Impunity for perpetrators is rampant due to weak legal mechanisms. Dalit women still face hardships regarding property rights and do not enjoy ownership of property on equal footing with Dalit men. Child marriage, early pregnancy, and uterus prolapse are just some of the conditions that have worsened the health conditions of Dalit women, mostly the Madheshi Dalit women.   Status of Protection of Dalit Rights in Nepal: An Overview   Status in Education   According to the 2011 Census, the average literacy rate in Nepal is 65.97%, with 75.21% of men and 57.53% of women being literate. The literacy rate for Dalits aged 6 years and above is 52.4% compared to the national average of 65.9%, while the literacy rate for Tarai/Madhesi Dalits is just 34.5%. Women from all Dalit groups have lower literacy rates compared to the national average and their male counterparts. The literacy rates of Dalit women are 45.5% overall, with women from the Musahar and Dom community at the bottom, with literacy rates of 17.4% and 17.9%, respectively.   Children from Dalit communities face discrimination at school from their teachers and peers. Due to the prejudiced mindset, teachers provide less care for Dalit children, who are not permitted to drink water, are addressed in a rude manner, and are placed in separate lines, seats, and so on. Ultimately, these students fall behind in their learning achievements, often dropping out. In turn, low educational attainments have a multifaceted impact on the socio-economic and political life of Dalits, and become a barrier to human development. The isolation and segregation of Dalit students are apparent. Teachers in Nepalese schools are largely upper caste males who have not internalized the value of caste and gender equality. Dalits are discouraged from becoming teachers and occupying higher executive positions in schools because the non-Dalit community does not want to pay respect to a Dalit.   Status of Life Expectancy   Dalits fall behind in all major health indicators. For example, the under-five mortality rate among Dalits is 90 deaths per 1,000 live births, compared with the country level of 68. Nepal has immunization coverage of 83%, whereas immunization rates for Dalits are 13 points below the average. In 2011, around 31% of children under five had a low weight-for-age ratio. Disaggregated results across ethnic and caste groups depict that the proportion of underweight children is highest among Madhesi Dalits (36.3%) and Hill Dalits (33.9%), with the exception of Madhesi caste groups (41.2%). This clearly indicates that there are problems with access to nutritious food for Dalit groups among others. Many Dalit women in rural areas suffer from uterus prolapse, and their morbidity rates are high. Child marriage, early pregnancy, and reproductive health issues are other problems faced by Dalit women.   Status of Poverty   Dalits comprise the poorest community in Nepal in terms of all poverty measures—income, consumption and human development. Discrimination is the single most important factor explaining why the Dalit are disproportionately affected by poverty. Around 42% of Dalits live below the poverty line (43.6% of Hill Dalits and 38.2% of Terai Dalits), whereas the national poverty rate is 25.2%. While the immediate causes of this gap are limited employment opportunities due to occupation specialization preventing Dalits from accessing well-paid jobs, as well as lack of access to (quality) education and land that perpetuates poverty from one generation of Dalits to the next, the persistence of social discrimination is the overarching factor explaining this situation.   Land is the main asset for determining an individual’s social status and standard of living in Nepali society. The land holdings of the Dalit community are small, and landlessness among Dalits is extreme, with 36.7% of Hill and 41.4% of Madhesi Dalits being landless. Landlessness makes Dalits economically vulnerable and dependent on landlords. Most Dalits are agricultural and occupational laborers and are generally landless. This makes them vulnerable to violence and discrimination. The Constitution guarantees provision of lands and housing for landless Dalits according to the law. However, the amended law on land distribution is overly complex, imposing many conditions on land acquisition. Similarly, Dalits can obtain housing, but under complex conditions. The root causes of Haliya, Balighare/Khalo, Charuwa, Haruwa, etc. systems are associated with the issues of landlessness and small holdings.   Status of Atrocities against Dalits   In Nepal, Dalits are regarded as a group of people who don’t have any sort of human rights, let alone access to justice or a voice. Nabaraj BK and five of his friends were killed in Rukum West on May 23, 2020. On the very same day, the body of a 13-year-old child, Angira Pasi, was found hanging from a tree in Rupandehi after she was reportedly raped and murdered.   In 2016, Ajit Mijar was murdered for marrying a girl from a so-called upper caste. His body still lies cold at TU Teaching Hospital, waiting for justice. These tragic outbursts of violence resulting from inter-caste marriages suggest that, while the mainstream narrative highlights social cohesion and harmony, resistance by dominant groups is strong when historical hierarchies are questioned. Although untouchability was declared illegal more than a decade ago with the adoption of the Caste-Based Discrimination and Untouchability (Offence and Punishment) Act, 2011, caste-based discrimination persists across the country, with lingering prejudices continuing to cause significant violence within Nepali society.   A social science teacher murdered Laxmi Pariyar. Even elected representatives are not safe— Mana Sarki, a ward representative, was beaten to death in her home in 2018. The custodial deaths of Roshan Bishwakarma, Shambhu Sada, and Bijay Ram Chamar are but the reflection of statelessness and oppression of the vulnerable by the dominant so-called upper caste and elites. Over and over again, history continues to repeat itself.   These are just few representative stories of Dalits, who are systemically marginalized and persecuted every day through the contemporary caste hierarchy, the tragic outcome of a centuries-old caste system. And yet, many more stories remain unreported and untold.   The Pandemic, Dalits, and Democracy   The COVID-19 pandemic deepened the layers of discrimination and hardships for Dalits. With lockdown in affect, their means of earning wages were put on hold, resulting in no income and no access to remedial services. To support citizen from low-income groups, the government introduced a relief package system. However, Dalits could not benefit from those packages. The Samata Foundation conducted research across all of the provinces and published a book titled The Impact of COVID-19 on the Dalit Community in 2020. The book focused on the repercussions of the pandemic and lockdown on the livelihood of the Dalit community and the measures taken by the government, along with the hardships faced by elected representatives. During the research, we found that the relief packages distributed by local governments were not adequate to serve a large portion of the Dalit community. Only 1.6% of Dalits stated that the relief packages were readily available, while 52.2% claimed to not have any relief packages available. Similarly, 14.5% of Dalits indicates that the packages that were available were not sufficient to meet their needs.   Various efforts have been made by the government to exploit the democratic situation by disregarding constitutional institutions. The introduction of various undemocratic bills such as the NHRC Act (Amendment) bill, the introduction of the media council bill, the bill on mass communication, the information technology bill, and measures proposed to register and monitor I/NGO activities, was seen as a method to suppress the voices of the public.   According to Dr. Kyungmee Kim, a visiting researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, “the lack of inclusiveness and representation of diverse minorities in the country is a threat to the consolidation of democracy.” While Nepal “has made tremendous progress” with regard to democratization over the past decade, “the progress is stagnant if not under threat due to the emergence of political leaders who have autocratic tendencies.”       The social and economic impacts of COVID-19 on poor and low-income groups are higher than on other groups. The Dalit community is disproportionately affected in humanitarian responses, relief distribution, and other support programs. During the COVID-19 pandemic, most Dalits encountered difficulty in accessing income and meeting basic needs due to unequal social protection schemes. Such lack of social protection once more perpetuates the vicious cycle of poverty, exclusion, and marginalization. Amid the lockdowns, the many violations perpetrated against Dalits remained invisible, such as the massacre of 23 Dalit youths, which was a brutal display of the deeply entrenched caste-based discrimination of Nepali society.   Legal Instruments for the Protection of Dalit Rights   The new Nepali Constitution is one of the biggest achievement for Dalits and the Dalit movement. Dalit rights are provisioned as fundamental rights. In particular, Articles 24 and 40 guarantee fundamental rights including education, health, and land. Nepal enacted the Caste-Based Discrimination and Untouchability (Offence and Punishment) Act, 2011 that criminalizes all forms of caste-based discrimination. More importantly, the election system has ensured Dalit representation in all three-tiers—federal, provincial, and local governments. After the formation of the three tiers of government, the number of Dalit representatives increased, but their representation is still not proportionate compared to the Dalit population of the country. However, the increased representation is a fostering hope for the Dalits in Nepal.   However, four years after its promulgation, the Dalit community has still not enjoyed those rights on equal footing, nor felt satisfactory action has been taken by the government to ensure the rights enshrined therein. The National Dalit Commission (NDC) has been elevated to constitutional status, but the commission is not in line with the Paris Principles. Moreover, NDC commissioners have not been appointed since the Commission acquired constitutional status due to the apathy of the government.   The Caste-Based Discrimination and Untouchability (Offence and Punishment) Act, 2011 is the main law which has criminalized CBDU. Criminal (Code) Act 2074 (2017) has also further strengthened actions against it. To date, the Dalit Empowerment Act has only been enacted by the provincial government of Province 2. The Constitution of Nepal, mainly the preamble and Articles 18 and 42 (Right to Equality and Right to Social Justice), provide that the socially backward and indigent KhasArya shall have the right to participate in the state bodies on the principle of proportional inclusion. However, Article 84 of the Constitution has guaranteed KhasAryas, the major dominant caste group in Nepal, will have more than full proportional representation, as per their population. Accordingly, the electoral law of Nepal has prioritized KhasArya compulsory in the first rank, while nominating members for the House of Representatives under a proportional electoral system. Therefore, it is inconsistent with the spirit of Constitution's preamble and fundamental rights, which aims to provide for affirmative action to the groups who have endured historical injustices. Article 40(1) of the Constitution ensures that the Dalit community shall have the right to political participation in every state body according to the principle of proportional inclusion.   The local level election law has guaranteed Dalit women a place as members of ward committees at the local level. A large number of women from the Dalit community are represented at the local level, and 6,567 are ward members. However, such representation is merely formal and has not led to the effective participation of Dalit women in local decision-making processes.   Conclusion   After the promulgation of the Constitution, the country became a federal system where the principle of inclusion needs to be considered. In order to implement the principle of inclusivity, a reservations policy was put in place in 2007 by the Public Service Commission for Dalits and marginalized communities, providing that 45% of positions in the federal civil service should go to specific disadvantaged groups as now identified in the Constitution. This policy was effective to some extent. Women’s representation in civil service, for instance, increased from 11% in 2007 to more than 20% a decade later, a remarkable achievement in such a short period of time. However, progress was slower for other groups.   Unfortunately, these quotas are not in compliance with the proportional system, as the Dalit community has only 9% reserved seats in classified (allocation for marginalized groups is 45% of total vacancy and is considered 100%) vacancies. Dalit representation in the civil service was below 1% prior to the introduction of the reservations policy, but it remained around 2% by 2018, which is significantly below the aims set by the policy. In contrast, KhasArya representation is approximately 62%.   Similarly, not every mechanism of the state has proportional representation. For example, the Federal Cabinet of Nepal does not have proportional representation of women and Dalits. The House of Representatives of Nepal only includes 6.91% representation of Dalits. Not a single provincial parliament has proportional representation of Dalits. Among the 753 mayoral positions at local level, only six (2.05%) individuals have been elected as mayors in municipalities and one (0.22%) in a rural municipality. Twelve (4.10%) have been elected as deputy-mayors in municipalities and 15 as vice-chairs (3.26%) in rural municipalities.   The representation of the Dalit community in the judicial mechanisms is also insignificant, as there have never been any Dalit judges in the Supreme Court. There have only been three Dalit judges in all seven high courts, and one Dalit district judge out of 77 district courts. Representation in high-ranking positions in the police force is also negligible.   To address all these challenges, there is a need to amend the present constitution to ensure Dalit rights. Additionally, the recent verdict of the Supreme Court on a writ petition by advocate Prakash Nepali needs to be properly implemented. The structure, budget, and plans, as well as the review, revision, and implementation of the laws should be ensured. Additionally, there needs to be proportional representation of Dalits and minorities in the state bodies, especially the bureaucracy and law enforcement agencies like the Nepal police force. In a nutshell, awareness needs to be enhanced to enable the Dalits and minorities to claim their rights. Nepal is a diverse country with more than 125 ethnic groups and 123 vernacular languages, and its social foundation stands in the caste system propounded and protected by the Hindu varna system. Caste is everybody’s concern and hence should be on everybody’s agenda.■     ■ Pradip Pariyar is Executive Chairperson of Samata Foundation. Mr. Pradip Pariyar is an alumnus of American University and Tribhuvan University. He specializes in youth empowerment, peace building and capacity building of media professionals.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 백진경 , EAI 연구실장∙선임연구원     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]  

Pradip Pariyar 2022-06-23조회 : 8776
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[ADRN Working Paper] Fighting for Love: A Battle for Equal Marriage Rights in Thailand

Homosexuality and transgenderism have had a long presence in Thai history. With a high level of visibility and societal tolerance, Thai lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) individuals appear to enjoy relatively greater freedom to express their identities and to lead their way of life than their compatriots in other countries (UNDP 2014). Such an outward appearance of individual freedom and acceptance, however, has concealed the prevalent institutionalized discrimination that poses a challenge for the Thai LGBT community to access rights equal to those that their heterosexual counterparts have enjoyed. Since 2012, the Thai LGBT community has fought for the right to marry, which would allow them the same rights as heterosexual couples. In this article, we look back at LGBT rights advocacy in Thailand and how the fight for legalized same-sex marriage has resulted in a public debate on minority rights.   A Brief History of LGBT Rights and LGBT Advocacy in Thailand   The history of homosexuality and LGBT rights in Thailand is often complex and contradictory. Pre-colonial Thai society was relatively androgynous and quite accepting of non-heteronormative behaviors. Sexual activities, including homosexuality, were considered a private matter and did not concern the state.   However, this attitude towards sexuality began to change with the arrival of Western colonial norms during the 19th century. According to Peter Jackson, an eminent scholar on the history of Thai gender and homosexuality, around this time a more rigid Western understanding of sexual orientation and gender identity began to replace the less formalized Thai moral concepts of gender (Jackson 2003). During the Victorian era, Thai society began to adopt this Westernized concept of virtues and sexualities as a path towards modernity to become a more civilized nation. In the process of the Westernization of Thailand, individual sexuality and sexual behavior became part of a person’s identity, and social norms changed such that to the criminalization of homosexuality and sexuality have also been considered.   In 1917, a royal decree on gender assignment was issued. It was the first time that a person’s identity was officially recognized by one’s gender at birth. When Thailand shifted from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy in 1932, such a “modern” concept of sexual orientation and gender identity was systematically imposed and employed by the state as a means to establish a new social order (Winichaikul 1994) (Barme 1993). Clear definitions of gender identity and how Thai men and women should express their sexuality began to emerge. Gender norms were institutionalized through newly established state apparatuses such as schools, the legal system, the military, and the police force. These institutionalized gender norms and definitions remain key challenges to Thai LGBT rights advocacy to this day.   There has been no evidence of any laws against cross-dressing, cross-gender behavior, or sexual orientation in Thailand. Early Thai laws tended to criminalize sexual acts rather than sexual identity. Private and non-commercial sodomy between consensual adults was decriminalized in 1953 (UNDP 2014). Since then, there has been little development in terms of legislative policies to protect and to promote the rights of the Thai LGBT community. No evidence emerges of any LGBT advocacy in Thailand in the 1960s and 1970s. One reason might have been that Thai LGBT community enjoyed a comfortable level of social space and freedom, which led to the absence of an LGBT advocacy group or political union. Accordingly, historiographers on Thai social movements often point to the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS epidemic during the 1980s as the birth of Thai LGBT advocacy.   When HIV/AIDS first arrived in Thailand, it was labeled a homosexual or a “sinner’s” disease. HIV/AIDS patients were stigmatized along with the LGBT community. Those who were infected were considered shameful to society, and the disease was rarely discussed in public, which resulted in a greater number of infections. Thai LGBT advocacy was hence born out of a mission to change public perception of the LGBT community, as well as to educate its members about prevention of and treatment for the disease (Ungpakorn B.E. 2559 (2017)). The Rainbow Sky Association of Thailand, which is one the oldest LGBT advocacy groups in the country, began itself as a self-help group that offered information exchanges among HIV/AIDS patients. Since the 1990s, the Rainbow Sky Association has, along with many other LGBT advocacy groups, started to campaign for more equal social protection and legal rights for the LGBT community. This includes the right to civil partnership and the right to receive equal fundamental benefits like other Thai citizens, including the rights to make health care decisions for a partner or the right for same-sex couples to be eligible for employee benefits or health insurance policies, joint financial loans, inheritance, and adoption or other parental rights. In the next section, we will discuss the movement to campaign for same-sex marriage rights and public discourses on the issue.   Public Discourses on Civil Partnership and Equal Marriage Rights   The issue of same-sex marriage rights was introduced into the Thai public discourse around 2012, when a same-sex couple in Chiang Mai, who happened to be leading LGBT rights advocates, applied for a marriage registration, and their application was refused by the registrar because Thai laws did not recognize same-sex marriage. Their petitions to several government agencies led to legal reform efforts to allow equal marriage rights to same-sex couples.   Since 2013, there have been several drafts of same-sex marriage legislation. The life of the first draft proposed by the Ministry of Justice was cut short by the 2014 military coup and political climate that followed. A second draft was again proposed by the Ministry of Justice in 2018. However, it was heavily criticized by the LGBT community and legal experts because its content was primarily about co-ownership of assets and inheritance rather than marriage rights. This is due to the inability of legislators to think beyond traditional definitions of family and gender norms (Wallayangoon 2018). The third draft was revised from the second draft in 2019 by the Rights and Freedom Protection Department together with an LGBT advocacy group, and it came to be known as the Civil Partnership Bill.   The Civil Partnership Bill allows same-sex couples who are at least 20 years of age to register in a civil partnership which includes the right to start a family, the right to co-manage assets, the right to serve as each other’s legal representative, the right to inheritance, and the right to adopt. It defines “civil partners” as “two persons of the same sex who register their relationship under the civil partnership law.” According to some legal experts, such a definition may contradict the existing Civil and Commercial Code which predicates that “A marriage can take place only when the man and woman have completed their seventeenth year of age. But the Court may, in case of having appropriate reason, allow them to marry before attaining such age.”   In contrast with the Civil Partnership Bill which is predominantly about same-sex civil partnerships, the Civil and Commercial Code encompasses broader civil and legal rights. As a result, some politicians and LGBT advocates fear that the Civil Partnership Bill cannot grant rights equal to those that heterosexual couples have received, such as access to civil servant welfare or legal protection over dowry disputes. Moreover, some legal experts also argue that the Civil Partnership Bill does not take into an account the case where transgender couples want to start a family, which in effect has excluded them from the same marriage rights. Accordingly, opponents of the bill have proposed that parliament reform the Civil and Commercial Code to be more gender-neutral, which would allow LGBT couples more equal access to the same rights as heterosexual couples compared to the Civil Partnership Bill (Lawattanatrakul 2021). The campaign for the Civil and Commercial Code reform, which later became known as the Marriage Equality movement, quickly gathered momentum on the internet and led to a campaign within the LGBT community to reject the Civil Partnership Bill as it was deemed less equal or even an obstacle to true marriage equality (An Open Letter to Minister of Justice 2019).   The dispute between the Civil Partnership Bill and the Marriage Equality camps has caused much confusion among the Thai public. It has nearly escalated into a political row between those supporters of the government proposition (the Civil Partnership Bill camp) and those who stand opposed (the Marriage Equality), has threatened to derail the whole legislation process. From my observation, the media, which is unanimously in support of LGBT rights, has played an important role in resolving the situation by providing a public sphere for debates on the issue as well as helpful information.   Existing Mechanisms and Key Challenges for LGBT Rights Protection   “Human dignity, rights, liberties, and equality of the people shall be protected. The Thai people shall enjoy equal protection under the Constitution.” - Chapter 1, Section 4, Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2560 -   On paper, the constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand provides a basic mechanism for minority rights protection. Both the Thai Constitution and numerous ratified human rights resolutions and conventions provide LGBT citizens with the same rights as other Thai citizens. All citizens are entitled to receive protection from the state and must not be discriminated against for any reason, especially by the state itself. For example, citizens must not be discriminated against based on gender, age, disability status, race, birthplace, or religion. In practice, Thai law, which has rarely been revised to keep up with the changing times, often excludes LGBT citizens from obtaining basic equal rights and protections. One major challenge for legal reform to protect LGBT rights is the conservative and heterosexual majoritarianism among Thai legislators and legal practitioners (UNDP 2014) that prevents the legislative body from comprehending the world beyond the traditional heterosexual family structure and gender roles. Another major challenge seems to stem from the Thai attitude towards laws and law reform. The constitution and laws are often seen as sacred, unchangeable, and unintelligible to the public. For law reform advocacy to gain enough momentum, members of the Thai LGBT community need to become better informed regarding legislative policies and the legal reform process.   The third key challenge for the Thai LGBT community is the absence of a unified core movement or a state-recognized LGBT union. This absence became obvious during the Civil Partnership and Marriage Equality campaigns, where different advocacy groups appeared to have their own discourses and agendas that often clashed with one another and nearly derailed the true aim of the movement.   The last key challenge for Thai LGBT rights advocacy that we want to present here is the failure of policy makers to separate their personal religious and moral worldview from their obligation to protect civil rights. The challenge becomes even greater when such a religious and moral worldview is intertwined with their own minority identity and rights. Legislation passed in 1946 officially recognizes a limited use of sharia for Thailand’s Muslim minority in the four border provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkhla. Traditional Islamic law holds that homosexual activities are forbidden and considered a punishable offence. Accordingly, Muslim legislators chose to vote against marriage equality during the February 2022 parliament session. Despite the fact that the bill passed by an overwhelming majority, Muslim legislators still sought to be exempted from the bill and to maintain their minority right to observe Islamic law.   As of March 2022, both the Civil Partnership Bill and the Civil and Commercial Code reform have been approved by the parliament in principle. They must go through several additional legislative protocols before they become effective. Anything can happen along the way, and the battle for equal rights for the Thai LGBT community continues.    References   Asanasak, Suprawee. 2022. "Legal Mechanism towards Marriage Equality: experiences from abroad." SDG Move. January 12. Accessed March 1, 2022. https://www.sdgmove.com/2022/01/08/sdg-insights-constitutional-court-ruling-legal-mechanisms-to-recognize-marriage-equality/. Barme, S. 1993. Laung Wichit Wathakan and the Creation of Thai Identity. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Constitution Drafting Commission. B.E. 2560 (2017). Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand. August 29. Accessed March 1, 2022. https://cdc.parliament.go.th/draftconstitution2/download/article/article_20180829093502.pdf. iLaw. 2020. "#marriage equality: a survey of legal and a reform of civil law on marriage." iLaw. July 7. Accessed March 1, 2022. https://ilaw.or.th/node/5711. Jackson, P. A. 2003. "Performative Genders, Perverse Desires: A Bio-History of Thailand`s Same-Sex and Transgender Cultures." Intersections: Gender and Sexuality in Asia and the Pacific, vol. 9, no. August 2003 1–52. Lawattanatrakul, Anna. 2021. "Next Steps on Thailand`s Road to Marriage Equality." Pachathai English. December 3. Accessed March 1, 2022. UNDP, USAID. 2014. Being LGBT in Asia: Thailand Country Report. Bangkok: United Nations Development Programme. Ungpakorn, Giles. B.E. 2559 (2017). ขบวนการเคลื่อนไหวทางสังคมไทย (Thai Social Movement). Bangkok: Prachatipatai Press. Wallayangoon, V. 2018. the101.world. November 8. Accessed March 1, 2022. https://www.the101.world/partnership-law/#_ftnref1. Winichaikul, T. 1994. Siam Mapped. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. https://prachatai.com/english/node/9596. Working Group for Marriage Equality. 2019. "An Open Letter to Minister of Justice." Pachathai News. August 22. Accessed March 1, 2022. https://prachatai.com/journal/2019/08/83980.     ■ Jirayudh Sinthuphan is an assistant professor at the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University. ■ Thanchanok Ruendhawil is a researcher at the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University.     ■ Typeset by 백진경 , EAI 연구실장∙선임연구원     For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | [email protected]      

Jirayudh Sinthuphan 2022-06-23조회 : 9039
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[ADRN Working Paper] Malaysia’s Ongoing Tussle With Democracy

Abstract   Following Malaysia’s fourteenth general election (GE14) in 2018, there was a genuine sense of optimism brimming in the imagination of many of its citizens. A result of the undercurrents formed ever since GE12 back in 2008, the difficult transitions away from colonial legacies like patronage or feudalism as well as traditional political arrangement of consociationalism were beginning to unravel. A more democratic environment began to organically take shape in many layers of Malaysian society in tandem with the gradual electoral rejection of the long-ruling National Front (BN) coalition, culminating in the first ever democratic change of federal government in GE14 after more than six decades of single-party dominance.   However, a sudden collapse of the Pact of Hope (PH) coalition due to party defectors and ideological differences led to a unique political and constitutional crisis that gave birth to a new coalition named the National Alliance (PN). After poor handling of the COVID-19 situation and blatant attempts at undermining democratic pillars, Malaysians again went through a period of uncertainty as the PN coalition endured an internal reshuffle involving the prime minister’s post. All of these recent incidents have given rise to many questions as to the health of democracy in Malaysia. Some have felt utterly confused and disillusioned with the entire democratic process, while others are actually galvanized to offer alternatives via more participatory or direct forms of democracy.   Introduction   Many observers of Malaysia anticipated a more progressive shape of democracy for the country as it bucked the global and regional trend of sliding backwards into more authoritarian regimes or far-right populist rule. Unfortunately, the deposed BN coalition effectively manufactured a narrative to entice its long-time political rival, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic party (PAS), into working together in forming the National Concord (MN) to destabilize the PH government and potentially return the BN coalition to power. This strategy led to the eventual resignation of the seventh prime minister and self-sabotage of the promising “New Malaysia” agenda. Leadership ambiguity ensued for several weeks until the hastily assembled PN coalition stepped in as a substitute amidst the start of the pandemic.   The far less transparent and rather desperate installation of the PN government without the people’s mandate led to clear and urgent demands from the Malaysian public, especially its civil society, to rethink democracy and reform its decaying institutions as posited by Francis Fukuyama in his works. As the eighth prime minister was forced to make way for the current prime minister to avoid being removed in a vote of no confidence in Parliament, numerous concessions were dealt out as part of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the fragile government and the largest opposition bloc. This further invited public criticism as the deal was discussed and done among the leaders of the respective parties and its supporting members of Parliament (MPs).   Such an “elite” form of deliberation adds salt to the wound for the people who felt cheated by some of their elected representatives that jumped ship and collaborated with the electoral losers. This is further exacerbated by the double standard SOP practiced by law-enforcers during the COVID-19 lockdowns in Malaysia that gave politicians leeway while the public received the full brunt of penalty fines. There is a near-total deficit of trust towards the entire political establishment on both sides of the aisle, triggering conversations on renewed calls for a more inclusive and deliberative democracy that can actually resolve the real issues that average Malaysians are facing.   Definition and Local Context   Essentially, deliberative democracy or direct democracy is a process that aims to gather the relevant stakeholders or those citizens whose daily interests and future prospects are affected by a particular issue to willingly participate in expressing their opinions and exchanging ideas. Once these valuable inputs are shared and critically evaluated, participants begin to discuss and determine for themselves what sort of policies derived from the dialogue are best to put forth in the interest of all members of the public, irrespective of background or social status. Once a consensus is reached, this inclusive decision-making approach not only gives a platform for citizens to voice their concerns to influence policy making, but more importantly it gives a certain measure of responsibility for the stakeholders themselves to also ensure that their recommendations are indeed implemented and that they have a sense of mutual ownership of public policy.   Historically, Malaysia practices an indirect form of democracy, which is the representative mode it inherited from its British colonial experience. This foreign concept was carefully designed and infused with existing local context during the early period formation of the federation to establish the current modern system, which is a constitutional monarchy. Malaysia’s democracy is somewhat distinct compared to other nations in the world on the basis of its complex power structures and diverse social fabric. Even at the highest level, the elected King (Yang di-Pertuan Agong) is subject to consultation with his fellow brethren through the Royal Council (Majlis Raja-Raja) for any official matters. As there are nine monarchs in Peninsular Malaysia, they each assume the Kingship of the Federation of Malaysia on a five-year rotational basis after internal deliberations.   Beneath the royal institution, which is limited or bound by the federal Constitution, are the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government that were adopted heavily from the Westminster system. As the executive and legislative branches are fundamentally elected from amongst the public, it is here that the functions of democracy apply. Candidates stand for elections both at federal and state levels on behalf of their constituencies and the prevailing winners then enter into the lower chamber of a bicameral parliament structure or state assemblies to convey the issues, debate motions, and suggest policies to be enacted. The party or coalition that gains the majority of MPs in the lower house will go on to form the cabinet for the executive branch.   Delving deeper into Malaysia’s representative democracy, the interactions and affiliations between the MPs and their grassroots base through various avenues and local activities remains a vital component of public engagement. As representatives, maintaining such physical outreach or media communication is necessary to enable greater participation among the constituency. It also functions as a means of information dissemination for government initiatives whereby national agendas are explained to the public and feedback is channeled through the elected representatives, who then take this feedback into consideration when forming policies at the executive level or passing laws at the legislative level. Nevertheless, there exist crucial gaps within such dealings, with the example of some MPs who respond by providing services to the voters to curry favor for the next electoral cycle.   External Developments   Although Malaysia shares a geographical landscape and common cultural features with ASEAN, the country’s path to democracy differs greatly to its counterparts as the experience in gaining independence, its population makeup, and choices taken by the founding fathers when appraising democracy have been dissimilar. Due to anxieties surrounding racial and religious sensitivity, Malaysia chose to adopt a more exclusive form of deliberative democracy that entrusts its privileged segments to assume leadership decisions and facilitate items relating to personal liberties. Deliberative or direct democracy was not an attractive option during the inception of Malaysia as a nation-state back in the 1940’s and 1950’s, yet the topic seems fairly relevant today, especially for the younger generation. Direct democracy is being seriously explored given the challenges and changes taking place in many contemporary democracies.   Malaysia’s strategic location in the heart of Southeast Asia as well as its long-held stable democracy (some define it as semi or quasi-democracy) provides it with generous access to its surrounding neighbors to learn from their different models of governance. That being said, popular trends or new changes, particularly those pertaining to democracy, that occur in the ASEAN region will in some way or form permeate to impact Malaysia’s own trajectories. The propagation of identity politics and appointment of “strongman” leaders amidst crises have recently stalled democracy’s inroad in this part of the world. The examples of very open democracies such as Indonesia and Philippines practicing direct or deliberative democracy at village or community level are offset by the extreme fundamentalism and populist authoritarian tendencies in these same places.   Additionally, Malaysia’s well-developed infrastructure compared to the rest of the region has also given Malaysians wide access to international news coverage and knowledge from universities abroad regarding the political experiments performed in more advanced liberal democracies. Malaysians had easy access to real-time updates at their fingertips on events like the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union (Brexit), the presidency of Donald Trump in the United States, and the Arab uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, allowing them to observe the many volatile drawbacks and difficulties of sustaining democracy. These episodes, coupled with the neighboring examples of China’s rapid prosperity despite its excessive display of human rights violations and India’s escalating social polarization despite being the world’s largest democracy, put discussions about democracy in Malaysia at a slight disadvantage.   Recent Issues   The main obstacle in Malaysia for something as familiar as representative democracy to evolve into direct democracy would be convincing the persons located in semi-urban and rural constituencies of its merits. The inequalities that they face, be it in terms of robust discourses or economic opportunities, can very much hinder their appreciation of untested measures. It would seem far more practical for these communities to delegate the responsibilities of managing policies to an elected representative while they attend to their daily affairs. An entrenched system of race-based policies, religious bureaucracy, and the decades-long nexus between political status and business interests further complicates any attempts at altering the present circumstances.   As exemplified by the political turmoil post-GE14, there have always been resisting elements both within administration hierarchies and the general populace that push back against progressive ideals by casually labeling them foreign undesirables that threaten the majority’s way of life. It is often implied that implementing more democracy would dilute certain facets of the social contract, and thus the perception is to merely tolerate the beneficial outcomes of democracy like peace and freedom while overlooking its core principles like good governance or justice. Moreover, the proponents of democracy and human rights in Malaysia are usually found in urban-centric areas, have been involved with activism, are exposed to multicultural surroundings, and belong to a younger age bracket. Those that can identify themselves in any of these four quadrants tend to be willing to support direct democracy tools like referendums or petitions.   As a consequence of Malaysia’s rapid modernization in the 1980’s and 1990’s, we witnessed a clear national direction that invested early on in the tech ecosystem which broadened the digital space as unintended compensation for a partially free public sphere. The internet cafes, blogs, online forums, and social media sites like Yahoo or MySpace back then revolutionized Malaysia’s democratic scene by providing alternative avenues for deliberation and dissent to take place. Over time, this inculcated the steady advance of prominent civil society organizations and informative media outlets to enrich conversations about democracy. This now seems to be bearing fruit as their integrity as an autonomous “third force” remains intact against the backdrop of the political establishment’s scramble to grab power. A burgeoning volunteer culture is seen with the #KitaJagaKita movement and recent flood disaster relief efforts.   Another example of formidable NGO networking in Malaysia is the increasing presence at stakeholder engagement events hosted by the government. Such consultations, either through high-level face-to-face meetings or town hall dialogues, have in recent years become more widespread as the government acknowledges the important role played by civil society organizations in both nation building and policy making. Furthermore, in the era of the constant surveillance of the 24/7 news cycle, no sitting government can afford to discount strategic partners or casually dismiss their demands as they did in the past, since doing so would seriously hurt their reputation and subsequently affect their electability, particularly in city-centric and ethnically mixed seats.   All of this indicates that there is already latent potential for community-driven initiatives in Malaysia to step up and fill in the gaps or reprimand the abuses committed by formal institutions, rigid administrations, and, most troublingly, political parties, which had principally dictated public affairs from 1957 up until 2018. With the continuing fragmentation of the political class, there is ample room and purposeful interest for a reconsideration of democratic models in Malaysia. A citizen’s assembly mirroring the Scandinavian and Irish case studies has been touted by the Better Malaysia Initiative and has garnered some traction. However, criticisms include the implementation mechanism as well as the fact that it is a proposal by elite individuals to start an elite council consisting of eminent Malaysians emulating the National Operations Council in the early 1970’s after the deadly racial riots of May 13th.   There are more positive indicators in favor of direct democracy. The mounting influence of online petitions through websites such as change.org to instigate pressure towards specific issues, the policy suggestion from BERSIH 2.0 on recall elections to hold party-hopping MPs more accountable, and sub national efforts by IDEAS to encourage citizens to monitor state government budgets and procurement are all examples demonstrating that efforts towards direct democracy are already in the pipeline.   Emerging Trends and Conclusion   Looking at the upward trend among Malaysians to seek direct democracy as an outlet for their disappointments with representative democracy, we find that much of the frustration centers around the shattered expectations for institutional reform after the infamous Sheraton Move incident in February 2020. The collapse of the PH government created intense debates as to the motives of elected representatives and the actual meaning or value of their votes. The situation has also fashioned a variety of choices as new political parties emerge, such as the youth-based party MUDA (Malaysian United Democratic Alliance), the anti-corruption party PEJUANG (Homeland Fighters Party) and the inclusive Parti Bangsa Malaysia (Malaysian Race Party) to name a few. This suggests that decentralization of traditional power distribution in Malaysia is well underway.   Elaborating further on decentralization, the MOU signed between the PN government and the PH opposition bloc has also revisited the issue of federal-state relations between Peninsular Malaysia and the Bornean territories connected to the Malaysian Agreement of 1963 (MA63). As such democratic discourse gains momentum, civil society organizations and progressive politicians have also raised improvements to local council elections in the hope this will mark a catalyst for moving the needle of Malaysia`s conventional political culture. Leading the charge is the talented UNDI18 movement that successfully pursued the expansion of the legal voting age as well as automatic voter registration in Malaysia. Their advocacy and organization of the #Lawan street protest built optimistic expectations for MUDA as a youth generation bloc aiming to disrupt the status quo.   With a weakened majority government as well as an opposition coalition in such disarray, the predominant logic in reading Malaysian politics would be the formation of post-electoral pacts or shared governments for the foreseeable future. A far less powerful state and a steadily influential civil society segment do indeed encourage more involvement from the public that can endorse further support for direct forms of democracy. The key lessons are to further strengthen the people’s room for dissent and protect their civil liberties in tandem with basic human rights. Simultaneously, enhancing democratic literacy that can create more awareness of disinformation is pertinent to restoring trust to public institutions. By executing such reforms, there is potential for progress. However, further nurturing is required before a mature democracy can benefit all.   Nevertheless, there has to be caution against the potential to return to the feudalistic mindsets and patronage practices that heavily rely upon cronyism and grassroots servicing. An attempt at a political comeback by the former sixth prime minister using a populist personality, despite the tainted image of the 1MDB corruption scandal, is truly frightening and threatens Malaysian democracy. ■   References   Bohman, J. (1998). ‘The Coming Age of Deliberative Democracy’, Journal of Political Philosophy 6 (4): 400–425. Disch, L. (2011). ‘Toward a Mobilization Conception of Democratic Representation’, American Political Science Review 105 (1): 100–114. Dryzek, J.S. (2000). Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Dryzek, J.S. (2009). ‘Democratization as Deliberative Capacity Building’, Comparative Political Studies 42 (11): 1379–1402. Kuyper, J. W. (2016). ‘Systemic representation: democracy, deliberation, and nonelectoral representatives’, American Political Science Review 110 (2): 308–324. Mansbridge, J., Bohman, J., Chambers, S., Christiano, T., Fung, A., Parkinson, J., and Warren, M.E. (2012). "A Systemic Approach to Deliberative Democracy," in J. Parkinson and J. Mansbridge (eds.). Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 1–26. Moore, A. (2017). Critical Elitism: Deliberation, Democracy, and the Problem of Expertise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Rehfeld, A. (2006). ‘Towards a General Theory of Political Representation’, Journal of Politics 68 (1): 1–21. Urbinati, N. (2006). Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).     ■ Halmie Azrie Abdul Halim is a researcher for Democracy and Governance at the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS), a well-known and independent think-tank based in Kuala Lumpur. He was a student activist with the National Union of Malaysian Muslim Students (PKPIM) for over fourteen years, and got familiarized to public policy affairs during his internship at IMAN Research. He holds a Bachelor of Arts (Hons) in International Relations from Staffordshire University, UK. He has posited his thoughts on domestic political trends at various online portals, and represented Malaysia for several international youth conferences in Turkey, Thailand and Germany.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 전주현 ,EAI 연구원     문의: 82 2 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]  

Halmie Azrie Abdul Halim 2022-06-07조회 : 22063
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[ADRN Working Paper] Can Online Public Participation Strengthen Direct, Deliberative, and Participatory Democracy in India?

Introduction [1]   Most modern constitutional democracies govern themselves through the representative form of democratic governance. This representation is determined by fair, regular, and competitive elections. However, over the decades, the limitations of representative democratic governance have been well-documented (Jayal 2009; Hirst 1988). To address these limitations, several innovations have been fostered by governments, civil society, and citizen associations and are variously known as direct, deliberative, and participatory democracy. Despite having the common goal of complementing representative democracy, the theoretical underpinnings, trajectories, and practices for direct, deliberative, and participatory democracy that has been elaborated elsewhere have been quite distinctive (Leib 2006; Carson and Elstub 2019).   Direct democracy is understood as describing those rules, institutions, and processes that enable the public to vote directly on a proposed constitutional amendment, law, treaty, or policy decision. The most important forms of direct democracy are referendums and initiatives (Bulmer 2017). In contrast, deliberative democracy considers the participation of the public in deliberations and decision-making to be the central element in democratic processes. In deliberative democracy, the public deliberation of free and equal citizens forms the basis of legitimate decision-making (Joseph and Joseph 2018). The emphasis in deliberative democracy is on deliberation as opposed to voting, which is the focus in direct democracy. In promoting participatory democracy, the participatory democrats prize public engagement in both formal activities such as consultations, committee hearings, and participatory budgeting sessions, as well as less obviously political actions such as spontaneous protests, volunteering, or involvement in decision-making (Dacombe and Parvin 2021). Many scholars have studied, critiqued, and questioned the efficacy of direct democracy (Lupia and Matsusaka 2004), deliberative democracy (Owen and Smith 2015), and participatory democracy (Parvin 2021) for their theoretical constructs as well as their practices.   A key expectation from a democratic governance regime is the formulation of policies that promote equity and ensure justice. Public participation in policymaking is the cornerstone of a mature and consolidated democracy. With growing public aspirations, public policymaking that affects millions of citizens cannot rely only on the representative and procedural democratic mechanisms. It must embrace direct, deliberative, and participatory democratic mechanisms and practices.   This paper lays out the practice of public participation to promote direct democracy and dives deeper into the question of potential and actual barriers to online public participation, especially for policymaking. It maps the existing interventions in online public participation and suggests good practices. Based on the gaps found in the existing discourse, recommendations are made for the most meaningful and inclusive ways to engage in online public consultation when making public laws and policies.   India, despite being the largest democracy in the world, has often relied more on procedural democracy and created very little space for direct public consultation in its national, sub-national, and local policymaking at a substantive scale. The emergence of local governance institutions in the early 1990s created some significant spaces for public participation in decision-making related to local development. The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts, enacted in 1992, made provisions for Gram Sabhas (an assembly of all the electorates within the territory of a Gram Panchayat[2] ) and Ward Committees (elected or nominated members in a municipal ward to be constituted in municipalities with a population of more than 300,000). Both the Acts elaborated the functions of Gram Sabhas and Ward Committees respectively, which included participation in planning and monitoring of all local development work. Despite being the only institutionalized space for direct participation, the experience has been mixed as far as Gram Sabhas are concerned. However, the experience of Ward Committees has been disappointing as most state governments and municipalities have not formed or activated these committees.   In the last decade, many public programs have emphasized the importance of public participation in the effective implementation and monitoring of these programs. A few ministries and departments of both the union and state governments have occasionally invited comments, suggestions, and objections to proposed policies or plans. However, in the absence of a robust mechanism and coherent laws requiring mandatory public consultations, such initiatives have often been short-lived and dissipated before they could accomplish their goals (Arora and Bandyopadhyay 2021).   In the absence of an institutionalized space for public participation in public policy planning and monitoring, several civil society organizations and citizen associations have used the social accountability approach and tools to promote public participation by engaging in participatory data gathering and analysis, sharing of findings with public authorities as well as the media, and negotiating with public institutions responsible for the implementation of a program or policy. They have used many tools including Citizen Report Cards, Community Score Cards, and Social Audits. Such initiatives have helped citizens amplify their voices, but have fallen short of institutionalization and scaling up public participation (Bandyopadhyay, 2015). In cases where Social Audits have been institutionalized, for example in the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), implementation has fallen far short of expectations due to the lackadaisical attitude of the public institutions and insufficient capacity of local governance institutions.   In the past few years, with the rise of technology innovations, several governmental initiatives have tried to leverage technology for soliciting public consultations in public policy planning and monitoring. On several occasions, ministries and departments have invited members of the public to share their concerns, comments, and suggestions online regarding a specific policy or program initiative. However, the absent legal framework for organizing online consultations with members of the public and “affected persons” in making public laws and policies belies the government’s efforts to put citizens at the center of policymaking. The practice of public consultation in making public laws and policies has been sporadic, whimsical, and inadequate. In several cases where suggestions, comments and feedback have been sought from citizens on draft bills or draft rules, there was no obligation on the part of the government to “close the feedback loop” by disclosing specifically what feedback from the public was considered, was or was not included, and why (Arora and Bandyopadhyay 2022). On the other hand, a few civil society groups have leveraged online technology to channel public concerns and suggestions in public policymaking processes.   This paper delves into the following research questions: What lessons can be drawn from the current online mechanisms and practices for consulting members of the public in making laws and policies by the governments? How have civil society organizations attempted to influence policymaking using online public participation? What principles can be suggested to make online public consultations reliable, inclusive, and ongoing?   To examine examples of governmental as well as civil society initiatives that promote online public participation, this paper uses a simple yet meaningful framework: Inform, Listen and Consult, Consolidate and Prioritize, and Feedback.   1) Inform Communicate the details of the program or policy under consideration directly to the public. Make the public aware and educate them about the initiative. Prepare them to engage by conveying what the institution expects from them in developing a program or policy and why public participation is critical.   2) Listen and Consult Engage with the public by asking questions and listening to their responses. Ask specific questions to get quality information on issues and ideas relevant to the program or policy under consideration.   3) Consolidate and Prioritize Collect, analyze, and evaluate public responses on an ongoing basis. Different methods require the use of different tools, but the analysis will uncover important trends in various aspects of the program or policy.   4) Feedback Communicate findings back to the public to keep them in the loop. This will ensure that the public is aware of how their participation has influenced the program or policy.   The Promises of Online Technology for Promoting Direct Democracy through Public Participation   In the last decade, with the emergence of digital and information technology in all spheres of human activities, copious efforts are being undertaken to make development, democracy, and governance more inclusive by using digital and information technology. The champions of the tech-driven development community often advocate a range of virtues associated with digital and information technology in promoting public participation, including:   1) Ease of participation Online technology has enabled communication and participation between multiple actors, both state and non-state, in multiple arenas.   2) Scaled-up outreach despite limited resources Constraints on the available resources to reach out to the people collectively en masse can be overcome using online platforms. Multiple social networking sites and online meeting platforms that the public and other non-state actors use for communication with each other across geographies, as well as in some cases with the state actors, allow for higher and scaled-up outreach.   3) Access to decision-makers Multiple experiments and initiatives using online technology have provided members of the public with the ability to access decision-makers remotely, without having to physically encounter the bureaucratic hierarchy.   4) Integration of information from multiple ministries Online portals have enabled the integration of information from multiple departments and ministries or the silos of domains and jurisdictions together, such that one does not have to spend time physically going to look for information from the right source or to meet the right government official from one department to another.   5) Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based labeling and sorting for ease of analysis and decision-making AI technology has the potential to sort and analyze a vast and diverse quantity of information with predefined labeling which otherwise would have been cumbersome and daunting to handle manually.   Barriers to Online Public Participation   Online public participation, especially in the Indian context, is not without its share of limitations. The following are the most prominent barriers to scaling up online public participation.   1) Digital divide The fundamental challenge in India remains access to the internet and technology for all. While access and inclusivity have improved enormously in recent years, continuous high-speed internet connectivity is still limited to pockets of the population. Many groups continue to face exclusion from high-speed internet access and technology, thereby impacting their access to technology-based services including the existing gender inequality (Sheriff 2020). Moreover, there are chronic inequalities based on other intersecting factors such as income, language, literacy, disability, caste, and religion. The infrastructural challenges at hand include the unstable supply of electricity or power cuts in many parts of the country, poor telecom service provider signals or networks, higher pricing of high-quality devices with higher storage capacities (pricing depends upon the device manufacturing companies), and higher pricing of high-speed internet broadband plans or mobile data plans (depends on the internet service provider), among others.   2) Polarization of information due to predesigned algorithms Information and news that internet users receive online to read or hear are based on predesigned algorithms such that users receive information that is increasingly tailored to and influenced by their searches and browsing histories. This creates a cycle of polarized opinions as the multiplicity of voices and opinions are often less tolerated or accounted for. This has contributed to a deep-seated polarization of political views and opinions among India’s residents. Thus, there is a growing phenomenon of echo chambers or information cocoons wherein similar views and opinions are recycled and thereby reinforced. These algorithms block out the diversity of perspectives.   3) The majority takes all In a majoritarian democratic state and culture, there is a risk of important minority voices being overlooked or ignored. These could be the voices of marginalized people or unpopular opinions that do not gain enough traction or prioritization. Interaction to influence different interest groups or perspectives, and facilitation to coalesce around a shared agenda is not easy with online consultations alone. Trust in online consultations without an offline relationship is thereby obstructed.   4) Untrained staff Efforts are underway to enhance individual and organizational capacities for using technology in the functioning of governance institutions. However, these capacities vary across levels of government machinery and are the weakest at the district, city, and block levels, at present. Most staff members are not trained to facilitate public participation using technology.   5) Sense of a safer space Public policymaking is intrinsically political. Discussions on social media are often loaded with threats, trolling, and abuse, which may cause a sense of discomfort in engaging online. This poses a huge barrier to building a positive culture of participation and civic discourse. Safe space requires building mutual trust and respect, especially for marginalized people and groups to share and communicate their vulnerabilities and lived experiences. Online modalities may not enable deep listening to alternative points of view, which is an important aspect of creating a safe space.   6) Getting relevant responses can be difficult Promoters of public participation may face the challenge of receiving mixed responses based on personal experiences, opinions, perceptions, evidence, etc. This may increase the difficulty of the task of finding relevant responses. A search for a pointed and objective response might also be prone to the existing biases of the institution that is seeking public participation. This is particularly relevant for online responses, where opportunities to probe deeper and seek further clarification are limited.   7) Extractive nature of information gathering Information gathering exercises, even in non-digital modalities, have largely been extractive in nature where communities and respondents do not get to know how their data will be used. A similar trend is visible with digital modalities. A growing awareness of data privacy is also linked to this concern.   Use of Technology in Public Participation – A Typology of Purposes and Mechanisms   This section lays out the landscape of the civil society initiatives and government programs that use technology for public engagement in India. It elaborates on the emerging typology of purposes and mechanisms as evidenced by various Indian examples. These have been organized around the following five major purposes of public engagement.   1) Dissemination of information and online campaigns Several civil society initiatives have tried to provide relevant information online in a language and manner that are accessible to ordinary citizens. Most government initiatives to provide information online have been focused on raising awareness and driving behavior changes.   2) Facilitating access to government schemes and programs A few civil society organizations and social entrepreneurial initiatives have developed online platforms which not only provide information about government schemes and programs, but also allow members of the public to check their eligibility and enroll as beneficiaries.   3) Grievance redressal Still other online platforms developed by civil society groups are for members of the public to register their grievances as well as share their experiences in accessing public services. The information collected through these platforms is collated and analyzed for advocacy and engagement with relevant public departments.   4) Highlighting policy issues through online petitioning There are a few online platforms developed by other civil society groups which allow members of the public to initiate petitions either to change some policy provisions or to draw the attention of the policymakers to a defined policy gap. These platforms encourage citizens at large to support specific petitions.   5) Crowdsourcing ideas and suggestions for policymaking A few government ministries and departments publish draft public policies or laws on their websites to solicit comments, suggestions, and objections from the public. This has largely been an ineffective way to promote public engagement, as in most cases the jargonistic legal language, lack of facilitation, and rigidity of the platforms do not allow for meaningful deliberations. In recent years, a few civil society organizations have developed online platforms that organize online deliberations and consultations with the public and especially with the “affected persons” by a specific law or policy. They collate responses from the public and share the consolidated findings with the concerned ministry or department.   A Framework for Effective Online Public Consultation   The foregoing context and analysis provide a sound basis for suggesting a framework for effective online consultation with the public in matters of public policymaking. The framework consists of four key phases as follows.   1) Inform the public Information is power. The purpose of this step is to raise awareness about the governance systems, laws, policies, and entitlements that are important to the public. Unlike traditional ways where information sharing and mobilization of the public happened face-to-face, digital platforms are being explored for this today. Technology is being used to simplify knowledge dissemination, raise awareness, and create an informed public. Multiple types of platforms are being used for information dissemination. The focus is on simplifying and making information accessible, simpler, and contextual for a wider audience, in some cases in multiple languages or local dialects as well.   2) Listen to and consult with the public This phase aims to listen to and consult with the public to facilitate the use of diverse perspectives in decision-making during policy planning. There are very limited initiatives with this goal this in the Indian context today. Consultation with the public has important considerations such as who is consulted, why are they consulted, what are they consulted for (evidence, lived experiences, opinions, ideas, perceptions etc.) and how they are consulted (digitally, online, face-to-face). In this process, it is important to consider primary stakeholders, but who else should be consulted on laws that are generic and not constituency-based? It is important to identify a pathway for intentionally reaching out to diverse caste groups, genders, religions, locations, levels of literacy, languages, and disability-based minority groups such that they are not disfavored, and to ensure that they have access to the technology necessary to enable their participation in the first place. In an online space, norms and ground rules need to be set for the consultation process to encourage engaging respectful interactions, acknowledge feedback received (administrators can do this), and encourage respondents to keep the conversation relevant.   3) Consolidate and prioritize responses It is not very difficult to collect data and hold consultations, but it is not so easy to analyze and consolidate a vast amount of data. The steps in the process are making sense, identifying trends and patterns in the data using labels, consolidating it, and prioritizing the key ideas that emerge from the consultation. One must consider the heterogeneity of the group to obtain disaggregated data. Gender, age, caste, religion, ethnicity, and socio-economic disaggregation of data are important to hear and understand what different constituencies are saying. Technology must be designed to provide solutions to understand the data in a disaggregated manner. In the labeling system, technology must be able to consider minority or less popular opinions and views. There is always a chance that breakthrough suggestions or recommendations may emerge from minority views. The data consolidation process and results need to be transparent for the members of the public who provide the feedback. The public must be made aware of the process of consolidation and prioritization to enhance trust in the process. At the same time, sensitive data cannot be given out to any institution, regardless of whether it is the government or private companies or civil society groups. The growing awareness and concerns about data privacy must be respected, and members of the public should not be discouraged from participating by requests for unnecessary identification.   4) Closing the feedback loop This is an important phase where the government or the public participation promoter shows that it cares and is invested in the process. An exchange between the public and government is important for a meaningful dialogue. Feedback to the public is important to provide the rationale for the decisions taken, explain how the inputs were used, and close the feedback loop. This communication exchange between the government and the public is important to incrementally increase mutual trust and understanding. Feedback needs to showcase a long-term vision with the inputs received. Participation does not stop here. It is the cycle of participation that will improve the quality of input from the public and make the government more responsive.   Conclusion   This article highlights that in the absence of a robust legal framework for promoting public participation in public policymaking, civil society has created direct, deliberative, and participatory spaces to complement India’s representative and procedural democracy mechanisms. The rise of online technology has opened new vistas for direct public participation in public policymaking processes. However, the impact, outreach, and institutionalization of such efforts require more investigation and interrogation. Nevertheless, some lessons could be used to scale up the use of online platforms to strengthen direct and deliberative participation.   Fully digital channels for information dissemination will not be effective in rural and other marginalized communities that do not have adequate access to the internet and other such technology. Online channels for information dissemination could be more effective if used in collaboration with organizations which have a physical presence in these communities. The people who will be directly impacted by a program or policy must be consulted. It is important to gather and provide relevant budgetary information to the public to ensure transparency in fiscal policies. If the information is relevant, it can further influence budget planning in the future. Participatory budgeting has the potential to bring transparency, accountability, and effectiveness to local development.   Low digital penetration is one of the biggest challenges that members of the public face in accessing services through online systems. Multiple efforts are needed to increase the public’s digital access, awareness, and literacy in linking them to government schemes and programs. Public application submissions still require an offline interface. It is mostly grievances from the public that can be resolved through online mediums. An effective grievance redressal mechanism is a good source of public feedback about government programs and policies. It is also important for local civil servants to be digitally trained to respond to online queries and grievances from the public.   Petition platforms are important models for civic education and citizen-led campaigning. Petition pathways directed towards the key decision-makers can be strengthened to increase direct public participation. Digital methods for crowdsourcing ideas, such as text messages, social media channels, and government discussion forums, can be leveraged to scale up public participation. Well-equipped systems and multi-sectoral partnerships between civil society groups, national, state, and local governments, and the private sector may be needed to scale up crowdsourcing ideas and suggestions for program planning. However, it must be considered who is being consulted and why. Such consultations also need to maintain the spirit of collective participation. While offline discussions can be shifted into the online sphere for public knowledge, adopting an effective hybrid model of consultations to encourage empathy, care, and trust is also critical to the continued promotion of direct, deliberative, and participatory democracy. ■   References Arora, Shruti and Bandyopadhyay, Kaustuv Kanti. 2022. Citizens should have a say in the laws that affect their lives. IDR. 24 March 2022. Available at: https://idronline.org/article/rights/citizens-should-have-a-say-in-the-laws-that-affect-their-lives/ Bandyopadhyay, Kaustuv Kanti. 2015. Development, Democracy and Participation: The Curious Case of Social Accountability. In Capacity Development Beyond Aid. Eds. Greijn, Heinz, Hauck, Volker, Land, Tony and Ubels, Jan. Available at: https://ecdpm.org/wp-content/uploads/CAPACITY_BOOKLET_ENG_WEB.pdf Bulmer, Elliot. 2017. Direct Democracy - International IDEA Constitution-Building Primer 3. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), Stockholm, Sweden. Carson, Lyn and Elstub, Stephen. 2019. Comparing participatory and deliberative democracy. Research and Development Note, The New Democracy Foundation. Available at: https://www.newdemocracy.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/RD-Note-Comparing-Participatory-and-Deliberative-Democracy.pdf Dacombe, Rod and Parvin, Phil. 2021. Participatory Democracy in an Age of Inequality, Representation, 57:2, 145-157, DOI: 10.1080/00344893.2021.1933151https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2021.1933151 Hirst, Paul. 1988. Representative Democracy and Its Limits. The Political Quarterly. Vol. 59, No.2, April-June 1988. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-923X.2009.02153.x Jayal, Niraja Gopal. (2009) The Limits of Representative Democracy, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 32:3,326-337, DOI: 10.1080/00856400903374269 Joseph, Teresa and Joseph, Siby K. (Eds). 2018. Deliberative Democracy: Understanding the Indian Experience. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London and New York. Leib, Ethan J. 2006. Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative? 54 Buff. L. Rev. 903 (2006-2007) Available at: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/144222057.pdf Lupia, Arthur and Matsusaka, John G. 2004. Direct Democracy: New Approaches to Old Questions. Annual Review Political Science. 2004. 7:463–82. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104730. Owen, D. and Smith, G. 2015. Survey Article: Deliberation, Democracy, and the Systemic Turn. The Journal of Political Philosophy 23 (2): 213–234. Parvin, Phil. 2021. The Participatory Paradox: An Egalitarian Critique of Participatory Democracy, Representation, 57:2, 263-285, DOI: 10.1080/00344893.2020.1823461 Sheriff, M. Kaunain. 2020. NFHS data shows urban-rural, gender gaps in Internet use. Published at Indian Express. 14 December 2020. Available at: https://indianexpress.com/article/india/nfhs-data-shows-urban-rural-gender-gaps-in-internet-use-7103710/     [1] Acknowledgements: This article draws on the findings from a research study titled “Institutionalizing Online Citizen Consultation for Public Policymaking in India.” The study was undertaken by Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA) with support from the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL). The author was the Principal Investigator of the research study. [2] The lowest level of governance structure within a three-tier governance structure of the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in rural areas.     ■ Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay is the director of Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), a pioneer CSO, who has dedicated more than three decades to work on participation, democratic governance, and civil society development. He has twenty-five years of professional experience working with universities, research institutions, and CSOs. He serves on the Steering Committee of the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) and the Asia Democracy Network (ADN). He holds a Ph.D. degree in anthropology for his work with the Parhaiya tribes of Chotanagpur in India.     ■ Typeset by Juhyun Jun , Research Associate     For inquiries: 82 2 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | [email protected]   -

Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay 2022-05-31조회 : 16511