EAI는 아시아 지역의 민주적 거버넌스와 인권 증진에 관련된 연구를 진행하기 위해 2013년 11월 아시아민주주의연구네트워크(Asia Democracy Research Network: ADRN)를 발족했다. EAI는 국내 싱크탱크의 대표기관인 동시에 아시아 지역 싱크탱크의 직능대표로서 소속된 연구기관들의 민주주의 관련 연구지원 및 관리를 담당하고 있다.

ADRN은 아시아 지역이 직면한 민주주의 위협 요인을 분석하고 민주주의 전환 및 공고화에 기여할 수 있는 실무형 연구과제를 논의하고 확산하고자 창립되었다. ADRN은 연구에 기반한 정책 제시를 목표로 아시아 민주주의의 위협 요소와 당면과제를 점검하고 지역적 차원에서 바라보는 민주주의 발전을 위한 실천적 의제를 발굴하고 연구하고 있다. 네트워크에는 한국의 EAI를 비롯하여 대만, 말레이시아, 몽골, 미얀마, 방글라데시, 스리랑카, 인도, 인도네시아, 일본, 태국, 파키스탄, 필리핀 등 아시아 14개국 22개의 주요 싱크탱크들이 참여하고 있다. 

논평이슈브리핑
[ADRN 이슈브리핑] Thailand`s 2019 General Election: Post-Election Uncertainties and Trust Concerns

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ 본 ADRN 이슈브리핑 원문 보기 및 PDF 다운로드는 ADRN 웹사이트를 통해 이용 가능합니다.  [바로가기]  편집자 주 Thailand's general election was held on March 24, 2019. Its new electoral rules based on the 2017 constitution remain controversial due to several political issues related to civic trust and majority representation. According to Thawilwadee Bureekul, Director of Research and Development Office at King Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI), the constitutional amendment has enabled the Thai military to exert stronger influence over the National Assembly. KPI's public opinion polls, administered before and after the 2019 general election, also show that the level of public trust in the Thailand Election Commission has declined consecutively since 2016. On the basis of these observations, Dr. Bureekul argues that "public bitterness with the new electoral process is likely to grow throughout the coming years" and requires government attention.     Introduction Thailand’s general election held on March 24, 2019 is representative of an ongoing battle between its pro-military and pro-democratic forces, and indicative of yet another culmination to the democratic transition which had preceded the 2014 military coup. While the election rallied 51,239,638 eligible voters and the voter turnout reached 74.69 percent, its modified electoral process on the basis of the 2017 constitution has been a subject of critical debate among democratic scholars and policymakers. With alleged voting irregularities and delays in the release of official results, Thailand’s constitutional amendment raises several important questions. This paper, in particular, expands on whether the changes in the electoral process inflicted by the 2017 constitution enable the Thai public to properly elect Members of Parliament (PM) and the Prime Minister (PM) based on their majority support. It also supplements the overall discussion with findings from public surveys conducted by King Prajadhipok’s Institute before and after the 2019 general election in Thailand.   Do the Elected Members Represent Majority Public Support? The 2019 general election in Thailand was the first of its kind since the promulgation of the 2017 constitution. Unlike its predecessor from 1997, the 2017 constitution introduces a new voting system where instead of marking two parallel ballots—one for the constituency Member of Parliament (MP) and another for the political party—voters are asked to cast a “mixed-member apportionment” with a single vote for both the candidate and the party. The constitutional amendment has consequently impacted the proportion of seats allocated to different political parties within the National Assembly. From a total of 500 seats within the Lower House, 350 are determined directly by a casting of vote while the remaining 150 are allocated to the respective political parties of the elected MPs in proportion to their nationwide number of votes. Without separate ballots being cast for party-list seats, the amendment hence provides many smaller parties political advantage while limiting majoritarian parties with higher general public support from gaining access to the reserved 150 seats. These changes in the electoral process, however, have led to several controversie surrounding the 2019 general election. Firstly, compared to prior elections, the Election Commission (EC) had more difficulties in reviewing and tabulating the votes because they had to determine whether the 350 constituencies complied with the newly adopted constitution. Based on the constituency count, the EC then calculated the 150 seats based on Article 128 of the 2018 Organic Act on the Election of the House of Representatives, whose methods bear uncertainties (Allen Hicken 2020). Official results were finally announced on May 8—45 days following the election—after which the general public still held speculations as to whether the results displayed accurate representation of their votes. Secondly, due to how the 150 seats were allocated, a coalition government comprised of more than 20 smaller parties was formed whereas other larger parties did not receive as many seats correspondent to their greater and wider public support. For instance, the Pheu Thai party of former PM Thaksin Shinawatra was deemed ineligible for any of the 150 seats since it had won more constituency seats than those available for the party-list. Another example addresses the anti-military and relatively newly formed Future Forward Party (FFP), which was on its track to become Thailand’s third largest political party with 5.3 million vote counts. Unfortunately, however, its leader Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit was disqualified from the elections due to media ownership allegations submitted by the EC. Critics therefore continue to question the implications behind the new electoral rules and whether they have been implemented to prevent larger sized parties from potentially threatening the military’s political leverage. Another issue that stems from the 2017 Constitution is the way in which the Prime Minister (PM) was elected. According to the new constitution, the PM is elected by the combined National Assembly, which includes both the Upper and Lower Houses. However, the respective electoral amendments also dictate that the 250 senators who comprise the Upper house be appointed by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) which lies largely under the control of Thailand’s military and the royal family. Such stipulation hence provides 250 non-elected members to exercise significant influence over the election of the Prime Minister (PM), since only 126 Lower House members are needed to determine majority support. With the Lower House comprised of around 20 smaller parties and the Upper House staffed with senators appointed by the military, the pro-military General Prayut Chan-o-cha was elected as PM as a result of the 2019 general election.   Public Perception of the 2019 General Election As aforementioned, the 2019 general election calls for a critical review of Thailand’s 2017 constitution and its electoral process. These issues are also supplemented by the public’s relatively negative perception regarding the election. For instance, survey findings indicate that a higher number of citizens were skeptical of vote buying behavior occurring at the 2019 general election. According to the 2019 pre-election survey by the King Prajadhipok’s Institution (KPI), 35.3 percent of the respondents believed that there would be vote buying instances in the election compared to the 14.9 percent who responded that there would be no occurrence of such behavior. From the 35.3 percent who believed in vote buying behavior, 14.2 percent stated that it would increase with the coming election (King Prajadhipok’s Institution 2019). Furthermore, according to the Election Commission, a total of 590 cases of citizen complaints were reported following the general election, from which 79 cases were submitted to the central EC office, 59 cases were reported in Bangkok, and 41 from Nakorn Rajsima. One of the major issues related to the complaints was the qualification of the MP candidates (Election Commission 2020). In fact, according to the 2020 survey by the KPI, 38 percent of the voters based their selection on the political party’s policy while 8.2 percent did so on the candidates’ reputation (King Prajadhipok’s Institution 2020). The results prompt further discussions on how to increase the qualifications of the candidates especially in the context of the new electoral process; without two separate ballots being cast for the constituency and the party, voters are now urged to make a strict selection between their preferred candidate and the political party of their choice. Finally, citizen trust in the Election Commission continues to show a decreasing trend since 2016. While over 60.8 percent of the respondents to KPI’s pre-election survey said that they trust Thailand’s Election Commission (Figure 1), this shows a 5.6 percent point decrease compared to 2018, and a 10.1 percent point fall since 2016 (Figure 2) (King Prajadhipok’s Institute 2019). The findings are also significant in that the citizen trust level showed a continuously rising trend prior to 2016, after which discussions related to the 2017 constitution gained more traction.   Figure 1: Trust in the Thailand Election Commission (2019) Source: King Prajadhipok’s Institute (2019).   Figure 2: Trust in the Thailand Election Commission (2002-2019) Source: King Prajadhipok’s Institute (2019).   Conclusion The 2019 general election in Thailand has significantly altered the nation’s political landscape, which had been under democratic transition prior to the 2014 military coup. With the 2017 constitution as its backbone, the new electoral process has successfully borne a coalition government of smaller-sized parties in the Lower House of the National Assembly that do not possess the capacity to threaten the pro-military government. The government also has strong foundational support from its non-elected, appointed members of the Upper House, as well as from the newly elected pro-military Prime Minister. In addition to international observers who have questioned the impartiality of the overall election, the Thai public portrays a negative public perception towards the 2019 general election. Most importantly, survey findings by the King Prajadhipok’s Institute before and after the election infer that civic trust in the Thailand Election Commission has been continuously decreasing since 2016 and 2017, which coincide with the promulgation of the 2017 constitution. Furthermore, the Thai public has been noting the lack of qualifications among the political candidates and has not been shy to file complaints regarding their relative inaptitude. Finally, because the 2017 constitution limits their votes to one ballot—for both the constituency and the party—public bitterness with the new electoral process is likely to grow throughout the coming years.     ■저자: Thawilwadee Bureekul is Director of Research and Development Office at King Prajadhipok’s Institute, Thailand. She used to serve as the National Reform Steering Committee, the National Reform Council and the Constitutional Drafting Assembly. Her current academic interest lies in the field of good governance and gender equity, such as participatory and gender responsive budgeting, preparation of action plan for leadership development and women’s participation in politics and decision-making, and gender-responsive local development planning and budgeting manual. She has been heavily dedicated to conducting research projects related to democracy, good governance, social quality, public participation, public policy, and voting behaviors. In 2015, she was awarded a prestigious award given to a woman with outstanding performance by the National Council of Women of Thailand. She also succeeded in proposing “Gender Responsive Budgeting” in Thai Constitution and was presented with the “Women of the Year 2018” award from the Association for the Promotion of the Status of Women accordingly.   ■ 담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구원             문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]     [EAI이슈브리핑]은 국내외 주요 사안에 대해 다양한 분야의 전문가들이 심층적인 분석을 통해 의견을 개진하고 정책적 제언을 발표할 수 있는 담론의 장을 마련하고자 기획된 시리즈입니다. 인용할 때에는 반드시 출처를 밝혀주시기 바랍니다. EAI는 어떠한 정파적 이해와도 무관한 독립 연구기관입니다. EAI가 발행하는 보고서와 저널 및 단행본에 실린 주장과 의견은 EAI와는 무관하며 오로지 저자 개인의 견해임을 밝힙니다.   "IMG_3855" by Shafquat Towheed is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0

: Thawilwadee Bureekul 2020-02-20조회 : 10653
논평이슈브리핑
[ADRN 이슈브리핑] Existential Threats and Democracy: 2020 Taiwan Presidential Election

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ 본 ADRN 이슈브리핑 원문 보기 및 PDF 다운로드는 ADRN 웹사이트를 통해 이용 가능합니다.  [바로가기]  편집자 주 The 2020 presidential election saw victory for the Tsai Ing-wen administration and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). According to Chin-en Wu, an associate research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, the theme for the 2020 election was “existential threats.” Taiwanese politics embody a complicated domestic rivalry between the pan-blue and pan-green coalitions as well as a constant struggle against Chinese influence. DPP’s victory in the election portrays the Taiwanese people’s determination to protect Taiwan’s political freedom and identity from external threats, and especially those that emanate from China. However, in the process of winning votes and the hearts of the Taiwanese public, DPP, too, has pushed forward political agenda such as the Anti-Infiltration Act that sometimes limits freedom of speech and individual rights. Elections in Taiwan, including the 2020 presidential election, hence provide foods for thought regarding its liberal democratic system and democratic future.     Taiwan is a divided society in which two groups of people with different national identities live on the same island. One group wants to establish a Taiwan-centric country. Under the current international power structure, this group is willing to accept the banner of the Republic of China (ROC). The other group wants to maintain the ROC and its cultural and historical connotations. Their interpretation of Taiwanese and Modern Chinese history and culture is different. Because of such difference in identity between the two groups, presidential election in Taiwan is not only about choosing a president but also about choosing a country, whether it is Taiwan or China. After each party turnover, the new ruling party seeks to re-interpret history and culture. Because of the clash between national identities, presidential election is emotionally tense. Parties often accuse the other side of treason, for selling Taiwan, or for even eliminating ROC. However, the main political parties are similar in their socio-economic policies. They heavily rely on writing checks for public construction and social welfare with limited interest in economic structural reforms.   Existential Threats Existential threat is the main theme of Taiwan's 2020 elections. Although popular support for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) plummeted following its landslide defeat in the late 2018 mayoral election, there has been a quick turn of events. In a speech in early 2019, Xi Jinping argued that unification is the ultimate goal for China with the “one country, two systems” as its backbone and the use of force as an option. This led to an elevated sense of existential threat among the Taiwanese and President Tsai Ing-wen swiftly and firmly fought back against the statement, which helped raise her approval rating. Xi’s speech and President Tsai’s following actions caused the Kuomintang (KMT)’s less confrontational mainland policy to lose its appeal. A massive democratic protest also took place in Hong Kong in mid-2019 to accompany these events. Many Taiwanese are worried that China’s encroachment will destroy Taiwan’s sovereignty and democracy. DPP has hence been using the perception of the Chinese threat, Taiwan’s rights to deny China’s demands and the protection of Taiwan’s freedom and democracy as the main messages of its election campaign. DPP’s political messages have helped to boost their votes, especially among the young voters and educated urban dwellers.  Another existential threat comes from concerns among the pan-blue supporters regarding the survival of the ROC. For these supporters, threat does not emanate from the other side of the Strait, but from DPP's ways of promoting nation-building and localization. In the past few years, DPP has pushed through curriculum reform, transitional justice, and the Taiwanization of cultural policies. The pan-blue supporters worry that these policies will leave the ROC an empty shell, with only the country’s name and the national flag remaining unchanged. In general, DPP's appeals of sovereignty, autonomy and the protection of freedom and democratic institutions are universal values that are likely to be accepted by pan-green, independent, and even light-blue voters. In contrast, KMT’s appeals of guarding the ROC is an identity issue and restricted to the pan-blue camp, and especially the deep blue masses. DPP’s appeal to the wider Taiwanese public compared to the pan-blue supporters is one of the primary reasons for its victory. Finally, the Tsai Ing-wen administration’s other policies have helped raise her popularity among the younger public. For instance, the Tsai Ing-wen government passed the same-sex marriage bill in 2019 and has steadily raised the minimum wage throughout the past few years. Her government also faces favorable conditions for reelection as the international economic environment remains strong and Taiwan’s exports and the stock market both continue to perform well. On the other hand, KMT nominate Han Kuo-Yu, the incumbent Kaohsiung Mayor, ran for president less than a year after he got elected. Many people questioned the legitimacy of his participation. He has attempted to appeal to lower classes by arguing that that cross-strait reconciliation can bring economic opportunities. In terms of other socio-economic policies, both Tsai Ing-wen and Hao Kuo-Yu are largely similar.   Balance between External Threats and Political Freedom Taiwan has been facing China’s military threat constantly since World War II. Taiwan government imposed significant restrictions on political and social freedoms to maintain Taiwan’s security. Yet it becomes problematic when the government overly restricts these freedoms in order to strengthen is rule under the banner of national security. In response to China the Tsai Ing-wen government is driven to place its own restrictions on political and social freedoms through policies such as the anti-infiltration law and crackdown on fake news. The anti-infiltration law regulates cross-strait interactions extensively by placing punitive measures against the accepting or entrusting of Chinese instructions and funding to lobby and influence elections. In doing so, it aims to limit China’s political, economic, and cultural influence upon Taiwan. However, the bill was discussed in the Legislative Yuan for a very short period of time and was passed hastily, mainly to prevent DPP from losing votes to the more radical small green-camp parties. As a result, the Anti-Infiltration Act has caused uneasy among the pan-blue supporters and Taiwanese who live in and travel to China often. Because China’s state power penetrated its society and economy, doing business and academic exchanges in the Mainland, etc., are unavoidable to deal directly or indirectly with the Chinese government, and thereby under the risk of violating the law. Under such a structure, to enact such a law, there should be more discussions with different sectors of the society. After the DPP lost the 2018 county mayoral election, it attributed its election failure partly to the proliferation of fake news, especially those from China. Since the election, the DPP government has actively cracked down misinformation on the internet with state agencies working to block cyber army from China as well as interrogating and punishing individuals who produce and disseminate fake news. While these measures have had a positive effect of curbing the spread of fake news, they also risk violating freedom of speech. In fact, some of the individuals who are accused for spreading fake news include supporters of the opposition party who comprise the general public and serve as opinion leaders. In fact, both blue and green have their own cyber army and they all engage in news manipulation on the Internet.   Two Major Parties with Mixed Moderate and Tough Positions Taiwan's independent voting population, which is actually quite large, is fatigue of continued fights between pan-blue and pan-blue coalitions over national identity and policies regarding unification and independence. Most voters prefer to maintain the status quo and take a more inclusive position in the national identification issue. While pan-blue and pan-green supporters vote for candidates of their respective coalition, the moderate voters tend to support the candidate with a better economic vision, personal image, and a more inclusive stance on the national identity and cross-strait issues. Candidates who take on a moderate policy stance also sometimes draw broad support from light-green or light-glue voters who belong to the opposite camp. As a result, candidates from both parties often have to propose more moderate and inclusive policies in order to win presidency. An example is how Tsai softened her identity policy and slowed down transitional justice policies following the defeat of the county mayoral election in 2018. In the 2020 election, she even proposed the concept of “Republic of China: Taiwan,” which—like Ma Ying-jeou’s 2012 statement, “ROC is our country and Taiwan is our home”—attempts to fuse the Chinese and Taiwanese identities together. Unlike her KMT rival who solely safeguarded ROC beliefs and identity, Tsai contributed to DPP victory by promoting a more widely inclusive campaign slogan. On the other hand, the two Taiwanese political parties face the same dilemma: they wish to appeal to moderate voters while also catering to hardline voters in their own camps. This is a problem for the parties as shifting towards the center may induce the hardline voters not to vote or vote for other smaller parties that are more radical on the identity spectrum. On the other hand,, the DPP worries that it will lose the support of independent voters if it takes a hardline on cross-strait relations while the KMT is concerned that it will lose their support for being overly friendly towards Beijing. As a result of such dilemma, political parties choose to be moderate on some issues while being tough on the others. For example, the DPP emphasizes that it will leave the name of the ROC unchanged, will not push through constitutional amendment and Taiwanese independence. At the same time, it rushes to pass the Anti-Infiltration Act and in some instances, accuse the KMT of kowtowing to Beijing. KMT demonstrates similar characteristics as the DPP. On the one hand, it stands against the “one country, two systems” proposal and upholds freedom and democracy, insisting that reunification requires the consent of the Taiwanese. But on the other hand, it emphasizes safeguarding the ROC to gain the support of the deep-blue voters. As portrayed above, DPP is more willing to compromise on the identity and country name issue but is less willing to back down from tight regulation of the cross-strait interaction. By contrast, KMT’s mixed picture reveals their deep distrust in DPP’s promise of keeping the ROC regime.   Impacts on the Function of Democracy Tsai Ing-wen won 57% of the votes in the 2020 presidential election. This result sent a strong message that the more China intimidates Taiwan, the further Taiwan is going to draw away from China. Votes show that the Taiwanese public support political parties that clearly say no to China and its “one country, two systems” proposal. With a stable and vibrant liberal democracy, Taiwan is naturally inclined to become united in support of its current political system against threats from China’s hegemonic authoritarianism. Even in the future, threats and economic incentives from Beijing will not be enough to undermine the determination of Taiwanese to protect Taiwan from falling to the Chinese Communist Party. Unless China undergoes political liberalization and reform, Taiwanese are unlikely to change their minds. But this election also raises some potential concerns about democracy. First of all, accepting the result of democratic competition is an important foundation of democracy. Taiwan has experienced seven presidential elections, and three party turnovers. Taiwan’s democracy has well passed Samuel Huntington's two-turnover test of democratic consolidation. However, some candidates fail to observe the rules of game in primary. While this situation tends to occur mainly at local primary elections, it has been occurring in this election. During the DPP primary, Tsai Ing-wen postponed the primary and changed the rules of the elections several times after she fell behind in polls following a challenge from her former premier. She was then finally able to reclaim her victory following Xi Jinping’s speech which provoked the Taiwanese citizens to rally behind her. Meanwhile, Terry Kuo, the chair of Foxconn, who participated in the primary as the KMT candidate, also refused to endorse the winner of the election after placing second.  In addition, the independence of some non-partisan government agencies also began to erode beginning in 2019, the year prior to the 2020 election. For example, while the National Election Commission was chaired by non-partisan members in the past, DPP is now able to nominate its own members as the chair. The police force and the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau have also been responsible for cracking down on fake news, but as aforementioned, some of the fake news allegations are based on partisan issues and are politically instrumentalized. In addition, a high-profiled member of the Control yuan member intervened to interview judges when he was unhappy with the court decisions. Finally, DPP has restricted the exercise of direct democracy in restricting the influence of referendum on the presidential election by allowing referendums to be held biannually and not alongside presidential elections. As a liberal democracy, civil liberties in Taiwan have always been fairly protected, and the participation of civic society groups is also quite active. But as mentioned above, because of security reasons, the government has begun to place increased restrictions on political freedom. Taiwan' democracy is certainly unlikely to retreat into electoral democracy, but still requires attention. The reason why Taiwan has been able to compete with China is due to its continued upholding of the banner of freedom and democracy in the moral front. A setback in freedom and democracy will also damage Taiwan’s security. As key to a stable democracy is determined by the attitudes and strength of the civil society, Taiwan’s civil society groups, which are strong and active, will refuse to accept further restriction on political freedom. Polls over the years have shown that more than 90% of Taiwanese do not support China’s “One country, two systems” proposal, and prefer a free and democratic system. This means that the money incentives and the political and military threat that China provide and exert over the years have failed to buy the hearts of Taiwanese. Can misinformation effectively sway the minds of the Taiwanese? If not, what is the point of putting so much effort to restrict people’s freedom?     ■Chin-en Wu is the associate research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, Taiwan. He received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Michigan. His main research interest includes the impact of economic development on political regime dynamics and how regime type influences economic performance.   ■ 담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구원             문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]     [EAI이슈브리핑]은 국내외 주요 사안에 대해 다양한 분야의 전문가들이 심층적인 분석을 통해 의견을 개진하고 정책적 제언을 발표할 수 있는 담론의 장을 마련하고자 기획된 시리즈입니다. 인용할 때에는 반드시 출처를 밝혀주시기 바랍니다. EAI는 어떠한 정파적 이해와도 무관한 독립 연구기관입니다. EAI가 발행하는 보고서와 저널 및 단행본에 실린 주장과 의견은 EAI와는 무관하며 오로지 저자 개인의 견해임을 밝힙니다.   "IMG_3855" by Shafquat Towheed is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0

Chin-en Wu 2020-01-22조회 : 10590
워킹페이퍼
[워킹페이퍼] Populism in Thailand

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note For the sixth publication of the ADRN special working paper series, Dr. Thawilwadeee Bureekul, Ms. Ratchawadee Sangmahamad, and Ms. Nuchaprapar Moksart of the King Prajadhipok's Institute explore the populist phenomena in Thailand. According to the authors, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (in 2001) has been instrumental in establishing populism through policy within Thai politics since the adoption of the 1997 Constitution. Despite the military coups that ensued the Thaksin administration, policy populism continued to provide benefits to the poor and help maintain public trust in the government. However, the authors argue that this kind of populism calls for a "checks and balances by non-governmental organizations [...] to ensure accountability in the implementation process." Given that redistributive policies have the potential of fiscal mismanagement and corruption, they suggest that the "function of laws and regulations should be considered" and the new measures following the 2017 Constitution be strictly enforced.     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   Before the Asian 1997 financial crisis and the adoption of the 1997 Constitution, Thailand had endured a great number of fluctuations in its political development. The coming of the TRT party and Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001 paved the way for the establishment of new politics in Thailand. The Thaksin administration created a new form of political campaign under the implementation of populist policies to increase public trust in government and improve national well-being such as the thirty baht healthcare scheme, community village funds, agrarian debt relief, One Tambon One Product (OTOP), and so on.   Literature Review Historically, academic definitions of populism have differed and people have often defined  populism in loose terms referencing “people,” leaders who have the power of provocation (especially political leaders), and “catch-all politics.” In addition, the term has also been used as a label for new unclassified groups, which have often refused to refer to themselves as “populists.”   Context of Thailand Populism has been employed in Thailand for many decades, but in the past covered only some aspects of political and economic activity, unlike the universal practice of the Thaksin Shinawatra administration. For example, monetary policy under Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj in 1975 helped people by providing a budget to develop livelihoods in local communities, but such moves were not widely regarded at the time as populist. More than twenty years later the 1997 constitution opened the door to public participation in the policy decision making process, and in 2001 the TRT party under Thaksin Shinawatra introduced a national populist agenda to attract Thai voters. The Thaksin political campaign promoted policies such as the thirty baht healthcare scheme, a community fund, an agrarian debt relief scheme, loans for education and more. This political strategy helped him win the election and represented a new kind of politics in Thailand, changing the landscape of the policy making process for all political parties.He used populist policies to alleviate poverty and help impoverished people gain access to social services. As a result of these policies, many people were satisfied with and supported the TRT and Thaksin.   Populism in Four Periods of Government Populism in the Thaksin Shinawatra Period Thaksin became the twenty-third Prime Minister of Thailand on February 17, 2001 and was in power until September 19, 2006. In 2006, his government was overthrown by a military coup d’état following street demonstrations and political conflict. Before forming the government in 2001, Thaksin was well known as a successful business-man. He used political marketing and policy strategy during his five years and 222 days in office, and together with his TRT party launched an array of policies to promote the rural economy and gain popular support from the people, Key examples include the thirty baht healthcare scheme, the agrarian debt relief scheme, and the one million baht village fund. Populism in the Abhisit Vejjajiva Period Elderly Allowance The Elderly Allowance was implemented under the Abhisit administration to promote income security for every elderly person in Thailand. People over the age of sixty receive an allowance starting at 600 baht every month for the rest of their lives, with the exception of civil servants, who benefit from a government pension. The allowance rises to a maximum of 1,000 baht a month according to age. In 2011, more than 3.5 million people registered for the elderly allowance, and approximately 6.75 million seniors have benefited from the policy.   Populism in the Yingluck Shinawatra Period First-time Car Buyer Policy A first-time car buyer policy was implemented between September 16, 2011 and December 31, 2012 under Yingluck Shinawatra’s administration. The aim of the policy was to give low-income citizens an opportunity to buy a new car at a low tax rate. However, the beneficiaries of the first-time car buyer subsidy were not the poor. Instead, the upper income groups, or the Thai middle class, benefited most from the policy. This policy also provided an enormous benefit to automobile companies, which saw increased profits from selling their vehicles.   Populism in the General Prayuth Chan-ocha Period General Prayut Chan-o-cha was the twenty-ninth Prime Minister of Thailand. His government began on August 30, 2014 under the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). His administration played an important role in stimulating the grass roots economy via the Civil State or pracharat project. The government also promoted the twenty-year strategic plan, which is the main project under the NCPO. The details of each of these policies are as follows.   Results of Policy Implementation Success Factors Populism has been the mechanism and approach to alleviating inequality and poverty in Thailand. After Thaksin implemented a populist approach, the public was satisfied with the benefits they received from the policies. Since Thaksin, some populist policies have been created and implemented response to public demand. Healthcare services have been extended to 48 million people, and the adoption of “citizenship rights” means that everyone in the country has equal access to social services and the same rights to welfare. Thus, a number of scholars agree that populism has resulted in an increased quality of life for the Thai people.   Positive and Negative Aspects of Populism Positive Aspects of Populism First, populism has transformed Thai politics from the old election culture of buying support to one of policy competition. Political parties increasingly use populist policies to gain public support and win election. Second, populism has encouraged greater checks on the actions of the government, both through popular movements and through the Parliament.Thirdly, people have become more interested in public policy, resulting in higher rates of voter turnout at elections. Many populist policies offer basic guarantees, e.g. the thirty baht healthcare scheme and accessibility to health care for all, but most of them are political tools as well. Lastly, populism can alleviate inequality, because it can lead to the promotion of aspects of social welfare such as health care, education, old age pensions, and allowances for poor people.   Criticism and Analysis In a group discussion held by King Prajadhipok’s institute on December 12, 2018, experts and academic participants introduced five problems with populist policies. Mechanisms to avoid fiscal mismanagement in the policymaking process and critical recommendations to establish sustainable policies were also part of the group discussion.   Problems with Populist Policies in Thailand Populist policies do not strengthen people’s livelihoods by introducing income distribution, job creation, innovation, or opportunity. Rather, many policies create public reliance on the government as people wait for help rather than engaging in self-reliant behavior. The launch of the 500 baht banknote and the national welfare scheme card under the Prayuth administration are examples of this dependence.   Recommendations to Create Sustainable Policies The Role of Political Parties and Policymakers Political parties should understand the likelihood of successful policy implementation, emphasize the national interest, and be held responsible for the results and consequences of populist policies. Moreover, political parties should not merely emphasize political marketing; instead, all parties should provide opportunities to the public to participate in the policymaking process.   Conclusion and Recommendations In conclusion, populism has been embedded in Thai society for almost two decades. Populism, or prachaniyom, has both positive and negative aspects. It is an approach that can provide benefits to the public, but absent regulation it can result in fiscal problems as well. Even though populism has increased public satisfaction with political parties and established a culture of policy competition, it has also shown that it can have impacts on social economic and politics. First, populist policies interact with the fiscal dimension, and thus policy budgets need to incorporate checks and balances by non-governmental organizations or monetary institutions to ensure accountability in the implementation process. There also needs to be an economic strategy to maintain policies in the long run. Sustainability is a major challenge for the government and the good management of economic mechanisms and economic growth is essential in order to sustain good populist policies in the future.     Author’s Biography Thawilwadee Bureekul is the director of the Research and Development Office at King Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI) where she is involved in the planning, management, implementation, and coordination of the Institute’s research projects. In addition to her role at KPI, Dr. Bureekul is a professor at several universities in Thailand, including the Asian Institute of Technology, Thammasat University, Burapha University, Mahidol University, and Silpakorn University. She succeeded in proposing “Gender Responsive Budgeting” in the Thai Constitution and she was granted the “Woman of the Year 2017” award as a result.   Ratchawadee Sangmahamad is a researcher assigned to the Research and Development Office of King Prajadhipok’s Institute. Her research includes citizenship, gender, and election studies. She has published books such as Value Culture and Thermometer of Democracy (with Thawilwadee Bureekul), Thai Citizens: Democratic Civic Education (with Thawilwadee Bureekul and Eugenie Mario), and many articles.   Nuchaprapar Moksart is a researcher assigned to the Research and Development Office of King Prajadhipok’s Institute. Her research includes social policy and political economy theory. She also writes on socioeconomic issues.

Thawilwadee Bureekul, Ratchawadee Sangmahamad, Nuchaprapa Moksat 2019-08-05조회 : 10529
워킹페이퍼
[워킹페이퍼] Populism in Contemporary Indian Politics

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note For the fifth publication of the ADRN special working paper series, Dr. Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay and Mr. Kaustuv Chakrabarti of the Participatory Research in Asia study the populist phenomenon in India and its impact on Indian politics. They note that this movement, contrary to other cases of populism around the world, refers to "virtually any policy that is redistributive in nature... particularly when a policy is announced before impending elections." With this condition, Dr. Bandyopadhyay and Mr. Chakrabarti argue that populist decisions "can become more responsible and at the same time more irresponsible." The authors conclude that in order to bring an end to irresponsible and fiscally concerning decisions, civil society needs to "engage with the citizens" to "counter majoritarian populism."     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   In recent times we see populism all around us, but its precise definition remains elusive. From a democratic point of view, the ambivalence is already apparent in the term “populism.” Its root is the Latin word populus (the people), which exhibits a clear link with the democratic idea. Where there is democracy, in other words, there is always populism. On the other hand, the suffix “ism” signals an ideological potentiation in contrast to the moderate character of today’s democracies. By exaggerating the democratic element and mobilizing it against the constraints introduced into democratic sys-tems by constitutional principles, populism moves at least potentially into the proximity of opponents of the sys-tem.   History and the Rise of Populism in India Since the late nineteenth century, populism has played a vital role in different phases of Indian history, particularly in mobilizing emergent groups and bringing about different movements and civil society initiatives. Populism has co-existed with several different ideological strands, and yet influenced a range of policies with its discourses and mobilization.   Populist Measures in India India is an example that proves economic liberalization can co-exist with populist politics and that populism can be used as an ideological framework within which the political contradictions that follow from economic change can be managed. The capaciousness of populism allows for a range of interests, some of them conflicting, to be acknowledged in both symbolic and practical ways.   Case Study 1: Guaranteeing Wage Employment in Rural India The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) is a social security measure that guarantees the “right to work” to Indian rural citizens. The scheme provides a legal guarantee for at least one hundred days of employment in every financial year to the adult members of any rural household willing to do public works-related unskilled manual labor at the statutory minimum wage.   Case Study 2: Providing Subsidized Cooked Food in Tamil Nadu Tamil Nadu’s political history for the past four decades has been characterized by a slew of populist measures. The laundry list of freebies handed out by the late Jayalalithaa included the waiver of all farm loans, free laptops for Class X and XII students, free cell phones for all ration card holders, and government reimbursement of education loans.   Case Study 3: Free Laptops to the Students of Uttar Pradesh (UP) With nearly 200 million people, UP remains the most populous Indian state. It ranks sixteenth among the seventeen Indian states according to the 2015 Human Development report. According to Sen and Ray, UP continues to be counted among the BIMARU states while others, such as Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, have come out of it. The crisis in education is especially apparent in the four BIMARU states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh – with 445.1 million of India’s population of 1.2 billion and some of the lowest literacy rates in the country, according to the 2011 Census.   Case Study 4: Demonetization The issue of corruption has long been a feature of the BJP’s electoral mobilization against the Congress. An opinion poll of 19,000 respondents conducted in mid-2013 found that 69 percent of respondents thought that the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government was corrupt and that corruption had increased under the UPA’s rule, while only 23 percent thought that corruption had increased under the NDA government. Seeking to capitalize on these perceptions, a key theme in the BJP’s election manifesto was a populist narrative on corruption, according to which a “lack of openness in government and lack of people’s participation had led to concentration of power in a few hands and lack of transparency breeding corruption and nepotism on a massive scale.” Corruption was also “a manifestation of poor governance” and “reflects the bad intentions of those sitting in power.”   Impact of Populist Measures on Democratic Governance Democratic governance is the range of processes through which a society in pursuit of justice, equality, welfare, and environmental protection reaches a consensus on and implements regulations, human rights, laws, policies, and social structures. In this sense, democratic governance brings to the fore the question of how a society organizes itself to ensure equality of opportunity and equity (social and economic justice) for all citizens.   Positive Implications of Populist Measures One of the most important aspects of MGNREGS is that villagers can rightfully demand employment. The authority is responsible for providing employment in response to demand or providing an employment allowance in the cases where it has failed to meet the employment demand. According to Alam and Alam, it has made a dent in poverty by increasing employment opportunities. During the first year of implementation (2006-2007), in 200 districts, 21 million households were employed and 905 million person days were generated. In 2016-2017, in 686 districts 51 million households were provided employment and 2.35 billion person days were generated. In 2017-2018, 51 million households have been provided employment and 2.3 billion  person days have been generated across the country.   Negative Implications of Populist Measures Despite many positive outcomes of the MGNREGA, it has been criticized for its poor implementation and leakages. Under the MGNREGA, which was promulgated in 2005, each household is guaranteed 100 days of work every year. On average, each household received only forty-five days of work over the last decade – less than half the guarantee. The IHDS-II surveys report that up to 70 percent of interested poor households did not receive any MGNREGA work between 2004-2005 and 2011-2012. Unemployment allowance has rarely been paid.   Conclusion Populism does not oppose the democratic sys-tem per se; on the contrary, the democratic sys-tem needs its support and tools (e.g. elections). As analyzed in this paper, not all forms of populism are necessarily corrosive to democracy. In an unequal society where politics are governed by the interests of the political elite, populism plays an important role in balancing power by introducing citizen participation.     Author’s Biography   Kaustuv Chakrabarti is a senior program officer at PRIA. Currently, Kaustuv works on the issues of civic space, multi-stakeholder partnerships, South-South Cooperation, and building CSO capacities. He has been passionately engaged with PRIA’s work on civic space both at the Asian and South Asian level.  He co-authored Civic space under Siege: experiences from South Asia; the “State of Democracy: India” report, and the synthesis report on “Civic Space in Asia: Emerging Issues and Policy Lessons from Six Asian Countries 2018.” He has a Master’s degree in globalization and development from the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Sussex.   Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay is the director of Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), a pioneer CSO, working on participation, democratic governance and civil society development for more than three decades. He has twenty-five years of professional experience working with universities, research institutions, and CSOs. He serves on the Steering Committee of the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) and the Asia Democracy Network (ADN). He holds a PhD in anthropology for his work with the Parhaiya tribes of Chotanagpur in India.  

Kaustuv Chakrabarti, Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay 2019-07-30조회 : 8791
워킹페이퍼
[워킹페이퍼] The Changing Nature of Populism in Malaysia

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note For the fourth publication of the ADRN special working paper series, Ms. Aira Azhari and Mr. Faiz Abdul Halim of the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs discuss the Malaysian populist phenomenon and its role in bringing the current Pakatan Harapan (PH) government into power. They caution that the now-opposition Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) and the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) may "adopt the successful platforms from right-wing political parties in Europe and the U.S." and provide a "more populist stance that may combine political Islam and Malay nativist sentiments." Given that the definition of populism has been "inconsistent" in Malaysian politics, they also suggest and conclude that further research is needed as to how the "'people' come to adopt these views and whether there is any factual basis for said views."     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   With the recent rise of populist leaders and parties across Europe, the United States, and the Philippines, many of whom have won the vote to rule, there has been a surge of scholarly and public interest in the topic of populism and its impacts on democracy and liberal values. This discussion has begun to spill over into Malaysia. Parallels are being drawn between the nativist rhetoric of popular right-wing European parties and the ethno-nationalist and religious rhetoric spouted by members of the now former ruling party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). There are also concerns over the potential socioeconomic and political impact and the feasibility of allegedly “populist” promises made by the now ruling Pakatan Harapan (PH) government on the campaign trail.      Definition of Populism The definition of populism varies and there is no wholly agreed-upon definition due to the diversity of the political and socioeconomic environments in which populism can arise. Some scholars define populism as “a set of shortsighted macroeconomic policies adopted for electoral purposes that end up generating more harm than good.”  This definition, referred to as the socioeconomic definition of populism, it has lost support amongst most social sciences, though it is still often used by the media, politicians, and policymakers as a pejorative.   The Malaysian Discourse on Populism The definition of populism has been fairly inconsistent within the Malaysian political discourse, despite its fairly frequent usage within the media and among some academics. For instance, in the most notable writing on populism in Malaysia, Autocrats vs The People: Authoritarian Populism in Malaysia by Anne Munro-Kua, the term “authoritarian populism,” a term first coined by Stuart Hall, “depicts politics as a struggle between ‘the people’ and some combination of malevolent, racialized and/or unfairly advantaged ‘others’ at home or abroad or both. It justifies interventions in the name of ‘taking back control’ in favor of ‘the people’.”   What Socioeconomic and Political Issues Resonate with the Malaysian Public? As populism is not a substantive ideological stance, what constitutes as populist in Malaysia generally varies from other countries, though there may be similarities. In Malaysian politics, populist issues might center on controversial topics regarding ethnicity, religion, education, cost of living, immigration, political corruption, repressive laws, the Constitution, and taxation to name a few. Moreover, who are or would “the people” be defined as in Malaysia, and what would their “general will” be?   Why Were these Issues Considered Populist in Malaysia?  While public opinion surveys provide some insight into what popular issues the Malaysian public is concerned about, it is important to account for how and why the former political elite responded to (or ignored) these issues. Populism brings controversial issues back to the forefront of the public political discourse, issues that the elites are largely uncomfortable discussing. In the case of Malaysia, which has been referred to as a competitive authoritarian regime— a hybrid regime where competitive regular elections are practiced but where the ruling party has unfair and advantageous access to state mechanisms and institutions (such as the media) which are frequently used to hinder or attack the opposition, the elites tend to apply repressive laws to censor discussion of sensitive and “uncomfortable” issues and silence opposition towards the regime.   Current Trends in Populism in Malaysia Pakatan Harapan’s GE14 manifesto: Buku Harapan (Book of Hope)  There are several elements of populism within PH’s Buku Harapan, despite the fact that it contains only two mentions of the term “elite,” both of which are found in a paragraph which describes UMNO and the BN’s manipulation of “racial politics” to ensure that the political elite remained in power. The manifesto also makes it clear that it aims to cleanse Malaysia of “corruption, malfeasance and kleptocracy,” citing the 1MDB case as the primary example.    One Year on – has PH Kept True to its Promises? At the time of writing, the PH government will have been in power for almost a year. There is a need to assess how successful they have been in implementing their promises. The most notable success has been the zero-rating of the GST and the reintroduction of the Sales and Services Tax (SST) in its place. The government clearly made this move a priority for its administration, knowing full well that any indication otherwise would trigger a backlash from the public and risk losing its hard-won support. As a result of this policy, there was an initial sharp drop in prices, and the lower prices were enjoyed during the tax holiday before going up again on September 1, 2018, when the SST came into place. Malaysians have begun to realize that lowering the cost of living does not simply entail removing an unpopular consumption tax, but requires deeper structural reforms to tackle problems such as stagnant wages and changing consumer habits. The GST is a good example of how populist economic promises do little to serve the rakyat’s interest in the long term.   Conclusion: Changing Currents of Populism in post-GE14 Malaysia? Following Pakatan Harapan’s surprise victory in the fourteenth general elections, their first hundred days in government saw the “zeroization” of the GST and its eventual replacement with the SST. As of now, the government has focused on dealing with the 1MDB scandal and prosecuting figures associated with the scandal, renegotiating project contracts and attempting to slowly reform institutions. However, they have also rolled back or delayed some popular promises such as the promise to abolish tolls, though it is still too early to see where PH’s numerous promises will head in the coming years. Now that they are in power, PH’s populist language has changed somewhat whereby current government ministers talk about how the challenges currently faced by the government are linked and said to be caused by the failings of the BN.      Author’s Biography   Aira Azhari is Senior Researcher in Democracy and Governance at the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS), a public policy research organization based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. She holds a Bachelor of Laws from the University of Liverpool, UK and a Master of Laws (Public International Law) from the London School of Economics and Political Science. She has provided analysis on political and economic issues to Malaysian and international press, including Channel News Asia and the BBC.   Faiz Abdul Halim was an Assistant Researcher under the Democracy and Governance Unit at IDEAS. He holds a Bachelor's Degree in Political Science from the International Islamic University of Malaysia.  

Aira Azhari, Faiz Abdul Halim 2019-07-23조회 : 8739
워킹페이퍼
[워킹페이퍼] Contemporary Populism and Democratic Challenges in the Philippines

.a_wrap {font-size:14px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:20px;} Editor's Note For the third publication of the ADRN special working paper series, Dr. Francisco A. Magno of the Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance explores the populist phenomenon in the Philippines. In his paper, Dr. Magno argues that weak democratic institutions and the “wide disparity between what is envisioned under the democratic Constitution and the actual exercise of democracy” have created an environment that allows populism to thrive. He states that because these institutions, including political parties, have transformed into tools for politicians to use, “personality-oriented elections are routinized and become the norm.” Thus, Dr. Magno argues that more needs to be done to provide mechanisms for citizens to participate in the governing process and concludes that “a rules-based sys-tem is nurtured through interdependent civic and knowledge practices and institutions.”     Quotes from the Paper Introduction                   Populism is not a novel event but a periodic one. It is a type of direct democracy that emerges when people sense that they are pushed to the margins by mainstream politics. Riding on the back of political discontent, populism gains traction and thrives amid an atmosphere of divisiveness cultivated by identity-driven politics. It focuses blame on certain domestic groups, countries, and international organizations for the ills of the nation. Populism is defined as a thin-centered ideology that delineates society into two homogeneous and adversarial groups – the pure people versus the corrupt elite.  It insists that politics should express la volonté générale or the general will of the people.   Institutional Lens An institutional theoretical lens is appropriate to assess the role of weak institutions in fostering the rise of a populist leadership that promised to make up for the ineffectual performance of previous regimes. In this regard, institutions are framed in terms of enduring rules and organized practices embedded in structures of meaning and resources. These constitutive rules and practices stipulate appropriate behavior for specific actors under given circumstances. In this regard, structures of meaning provide the explanation and justification of behavioral codes while structures of resources foster capabilities for action.   From Mayor to President Unlike the other presidential candidates who made their marks on the national scene before seeking the highest office of the land, Duterte spent most of his political career as a local government official. As mayor, Duterte dramatically transformed Davao from being a cradle of insurgency during the martial law years into a progressive urban center in the post-EDSA period. He installed security outposts surrounding the city where militias had to surrender their weapons. He imposed a smoking ban in public places, ordained curfew hours, and enforced road speed limits. The Davao City Investment Code was passed and business processes and licensing sys-tems were streamlined to ease the regulatory cost of doing business. The influx of investment was accompanied by the proliferation of high-rise condominiums and shopping malls in the city. In 2014, Davao’s economy grew by 9.4 percent, outpacing the growth rate of other urban hubs.   The Populist Appeal A survey of thirty-eight nations conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2017 indicates that unrestricted executive power has a substantial number of adherents. In twenty countries, a quarter or more of those polled preferred an arrangement in which a strong leader can make decisions without interference from the legislature and judiciary. This political trajectory is evident in countries where executives have extended or consolidated their power in recent years, such as the Philippines, Russia, and Turkey. The overpowering executive demonstrates a weakening of the sys-tem of checks and balance that is inherent in representative democracy. In the case of the Philippines, the survey finds that half of the population is favorably inclined towards strongman rule.   The Drug War After being elected president of the Philippines in May 2016, Duterte delivered on his campaign promise to wage a drug war. He offered bounties for the bodies of drug dealers and guaranteed the police that they would be shielded from prosecution. From 2016 to 2018, around 4,500 people were killed either in police operations or suspected vigilantism. The killings sparked widespread condemnation from the United Nations and other international human rights organizations. Chris Beyrer, Professor of Public Health and Human Rights at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and an expert on the health implications of drug policy, registered his protest that “this is not the rule of law. People are being killed on the accusation or presumption that they are involved in the drug trade: that is a recipe for vigilante violence.” In 2003, a similar policy action was pursued in Thailand through Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s war on drugs where more than 2,400 extra-judicial deaths were registered.   Social Media as a Battlefield Cyberspace has evolved into a battlefield for political engagement and contestation. Aside from official government sites, many cyber-troop teams manage fictitious accounts to cloak their identities and interests. This phenomenon is also depicted as a form of astroturfing where the identity of a sponsor or organization is depicted in terms of grassroots activism (Howard, 2003). In many cases, these fake accounts are bots that refer to bits of code that are programmed to connect with and imitate human users. Media reports indicate that bots have been widely utilized by state actors around the world. These include Argentina, Azerbaijan, Iran, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, Turkey, Venezuela, and the Philippines. These bots are usually deployed to inundate social media networks with spam and fake news. However, not all governments make use of this type of automation.   The Rising Tide of Populism Globalization has had mixed effects, producing winners and losers. It has been pointed out that globalization benefited exporters, transnational corporations, international banks, and the professional sectors that thrive in bigger markets. In China, millions of farmers made the transition from farmers to workers in the export-led manufacturing industry. On the other hand, globalization also deepened the rifts that divide capital and labor, urban and rural areas, sunrise and sunset industries, mobile professionals and local producers, and elites and ordinary people (Rodrik 2018).   Erosion of Independent Institutions Populism can use an electoral mandate to decimate independent institutions that are considered bedrocks of liberal democracies like the courts and the free media. Populism might lead to political tribalism, which derails civil discourse and prevents political consensus. The substitution of global democratic norms with authoritarian practices would mean more elections in which the incumbent’s success is a matter of course. It would lead to more media spaces that are flooded by propaganda mouthpieces that sideline the opposition while presenting the ruler as omnipotent, tough, and committed to the welfare of the nation. It would mean state control over the Internet and social media through both censorship and active manipulation that promotes pro-regime messages.   Silencing Critics Critics of the Duterte presidency have been silenced either through detention, removal from office, or the use of public derision. In September 2018, President Duterte said in a speech before the Filipino community in Jordan that detained Senator Leila de Lima is not a prisoner of conscience. He maintained that De Lima is involved in the illegal drug trade and is not politically persecuted. The senator has been detained in the PNP Custodial Center since February 2017 on charges that she benefited from the drug trade in the New Bilibid Prison during her tenure as Justice Secretary under the Aquino administration. De Lima is a staunch critic of Duterte of the President's anti-drug war. She has petitioned a Muntinlupa City court to disqualify thirteen convicts as witnesses in the drug charges she is facing. The inmates do not qualify as witnesses since they have been convicted of drug trafficking, murder, homicide, kidnapping and robbery. De Lima argued that witnesses who are convicted of crimes with moral turpitude violate the law on state witnesses.   Marginalizing the Opposition Using an institutional theoretical lens, this study considered how weak institutions aided the rise of contemporary populism. Institutions are conceived as enduring rules and organized practices located in structures of meaning and resources. Political parties play a crucial role in fostering democratic linkage. They are the agents of representation in contemporary democratic sys-tems. Substantive representation requires consistency between the policy preferences of voters and the policy positions that political parties adopt. In addition, it is also important that political parties listen to their voters with regard to the policy issues they emphasize in democratic societies.   Conclusion Populism has always been around in the Philippines. Its presence is heightened or muted based on the confluence of actors and events that affect the political sys-tem. The framers of the 1987 Philippine Constitution sought to establish the foundations of a representative democracy that would bar the return of authoritarianism. Hence, the fundamental law is replete with features to ensure a sys-tem of competitive elections; checks and balances among the executive, legislature, and judiciary; respect for civil and political rights; and independent oversight agencies that promote accountability. However, there is a wide disparity between what is envisioned under the democratic Constitution and the actual exercise of democracy. The democratic gap lies in the failure to set up strong institutions to make representation work for the people.     Author’s Biography Francisco A. Magno teaches Political Science and Development Studies at De La Salle University (DLSU). He is the Founding Director of the DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance. He served as the President of the Philippine Political Science Association from 2015 to 2017. He finished his PhD in Political Science at the University of Hawaii.  

Francisco A. Magno 2019-07-16조회 : 41637