EAI는 아시아 지역의 민주적 거버넌스와 인권 증진에 관련된 연구를 진행하기 위해 2013년 11월 아시아민주주의연구네트워크(Asia Democracy Research Network: ADRN)를 발족했다. EAI는 국내 싱크탱크의 대표기관인 동시에 아시아 지역 싱크탱크의 직능대표로서 소속된 연구기관들의 민주주의 관련 연구지원 및 관리를 담당하고 있다.

ADRN은 아시아 지역이 직면한 민주주의 위협 요인을 분석하고 민주주의 전환 및 공고화에 기여할 수 있는 실무형 연구과제를 논의하고 확산하고자 창립되었다. ADRN은 연구에 기반한 정책 제시를 목표로 아시아 민주주의의 위협 요소와 당면과제를 점검하고 지역적 차원에서 바라보는 민주주의 발전을 위한 실천적 의제를 발굴하고 연구하고 있다. 네트워크에는 한국의 EAI를 비롯하여 대만, 말레이시아, 몽골, 미얀마, 방글라데시, 스리랑카, 인도, 인도네시아, 일본, 태국, 파키스탄, 필리핀 등 아시아 14개국 22개의 주요 싱크탱크들이 참여하고 있다. 

논평이슈브리핑
[Asia Democracy Issue Briefing] The Role of Civil Society in South Korean Democracy: Liberal Legacy and Its Pitfalls

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Note South Korea is regarded as an exemplary case of democratic transition amongst third-wave democracies in Asia. In this issue briefing, Prof. Jai Kwan Jung examines the trajectory of democratic development in South Korea by focusing on the role of civil society in the transition to and the consolidation of democracy in the country. While civil society mainly constituted a ‘contentious’ civil society against authoritarianism during democratic transition, it has transformed itself to a diversified and peaceful civil society since then. Nonetheless, Prof. Jung argues that while strong civil society is a historic legacy of the country’s democratization, there are also pitfalls: when strong civil society is combined with weak political parties and divided along the ideological spectrum, it can turn into a liability for democracy by undermining institutional politics and fuelling populism.     South Korea’s Democratic Development in Comparison South Korea is one of the most successful cases among 91 cases of democratic transitions since the third-wave of democratization. Using the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data, Mainwaring and Bizzarro (2019) categorize the outcomes of those 91 cases that transitioned to democracy from 1974 to 2012 as democratic breakdown, erosion, stagnation, and advance. While 23 of 91 cases (25.3%) are classified as democratic advance, only 8 cases (8.8%) have reached the level of liberal democracy. South Korea is one of those 8 successful cases and the second-best case, following Portugal, which has most improved the quality of democracy from the year of regime transition. Figure 1 compares South Korea’s post-transition trajectory with five other third-wave democracies in Asia – Taiwan, Mongolia, Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. Since its transition to democracy in 1987, South Korea’s quality of democracy consistently increased and reached the level of liberal democracy (i.e., 0.7 in the Liberal Democracy Index) in 1998, when the Kim Dae-jung government was inaugurated. But South Korean trajectory of democratic development is not unilinear. The liberal principles of democracy came to decay substantively from 2008 to 2016 during two conservative governments. This downward trend was most pronounced in 2014 when the Park Geun-hye government faced a governing crisis after the Sewol ferry disaster, in which 304 people, including 250 high-school students on their field trip to Jeju Island, were drowned. This governing crisis was further fueled by the Park Geun-hye and Choi Soon-sil corruption scandal and led to the massive wave of candlelight protests in 2016. A total of 17 million people participated in 6-month long Saturday protests from October 2016 to April 2017. It was a historic moment in South Korea, not just because of the unprecedented size and peacefulness of mass mobilization. For the first time in the history of Korean democracy, the 2016-17 candlelight protests resulted in the impeachment of an incumbent president through due constitutional procedures. The candlelight protests seem to have saved Korean democracy, since its liberal democracy score increased and passed again the cut-point of 0.7 in 2017. If we look at the post-transition trajectories of other Asian democracies in Figure 1, Taiwan and Mongolia can be also classified as democratic advance. Yet in terms of the level of liberal democracy, only Taiwan is comparable with South Korea. Mongolia’s quality of democracy has been closer to Indonesia, which shows a pattern of stagnation since the transition to democracy. Philippines and Thailand clearly show the vulnerability of third-wave democracies. These two new democracies experienced democratic breakdown in 2004 and 2006 respectively, as 34 of 91 third-wave democracies have done so (37.4%).             Contentious Civil Society and Its Diversification after Democratic Transition How can we understand South Korea’s successful post-transition trajectory of democratic development? There are many factors that can affect post-transition trajectories in general. One particular factor in South Korea is the role of civil society in the transition to and the consolidation of democracy. Conceptually, democracy puts the state and civil society in a horizontal relationship, while authoritarianism uses the state’s power to control or repress civil society in a vertical manner. As civil society tends to be contentious, if not co-opted, in authoritarianism in transforming the vertical relationship with the state to a horizontal one, it can play a critical role in the transition to democracy. Theoretically, civil society mobilization for democracy can compel authoritarian elites to stop defending the old order and signal the collapse of authoritarian rule by creating a united force for democratic reforms. If civil society successfully mobilized popular pressures for democracy and influenced the bargaining between ruling elites and opposition leaders during democratic transition, it would have an enduring effect in the subsequent period of democratic development. This is because the collective experience of making popular pressures for democracy can shape the public perception about the role of civil society and the significance of citizens’ direct action in advancing democracy. Another reason is that the unified pro-democracy coalition may evolve into a variety of civil society groups in widely open and free political opportunities after democratization. Those various groups constitute a vibrant civil society, which is a key component of advanced democracy. From the Syngman Rhee government in the 1950s to the Park Chung-hee regime in the 60s and 70s, South Korean civil society had actively resisted authoritarianism. The April 19 Revolution in 1960 toppled the Syngman Rhee government. Liberal intellectuals, journalists, lawyers, pastors and priests as well as college students constituted a contentious civil society, which is called chaeya, and mobilized democratic opposition against the Park Chung-hee regime. This contentious civil society formed a unified democratic coalition along with opposition political elites during the Chun Doo-hwan military dictatorship in the 1980s and eventually brought about the liberalization of the authoritarian rule. After the transition to democracy, the contentious civil society has been diversified into various sectoral movements (e.g., the women’s movement, the environmental movement, etc.) and civic organizations (e.g., the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, etc.). This historic change can be understood as a transformation of South Korean civil society from a contentious and often militant to a varied and peaceful one. Figure 2 clearly shows the historical transformation of South Korean civil society in terms of its nature and constitution from 1948 to 2019. The V-Dem data include several indicators for civil society organizations (CSOs). By using two of those CSO indicators, Figure 2 presents a historical pattern of change in South Korean civil society. Prior to the transition to democracy, the dominant nature of South Korean CSOs had been “anti-regime” movements, which means that the main purpose and activities of CSOs were to change the political sys-tem from authoritarian to a democratic one. This anti-regime nature of South Korean CSOs had increased from the Syngman Rhee government (the average of anti-regime CSO score on the left Y-axis was 2.39) to the Park Chung-hee era (2.53) to the Chun Doo-hwan regime (3.41). After democratization, it dropped substantially. The average anti-regime CSO score became 1.38 for the first 10 years of democratization and 0.66 since 1998. To the contrary, South Korean CSOs became highly diversified after the transition to democracy. Before 1987, the average score for CSO diversity on the right Y-axis was 0.31, which means that most South Korean CSOs used to be state-sponsored and not voluntary with the smaller number of voluntary and anti-regime movement organizations. But since 1988, it jumped into 2.59, which is fairly a high degree of diversification of voluntary CSOs. In essence, the democratic transition in 1987 fundamentally changed the dominant feature and diversity of South Korean CSOs, as we can see vividly in Figure 2.           Pitfalls of Strong Civil Society South Korea’s vibrant civil society is a legacy of the democratization movement during the authoritarian period. This historic legacy is an important asset and has worked well for democratic development so far. But strong civil society is not always good for democracy, especially if it is divided by a politicized social cleavage and when there is a fierce competition for mass mobilization along that cleavage line. In this respect, there are two pitfalls in the foreseeable future of South Korean democracy. First, South Korea’s strong civil society has been combined with weak political parties. This combination of strong civil society and weak parties has led to under-development of democratic institutions, such as party and electoral sys-tems as well as institutional politics often swayed by civil society voices and interests. It has in turn generated a serious concern about the stability of South Korean democracy. One particular problem is so-called “emperor-like presidentialism.” If a president mainly relies on vocal demands of strong civil society in his/her decision-making and is unchecked by the under-developed legislative and judicial bodies of the government, presidential power can be more overly concentrated than it is now and a populist rule might be a real possibility in the near future. Second, South Korean civil society has increasingly mobilized ordinary people along the left-right ideological cleavage. It will be harmful for the future of South Korean democracy, because it can exacerbate the governability problem of its democracy. The 2016-17 candlelight protests and the impeachment of Park Geun-hye has brought about a right-wing counter-movement in the form of Taegukgi (national flag) protests. This ideological polarization in civil society became highly conspicuous in the fall of 2019 when the appointment of Cho Kuk as Minister of Justice brought about the months of street protests by both anti- and pro-Cho citizens. Massive civil society mobilization along the ideological divide has undermined South Korea’s institutional politics further, as major parties and political elites were captured by competing and even hostile claims of the divided civil society. It has also made scholars and pundits worry about the potential instability of South Korean democracy. In conclusion, South Korea’s strong civil society can turn into a liability for democracy under certain conditions. If it is sharply divided along the ideological spectrum while undermining institutional politics, it can be a fertile ground for populism. South Korean civic groups and political elites should be aware of this caveat and reduce the likelihood of the emergence of populist politics. In order to do so, they need to establish a healthy relationship between parties and civil society by seeking a balance between institutional and non-institutional politics of democracy.   ■ Jai Kwan Jung (Ph.D., Cornell University) is Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. His research interests include social movements and contentious politics, political conflict and violence, and comparative democratization.   ■담당 및 편집: 이은지 EAI 연구원               문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 207)  |  [email protected]     [EAI이슈브리핑]은 국내외 주요 사안에 대해 다양한 분야의 전문가들이 심층적인 분석을 통해 의견을 개진하고 정책적 제언을 발표할 수 있는 담론의 장을 마련하고자 기획된 시리즈입니다. 인용할 때에는 반드시 출처를 밝혀주시기 바랍니다. EAI는 어떠한 정파적 이해와도 무관한 독립 연구기관입니다. EAI가 발행하는 보고서와 저널 및 단행본에 실린 주장과 의견은 EAI와는 무관하며 오로지 저자 개인의 견해임을 밝힙니다.  

Jai Kwan Jung 2020-08-21조회 : 10353
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[Asia Democracy Issue Briefing] Corona-Tracking and Privacy: The Opposite Approaches of South Korea and Japan

Editor's Note In the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, governments all around the world have come up with various countermeasures to track and flatten the curve of the virus. Professor Maiko Ichihara from the Hitotusubashi University’s Graduate School of Law looks at IT-based tracking methods as one of these countermeasures, which have been widely used in countries including China, Singapore, and Malaysia but gained the most attention for its use in South Korea. In this paper, she analyzes the effectiveness of the South Korean government’s tracking sys-tem with regard to the reduced time required for data collection and analysis. But in doing so, she also raises possible concerns related to privacy breaches due to the sources the government uses to collect the data of COVID-19 patients. She also compares South Korea’s technology with Japan’s less invasive tracking app, COCOA, which relies on Bluetooth to detect devices that are in the vicinity of confirmed patients. While it is based on the user’s own initiative to download and use the app themselves, it lessens the effectiveness of the sys-tem. Professor Ichihara concludes that the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the importance of “preserving privacy and freedom both online and offline.”   .a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;}   COVID-19 emerged as an invisible enemy for the human being. It is not easy to fight this enemy when we do not know who is infected or what surfaces the virus may be on. Governments have begun using IT to track infected people in order to make this invisible enemy as visible and manageable as possible. IT-based tracking methods were in use even before the COVID-19 outbreak, triggered by the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001. As a countermeasure against terrorism, technologies such as biometric identification and facial recognition were developed and widely used, especially for immigration control. Advances in AI have further increased the speed and accuracy of personal identification, and combined with the widespread use of GPS, the Internet, smartphones, closed-circuit TVs, and IC cards, the foundations have been laid for individual surveillance. Various countries and regions, including China, Singapore, and Penang in Malaysia, have built smart cities using these technologies. However, to date there has not been large-scale surveillance of individuals in democratic countries.   COVID-19 Tracking by South Korea In this context, the South Korean government's early initiation of coronavirus tracking has attracted attention. The government's swift deployment of tracking measures was made possible by its experience with the MERS epidemic in 2015. The Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Act was amended in response to MERS to make it possible for the government to request telecommunication and other relevant companies to provide personal information on those who are infected or suspected of infection. Based on this Act, the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) has used credit card history, closed-circuit TV records, GPS functions on phones, and smart cards for public transportation to track the moves of confirmed cases, and has alerted those who may have come into contact with them. Although the names of the infected are not disclosed, their behavioral histories, along with personal information such as gender, age, and nationality, have been made public on the KCDC website. Those who enter the country from abroad are required to install a self-examination app at the immigration office and register information about their passport number, country of residence, and health status. They must enter their health information for 14 days, and if they forget to do so for four days, they will be reported to the police. In late March, the Korea Electronic Technology Institute, KCDC, and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport developed the Epidemic Investigation Support Sys-tem (EISS) based on a Smart City data platform, which collects information related to urban planning. The Smart City was originally scheduled to be tested in February 2020 but has been converted to a COVID-19 countermeasure sys-tem. Once KCDC enters the information on confirmed cases, authorized agents request personal information needed to track these cases from the telecommunication and credit card companies through EISS. In response, the companies upload the information to EISS either automatically or manually. The tracking and analysis of hotspots using the EISS reduced the time required to collect and analyze data on infected persons from 2–3 days to less than one hour. As a result, South Korea has quickly examined and isolated infection suspects. Messages are also shared with people who might have come into contact with the infected persons to raise awareness of their own potential for infection. Despite the early outbreak in Daegue, the tracking sys-tem has contributed to controlling the spread of infection to this day, allowing people to continue their daily lives without lockdown. The country even managed to hold its legislative election in April. The EISS has paid attention to minimizing privacy breaches and to preventing the hacking of personal information. Personal information of infected people can be browsed on EISS only up to 14 days according to the virus’s incubation period. The number of investigators authorized to access the information is limited as well. The only data accessible is related to the infection route, and information from closed-circuit TV or face recognition sys-tems are not linked to it. To prevent hacking, investigators log in via VPN and two-factor authentication. The database is encrypted. However, this approach still does not eliminate privacy violation completely. The fact that the authority obtains personal information without the consent of either the individuals themselves or the courts is problematic and raises concerns of abuse. In particular, there is no clear timeframe set for the use of this sys-tem and the storage of individual data. The pandemic itself is expected to be prolonged, and the possibility of the use of the sys-tem for different purposes after the pandemic cannot be completely ruled out. This concern was compounded by the revelation that the South Korean government is still holding personal data on those who were infected with MERS in 2015. Kwon Jun-wook, director of the National Institute of Health, told a press conference in early June that they have decided to store data on MERS-infected individuals permanently. This is a move that violates the Personal Information Protection Act, which requires data on infected individuals to be deleted without delay. Although the government says that it will delete information on the confirmed cases of COVID-19 after the pandemic, based on the MERS precedent, the government's statement is not considered credible. In addition, the fact that an excessive amount of personal information on infected individuals is made public has been a problem, both domestically and internationally. Social media is used to search for the infected persons and to pry into their private lives, violating their individual dignity and discriminating against them. Oh Byoung-il of the Korean Progressive Network says that the personal information of infected people such as gender, nationality, and age are not necessary in warning about the possibility of contact. In addition, people with symptoms may be hesitant to take a COVID-19 test if they fear the breach of privacy, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea warns.Nevertheless, individual tracking is used in South Korea because the public generally supports the government's approach of controlling the virus while tolerating privacy violations to some extent.   Japan Hesitant to Obtain Personal Information In Japan, on the other hand, there has always been a strong sense of aversion to the invasion of privacy, and the government has not allowed health officials to access personal information. While Japan has traced the moves of confirmed cases to prevent the formation of clusters just as in South Korea, information on their moves has been obtained through interviews. The introduction of an app to track contact with infected people was examined carefully, and COCOA was introduced on June 19, five months after the first case of infection was discovered in Japan. While the South Korean sys-tem allows the authority to access personal information, COCOA is a sys-tem developed by Google and Apple which uses Bluetooth to reveal information on contact. It notes within the individual’s own phone the presence of devices that have been within one meter of each other for more than 15 minutes, with a random IDs issued every 10 minutes. The ID information stored on the individual's phone is not sent to the central server, but if a person tests positive for COVID-19 and enters the number issued by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare into the app himself/herself, the ID-related information is sent to the central server. Notifications are then sent to the devices that may have been in the vicinity of the device of the confirmed case. The sys-tem is not tied to personal information, such as location, and the government cannot access personal information through COCOA. Nevertheless, due to the fear of personal information leaks, the number of downloads within a month of the announcement was only 7.69 million. The download is limited especially among the younger generation. There is also a probability that people will not register the fact of infection, and indeed, the number of registrations of infection in one month was only 27. Without an increase in the number of users, the effectiveness of this sys-tem will not increase. Some commentators point out that the weak level of trust in government might be a stumbling block for downloads. In addition, there is also a widespread concern in the society about the misuse of information by the app companies. As such, concerns about privacy violations have prevented the government from an effective use of IT-based tracking in Japan. However, the government’s approach unfortunately did not guarantee the protection of human rights; the absence of coercive government control led to voluntary mutual monitoring of people in the society. The emergence of a number of so-called “Jishuku Keisatsu” (self-restraint police), who voluntarily protest, report to the police, and threaten people for going out, not wearing masks, or continuing to operate their businesses has become a social problem. Despite the government's choice of measures to respect privacy and civil liberties, people are acting to suppress each other's civil liberties.   Conclusion While there is no protection of human rights without life, we need to move with one eye on the post-COVID society. Allowing excessive privacy violations by governments is dangerous because it could be the basis for an authoritarian surveillance society; the encapsulation of various restrictive measures in the EISS is sensible. In addition, it would be desirable for the Korean government to set deadlines for access to personal information and commit to deleting personal information after the pandemic, and to do so in a manner that allows for public scrutiny. In Japan, there is a need for continued advocacy on how mutual surveillance suppresses civil liberties. It is advisable to educate people about the issue of self-restraint police, as has occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, as a part of civic education. The COVID-19 pandemic has led to increased interaction on the Internet and will make it even easier to monitor individuals in the future. We need to begin tackling this issue and take steps to preserve privacy and freedom both online and offline.■     ■ Maiko Ichihara is Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Law at Hitotsubashi University, Japan, and a Visiting Scholar at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University. She is also a co-chair of the Democracy for the Future project at the Japan Center for International Exchange. Throughout her career, she has undertaken research on international relations, democracy support, and Japanese foreign policy. Her recent publications include: “Universality to Plurality? Values in Japanese Foreign Policy,” in Yoichi Funabashi and G. John Ikenberry, eds., The Crisis of Liberalism: Japan and the International Order (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020); and Japan’s International Democracy Assistance as Soft Power: Neoclassical Realist Analysis (New York and London: Routledge, 2017).   ■담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구원               문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 209)  |  [email protected]     [EAI이슈브리핑]은 국내외 주요 사안에 대해 다양한 분야의 전문가들이 심층적인 분석을 통해 의견을 개진하고 정책적 제언을 발표할 수 있는 담론의 장을 마련하고자 기획된 시리즈입니다. 인용할 때에는 반드시 출처를 밝혀주시기 바랍니다. EAI는 어떠한 정파적 이해와도 무관한 독립 연구기관입니다. EAI가 발행하는 보고서와 저널 및 단행본에 실린 주장과 의견은 EAI와는 무관하며 오로지 저자 개인의 견해임을 밝힙니다.    

Maiko Ichihara 2020-07-27조회 : 13477
논평이슈브리핑
[Asia Democracy Issue Briefing] Democracy and Economic Development: Experience from South Korea

Editor's Note South Korea is considered to be a distinguished case that achieved both industrialization and democratization simultaneously within a short period of time. In this issue briefing, Dr. Seungjoo Lee presents South Korea’s parallel experience of economic development and democratization by examining its interplay between democracy and economic development as well as institutional factors that have changed and continued throughout the periods of authoritarianism, democratic transition, and democratization. Dr. Seungjoo Lee argues that despite a series of challenges it has faced, South Korea has actively sought new solutions in the wake of intense domestic political competition and conflicts, which has shown its capability to turn crises into opportunities, and that the country’s quest for a balance of democracy and economic growth is still ongoing.   .a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;}   The parallel development of democracy and capitalism is a value accumulated from historical experiences of the West. South Korea presents a distinguished case from other developing countries in Asia, as it achieved both industrialization and democratization simultaneously. While the nominal GDP of South Korea was at 2.41 billion USD in 1961, it reached 146.1 billion USD in 1987 with an annual growth rate of 9.7% per year. 1987 was also the year in which South Korea achieved its democratization. Since democratization, South Korea has grown continuously and at a high rate of 8.9% (GDP growth rate) on average, until the country was hit by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Although the GDP growth rate of South Korea gradually decreased to 4.1% throughout 2000 to 2019, it was still higher than that of other advanced economies. South Korea’s GDP reached a record of 1.63 trillion USD in 2019, placing the country as the 12th largest economy in the world and the fourth largest in Asia. This translates to a 676-fold economic development over a period of less than sixty years since South Korea first embarked upon its process of industrialization. South Korea pursued economic growth throughout periods of authoritarianism, democratic transition, and democratization. South Korea’s interplay between democracy and economic development can be explained by “challenges and responses.” For instance, South Korea was able to effectively manage the uncertainties that arose from the process of democratic transition. Furthermore, despite various challenges that emerged during its period of democratic consolidation, it retained economic stability by turning toward new engines of economic growth. Some of the challenges South Korea faced during this time included weakened public consent on economic growth, new surge of demand for distribution, and division of value sys-tems. How was South Korea able to see continued economic growth even after its democratic transition and democratization? In order to answer this question, we need to examine the linkage between political transition and economic growth in the context of South Korea’s domestic experience. We also need to examine specific variables such as the institutional factors that enabled South Korea to attain high level of economic growth under the authoritarian regime; changes and continuities in institutional factors following its democratization; and if changes have occurred, the new sets of institutional factors that have made its continued economic growth possible.   Authoritarianism, Democracy and Economic Growth The characteristics of South Korea's economic development under authoritarianism include the government’s mobilization of capital as well as strategic promotion of industries and industrial policies. In order to elucidate South Korea’s “sustained” economic growth during the authoritarian era, two issues need to be examined. Firstly, it is true that the government’s capacity to mobilize capital and labor, and its policies played a key role in the early model of South Korean development. However, the government’s capacity and policies do not provide a full account of the variables that contributed to South Korea’s continued economic growth. Due attention needs to be paid to the mechanisms of mobilization and participation. While mobilization and participation can be seen as mutually exclusive, they can co-exist when cooperative relationships are formed in the long-run between the government and businesses, the government and labor sectors, as well as between businesses and labor sectors. For instance, mobilization and participation co-existed during the period of heightened growth in South Korea despite the oppression of labor forces, due to relatively low income inequalities and cooperation between employers and employees based on long-term contracts. The government’s lead on resource mobilization may have been the main feature during this period, but continued economic growth was also made possible due to limitations in the participatory mechanism. The second issue addresses the “rent” caused by the government’s market intervention. A rent is generated when a “strong” state—which is insulated from social pressure to the extent that it can order a certain group to make sacrifices for the society—intervenes in the market economy. What is important to consider is how to utilize the rent that has been generated. During its authoritarian era, the South Korean government utilized the rent in compensation for entrepreneurship in order to make continued economic growth possible. In sum, mobilization and participatory mechanisms as well as the productive use of the rent laid an institutional foundation for South Korea's economic growth during the authoritarian era.    Democratic Transition and Economic Growth: Management of Uncertainty During its democratic transition, South Korea faced a new set of challenges and displayed a feature of “continuity and discontinuity.” The Roh Tae-woo administration inaugurated in 1987 exhibited dual aspects in terms of its policy ideals, institutional framework, and individual policies. The Roh government was faced with external challenges including increased pressure from developed nations to open up South Korea’s market, effects of globalization, pressure for liberalization, and industrial transition. Domestically, a new set of challenges emerged such as the new surge of social demand, the need to re-establish relationships with societal groups including the labor force, and the pressure to expand existing political coalitions. These challenges were fundamentally different from those in the past. South Korea’s democratic transition also displayed a continuity in terms of elite power, since it had been achieved through pacts. Democratization via the establishment of pacts incurs divisions among elites and enables a certain group of elites to take the lead in negotiations with other societal groups. This is different compared to democratization from the bottom which is accompanied by a major shift in the ruling elites. Since its democratization, the South Korean government experienced restricted autonomy on labor. As the need for the government to proactively tackle the demand for policy shift grew stronger, the “discontinuity and shift” tactic emerged. At the same time, “continuity” also took place, as political participation of societal groups including the labor force, had not been sys-tematically expanded in the short term.   Democracy and Economic Growth after Crisis Since its democratization, the main challenge South Korea faced has been respective changes in its economic paradigm. President Kim Young-sam who was elected in 1992 advocated for a “civilian government” model which differed from the government-led growth model that South Korea had adhered to since the 1960s. In doing so, he aimed to eliminate “legacies of authoritarianism.” The Kim Young-sam administration pursued a set of reform policies such as the abolition of the Five Year Plan of Economic Development, the revocation of policy finance, and introduction of the Real-Name Financial Sys-tem, as well as a globalization policy for joining the OECD through financial liberalization. The Kim administration made a considerable achievement in terms of dismantling the authoritarian economic model. However, its ambitious penchant for reform was met by the Asian financial crisis in 1997. In the aftermath of the crisis, the South Korean economy recorded -5.1% of economic growth in 1998, which was the lowest since 1970s. The reason that the South Korean government’s drive for reform ended with the financial crisis largely had to do with the design of the reform, rather than its speed or scale. While the Kim Young-sam government tried to diminish the role of the government in pursuing its liberalization process to dismantle authoritarianism, it failed to put forward a sys-tematic and sophisticated strategy for liberalization. The Kim administration utilized the “retreat of the state” strategy in its liberalization drive in order to set a new political-economic model and institutional framework. However, while liberalization might have been an effective tool for dismantling the state-led authoritarian growth model, it did not lead to an establishment of a new model in itself. As a consequence, the experiment to set up a new economic model following democratization came to an end.      The financial crisis was not only an economic crisis, but also a political and social crisis. At the same time, it acted as a catalyst for a great shift in the country’s economic, political and social realms. Since its democratization, South Korea witnessed a wide range of issues, including government-business relations, concentration of economic power, low efficiency of financial institutions, inflexible labor markets, and inefficiency in the public sector, amongst others. The South Korean government utilized the crisis to alleviate the reform’s opposition. As a consequence, following the crisis, a wide range of reform measures were implemented including the liberalization of foreign investment, merging and acquisition of financial institutions, reform of corporate governance, privatization of the public sector and enhanced labor flexibility. A decade following its democratization in 1987, the Korean-style development model evolved into a new paradigm encompassing “paradox of crisis.”  Since the 2000s, South Korea has faced the dual challenge of democratization and globalization, but has actively played a transformative role. First of all, South Korea has been exploring and experimenting with the government's new role within the democratic sys-tem. As the democratic sys-tem increases the number of actors involved in policy decision-making, it becomes difficult for the government to make consistent policy decisions and institutionalize cooperation amongst major actors in the short term. Globalization, combined with democracy, has emerged as another challenging factor that demands changes in the government’s role in economic growth. As globalization progresses and the global value chain is formed in major industrial sectors, the South Korean government faces a new task of positioning its industries within the new value chain and upgrading them to a more value-added production stage. Establishing the relationship between domestic industrial capacity and the changing global production sys-tem has become the core of transformation. The dual challenge of democratization and globalization served as an opportunity for the South Korean government in its search for new roles in coordinating complex interests and promoting cooperation among various actors. If the change in the number of actors in a democracy is inevitable, the formation and maintenance of an effective competitive environment is a new task expected from the government. Given the characteristics of high-tech industries, the role of the government in balancing competition and cooperation is of great importance, as it is difficult to expect various private actors to voluntarily participate in the development of technology and innovation and create a competitive market environment. The Kim Dae-jung administration’s ICT industrial policy, the green growth policy of the Lee Myung-bak administration, the creative economy policy of the Park Geun-hye government, and the Moon government’s energy transition policy are all examples of the government’s efforts to pursue a new role in a changing environment. For example, in the process of overcoming a crisis, the Kim Dae-jung administration reformed the economic power that had been once concentrated on large corporations and corporate governance, while simultaneously exhibiting developmentalism by intensively fostering the ICT industry. Additionally, while trying to implement policies with Neoliberal characteristics such as deregulation, liberalization, privatization, tax rate cuts, etc., as seen in the green growth policy, to create a virtuous cycle between economic growth and environment, the Lee administration actively supported related industries. The government sought its role as a facilitator of cooperation and coordination of interests.   South Korea’s Search for a New Equilibrium South Korea's quest for a balance of democracy and economic growth is not over yet. South Korea has faced a series of challenges since democratization. Although South Korea has not successfully dealt with each challenge, it has actively sought new solutions in the wake of intense domestic political competition and conflicts. As a result, South Korea has become the most “dynamic country” in the world and has shown collective wisdom that turns crises into opportunities. At this point, South Korea faces challenges that need to be addressed such as finding new growth engines, solving income inequality and strengthening job security for contract workers. These tasks are the result of reforms chosen by South Korea after the financial crisis. In the case of income inequality, during the period of rapid growth before democratization, South Korea had the lowest income inequality among developing countries, but it rose sharply after the Asian financial crisis. The Gini coefficient deteriorated sharply within just two years from 0.267 in 1997 to 0.308 in 1999 and is also at 0.306 in 2019. Based on the income share of the top 10%, as shown by a sharp increase from 35% in 1996 before the crisis to 50.6% in 2017, income inequality is worsening. South Korea has yet to find a complete solution to this problem. However, it is evident that Korea has never stopped its experiments to search for a new equilibrium. ■     ■ Seungjoo Lee is a professor in the department of political science and international relations at Chung-Ang University. His current areas of research interest cover the subjects of East Asian regionalism, mega FTAs and economy-security nexus, middle power diplomacy, and development cooperation.    ■담당 및 편집: 이은지 EAI 연구원               문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) / [email protected]     [EAI이슈브리핑]은 국내외 주요 사안에 대해 다양한 분야의 전문가들이 심층적인 분석을 통해 의견을 개진하고 정책적 제언을 발표할 수 있는 담론의 장을 마련하고자 기획된 시리즈입니다. 인용할 때에는 반드시 출처를 밝혀주시기 바랍니다. EAI는 어떠한 정파적 이해와도 무관한 독립 연구기관입니다. EAI가 발행하는 보고서와 저널 및 단행본에 실린 주장과 의견은 EAI와는 무관하며 오로지 저자 개인의 견해임을 밝힙니다.    

Seungjoo Lee 2020-07-24조회 : 9028
논평이슈브리핑
[Asia Democracy Issue Briefing] Waning Support for Ethnic Minorities in South Korea: Change in Public Mind from Cultural to Materialistic Concerns

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Note Koreans’ attitude towards multiculturalism and immigration has changed over the last 15 years, reflecting a nuanced perspective in which people acknowledge both threats and opportunities associated with multiculturalism. In this issue briefing, Dr. Rosa Minhyo Cho presents findings from the South Korean Identity Survey (SKIS: 2005-2020) and points out that while Koreans exhibited a form of paternalism at the initial stage, this attitude has changed in recent years with problems linked to the presence of immigrants in society. As the Korean society is increasingly faced with the issue of shrinking and aging populations, Dr. Rosa Minhyo Cho argues that Koreans will eventually need to weigh up whether immigration is a viable option to such problems and that efforts need to be made to engage with constructive discourse on the social costs and benefits of multiculturalism in a way that includes ethnic minorities, which is essential to a healthy democracy.     Roughly 2.5 million foreigners are estimated to be residing in South Korea (hereinafter, Korea) as of December, 2019, comprising about 4.9% of its total population. Given its long history of being an ethnically homogenous society, the relatively recent growth in the number of immigrant and foreign populations have led to new challenges. In 2007, the number of Korea’s foreign resident population reached 1 million for the first time. Faced with pressures from low fertility and a rapidly aging society, the Korean government began to promote multiculturalism as an important political agenda introducing several policy measures to support and encourage the integration of these newcomers. Such state-led efforts resulted in multiculturalism being upheld as an issue of ‘political correctness’ with much less attention paid to the complex implications of immigration in general. As a result, Koreans displayed a naïve form of paternalism toward immigrants at least during the early periods of increased migration. However, in recent years problems such as intensified job competition, marriage fraud, cultural clashes, and violent crimes have been linked to the presence of immigrants in Korea, making the risks of a multicultural society more visible. This has led to a change in attitude toward immigration reflecting a nuanced perspective in which people acknowledge both the threats and opportunities associated with multiculturalism. To further examine how Korean’s attitude toward multiculturalism and immigration has changed over the past 15 years, data from the South Korean Identity Survey (SKIS: 2005-2020) is analyzed and reported below.   Change in Attitude toward Multiculturalism and Immigrant Receptivity According to estimates from the SKIS (see Table 1), Korean’s preference toward becoming a multiethnic/multicultural country has declined over the past 10 years, whereas their preference toward becoming a monoethnic/monocultural country remained largely unchanged. Specifically, 60.6% of Koreans were in support of becoming a multiethnic/multicultural country in 2010, but that number decreased to 44.4% by 2020. On the other hand, 37.1% and 39.1% of Koreans were in support of becoming a monoethnic/monocultural country in 2010 and in 2020, respectively.  Generally, exclusionary attitude toward immigrants can be explained by two theoretical perspectives. Social identity theory posits that immigrants are viewed as cultural threats to the positive status of the country’s symbolic establishments as well as to the maintenance of its ethnic and cultural cohesiveness, whereas realistic conflict theory emphasizes strained social relations due to increased competition for limited resources with material threats being the primary concern. To better understand the source of recent decline in the overall support for multiculturalism, it should be important to examine how Korean’s attitude relating to immigrant receptivity has changed over time especially with regard to their perception of immigrants as cultural and material threats.  Based on survey results, it appears that the level of perceived cultural threat has not been increasing over the past 10 years. For example, the proportion of positive responses to the statement “Racial, religious, and cultural diversity enhances national competitiveness” increased consistently from 47.8% in 2010, to 50.4% in 2015, and to 51.8% in 2020. Likewise, the proportion of respondents who agreed that having more immigrants enrich Korea’s culture slightly increased from 33.6% in 2010 to 34.5% in 2020. When asked whether they would allow their child to marry a foreigner, the fraction of positive responses increased from 30.2% in 2005 to 32.5% in 2010, and to 44.3% in 2015 and 2020 indicating a rather open attitude toward marital assimilation. However, Koreans are found to display a more negative attitude on questions either directly or indirectly related to material threat. Examples of direct material threat include immigrants competing for the same jobs as natives, while indirect material threat may occur due to increased taxes for their welfare or congested public spaces and infrastructure. According to findings from the SKIS, the proportion of people who agreed to the statement that foreign laborers threaten the jobs of natives was 39.4% in 2005 but increased to 42.7% by 2020. Also, the fraction of people who thought that we should provide equal voting rights and social security benefits to naturalized citizens dropped from 56% in 2010 to 52.1% in 2020, while those who thought we should make it easier for foreigners to obtain Korean citizenships dropped from 40.7% in 2010 to 34.2% in 2015, and to 33.6% in 2020. Lastly, the fraction of people who agreed that there are limitations to receiving foreigners with different racial, religious, and cultural backgrounds increased from 48.9% in 2010 to 56.9% in 2015, and to 57.1% in 2020. Taken together, it appears that the direction of change in attitude toward immigrants is not uniform in Korea, but rather multifaceted. Koreans tend to display growing acceptance and tolerance on issues relating to the cultural benefits of multiculturalism and international marriages, yet their attitudes are becoming more exclusionary on matters that pose real economic threats to natives who have to compete with newcomers for jobs, benefits, and social services.   Difference in Attitude toward Multiculturalism by Education and Age Generally, attitudes about immigration are closely tied to one’s age and educational attainment. In the case of Korea, findings indicate that preference toward multiculturalism is positively correlated with one’s education level but negatively correlated with age. First, in terms of education, estimates presented in Table 2 show that during the past 10 years, support for multiculturalism has been much higher among people with college education or above than those with middle school education or below. This is not surprising, given that most migrant workers in Korea are unskilled laborers posing direct material threats to the less educated population. Results from cross-tabulations between education level and whether you think foreign laborers threaten the jobs of natives corroborated this finding where the proportion of positive answers was 53.6% for people with middle school education or below but only 35.1% among college educated or above in 2020.     Next, as shown in Figure 1, the pattern of change in preference for multiculturalism by age cohort is not uniform across time. Specifically, in 2010, people in their 20’s and 30’s showed strong preference for multiculturalism with 65.3% supporting the statement that this country should become a multiethnic/multicultural country. However, in 2015, the proportion of supporters among this age group drastically dropped to 47%, making it lower than the fraction of supporters for multiculturalism among people aged 40 and above at 51.1%. Such reverse in attitude was not long lasting, however, since in the 2020 survey those in their 20’s and 30’s continued to show the highest support for multiculturalism at 53.9%. These estimates indicate that although the decline in preference for multiculturalism between 2010 and 2015 was primarily due to the fall in support among the young generation, declining preferences for multiculturalism from 2015 to 2020 occurred by the decrease in support among people aged 40 and above, despite increased support from those in their 20’s and 30’s.     Feelings of Closeness by Immigrant Group Finally, to better understand the recent change in attitude toward multiculturalism among Koreans, feelings of closeness across various immigrant groups are presented in Figure 2. Prior research indicates that Koreans tend to interact differently with foreigners based on factors such as whether the person is a naturalized citizen, Korean ethnic, legal immigrant, and/or whether the person migrated from an advanced (as opposed to a less developed) country. As shown in all three surveys of 2010, 2015, and 2020, Koreans display the greatest degree of affinity toward children of international couples, followed by North Korean defectors, marriage migrants, Korean-Chinese, and labor migrants. Feelings of closeness tend to be stronger for groups that have family ties with native Koreans and weaker for groups that have the potential to compete for scarce resources.     Yet, perceived closeness has been consistently declining since 2010 for all groups. This trend concurs with our earlier finding of a decline in preference toward becoming a multiethnic/multicultural country. The decrease in affinity toward Korean-Chinese, the largest immigrant group currently residing in Korea, is especially noticeable where 60% of respondents in 2010 said they felt this group is close to native Koreans but in 2020 the number declines to only 40.1%. Another group that Koreans display exceptionally low affinity toward is labor migrants. In 2010, the proportion of people reporting that they felt this group is close to a stranger was 60.8%, while those reporting they felt this group is close to native Koreans was 38.2%. However, in 2020 the gap in such proportions increased and 71.1% of Koreans perceived labor migrants to be strangers, whereas only 28.8% reported feelings of closeness.   Transitional Period or Fading Cosmopolitan Dream? Is Korea experiencing a temporary setback in its transition to becoming a multicultural society where cultural differences and racial diversity is embraced or are these statistics indicative of serious underlying conflicts among members of our society? We do not know yet. Probably the answer to this question will ultimately depend on our future actions. However, one thing that is clear is that Korea is faced with a future of shrinking and rapidly aging populations even with the current rates of immigration. Currently, the number of non-working age population is expected to exceed that of the working age population by 2056. This means that, over the next decades ahead, we will experience severe fiscal pressures as the workforce declines and the numbers of elderly soar. Eventually, Koreans will have to decide whether immigration is a viable solution to such problems and learn how to attract promising migrants while successfully integrating them. To achieve our end goal, whatever it may be, we should start making efforts to engage in public discourse regarding the social costs and benefits of multiculturalism from a practical and objective perspective. Also, since changing attitudes among Koreans has the risk of exacerbating the economic and political exclusion of ethnic minorities potentially leading to their social exclusion, making sure that ethnic minorities are adequately represented throughout such discourse should be a priority for a healthy democracy. ■     ■ This brief is a revised version of the paper, “South Korean’s Multifaceted Attitude toward Multiculturalism” (by Choi, Ji- Hye and Cho, Rosa Minhyo), presented at the Conference on the 2020 South Korean Identity Survey held on July 6, 2020 at the Korean National Assembly Hall.    ■ Rosa Minhyo Cho is a professor at the Graduate School of Governance, Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU) in Seoul, Korea. Prior to her appointment at SKKU, she was an assistant professor at Brown University in the Department of Education and Public Policy between 2006 and 2012. Her research interests include evaluating the various effects of social welfare policy, education policy, immigrant policy, and labor policy using large-scale quantitative datasets. Her recent publications include “Collaborative Governance in East Asia” (2020), “Examining the Effects of the Durunuri Programme on Low-wage Workers’ Social Insurance Coverage in South Korea” (2019), and “Exploring the Acculturation Profiles and Adaptation of Children of Multiethnic Families in South Korea” (2016).    ■담당 및 편집: 이은지 EAI 연구원               문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) / [email protected]     [EAI이슈브리핑]은 국내외 주요 사안에 대해 다양한 분야의 전문가들이 심층적인 분석을 통해 의견을 개진하고 정책적 제언을 발표할 수 있는 담론의 장을 마련하고자 기획된 시리즈입니다. 인용할 때에는 반드시 출처를 밝혀주시기 바랍니다. EAI는 어떠한 정파적 이해와도 무관한 독립 연구기관입니다. EAI가 발행하는 보고서와 저널 및 단행본에 실린 주장과 의견은 EAI와는 무관하며 오로지 저자 개인의 견해임을 밝힙니다.    

Rosa Minhyo Cho 2020-07-22조회 : 13748
멀티미디어
[EAI 온라인 세미나] 코로나19와 신세계 질서 3. 민주주의의 미래를 묻다: 코로나 위기의 아시아

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} 동아시아연구원(원장 손열)은 [코로나19와 신세계 질서]의 세 번째 세미나, '코로나19 사태와 아시아 민주주의의 미래'를 개최하였습니다. 본 회의에서 EAI는 Larry Diamond 교수의 강연을 바탕으로 팬데믹 중 민주주의의 과제와 아시아 민주주의에 관한 국가, 지역별 해석을 논의하였습니다.     일시: 2020년 7월 16일(목), 12:00–13:00 (KST) 강연자: Larry Diamond(Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and at the Hoover Institution and Professor, of Sociology and of Political Science at Stanford University) 토론자: Francisco A. Magno(Professor at De La Salle University & Director at Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance), Maiko Ichihara(Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Law and the School of International and Public Policy at Hitotsubashi University), U Khine Win(Executive Director of Sandhi Governance Institute) 사회자: 이숙종 (EAI 시니어 펠로우; 성균관대 행정학과 교수)     민주주의의 미래를 묻다: 코로나 위기의 아시아   코로나19 팬데믹 이전부터 지속되어 온 민주주의 퇴보 추세 래리 다이아몬드 교수는 코로나19 팬데믹 발발 이전에도 전세계적으로 민주주의가 퇴보하는 추세가 지속되어 왔다고 지적한다. 2006년부터 자유를 비롯한 헌법주의, 법치주의, 견제와 균형 등 여러 민주주의 지표들이 퇴보하고 있었으며, 특히 최근 몇 년 사이 이러한 추세가 가속화되어 왔다. 이를 증명이라도 하듯, 지난 45년 간 분석해 온 ‘제3차 글로벌 민주화 물결’에서 최근 5년(2015-2020년) 동안 처음으로 상당수의 국가들이 민주주의 체제에서 벗어나면서 헌팅턴이 규정한 “민주주의 실패 물결의 역습(reverse wave of democratic breakdown)”의 경향을 보이고 있다. 이런 추세가 몇 년 더 지속된다면 전세계는 민주주의 퇴보 상태에 도달할 지도 모른다.   필리핀, 인도, 방글라데시 등 많은 아시아 국가들에서는 민주주의 퇴보 경향이 집권여당의 권력 강화나 야당의 견제 약화 등의 양상으로 나타나고 있다. 일례로 방글라데시의 경우, 2014년 선거에서 야당이 선거위원회의 독립성과 중립성을 침해하는 선거 절차에 보이콧을 하면서 현 총리의 집권이 계속되고 있다. 스리랑카는 5년 전 선거에서 권위주의 정권이 패배하면서 민주주의 회복 징후를 보였지만 또 다시 권위주의 정치인들이 재집권하는 모습을 보이고 있다. 필리핀의 경우에는 2016년 두테르테 대통령이 선포한 마약과의 전쟁이 법치주의, 인권, 시민의 권리를 약화하는 결과를 초래하였다.   현재 민주주의의 퇴보 현상은 이전처럼 군사 쿠데타나 비상계엄령 선포 등의 형태로 나타나기보다는, 견제와 균형이 교묘히 무너지며 공고화되는 방식으로 나타난다. 대통령이나 총리 등 행정부 수반의 권한이 교묘하게 강화되어 권력 장악이 보다 용이해지며, 이에 자연스레 사법부, 언론, 감사, 검찰, 입법부 등 권력 견제 기능을 가진 기관들은 독립성 및 권한을 잃어간다. 민주주의 퇴보 추세는 한국처럼 비교적 자유민주주의가 잘 정립된 아시아 국가를 예외로 삼지 않는다. 실제로 한국에서도 최근 대통령 권한 강화와 야당에 대한 무관용, 견제와 균형 약화, 정치적 반대파에 대한 위협 등 타 국가들에서 보이는 것과 유사한 민주주의의 퇴보 징후가 나타나고 있다.   래리 다이아몬드 교수는 민주주의 가치의 핵심인 자유 또한 급격히 쇠퇴하였으며, 자유 수호가 꽤나 기만적인 형태로 나타나고 있다고 지적한다. 세계 최대 민주주의 국가인 인도의 예를 살펴보더라도, 확실히 시민의 자유와 언론의 독립성, 다원주의, 선거 토론의 개방성 등이 약화되는 추세다. 아시아에서 두 번째로 큰 규모의 민주주의를 가진 인도네시아는 2019년 개최된 대통령 선거에서 권위주의적이고 포퓰리즘적 성향을 가진 야당 대표가 패배함에 따라 민주주의 퇴보 국면을 간신히 피했으나, 여전히 종교적 불관용과 반자유주의 등의 추세를 이어가고 있다.   래리 다이아몬드 교수는 코로나 사태 전에도 민주주의의 퇴보는 이미 진행 중이었다고 재차 강조한다. 민주주의로의 과도기 진통을 겪고 있는 미얀마, 민주주의 불씨 탄압과 시진핑에 대한 권력 집중 양상을 보이는 중국, 야당의 분열과 종말을 맞고 있는 캄보디아, 군부 출신의 정권 장악이 지속되는 태국 등 아시아에서 민주주의의 모범사례를 찾기가 힘든 상황이라고 덧붙인다.   아시아 민주주의: “팬데믹을 전화위복 삼거나, 내리막길 삼거나” 코로나19 사태가 아시아 민주주의는 남긴 시사점은 크게 두 가지로 나뉜다. 퇴보 추세를 경험하던 아시아 민주주의는 ‘팬데믹을 전화위복 삼거나 (팬데믹에 효과적으로 대응하는 유능한 민주주의), 내리막길 삼거나 (민주주의 퇴보 추세에 편승해 코로나19 대응 과정 중 권위주의에 굴복하는 민주주의)’하는 문제에 직면한 것이다. 대만과 한국의 사례가 증명하듯, 전자의 경우는 민주주의 체제가 코로나에 대한 효과적 대응에 있어 장애물이 아니라고 주장한다. 이러한 민주주의 국가들은 정부의 보건당국 전문가들의 의견에 경청과 효과적인 소통 채널과 시민의식이 동반된 마스크 착용 정책, 확진자에 대한 신속한 격리와 추적 등을 통해 바이러스 억제를 성공적으로 이끌어냈다. 한편, 후자의 경우, 이미 민주주의의 퇴보로 골머리를 썩히던 인도, 방글라데시, 필리핀 등의 사례를 통해 알 수 있듯이, 코로나 국면이 대중의 두려움을 공포정치의 도구로 삼고 권위주의 정권들이 야당과 언론을 탄압하는 등 자유를 침해하고 권력을 공고화의 수단으로 이용된다.   프란시스코 A. 마그노 교수는 필리핀의 현 상황을 “권위주의가 서서히 (민주주의를) 잠식하는 상황(creeping authoritarianism)”으로 규정하며, 최근 몇 년 간 필리핀이 보여준 민주주의 퇴보 징후가 특히 코로나19 사태로 인해 더욱 가속화되는 양상을 보였다고 지적한다. 코로나19 사태 이후 필리핀 정부는 비상계엄령을 선포하였으며 여당 권력의 의회 장악, 대통령 측근들의 대법원 장악 등 견제와 균형의 제 기능을 못하고 있다. 또한 최근 필리핀 의회는 ‘독립적 성향을 가지고 정권을 비판하던 거대 미디어네트워크를 폐쇄하겠다’는 결정을 내리는 한편, 반테러법(anti-terrorism law)을 통과시키기도 했다. 민주주의 가치 수호를 위해 내려진 결정이라고 보기엔, 일례로 반테러법이 테러리즘에 대한 정의가 모호하여 야당인사들을 탄압하는 수단으로 이용될 수 있다는 점, 동 법을 집행하는 위원회 역시 행정부의 통제를 받고 있다는 점 등 갖은 우려가 일고 있는 상황이다.   마이코 이치하라 부교수는 전세계적 관심이 코로나 사태에 쏠려있는 상황에서 국내적으로 인권 탄압과 법치주의 약화 등이 지속되고 있는 상황에 우려를 표하고 대표적인 사례로 홍콩 사태를 언급한다. 이와 관련하여 최근 미국 의회에서 홍콩의 인권활동가들과 일반 시민들이 중국 정부의 탄압을 피해 안전하게 대피할 수 있도록 돕는 법안을 통과하였다고 덧붙이며, 일본과 한국, 대만, 인도네시아, 인도 등 아시아 대표 민주주의 국가들에서도 동 이슈에 대한 논의가 일어나야 한다고 주장한다.   래리 다이아몬드 교수 또한 현 홍콩 사태가 세계사에 기록될 주요 사건이며, 코로나 사태로 국제사회가 홍콩의 민주화 탄압 상황에 제대로 대응하지 못하고 있다고 지적한다. 래리 다이아몬드 교수는 중국의 홍콩 탄압 조치들이 개인의 자유를 침해하고 국제법에 위배될 뿐만 아니라, 향후 시진핑 주석의 권위주의 경향을 더욱 강화하는 초석이 될 것이라고 전망한다. 또한 아시아 역내의 자유민주주의 국가들 역시 홍콩인들의 자유를 보호할 법안을 발의하고 중국 정부에 제재를 가하여 압박을 가할 필요가 있다고 주장한다. 래리 다이아몬드 교수는 중국 정부가 홍콩 민주화를 지지하는 외국인들에 대한 정보 접근을 허용하는 문제와 관련, 모든 민주주의 국가들이 소셜미디어 기업들이 자국민들의 정보를 외국 정부에 제공하는 것을 형사처벌 할 수 있도록 하는 법안을 마련하여야 한다고 주장하고, 이러한 조치가 시민들의 자유를 보호하기 위해 근본적으로 필요한 조치라고 언급한다.   팬데믹이 남긴 교훈: 민주주의 vs 권위주의 대결구도의 딜레마를 벗어나야 한다? 유 카인 윈 소장은 미얀마가 지리적으로 여러 권위주의 국가들에 둘러싸여 있다는 지리적 특징을 언급하며 베트남, 중국 등 역내 권위주의 체제 국가들이 미국, 이탈리아 등 민주주의 국가들에 비해 코로나 대응에 비교적 성공을 거두고 있다고 평가한다. 유 카인 윈 소장은 이러한 가정 하에 코로나19 사태 하 미얀마 민주주의의 상황을 프란시스 후쿠야마가 제시한 국가의 역량(state capacity), 사회적 신뢰(social trust), 리더십의 3가지 기준에서 설명한다. 사회적 신뢰와 리더십의 측면에서 미얀마는 비교적 주목할만한 선례들을 남기고 있는데, 이는 아웅산 수지가 이끄는 민간정부가 코로나 대응에 있어 차별 없이 모두를 아우르는 인간적 대응을 펼치고 있기에 가능하다고 한다. 특히 농촌공동체 차원에서 주민들이 직접 격리시설을 만들고 귀국한 사람들의 자가격리를 돕는 등 코로나 대응에 적극 협력하고 있다고 설명한다. 또한 미얀마 국민들이 소셜미디어 상에서 현 상황에 대하여 자유롭게 논의하는 등 대중의 참여(public participation)도 높은 편이라고 덧붙였다. 비록 보건의료적 측면에 있어 국가적 역량은 매우 약하더라도 사회적 신뢰와 리더십에서 좋은 모습들을 보여주면서 코로나위기를 극복하고있는 것이다.   이런 맥락에서 유 카인 윈 소장은 코로나 대응에 있어 민주주의와 권위주의 그 어떤 체제가 더 낫다고 단언할 수 없으며 그보다는 각국이 처한 상황과 리더십, 사회적 신뢰 등의 요소들이 중요하다고 강조한다. 또한 코로나19 사태가 언제까지 지속될지 모르는 상황 속에서, 장기적으로 보았을 때 미얀마에 가장 중요한 문제는 코로나로 인한 경제적 여파 및 타격을 해결하는 것이라고 한다. 미얀마의 경우 300만명이 넘는 국민들이 해외노동자로 일하며 국내로 송금을 보내던 체제가 코로나로 인해 타격을 받고있는 실정이다. 또한 이렇게 코로나로 경제적 타격을 입은 상황에서 중국에 대한 의존도가 높은 미얀마가 경제적 이익과 민주주의 가치 추구 사이에서 어떻게 균형을 맞출 것인지도 향후 과제로 남아있다.   지정학적으로 미얀마는 중국과 인도와 같은 강대국 사이에 위치하고 있어, 코로나19 사태로 인근 국가들에 영향을 강화하고 있는 중국과 세계 최대 민주주의 국가이지만 퇴보 경향을 보이고 있는 인도 사이에서 어떠한 입장을 취해야 할지 난감해 하고 있다. 또한 미얀마 정부가 정치적으로 과도기를 겪고 있다는 점과 라카인(Rakhine) 주 분쟁 문제와 같은 국내 분쟁 등에 직면하여 있다는 점 또한 팬데믹 속 미얀마 민주주의의 역할에 주목하게끔 한다. 이에 래리 다이아몬드 교수는 미얀마가 중국을 포함한 권위주의 체제 국가들에 둘러싸여 있더라도 자체적으로 중국에 대한 경제적 의존도를 서서히 줄여나가야 한다고 지적하고, 미얀마 정부가 라카인 주 분쟁 문제와 관련 국제 인권 규범 문제를 국제 협력을 통해 해결해 나갈 수 있도록 노력해야 한다고 역설한다.   아시아 민주주의의 포스트 코로나 과제: 개인의 권리와 프라이버시 존중, 자발적 저항의 목소리, 그리고 시민사회의 활약 래리 다이아몬드 교수는 코로나19 팬데믹 속 불거진 개인의 권리와 프라이버시 문제에 경고의 메시지를 던진다. 휴대폰에 설치된 코로나 추적 앱이 개인의 사생활과 권리 침해 논란을 야기할 수 있으며, 이러한 앱이 적절한 감시와 관리 체계를 갖춰 민주주의의 가치를 훼손하지 않는 방향으로 이용되어야 한다고 역설한다. 혹여 권위주의 정권에서 코로나 추적 앱을 반대 세력을 감시하고 개인의 권리를 침해하는 수단으로 이용할 지도 모른다는 점에 우려를 제기하며 팬데믹 위기 대응 방침의 일환으로 사용하는 추적 앱들이 민주주의의 주요 원칙들을 지키는 선상에서 운영되고 있는지를 확인하고 점검할 수 있는 체계가 갖춰줘야 한다고 덧붙인다.   래리 다이아몬드 교수는 또한 일본, 한국과 같은 아시아 민주주의 국가들이 역내에서 발생하고 있는 인권 침해 문제 등 민주주의가 위협받는 여러 상황들에 대하여 더욱 더 목소리를 낼 필요가 있다고 지적한다. 예컨대 중국이 현재 홍콩에 대하여 취하고 있는 조치들에 대하여 잘못된 부분들을 명백히 지적할 수 있어야 하며, 이는 비단 서구권 국가들의 역할이 아니라 아시아 국가들의 역할이기도 하다며 아시아 민주주의 퇴보 추세에 아시아 국가들이 좀 더 적극적으로 나서서 목소리를 높일것을 강조한다.   래리 다이아몬드 교수는 마지막으로 아시아 여러 국가에서 일어나고 있는 민주주의 퇴보 현상과 관련, 개별 국가 그리고 더 나아가 역내 시민의 자유를 지키기 위한 최후의 보루로서 시민사회의 중요성을 언급한다. 시민사회가 민주주의의 원칙을 지키기 위하여 들고 일어나며, 정부에 대한 감시와 견제의 기능을 제대로 할 때, 그리고 아시아 전역 시민사회들 간의 네트워크를 활성화 할 때, 비로소 민주주의 협력을 위한 국제적 연대와 지지를 받을 수 있을 것이다. ■     ■ 래리 다이아몬드 (Larry Diamond)_ 스탠포드 대학교(Stanford University) 사회정치학 교수. 후버연구소 (Hoover Institution) 시니어펠로우. 프리먼스포글리 국제학연구소 (Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies) 시니어펠로우. 스탠퍼드 대학교에서 정치조직 및 행동을 전공하고 동 대학에서 사회학 석사, 박사학위를 받았으며 민주주의 이론의 세계적 석학으로 꼽힌다. 미국국제개발처(USAID), World Bank, UN, 미 국무부 등의 자문위원으로 활동했으며 최근 편저에는 《Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency (2019) 》와 《China's influence & American interests : promoting constructive vigilance : report of the Working Group on Chinese Influence Activities in the United States (2019)》등이 있다. 특히 《In Search of Democracy (2016)》는 30년 간의 아프리카와 아시아 민주주의 발전사 연구를 바탕으로 민주주의가 직면한 도전을 점검해 본 수작으로 평가된다. ■ 프란시스코 A. 마그노 (Francisco A. Magno)_ 제스 M. 로브레도 거버넌스연구소 (Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance) 소장. 드라 살 대학교(De La Salle University) 사회과학과 교수. 필리핀국립대학교(University of the Philippines)에서 학사 및 석사학위를 취득하고 하와이대학교(University of Hawaii)에서 박사학위를 취득하였다. 플로리다 주립 대학교 (Florida State University)와 레딩 대학교 (University of Reading), 와세다 대학교 (Waseda University), 히로시마 대학교 (Hiroshima University), 하와이 대학교, 필리핀국립대학교에서 강의 및 연구를 진행했으며, 국립과학기술아카데미(National Academy of Science and Technology)로부터 2000년도 주목 받는 젊은 연구자 상을 수상하기도 했다. 태평양 지역과 안보 담론, 평화 연구, 공공 정책의 국제적 논의, 환경사 등 다양한 분야에 걸쳐 연구를 진행해 오고 있다. ■ 마이코 이치하라 (Maiko Ichihara)_ 이치하라 마이코는 일본 히토쓰바시대학교 법학전문대학원 겸 국제공공정책대학원 (Graduate School of Law and the School of International and Public Policy at Hitotsubashi University) 부교수. 스탠퍼드대학교 (Stanford University) 민주발전법률센터(Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University) 방문학자. 일본 국제교류센터(Japan Center for Democracy for Democracy)에서 미래민주주의 프로젝트 공동대표. 컬럼비아 대학교(Columbia University)에서 석사학위를 받고, 조지 워싱턴 대학교(George Washington University)에서 정치학 박사학위를 받았다. 국제 관계와 민주주의 지원, 그리고 일본의 외교 정책에 대한 연구를 주로 하며, 최근 연구물로는 “The Role of Democracy Promotion in Japanese Foreign Policy” in Nicholas Szechenyi, ed., Asianism and Universalism: The Evolution of Norms and Power in Modern Asia (Washington DC: Center for International and Strategic Studies, 2019) 등이 있다. ■ 유 카인 윈 (U Khine Win)_ 산디거버넌스연구소 (Sandhi Governance Institute) 소장. 리콴유 공공정책 대학원 (Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy)에서 석사학위를 취득하였으며, 공공 부문에서의 투명성과 책임성 재고, 미얀마 내 민주시민사회의 거버넌스를 위한 연구 및 사회운동 활동을 이어가고 있다. ■ 이숙종_EAI 시니어펠로우·이사, 성균관대학교 교수. 미국 하버드대학교(Harvard University)에서 사회학 박사학위를 취득하였으며, 세종연구소 연구위원, 미국 브루킹스연구소 객원 연구원, 존스홉킨스대학교 교수강사, 현대일본학회 회장, 외교부 정책자문위원, EAI 원장 등을 역임하였다. 최근 편저에는, Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea‟s Role in the 21st Century (편), Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (공편), 《세계화 제2막: 한국형 세계화와 새 구상》(공편), 《2017 대통령의 성공조건》(공편) 등이 있다.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 전주현 EAI 연구원  |  문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 204)  [email protected]                          [EAI 라운드테이블]은 국내외 주요 사안에 대해 전문가들이 한 자리에 모여 의견을 개진하고 정책적 제언을 발표한 내용을 독자들에게 생생하게 전달하고자 기획된 대담록입니다. 인용할 때에는 반드시 출처를 밝혀주시기 바랍니다. EAI는 어떠한 정파적 이해와도 무관한 독립 연구기관입니다. EAI가 발행하는 보고서와 저널 및 단행본에 실린 주장과 의견은 EAI와는 무관하며 오로지 저자 개인의 견해임을 밝힙니다.  

2020-07-20조회 : 10500
논평이슈브리핑
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Executive powers of Ordinance versus Legislation: The Case of Pakistan

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} ■ 본 ADRN 이슈브리핑 원문 보기 및 PDF 다운로드는 ADRN 웹사이트를 통해 이용 가능합니다.  [바로가기]    편집자 주 In Pakistan, governments have promulgated a number of ordinances as a way to bypass legislative procedures in the Parliament. Over the years, governments, regardless of what type of the governments they are, have resorted to the practice of promulgating ordinances instead of engaging with oppositions and constructive debates, which is essential to retain the spirit of democracy. In this context, Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob argues that the Constitution should be amended to omit the provision of ordinances so that the only legitimate route for legislations is one that should passes through the Parliament. Mr. Mehboob further stresses the importance of public awareness on the promulgation of ordinances as a highly undesirable practice in a democracy.     Pakistan is one of the few democratic countries that have retained the power to legislate by executive decree, or ordinances. In a classical democracy, legislation is the sole prerogative of the legislature but in Pakistan and a few other countries, the executive branch can be authorized to legislate under a constitutional provision. Article 89 of the Constitution of Pakistan authorizes that the “President may, except when the Senate or National Assembly is in session, if satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary to take immediate action, make and promulgate an ordinance as the circumstances may require.” Apparently, this provision was meant to be used only under very extraordinary situations when the Parliament is neither in session nor can be summoned to meet at an early date while the legislation is of such an urgent nature that it cannot be deferred. However, when we look back at the circumstances since the enactment of the 1973 Constitution in Pakistan in which ordinances have been issued, it is difficult to identify an ordinance of such urgent nature that could not have waited until the next parliamentary session. An overwhelming majority of the ordinances have been promulgated in Pakistan out of convenience because the government at the time did not want to debate with the Parliament in order to justify the proposed legislation. Ordinances have become a handy tool for bypassing the Parliament. During several occasions, governments have resorted to ordinances in situations where they lack the majority in either of the two houses of the Parliament. In addition, instead of engaging with the opposition and incorporating their ideas into the proposed legislation, successive governments have adopted the shortcut approach of law-making through promulgating ordinances. Prior to the adoption of the 18th Constitutional Amendment in 2010, which barred ordinances from being promulgated more than once, ordinances were issued multiple times to overcome their 120-day limitation. It was also common for ordinances to be promulgated a day or a few hours before the convening of the house of Parliament, which practically defied the very essence of the constitutional provision on ordinances. Although India, Pakistan's neighbor, also has a constitutional provisions regarding ordinances, India has not used this provision with so much relish as Pakistan. Since August 1973, Pakistan has promulgated more than three times as many ordinances (1,774) compared with India (533). Over the years, it has become very clear in Pakistan that the practice of promulgating ordinances runs counter to the spirit of democracy. There has hardly been a government during the past 46-plus years since the passing of the 1973 Constitution that has retained the spirit of democracy by refraining from enacting ordinances. This applies to a total of 28 governments led by an equal number of chief executives during the past 46 or so years including 16 elected governments, ten caretaker governments and two military governments. The two military governments led by Gen Ziaul Haq and Gen Pervez Musharraf ran for a combined duration of almost 11 years (this does not include the periods when quasi-democratic setups was established under the presidency of the two military dictators). During these purely military governments, a total of 680 ordinances were promulgated which corresponds to over 63 ordinances per year. Ten caretaker governments lasted for a total duration of more than two years and issued 140 ordinances, translating to a little less than 59 ordinances per year. 16 elected governments, with a total duration of a little over 33 years, issued 954 ordinances. The average number of ordinances in this case works out to a little less than 29 per year. The above analysis indicates that military governments, on average, have promulgated the highest number—more than 63 per year—of ordinances. Caretaker governments promulgated the next highest number — a little less than 59 ordinances per year during their combined duration. Elected democratic governments, although they carry the most scrutiny by the public, issued a relatively low number—of less than 29—ordinances per year during their total duration. With regard to the two military governments, although Gen Zia’s government issued far more ordinances in absolute terms (407) compared to the ones promulgated by Gen Musharraf’s government (273), the average number of ordinances issued during Musharraf's government (around 88 per year) exceeded that of Zia's government (around 53 ordinances per year). Among the caretaker setups, Malik Meraj Khalid’s government (November 1996 to February 1997) issued the highest number of ordinances, totaling 51 in just over three and a half months. In terms of the performance of the 16 elected governments in promulgating ordinances, Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto’s second government (October 1993 to November 1996) issued the highest number of ordinances (357) while Mohammad Khan Junejo’s government (March 1985 to May 1988) issued the least number of ordinances (10). Prime Minister Imran Khan’s current government, though criticized for issuing a large number of ordinances since August 2018, ranks ninth among the 16 elected governments since 1973 in terms of the average number of ordinances issued per year with 18 ordinances. Prime Minister Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government also has a thin majority in the National Assembly and lacks a majority by a considerable margin in the Senate. The spirit of democracy demands that the Constitution be preferably amended to omit the provision of ordinances so that the only legitimate route for legislations is one that passes through the Parliament. In the meantime, awareness should be created so that the public can identify the promulgation of ordinances as a highly undesirable practice in a democracy. In doing so, voters will hold such a practice or excessive ordinance promulgation against any government and strive for a more inclusive legislation in the Parliament.     ■ Ahmed Bilal Mehboob is the founder and president of PILDAT. He has over 25-year experience in senior management and advisory positions and over 15-year experience in design, planning and implementation of projects in the field of parliamentary development, strengthening democratic institutions, democratization, political discourse, election monitoring and dialogues for reconciliation. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob, one of Pakistan’s leading analysts of political, legislative, and electoral affairs, has been devoted to strengthening democracy and democratic institutions and providing thought leadership on crucial issues that affect quality of democracy and governance in the country. Mr. Mehboob has carved a non-partisan political research initiative from the platform of PILDAT and spearheaded objective and non-partisan, evidence-based analysis and policy reform initiatives on areas such as political and institutional reform including in areas of democracy, governance, rule of law, political parties, local governments, electoral processes, civil-military relations, federation-provinces relations, women and youth in politics, etc. Under the leadership of Mr. Mehboob, PILDAT, established in 2001, is widely recognized for quality, seriousness and objectivity of its policy analyses and reform proposals.   ■ 담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구원             문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 209) | [email protected]     [EAI이슈브리핑]은 국내외 주요 사안에 대해 다양한 분야의 전문가들이 심층적인 분석을 통해 의견을 개진하고 정책적 제언을 발표할 수 있는 담론의 장을 마련하고자 기획된 시리즈입니다. 인용할 때에는 반드시 출처를 밝혀주시기 바랍니다. EAI는 어떠한 정파적 이해와도 무관한 독립 연구기관입니다. EAI가 발행하는 보고서와 저널 및 단행본에 실린 주장과 의견은 EAI와는 무관하며 오로지 저자 개인의 견해임을 밝힙니다.  

Ahmed Bilal Mehboob 2020-06-24조회 : 46771
논평이슈브리핑
[칼럼] South Korea as a Beacon of Asian Democracy

  Editor’s Note Year 2017 marks the 30th anniversary of the beginning of the 1987 June Democratization Movement against the military dictatorship in South Korea. In understanding the origins of South Korean democracy, it is important to look at the geopolitics surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Bordering North Korea, which itself shares boundaries with China and Russia, and located a short distance from Japan, South Korea is in close proximity to a group of countries that appear almost overwhelmingly large and powerful. In this seemingly unfavorable geographical arrangement, an important question arises: how does South Korea remain independent entity among these great powers? Former Prime Minister Hong-koo Lee emphasizes that South Koreans’ relentless trust and belief in constitutionalism and commitment to the international community are the key characteristic of South Korean democracy.           Recent discussions on the Korean Peninsula have been dominated by security issues due to the rising nuclear and missile threats from North Korea. However, it remains equally important not to overlook South Korea and the way, despite its belligerent neighbor, the nation continues to act as a beacon of hope for democracy in Asia.   In determining the origins of South Korean democracy, significant attention should first be paid to understanding South Korea’s unique geographical setup. Bordering North Korea, which itself shares boundaries with China and Russia, and a short distance from Japan, South Korea is located within close proximity to a group of nations that appear almost overwhelmingly larger and more powerful. In light of this seemingly unfavorable geographical arrangement, an important question arises: how does South Korea remain an independent entity among these great powers?   To answer this question, we shall dive briefly into South Korea’s recent history. Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Korea, like many other Asian nations, was exposed to imperialism. However, unlike most of the others, Korea was subject almost entirely to an imperialism of non-Western origins. One of the most decisive moments in Korea’s recent history was when Japan, an Asian power, annexed Korea as an imperial colony in 1910 after its victories in both the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars.   Another important factor in South Korea’s geopolitical situation has been the increasingly close relationship between South Korea and the United States. At this point in time, it would not be an understatement to call the United States and South Korea neighbors in both the metaphorical and literal sense. The US has, in fact, become quite used to its status as a Pacific power. The US’s increasing emphasis on its Pacific endeavors can be seen not only in the context of its international relations, but also domestically, as can be seen from the movement of famous East Coast baseball teams to the West Coast, California’s rapid economic growth, and the statehood status obtained by Hawaii and Alaska during the twentieth century. The US’s inextricable link to the Pacific was cemented for good, however, with its participation in World War II and the Korean War five years later.   Under this geopolitical sys-tem in the Pacific, it has been difficult for countries to maintain independence, but even more difficult to maintain well-functioning democracy. This is particularly true for South Korea. While Asian nations often remember the early to mid-twentieth century as an age of imperialism, many European nations remember this period as the birth of totalitarianism. Asians, including South Koreans, it seems, are less sensitive to the dangers of totalitarianism than their Western counterparts. During the early and mid-twentieth century, Asian countries focused more on fighting against colonialism and driving economic development rather than enforcing human rights and promoting democratic values.   The birth of a democracy-centered outlook in South Korea can be traced back to the anti-Japanese, pro-independence movements of the early twentieth century. Rather than calling for a return to the previous dynastic order, these movements advocated the formation of a democratic republic. In order to decide what sort of republic to create, many advocated American or European-style democracy, including Syngman Rhee, who, with his academic and professional interest in American-style democracy in many ways, epitomized Korean support for democracy.   Occurring alongside these pro liberal-democratic independence movements, however, the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia caused many Koreans to become ardent supporters of communist ideals. Some Koreans were impressed with Lenin’s success in Russia and speculated that the best way to regain independence for the country and build a new country was to follow the path of Lenin. The then-undivided Korea’s border with Russia made it very easy for Korean communists to travel to the Russian side and join Lenin’s movement. The close proximity of Korea to Russia allowed for the rapid growth of communist support in Korea.   Thus, a few short decades after the Bolshevik Revolution, the conflicting nature of these ideologies solidified into a physical boundary with the creation of the two Koreas after World War II. With the election supervised by the US, the Republic of Korea was created as a democratic republic in 1948.   North Korea immediately followed by forming a government under the leadership of Kim Il-sung and his communist party. Today, almost eighty years later, the situation remains roughly the same—an indefinite armistice, one of the longest artificial divisions of a country in the world.   Since the division of the two Koreas, the past eighty years can be viewed primarily as a success story that resulted in the birth of a uniquely Korean form of patient democracy. From its inception, South Korea always desired to be an active participant in the international community, and a democratic one at that. On the other hand, North Korea sought to be an exception. In contrast to the recent success of the South in achieving political internationalism and a strong market economy, North Korea has continued to bolster ideas of its exceptionalism using remnants of twentieth century-style totalitarianism, posing severe problems not only for South Korea but for the world. Opposition to the antithetical North Korean sys-tem has always been and will continue to be one of the main challenges South Korean democracy faces.   It is true that despite current appearances, the past eighty years in South Korea have at times been anything but peaceful. Nevertheless, South Korea’s relentless emphasis on the power of constitutionalism has time and time again guided the country through times of crisis, especially the recent controversy surrounding the Park presidency. For the several months since the last fall, the international community witnessed massive candlelight demonstrations across South Korea demanding the impeachment of then President Park Geun-hye, and not a drop of blood was spilt. This was only possible because there was strong consensus among people that the best way to solve problems is to follow the constitutional procedure. Despite disagreements on many sides, the Korean people deferred to and respected the decisions made by the Constitutional Court.   South Korea has come a long way. Through our experiences, we have shown that patience, in combination with unequivocal trust in Korea’s constitutional sys-tem and close links to the international community, has become a defining characteristic of South Korean democracy. The case of South Korean democracy has demonstrated that in solving any challenge, one needs to maintain rule and order and follow constitutionalism. With this, we in Asia can, in our lifetime, make our region one of the best places to live as well as a model for successful democracy. ■         Author Hong-koo Lee was the Prime Minister of South Korea (1994-1995) under former President Kim Young-sam. Before that, he served twice as the Deputy Prime Minister for Unification. He was also a member of the Korean National Assembly and the chairman of then-ruling New Korea Party. He was the Korean ambassador to the United Kingdom (1991-1993) and the United States (1998-2000). He is currently Chairman of the Board at the Seoul Forum for International Affairs, and founded the East Asia Institute. He also sits on the Board of the Asia Foundation and the Salzburg Seminar, and serves as a member of the executive committee of the Club de Madrid. Dr. Lee received his Ph.D. in political science at Yale University.        

Hong-koo Lee 2020-06-05조회 : 8795