EAI는 아시아 지역의 민주적 거버넌스와 인권 증진에 관련된 연구를 진행하기 위해 2013년 11월 아시아민주주의연구네트워크(Asia Democracy Research Network: ADRN)를 발족했다. EAI는 국내 싱크탱크의 대표기관인 동시에 아시아 지역 싱크탱크의 직능대표로서 소속된 연구기관들의 민주주의 관련 연구지원 및 관리를 담당하고 있다.

ADRN은 아시아 지역이 직면한 민주주의 위협 요인을 분석하고 민주주의 전환 및 공고화에 기여할 수 있는 실무형 연구과제를 논의하고 확산하고자 창립되었다. ADRN은 연구에 기반한 정책 제시를 목표로 아시아 민주주의의 위협 요소와 당면과제를 점검하고 지역적 차원에서 바라보는 민주주의 발전을 위한 실천적 의제를 발굴하고 연구하고 있다. 네트워크에는 한국의 EAI를 비롯하여 대만, 말레이시아, 몽골, 미얀마, 방글라데시, 스리랑카, 인도, 인도네시아, 일본, 태국, 파키스탄, 필리핀 등 아시아 14개국 22개의 주요 싱크탱크들이 참여하고 있다. 

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[워킹페이퍼] Populism in Taiwan: a Bottom-up Model

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note For the second publication of the ADRN special working paper series, Dr. Chin-en Wu and Dr. Yun-han Chu, associate research fellow and distinguished research fellow of Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica explore populist movements in Taiwan. In their discussion, Dr. Wu and Dr. Chu analyze Taiwanese populist organizations and the environment that has contributed to their rise. In doing so, they argue that the “bottom-up model” of Taiwan is largely a “rejection” of the pro-mainland establishment and its attempts to “weaken Taiwan’s democracy.” They also add that the movement has room for improvement as they have not yet made “significant contributions to Taiwan’s political and social development.” In conclusion, Dr. Wu and Dr. Chu suggest that a “broad and inclusive definition of ‘the people’ is a better approach for the health of democracy.”     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   During President Ma’s terms, a series of social protests took place in Taiwan. These movements disapproved of the way the KMT was handling cross-strait relations, economic development, social justice, and environmental management. It is widely conceived among civil society organizations that the KMT, domestic big business, and multinational companies constitute a power bloc that rigs the economy and weakens Taiwan's democracy. The direct political results of these anti-establishment social movements were the creation of the White Force (WF) and the New Power Party (NPP). The leaders of both forces are political novices and opinion leaders of the social movements. These two political forces tend to assert a Manichean dualism of the corrupt elite and the pure masses.   Literature Review Mudde and Mudde and Kaltwasser consider populism a thin-centered ideology whose core idea is that a society consists of the pure and common people and the corrupt elite. The populist leaders claim that they represent the general will of the people rather than the special interests of the elite. Because of the thin ideology, populism is compatible with different ideologies and in different historical and geographical economic contexts. Weyland defines populism as a political strategy in which political leaders argue that they directly represent the will of the people. The relationship between the populist leaders and the common people is less institutionalized and more fluid. Thus, political movements that clearly make the distinction between the pure people and the corrupt elite and that claim to represent the interests of the ordinary people are often labeled as populist. Moreover, because populism condemns the corruption and ineffectiveness of representative sys-tems, they emphasize the importance of a direct relationship between leaders and the people. Thus, populists endorse many forms of direct democracy.   Populists and Their Demands Who Are the Populists? During President Ma’s terms in office, a series of social protests took place in Taiwan. Civil society organizations (CSOs) disapproved of the ruling KMT elites and their policies. These social movements railed against the coalition of the KMT, big business, and the model of economic development. The KMT government denoted an old regime that is politically, socially, and economically conservative. CSOs and the young generation tend to embrace progressive values and perceive the KMT’s policies as putting too much emphasis on economic growth and paying too little attention to distributive justice and environmental protection. The KMT governed Taiwan for seventy years, except for the short period between 2000 and 2008. Many members of CSOs fought for Taiwan’s democratic transition in the past, and so they do not like the KMT, especially the authoritarian legacy the present-day party inherited, such as the huge party assets and its close relationship with local factions. In addition, CSOs demand open government and greater civic participation in the government decision-making process. Moreover, they are uneasy with the closer economic relationship between Taiwan and China and the official interactions between the two sides. It is perceived that the KMT’s economic policies rely too heavily on the Chinese market. It is widely conceived in civil society that the KMT and big business groups, which invest heavily in China, form a coalition that rigs the economy and even tries to weaken Taiwan's vibrant democracy. The CSOs care about freedom and democracy and have a low level of trust in the KMT government, meaning they worry about the political implications of Taiwan’s economy increasingly relying on the Chinese market. A typical observation is that the big conglomerates monopolize local and cross-strait business, depriving ordinary people and the young generation of economic opportunities.   The Populist Issues and Agendas The social movements focus on a wide variety of social issues, ranging from ecology, distributive justice, human rights protection, judicial reform, and China's encroachment. They are based on many progressive social values or the so-called post-material values, and tend to embrace liberal democratic values. All of these movements disapprove of the way the KMT has handled cross-strait management, economic development, distributive justice, and environmental management. To a different degree, they also declare a Manichean dualism of corrupt elites and pure masses and perceive a failure of representative democracy. They focus individually on one particular social issue while in many cases expressing support for each other. These CSOs are independent and are not officially affiliated with any political party. They undertake a variety of direct actions such as marching, sit-ins, petitions, boycotts, and staging protests against the government and, in some cases, companies.   Absorbed into the Existing Political Sys-tem Both the NPP and the WF participate in elections and remain independent from the main political parties. The strong discontent against the ruling elites during President Ma’s second term contributed to the victory of the DPP, and the growth of the NPP and the WF. The DPP did not nominate candidates in those districts where the NPP nominated candidates, helping them win several seats. The NPP gained 6.11 percent of the votes and five seats from the total of 113 in the 2016 parliamentary elections, quickly becoming the third-largest party in the legislature. The main supporters of the two movements tend to be young people, liberal-minded people, and people who favor Taiwan’s independence or maintaining the status quo. Mayor Ko enjoyed quite high approval ratings in the first half of his term, especially among younger voters, although his approval ratings did decline in the second half. Ko received 57 percent of the vote in the 2014 Taipei mayoral elections, but only received 41 percent in the 2018 elections. Meanwhile, the NPP’s approval rating dropped from 14 percent in 2016 to 6 percent in late 2017.   Causes of the Rise of Populism Economic Reasons The first important underlying cause of the anti-establishment movement is that Taiwan’s economy has passed the high-income threshold. In the wake of globalization, manufacturing companies have moved to developing countries with abundant sources of labor, cheap land, and poor environmental regulations. Globalization benefits the people in developing countries and the skilled workers and elites in wealthy countries. Therefore, the working class and a significant portion of the middle class have “lost confidence in mainstream parties and established institutions.” Given this situation, some politicians have begun to blame developing countries for causing their economic problems. Along with rising globalization and advances in production automation, income inequality and unemployment rates in Taiwan have increased. The household income survey indicates that the country’s Gini coefficient was 0.337 in 2015. This number is roughly equal to those of Japan and South Korea and much lower than those of Hong Kong and Singapore. However, pre-redistribution incomes show that income inequality is becoming a serious problem in Taiwan. Moreover, overtime income inequality has also worsened. The income ratio of the fifth to ninety-fifth percentile was 1:33 in 1998, but rose to an alarming 1:99 in 2014. Compared to other major industrialized countries, Taiwan’s tax rates are relatively low, making it difficult to correct the unequal distribution of wealth and opportunity.   Political Issues On the other hand, the KMT still has some lingering authoritarian legacies. First, it still has huge party assets, which unlevels the playing field of elections. In each election, the KMT can easily outspend its rivals by transferring some of the party’s assets to finance the campaign. Next, the KMT tends to nominate candidates who are the children of prominent former government and party leaders. In primaries, the party leaders favor combining registered party member votes and district-wide opinion polling rather than solely relying on the latter. Under this mechanism, the party leaders can easily influence how registered party members vote. In addition, the KMT works comparatively more closely with local factions, and nominates people with criminal records. Related to this, a higher percentage of its candidates or vote brokers are prosecuted in legislative and local elections for vote buying. Finally, the KMT is reluctant to deal with some aspects of the historical interpretation and inheritance of its authoritarian past. These issues include releasing political archives, erasing authoritarian symbols, and addressing its party assets.   The China Factor The Blue-Green divide has been the main theme of Taiwan’s political development since 2000. Both camps fiercely compete to gain control of the state apparatus so that they can control the pace and direction of the cross-strait economic and political relationship. After 2008, President Ma’s administration sought a closer economic relationship with China. His government sequentially introduced direct air, sea, and postal links with mainland China, opened the door to mainland Chinese tourists, lifted the ban on inbound investment by mainland Chinese firms, and loosened the 40 percent cap on mainland-bound investment by listed companies. There is a strong sentiment among the opposition that cross-strait economic integration may eventually aggravate Taiwan’s economic vulnerability, facilitate Beijing’s political infiltration into Taiwanese society, and lead to the erosion of Taiwan’s autonomy. On the political side, President Ma embraced the “One China, Two Interpretations” policy, or the so-called 1992 Consensus. The Pan-Green camp believes the one-China policy constrains Taiwan’s international space. This social divide has historical roots, but the China factor plays a decisive role in aggravating it. The China factor includes the rising political and military power of China and the tightening controls initiated during President Xi’s term. Mainland China policies pursued by President Ma to encourage cross-strait economic integration further exacerbated the social divide.   The Influence of Populism upon Democracy Contributions of the Populist Movement As the literature has shown, the main threat of the top-down model of populist movements is that political leaders endorse democracy but not liberal democracy. The political elite tend to distrust representative democracy and the idea of checks and balances. In contrast, Taiwan’s populism is formed by autonomous civil society organizations which have launched several social movements. These movements have over time given rise to new political forces: the White Force and the NPP. As a bottom-up model of populism, Taiwan’s populism does not pose a threat to liberal democracy. All parties in Taiwan firmly believe in the superiority of democracy and embrace democratic principles. The KMT, the DPP, the WF, and the NPP have no intention of interrupting existing democratic norms. Both the NPP and the WF were absorbed into the existing political sys-tem by participating in elections and following democratic rules. At the individual level, as discussed above, popular support for liberal democracy in Taiwan is very high compared to other East Asian countries. Most populist supporters in Taiwan are liberal value holders and more likely to believe in the superiority of democracy. It is the threat from a closer KMT-Beijing relationship that sparks their fears. This movement in part aims to protect Taiwan’s democracy by forcing the government not to make deals with the communist regime and to pass the Supervision Act to regulate future trade negotiations. Those who strongly believe in liberal democratic values tend to feel the threat most forcibly. They ask for direct democracy and strong supervision of the government. In addition, a liberal orientation is also associated with a greater emphasis on equality and environmental protection. The populist issues essentially are associated with protecting and deepening democracy, so this movement is unlikely to damage democracy.   Potential Negative Influence This populist movement, however, also has some potential negative impacts on the functioning and governance of Taiwan’s democracy. These impacts include interference with the functioning of representative democracy, constraints on the profession of technocrats, and the oversimplification of certain problems, which we will discuss in turn. Because the newly revisited referendum law lowers the quorum requirement, ten referendum cases were voted upon in the 2018 local elections. This number is simply too high for people to understand, digest, and ultimately make decisions on. Moreover, such cases are proposed, deliberated, and voted upon within just two months. The current practice of direct democracy does not allow thorough social deliberation as can be seen in some matured democracies. Taiwan is a divided society with different national identities and views of the cross-strait political and economic relationship. Referendum questions often carry a dichotomous message and provide less room for compromise. For these identity-related issues, it might be better to deliberate and make compromises in representative institutions. Finally, the amended referendum law removes the power of the referendum reviewing committee, making it unable to check whether an initiative violates the constitution or confirm that its wording is understandable. The current referendum practice is an interesting experiment, but the institution needs to be carefully modified.   Conclusion Taiwan features a bottom-up model of populism. Taiwan’s populist movement is organized by autonomous civil society organizations. This movement has given rise to new political forces, the White Force and the New Power Party. The movement rejects the KMT’s handling of cross-strait management, economic development, distributive justice, and environmental management. It is widely believed among civil society that the KMT, domestic big business, and Taiwanese companies that invest heavily in China form a coalition that has rigged the economy and is trying to weaken Taiwan's democracy. Civil society organizations have staged several large-scale protests and were able to successfully block several government policies. As a bottom-up model, this movement has helped introduce several political reforms to level the political playing field and increase civic participation in decision making. In addition, a unique feature of Taiwan’s populism is that this movement in large part stems from fears over a close economic relationship between a small democracy and a great authoritarian power. Some of those who feel the threat most strongly are those who are liberal-minded. They seek to protect Taiwan’s democracy by forcing the government not to make any deals with a communist government. Popular support for liberal democracy is also high in Taiwan. The source of the populist movement and its bottom-up characteristics mean that this movement is unlikely to influence the stability of the country’s democracy. Instead, this movement has in the past few years made significant contributions to Taiwan’s political and social development. This populist movement, however, also has some potential negative impacts on the functioning and governance of democracy. These related issues include the functioning of representative democracy, technocratic governance, and oversimplification of the true problems.     Author’s Biography   Chin-en Wu is the associate research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, Taiwan. He received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Michigan. His main research interest includes the impact of economic development on political regime dynamics and how regime type influences economic performance. Yun-han Chu is Distinguished Research Fellow of Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica and Professor of Political Science at National Taiwan University. He serves concurrently as president of Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange. Professor Chu received his Ph. D. in political science from the University of Minnesota and joined the faculty of National Taiwan University in 1987.  

Chin-en Wu, Yun-han Chu 2019-07-09조회 : 13614
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[워킹페이퍼] South Korea’s Tamed Populism: Popular Protests From Below and Populist Politics from the Top

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note To start ADRN special working paper series on populism in Asia, EAI is publishing the South Korean case, written by Dr. Sook Jong Lee, Professor at Sungkyunkwan University and Former president of the East Asia Institute. Throughout this paper, Dr. Lee reviews and analyzes the issue of populism in the case of South Korea, and highlights specific cases of popular protests and populist politics to discuss the uniqueness of the Korean populism and its impacts on the country's democracy. She argues that the South Korean populism is not the same as that of Europe and South America, where charismatic populists and majority rule remain dominant. Yet it does share many core elements of populism in the following ways: anti-elitism that grants decisions of the plebiscite more legitimacy than those of the elite; a political discourse centered on moral grounds; and a movement that is largely flamed by rising economic inequality. What makes populism in South Korea unique, she suggests, is that “South Korea’s vertical populism can largely be characterized as ‘tamed populism’ with more positive than negative results” compared to most populist movements in Western democracies.     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   The rise of populism throughout the world has drawn much attention. Rightist populism in advanced economies, including many European countries and the US in particular, has alarmed democracy researchers. Foa and Mounk have coined the phrase “deconsolidation of democracy” to describe the dangerous trend of declining support for democracy in the US. Many scholars have attributed the difficulties of governing to economic decline and divisive migration issues, and they argue that poor government performance in dealing with these issues has delegitimized many democracies. Regardless of whether we characterize the situation as a more sustained decline or merely a temporary setback, the current crisis of democracy in the West is not only threatening democracy at home but also contributing to a global downturn of democracy. Domestically, populist protests and the successful entry of populist parties into legislatures are undermining the political stability of European democracies. Trumpism has transformed already polarized American politics into tribalism, with members of opposite sides treating their opponents as enemies. This rightist populism is antagonistic to transnational institutions as well as international rules and norms. As politically disrupted democracies fail to actively promote the liberal international order, authoritarian states have become emboldened in breaking international rules and expanding their influence, and Western democracies have ceased to make unified efforts to support democracy throughout the world.   Concepts and Functions of Populism While populism has been discussed avidly over the last decade, the concept of populism is quite messy in terms of its degree of applicability to diverse forms of political mobilization. According to Kaltwasser et al., the term populism was first used to describe the nineteenth century political movement that spanned both sides of the Atlantic and later emerged in Latin America in the early twentieth century. Kaltwasser et al. state that scholarship on populism began to expand in the 1950s, with research increasing greatly during and after the 1990s. Populism became a pejorative term understood to mean political decay. However, the history of populist movements and even the diversity found in contemporary populism defy this negative description. Populism usually damages established political institutions, but at the same time, it can lead to further democratization of governing sys-tems. Therefore, it seems to be more productive to approach populism without prior judgement and to examine its context and impacts.   The Case of South Korea South Korean politics do not necessarily merit the label of populism per se if one employs a populist model based solely on the experiences of European or Latin American societies. There have been neither clear economic divides nor ethnic or other cultural divides that have led to explosive popular protests or movements. “Populism” has a negative connotation in South Korea, and is usually applied to irresponsible public policies which waste taxpayer money. Politicians often attack one another by charging that their position is populist. Although the government and political parties in South Korea certainly engage in populist redistributive politics, the degree to which they do so is not excessive. What is distinctive about South Korea is its vertical structure of political populism from both below and above. For the operational definition of populism in the Korean context, I will define populism as “politics expressing the popular will of the people both by the people and by the leaders.” South Korean populist politics can be led by people mobilized from below and they can also be maneuvered by the powerful. Since populism is used as a neutral term, its impact on the quality of Korean democracy differs depending on the situation.   Popular Protests from Below Like many other democracies, Korean society is also plagued by rising inequality. People are anxious and extremely sensitive to the perceived lack of social mobility. They also view their society as ridden with high levels of social conflict; between the rich and poor, employers and employees, conservatives and progressives, older and younger generations, men and women, and so on. There are growing populist attitudes among South Koreans as they lose patience with their political sys-tem and become more prone to take to the streets to protest. Beetham argues there are three dimensions necessary to deem power as legitimate: conformity to rules that have legal validity, the presence of justifiable rules in terms of shared beliefs, and legitimation through expressed consent. Rules are upheld not just for their impartial application but also for their end result improving welfare and embodying social justice. In Korean society, the justifiability of rules is often challenged since many people believe that the rich and powerful can bend them as they please. This sense of injustice exists as the undercurrent of resentment against the hereditarily privileged class such as chaebol families. Chaebols are conglomerates controlled by a founding family and passed from one generation to another. These economically powerful conglomerates have repeatedly colluded with government and political leaders who have the regulatory power to influence their businesses.   The SOFA Revision Candlelight Protests Following the outbreak of the Korean War and subsequent influx of American soldiers, the Korean government signed a new wartime Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that recognized the exclusive jurisdiction of the US Military Tribunal over crimes committed by US troops on Korean soil. This unequal SOFA was modified through a series of revisions in 1967, 1991, and 2001 in order to put South Korea and the US on more equal footing. While South Korea had jurisdiction over most crimes committed by American soldiers while off duty, crimes committed while on duty were handed over to the US military for adjudication.   The Mad Cow Disease Candlelight Protests The so-called “mad cow disease candlelight protests” bear more populist features than the SOFA protests described above. On April 18 2008, the Lee Myung-bak government struck a deal with the US to lower the inspection criteria for imported American beef. It was agreed that nearly all parts of American beef from cows aged less than thirty months would be imported without inspections, while the import of specified risky portions of beef from cows aged thirty months and over would be inspected. Students, mothers with young babies, consumers, and people from all walks of life took to the streets to voice their opposition to this decision. Candlelight protests continued for more than two months, subdued only after the government renegotiated the beef import deal with the American government, and the presidential aids in the Blue House were reshuffled after taking the blame for the unpopular policy. The media report broadcast by MBC on the program “PD Diary,” which discussed the potential dangers of American cows with this disease, contributed to the ignition of public fear. Rumors and unscientific claims went viral. Public officials and some doctors tried to assuage the baseless fears of the public, but were no match for those who believed the fake news.   The Choi Soon-sil Gate and Park Impeachment Candlelight Protests The so-called Choi Soon-sil Gate was unique compared to other South Korean government corruption cases in the past. Its impact was huge, leading to the unprecedented impeachment of incumbent President Park Geun-hye. The candlelight protests lasted from October of 2016 to March 2017, which drew the biggest number of people onto the streets. The protests were able to avoid descending into violence despite their massive scale and long duration. The story began in late July 2016 when TV Chosun reported suspicious Blue House involvement in the raising of funds to establish the Mir and K Sports Foundations. It was Hankyoreh News that revealed Choi Soon-sil as President Park’s close confidante and exposed her involvement in the fundraising process for these two foundations. The report quickly drew public attention to this previously unknown woman, which exploded as media outlets competed to bring to light stories about the relationship between Choi and President Park. Whether the stories were true or not, a significant number of people who used to support Park began to turn their backs on her. How could Choi, a private citizen, intervene in government affairs using her close ties with the aloof President? The very idea was enough to anger the public. When it was exposed that Choi had used her money to gain admission for her daughter to a prestigious university, Choi became the embodiment of the corrupt rich in the public eye. Cable TV outlet JTBC reported on October 24 that they had discovered Choi’s tablet PC, which became the smoking gun of her involvement in the fundraising scandal. This prompted people to hold candles on streets in an expression of their anger over the injustice. The first protest on October 29 drew several thousand people, and later protests grew to a crowd of more than one million. One estimate stated that about sixteen million people participated in the twenty total candlelight protests. The protests soon developed into a movement calling for Park’s impeachment. Faced with this popular pressure, the legislature voted to impeach on December 9, 2016, a parliamentary decision that was upheld by the Constitutional Court on March 10, 2017. Progressive civil society organizations and labor unions provided leadership, but spontaneous grassroots participation was the key to sustaining the peaceful popular protests.   Populist Politics from the Top The Politics of Eradicating “Accumulated Evils” The current Moon Jae-in administration was launched in May 2017 after presidential elections were held seven months early following the impeachment of former President Park. After winning the election as an extension of the reform-driven candlelight movement, the Moon administration launched a political drive to eradicate the wrongdoings of previous governments. Dubbing them “accumulated evils,” public investigations were launched into a number of cases involving former high-ranking public officials. A series of prosecutorial investigations have been widely criticized by conservative media as political reprisals, while progressive outlets have praised them as long overdue. Following her impeachment, Park was imprisoned on March 31, 2017, and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison and a fine of twenty billion KRW (approximately eighteen million USD) by the higher court on August 24, 2018. The majority of the public did not view the ruling as unfair, although legal controversy has remained over the bribery of a third party, i.e., Choi, by conglomerates under Park’s influence. The drive to “root out accumulated evils” also reopened the bribery case of another former president. On September 6, 2017, the court sentenced former President Lee Myung-bak to twenty years in prison and a fine of fifteen billion KRW (approximately fourteen million USD) for taking bribes, taking money from a company he had denied ownership of, and other similar crimes. He was imprisoned on March 24 2018 and released shortly thereafter on bail. The unfortunate imprisonments did not stop with these two presidents. Former public officials who had been involved in several controversial policies were also investigated and charged. Some deserved this, but others did not.   Conclusion In this paper, I argue that it is difficult to categorize South Korean politics as the type of populism typically found in Latin America or Europe. There have been no signs of charismatic populist leaders or parties. There is no such conspicuous horizontal populism wherein the majority rules over the minority within society. Radical rightists and leftists alike treat each other as enemies, and achieving political compromise between them is nearly impossible. Nevertheless, this chasm does not form a horizontal structure of populism since both groups are part of mainstream society. On the other hand, South Korea shares the essential element of anti-elite populism where the decisions of the plebiscite have more legitimacy than decisions made by the elite, and political discourse is centered on moral debates of right and wrong. Major public decisions need to be legitimized by popular support, which causes political leaders to seek more direct ties and emotional rapport with their supporters. Korean populism is primarily vertical, flowing in both directions between the government and the people.     Author’s Biography Sook Jong Lee is the professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan University and former president of the East Asia Institute. She has been directing the Asian Democracy Research Network since its formation in 2015, leading a network of about 19 research organizations across Asia to promote democracy with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed. 2016), and Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013 and 2016).

이숙종 2019-07-02조회 : 8958
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[워킹페이퍼] Access to Clean and Safe Water in Yangon: A Case of Municipal Water Provision in Insein Township

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Executive Summary The provision of safe and reliable water supply is important to all urban dwellers. Actually, urban water supply sys-tems aim to be a safe and reliable water supply for all urban residents. But the municipal water supply with improved public hygiene is still inadequate even in the major cities of Yangon and Mandalay. This research aims to explore the challenges facing the current water supply in Yangon, particularly at the township level. It will also identify the factors that hinder the sustainable supply of water at the township level.   Quotes from the Paper Background of the Study Access to clean and safe water remains a pressing issue since Yangon is undergoing rapid economic growth which is likely to result in fast-paced urbanization. These two factors combined are expected to further stress the water supply sys-tem and its alternatives. The same could also exasperate differences in services among areas in the same townships. Yangon City comprises 33 townships. Insein, one of the townships, was selected for this study partly because of its relatively higher urban population compared to other townships. Statement of the Research Problem Access to clean and safe water is an urgent issue in Yangon. Little research has been done on the subject, especially at the township level. This study aims to provide in-depth information on the case of Insein Township with the hope of coming up with actions and strategies that can be implemented to provide sustainable access and/or supply for residents in this area as well as Yangon City in general. Research Questions This study aims to answer the following questions.       a)   What are the current water supply challenges in Insein Township?       b)   What are the factors that hinder the sustainable supply of water in the township?       c)   What are some of the strategies and actions that can be implemented in both the short and long-term to improve access to clean and safe water in Insein Township and Yangon City in general?   Author Another Development (AD) is a local Myanmar think-tank and a non-profit organization. The motto of the organization is “DIGNITY, PROSPERITY and COOPERATION” and the programs we anticipate rolling out in the coming five years reflect these principles. There are five themes that AD is focusing on: Human Rights, Multiculturalism, Decentralization and Federalism, Rural Economic Development and Social Enterprises, and E-government and E-citizen. AD was set up to be part of the solution to the problems and conflicts prevailing in Myanmar by advocating effective public policy change.    

Another Development 2019-01-30조회 : 8981
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[워킹페이퍼] Civic Engagement between MP and their Regional Community

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Introduction Members of Parliament (MPs) have three major responsibilities, including the responsibility to represent their constituencies. This means MPs are responsible for helping and protecting the people who voted for them in accordance with the existing law and their authority. As representatives, MPs have to present the people’s needs and difficulties to the government. This task can be effectively carried out through actions such as approving laws required for the country and monitoring the government instead of the people. Therefore, MPs need to strengthen their activities on their representative duty. MPs also need support and assistance to be effective representatives. Moreover, there is also need to upgrade the capacities of MPs as well as their support staff. In order for MPs to be effective representatives, it is necessary for them to improve their level of knowledge on topics such as understanding the existing political situation through the voters, the role of Parliament and representatives, and citizen rights and responsibilities. By increasing their own awareness on these topics, citizens can also collaborate with MPs, evaluate and criticize the performance of Members of Parliament and the government, monitor the government through MPs and participate and contribute to the legislation process. Only if those needs, between members of Parliaments, can be fulfilled, transparency, accountability, responsibility and collaboration can be strengthened. Only if those representative duties are carried out effectively, regional development can be progressed more and more.   Author The Open Myanmar Initiative (OMI) is a nonprofit organization promoting the right to information and education. The OMI is the first ever independent political think-tank in Myanmar and they try to play an important role to formulate policy studies and recommendations on various political issues and provide them to policy makers, political parties, civil society organizations and general population through various delivery sys-tems, including publishing, using social media networks, providing trainings and public talks, organizing seminars and conferences, as well as direct engagement with Members of Parliament and the Government Ministers.    

Open Myanmar Initiative 2019-01-21조회 : 8852
워킹페이퍼
[워킹페이퍼] The Boom in Unregistered Private Cars in Kachin State

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Executive Summary This research focuses on the use of unregistered cars in Myitkyina, Kachin State. From 2001, the military government artificially supported the domestic car industry. However, this did not last long, and the monopoly on vehicle import licenses led to a boom in the black market. Short supply and high demand meant that the secondhand car market in Myanmar was one of the most expensive in the world. This paper will explore the situation and the reasons for the increased use of unregistered private cars. Significantly, the import trend started in 2011 with the liberalization of car import procedures. Although the use of private cars in Kachin State has increased enormously, the amount of tax revenue remains stagnant because of an increase in unregistered vehicles . This rise led to the State Parliament agreeing to a proposal in 2016 to offer registration to unregistered car owners, but this could not be implemented because of the limited legislative power at the state level. A registered car costs five times more than an unregistered one, and at least four unregistered cars are driven to Myitkyina every day. The number of people who bought an unregistered car in 2017 is the highest of any year so far, and the briefly imposed travel restrictions on unregistered vehicles are no longer being implemented. The unreasonable cost of registering a vehicle is forcing people to choose affordability over the risk that the car could be taken away, but the huge number of illegally imported cars deprive the Union of vital tax revenue. According to the 2015 Motor Vehicle Law, the term “motor vehicle” refers to a vehicle with wheels using mechanical or electrical power or any other energy to move. Thus, it includes all kinds of vehicles such as motor cycles, motor cars and other vehicles. This research, however, will only focus on cars: using an unregistered car is against the relatively recent Motor Vehicle Law that was passed in 2015.   Author Naushawng Development Institute (NDI) is an independent, non-profit education and development organization founded on April 9th2009 by Kachin scholars committed to strengthening democracy and community development in northern Myanmar. NDI contributes to democratic transition, peace building and sustainable development in Myanmar through training; education; advocacy; research and policy development analysis, as well as networking.    

Naushawng Development Institute 2019-01-17조회 : 8781
워킹페이퍼
[워킹페이퍼] Library Use and Information Seeking Behavior of Public Library at Mandalay

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Abstract Public libraries improve the quality of life in communities and are centers that offer financial and social benefits for community development. This study aims to describe how people perceive public libraries and how the characteristics of libraries and the people in a community influence library use. Data is collected from purposive samples of thirteen librarians, eighteen users and twenty-seven non-users in Mandalay through in-depth interviews and participant observation at libraries. The information that different types of users need is determined by their respective personal profiles. The majority of non-users rely on the Internet, newspapers, radio and TV to fulfill their information needs. These resources provide fast and easy access to rich data sources. Whereas library users seek information from both libraries and the resources listed above, they seek information from printed books more frequently than the Internet or social media because data from printed books is more reliable than data online sources. However, there is a group of non-users who are unwilling to seek information from any of these sources. The study finds that those users and non-users who are elderly, female, married and middle-aged workers have the greatest difficult in accessing libraries compared to others. In addition, people have difficulty accessing libraries because they struggle to make a living and do not read as a hobby. The study also finds that library use correlates with the location of the library and how well-known it is. Library activities and the presence of Wi-Fi attract more people. Moreover, technology and entertainment have a high impact on the use of libraries. Finally, users perceive they gain social, financial, physical, mental and cognitive benefits by using libraries at the individual , community and country levels.  Key words: Public library, Information needs, Use of library, Impacts, Mandalay, Library use   Author Yone Kyi Yar was founded by university students and active youth in Mandalay on 22nd July, 2011. At first, its main activities were weekly book clubs, group discussion and topic presentations. At the end of 2013, members of Yone Kyi Yar decided to take another step forward. Then, Yone Kyi Yar rent a building and founded a free public library and training center in Mandalay to serve the community better. Then it also expanded new activities such as intellectual talks and capacity building trainings.    

Yone Kyi Yar Knowledge Propagation Society 2019-01-03조회 : 8818
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[워킹페이퍼] Public Opinion on the Yangon Bus Sys-tem and its Reform

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Executive Summary It is obvious that, in comparison with other regional countries, the overall political and living conditions of the Burmese people were explicitly left behind for over 60 years due to the rule of the military-backed dictatorship. Since the country’s 2010 transition to democracy, the desire and passion of the citizens to develop and catch up to international trends has only grown, reaching a peak around time of the NLD’s election triumph in 2015. The Yangon School of Political Science (YSPS) conducted a public opinion poll on the recently established Yangon Bus Sys-tem and came up with the optimism of its users and willingness to contributing to proceeding further reform measures such as national development and cities development by the users and the people.   Quotes from the Paper Introduction The strong will of the people to achieve higher national development and make progress in raising the country’s socioeconomic status was observed in the case of the reform of the Public Transportation Sys-tem initiated by the Yangon Regional government in early 2016. People were largely dissatisfied with the performance of the old sys-tem (Ma Hta Tha), and their desperation for something better allowed them to be swept away by the spreading news of the impending Yangon Bus Sys-tem at that time. However, since its introduction, the newly established (YBS) sys-tem has revealed some of innate structural weaknesses, especially in terms of the bus schedules and route maps. In spite of that, people were quite willing to endure these initial hardships as they remembered the struggles of the previous sys-tem held out hope that the reform had the potential to improve the situation. Research Methodology Yangon School of Political Science did a survey on the opinions of commuters who ride Yangon Buses. The survey was conducted to the best of our capacity, although financial and human resource limitations, as well as the limited availability of respondents, may have impacted the results. Surveyors visited crowded places, public squares and bus stops in Yangon and asked commuters who were willing to answer and had enough time to respond to the survey questions. A total of fifteen survey questions were answered by five hundred respondents. Yangon School of Political Science employed some questions from public transportation research in other countries and developed others tailored to the Yangon Bus Sys-tem to create the questionnaire. In addition, YSPS interviewed MPs from Yangon Regional Parliament, some directors from bus line companies, and some representatives from public transportation groups in order to collect additional opinions from a variety of perspectives on the changes to the public bus sys-tem. However, YSPS was unable to observe the implementation of instructions by the Yangon Regional government and policy making sessions because of limited access to information and a lack of transparency. This lack of access was unfortunate as we consider these observations necessary to gain a truly insightful understanding of the changes to the Yangon Bus Sys-tem. As a result, YSPS chose to focus on the improvements to the public bus sys-tem and examine public opinion regarding these changes. Recommendations on YBS Sys-tem YRTA should copy the reform of Seoul Bus Sys-tem and Tai Chun Bus Sys-tem. Before the Seoul Bus Reform, the mayor of it studied the problems and conducted a public policy research. After two years, his research report was publicized and the new sys-tem was based on its findings and got lessons learned. And also Taichun government allowed all the stake holders of Taichun Bus transportation to participate in the discussions for the reform. So their reforms were successful in a very short time and all stake holders followed the reform schemes. Another lesson from their reform is that the Seoul government gave incentive to bus owners and drivers for their better services. So YRTA should create some incentives to bus owners for investing in public companies like reducing their income tax and bus drivers for better service like giving bonus. The government should anticipate how private owned buses ought to be replaced and improved for better bus services. Improvement of bus services could hurt the owners of low quality buses as their business shall be stopped. The government should consider how to compensate them.   Author The Yangon School of Political Science(YSPS) is an academic institution which will be delivering knowledge to transform Burma into Free, Just and Tolerant society with informed, liberated and empowered citizenry. YSPS is a leading front in liberal philosophical movement and research, as part of the global movement towards the same end.    

Yangon School of Political Science 2018-12-27조회 : 12346
워킹페이퍼
[워킹페이퍼] Issues and Opportunities for Young Women’s Empowerment in Myanmar

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Introduction Myanmar is now in democratic transition. Historically, women's participation in politics is weak in Myanmar. Since independence, a limited number of women have taken decision-making and leading roles. Military dominance in politics explains why Myanmar's politics are so heavily dominated by men. Gender stereotypes are culturally deeply embedded. The majority of the population, including women themselves, accepts these culturally dictated gender roles. According to the 2014 Myanmar census, women are over 51% of the population in Myanmar and over 52% of people who can work are women. However, about 50% of women in that group are unemployed. As a training and research institute, Sandhi Governance Institute aims to understand the realities of women in the community, such as the current economic and social situations of young women, the relationships between education levels and social standards as well as economic opportunities in different areas of the country. In other words, Sandhi is exploring issues and opportunities for the empowerment of young women (between the ages of 18 to 35) who are potential leaders both in the political and the development sectors of the country. Thus, research on issues and opportunities for young women's empowerment was conducted by the training participants of Sandhi's women's leadership training for young women (from 18 to 35 years old) program. These participants come from political parties and civil society organizations and through this research they sought to understand how things are going with young women in their places of origin. In assessing the current situation, participants also looked for ways the young women in these communities can be empowered effectively, either by themselves or by local and international organizations as well as the government. This empowerment will contribute to the economic development of Myanmar in the country's transition to democracy. It is expected that this report, which reviews the findings on the current situations of young women in Myanmar and offers recommendations for how to empower them, can be instrumental for policy makers as well as international and local organizations that are interested in providing effective and substantive support to empower young women in Myanmar.   Author Sandhi Governance Institute was founded by two public policy graduates in 2007 and it was registered as private consultancy firm in 2008. Since that time, it has been conducting various development, governance, public policy and political trainings. In addition, it also carries out research on youth and employment opportunities, political parties and civil society.    

Sandhi Governance Institute 2018-12-24조회 : 8827