.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} 편집자 주 Despite the democratic movements and protests in Thailand, the 2019 democracy index still notes Thailand as a ”flawed democracy.” However, Dr. Kevin Hewison, emeritus Distinguished Professor at Chapel Hill and an adjunct professor at the University of Macau, argues that the latest movement is distinctive from the previous democracy movements in Thailand. Dr. Hewison points out that the latest movement is distinctive because 1) students are leading the movement, 2) technology allowed a short notice protest, 3) protests are not centralized compared to Hong Kong’s recent protest, and 4) protesters demand the monarchy to adhere to the constitution and scale back its political and economic power. In order to push forward democratization efforts, Dr. Hewison contends that a “developed constitutional sys-tem can protect a weak or unpopular monarch.”     The sight of thousands of protesters on Bangkok’s streets from June 2020, demanding that another government be brought down is nothing new. After all, since the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) donned yellow shirts and demonstrated against Thaksin Shinawatra’s government in 2005, leading to the 2006 military coup, there have been several groups on the streets, often drawing thousands of supporters. Most recently, it was the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) that paved the way for the 2014 coup. Yet, the current protests have several new and distinguishing features, including an assessment that the monarchy is an impediment to democratization. This article seeks to show what is distinctive about this latest movement and to compare it with previous democracy movements in Thailand. It also explains reasons why the monarchy is identified as anti-democratic.   Protests, old and new Larry Diamond has recently observed that “[t]he last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed the most dramatic expansion of democracy in the history of the world.”[1] Thailand had been part of that expansion. Since 2006, however, Thailand’s democratic progress has been undone. Despite their names and the support of the country’s middle classes, the PAD and PDRC were anti-democratic. Both groups promoted political regression by undermining elected governments, declaring their loyalty to the monarchy, and making demands for authoritarian politics. These movements laid the groundwork for two periods of military rule. The result of these interventions has indeed been authoritarianism. For example, in the five years following the 2014 coup, the military junta drafted laws and rules that prepared for 20 years of military-dominated administration. It did this while allocating increased political and economic power to the monarchy. With anti-junta movements quickly snuffed out, the judiciary wielded as political weapon against opponents, and hundreds jailed or facing charges like lèse majesté, sedition and computer crimes, authoritarian politics seemed almost indestructible. This descent into autocracy was made all the more resilient by the widespread international backsliding on democratic politics. In demanding democratic reform, the demonstrators of 2020 mark themselves as quite different from PAD and PDRC. While acknowledging the red shirt’s sacrifices for democratization, today’s demonstrators are generationally distinct from the red shirts and have moved beyond Thaksin’s politics.[2] The most recent protests have been massive and peaceful, demanding the resignation of the Prime Minister, General Prayuth Chan-ocha, a new constitution, an end to political repression, and reforms to the monarchy and military. In short, they want a political sys-tem that is more democratic and less repressive. The current movement exhibit several characteristics that distinguish it from previous movements. First, it is university and high school students who are in the vanguard. Students led the first effort for democratic reform in 1973, rising against a military regime.[3] Yet it has been almost 50 years since students led the calls for democracy. The current demonstrators acknowledge the events of 1973 and the vicious 1976 rollback when military-aligned right-wing vigilantes supporting the monarchy murdered students at Thammasat University. In the current iteration, rallies have been held at dozens of universities and schools, with uniformed high school students making thoughtful and impassioned speeches to crowds of thousands. Some of their symbols of revolt against oppressive school regulations – such as white ribbons – have becomes symbols of the wider protests. Second, the current uprising is the first that is technology driven and networked, with protesters called together at short notice using smart phone apps. News and vision of the rallies is also circulated on social media platforms. Phones have even become elements of rallies as support is shown by the mass use of phone flashlights. While earlier uprisings have mainly been Bangkok-based, smartphones have allowed the rallies to be nationwide events. Smartphones mean that rallies can be called, and locations changed, at short notice, bamboozling the authorities. The result is “flash mobs,” but on a larger scale than that term implies. The May 1992 uprising, where the military and police killing and injuring hundreds, was sometimes called the “mobile phone mob,” but this drew attention to support from Bangkok’s middle class rather than the use of technology.[4] Third, drawing comparisons with protests in Hong Kong, the current movement lacks a centralized structure; it is “leaderless,” politically innovative, inclusive, and spatially dispersed.[5] Several high-profile speakers and activists became centers of attention in July and August, but were soon arrested and had long detentions. However, others soon took their places and even larger rallies resulted, each throwing up new “leaders” as speakers. The rallies have been remarkably inventive, with multi-centered but well-disciplined rallies that featured costumes, entertainers and artists, as well as a diversity of speakers. The manipulation of royal and state symbolism, the use of protest memes, and the use of earlier sites of pro-democracy rebellion – including the Rajaprasong intersection where red shirts were shot down in 2010 – show that the young are “democracy historians.” The protest sites have included universities, schools, central city streets, urban transport hubs, and suburban malls in Bangkok. Similar patterns were seen in provincial towns and cities. From July 18 and October 10, it was reported that there were some 246 protest events in 62 provinces around the country.[6] Demonstrators embraced difference, and while politics was the core of rallies, LGBTI symbols and actors have been highly visible. Finally, and really marking the new generation of protesters as different from predecessors is their demand that the monarchy be brought under the constitution and that its political and economic power be wound back. Following the 2006 coup, anti-monarchism had expanded, including among red shirts, the regime’s political repression limited its expression.[7] The recent demonstrations changed that, with their calls for monarchy reform now being widely discussed and debated. From the language and memes used, it is evident that part of the learning about the monarchy and its political role has come from Thai political exiles, many of whom fled the country following the 2014 coup. Indeed, in their August 10 listing of 10 demands of the monarchy, the students acknowledged the work of exiled monarchy critics, historian Somsak Jeamteerasakul and political scientist Pavin Chachavalpongpun.[8] It is no coincidence that some of these “democracy historians” have chosen to call themselves “Khana Ratsadon 2563.” The original Khana Ratsadon, known in English as the People’s Party, overthrew Thailand’s absolute monarchy in 1932 and established constitutionalism.[9] Adopting that name and appending the current year in the Buddhist calculation (2563=2020) is an adamant statement of adherence to the principles of the People’s Party: that the king be brought under the constitution, and that he cannot act independently without parliamentary approval.[10] Previous democracy movements did not declare the monarchy an impediment to democratic reform, instead targeting the military. Why is it, after 88 years, today’s rebellious youth view the monarchy as the obstacle to democracy? Simply put, those calling for reform have determined that the monarchy represents a keystone of a tripartite alliance that has defeated democratization: monarchy, military, and big business. The protesters appear to believe that this triple alliance can only be undone if the monarchy is reformed. How did it come to this?   Monarchy vs. democracy Today’s monarchy was largely (re-)invented during the second half of the 20th century. Forced to accept a constitution in 1932, the monarchy was stripped of its most significant political power and lost control of palace wealth. The reign of King Bhumibol, which began in 1946 and ended in 2016, witnessed a remarkable restoration of both political authority and royal wealth. This restoration resulted from a political struggle by the palace that bore fruit in the late 1950s when Bhumibol developed a partnership with military coup leader Gen Sarit Thanarat.[11] The monarchy’s relationship with the military has strengthened and deepened to a stage where the current military leadership considers “protecting” the monarchy as its principal duty. Bhumibol, remained suspicious of electoral politics, considered elected politicians “dangerous,” treated constitutions with disdain, and regularly approved military coups.[12] As might be expected of a monarch, he was politically conservative and preferred a conservative polity. An incessant political meddler, Bhumibol favored “behind-the-scenes” manipulation, operating through trusted mediators and political schemers who made up the “network monarchy.”[13] By the end of the 20th century, the monarchy had regained and expanded its political authority. Related, constant, overbearing propaganda meant the throne’s public prestige grew to a level not seen since the 19th century. As the throne accumulated the capacity to influence and change political events, it also rebuilt its wealth. From claims of royal penury in the early 1950s, by 2005, the Crown Property Bureau – representing the bulk of the monarch’s wealth – had amassed wealth valued between US$27 and 40 billion.[14] By 2019, this wealth may have expanded to as much as $70 billion.[15] This makes the Crown the largest conglomerate in the country, a position that has brought it into alliance with Thailand’s big capitalists, involving business partnerships but also expressed in the ideological and political spheres. Thailand’s biggest tycoons are regularly seen donating to the palace, building their prestige and that of the monarchy. At the same time, in the political battles between Thaksin supporters and royalist forces, many of the biggest business families threw their money and influence behind the conservatives and military.[16] Under General Prayuth’s regime, as the protesters have noticed, not only has his government received strong support from the largest business groups, but they have been significantly benefitted from state projects and contracts. Knowing that previous democracy protesters have tried and failed to remove the military from politics, the new campaigners have decided that the keystone of the tripartite ruling alliance must be removed. Since Vajiralongkorn took the throne, he has demonstrated the power of the monarchy, his conservatism, and a desire to further expand the throne’s political and economic power. That the king and military have an accommodation built around the military’s capacity for repression and with Prayuth’s government rolling back constitutional constraints on the monarchy, democratic reform appears even more urgent. That urgency is underlined by the struggle over the symbols of 1932. With Vajiralongkorn and the regime erasing memorials to 1932, Khana Ratsadon 2563 has attempted to use and revive them.[17] Recognizing Vajiralongkorn’s neo-traditionalism and his preference for royal absolutism, the protesters feel constitutionalism under threat. The King’s view of the protests is opaque. Despite a recent “interview” that had him mention “compromise,” this is not a characteristic he has previously demonstrated. As a trained military officer, he demands obedience and he has shown a propensity for erratic and furious behavior.[18] His several public meetings with ultra-royalists suggest that he views the protesters as a threat to the throne. Until the recent protests, the maintenance of the monarchy’s prestige has relied on the regime and military stamping out anti-monarchism. From 2014, the regime charged and jailed hundreds.[19] More worrying, and an important stimulus for the emergence of the recent protests, some believe that the regime is also responsible for the enforced disappearance and murder of several exiled anti-monarchy activists.[20] Clearly, by challenging the King, the activists take on a powerful opponent. Vajiralongkorn is economically powerful. Not only has he inherited his father’s immense wealth, but he has made it his own, having both constitution and law changed to make the Crown’s wealth his personal property. The royal family also receives more than US$1 billion a year in taxpayer funding, to be spent on “protecting” and “revering” the royal family.[21] Taxpayer funding maintains an extensive ideological apparatus that projects the King as the “father of the nation,” responding to emergencies and “caring” for his people. Such promotion has been more difficult to sustain when the King spends most of his time living in Germany. Even so, vast resources are expended by scores of ministers and senior bureaucrats who must repeatedly demonstrate their loyalty to the monarchy. In his still short reign, Vajiralongkorn has amassed considerable political clout. Revisions he demanded in the 2017 constitution – something the protesters have targeted – and the transfer of palace administration and thousands of police and military to Vajiralongkorn’s personal control. Considerable effort has also gone into creating a quasi-military Royal Thai Volunteers, composed mostly of soldiers, bureaucrats and others who uphold the monarchy, who work to make the often absent King “present” and “connected” to his country. The King’s major alliance remains with the military leadership. Loyalty to the monarchy motivates the military leadership, with the top brass having made their careers through service to the throne.[22] With more than 360,000 active and 200,000 reserve personnel, a 2019 budget of more than $7.5 billion, and a penchant for shooting demonstrators, the military remains a dangerous defender of the status quo. Today, the military’s leadership backs Prayuth’s government in opposing students and others it identifies as anti-monarchists. With Vajiralongkorn having cemented his control over military promotions, he has also filled his palace with former high-ranking officers.[23] These moves have blurred the lines between palace, military, and regime. One of the major efforts by the Prayuth regime to shore up its political control and to defeat anti-monarchism has involved internal psychological warfare using the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC). Credited with “defeating” the red shirts after 2010, ISOC links the military and civilian administration making it “a potent tool with which conservative elites can undermine and control electoral democracy and through which the military can maintain its power.”[24] Its well-funded operations run in parallel with civilian agencies and most notably with the powerful Ministry of Interior, with a network of agents and officials throughout the country. Its activities include surveillance that extends to the community level and online, developing, funding and mobilizing right-wing groups, the harassment and detention of political opponents and the disruption of their activities. Today, all state agencies must abide by ISOC’s plans and work with ISOC supervision, making it a powerful and dangerous opponent for the pro-democracy students.[25]   Concluding comments The struggle for democratic reform in Thailand has extended over nine decades. Democratic expansion has always seen an authoritarian reaction and democratic rollback. The fight continues, with the outcome uncertain. The current protesters have emphasized the monarchy and military in authoritarian alliance, with the attention to the monarchy unprecedented. More than 20 years ago, in criticizing the then monarch’s opposition to democratization, I pointed out that “[a] developed constitutional sys-tem can protect a weak or unpopular monarch.” Vajiralongkorn seems less interested than his father and as then, “this may well prove to be to the detriment of the dynasty and the institution.”[26]■   [1] Larry Diamond, “Democratic regression in comparative perspective: scope, methods, and causes,” Democratization, 2020, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2020.1807517. [2] The red shirts also demanded elections and democratic reform, but their demands were snuffed out by military repression, first in 2010 and again after the 2014 coup – see several contributions to Michael J. Montesano, Terence Chong, and Mark Heng (eds), After the Coup. The National Council for Peace and Order Era and the Future of Thailand, Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019. [3] Ruth-Inge Heinze, “Ten Days in October -- Students vs. the Military: An Account of the Student Uprising in Thailand,” Asian Survey, 14 (6), 1974, pp. 491–508. [4] See David Murray, Angels and Devils, Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996, p. 141; Philip Shenon, “The 'Mobile Phone Mob' Faces Guns and Tanks,” The New York Times, May 24, 1992. [5] Ruji Auethavornpipat, “Thailand’s protests and preventing a ‘second 6 October’,” New Mandala, November 2, 2020, accessed November 2, 2020, https://www.newmandala.org/thailands-protests-and-preventing-a-second-6-october/; on Hong Kong, see Tin-yuet Ting, “From ‘be water’ to ‘be fire’: nascent smart mob and networked protests in Hong Kong,” Social Movement Studies, 19 (3), 2020, pp. 362-368. [6] Tyrell Haberkorn, “The Fight for Democracy in Thailand,” Dissent, October 21, 2020, accessed October 21, 2020, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/the-fight-for-democracy-in-thailand. [7] Anonymous, “Anti-Royalism in Thailand Since 2006: Ideological Shifts and Resistance,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 48 (3), 2018, pp. 363-394. [8] Prachatai, “Demonstration at Thammasat calling for reform on politics and monarchy,” Prachatai, August 13, 2020, accessed November 1, 2020, https://prachatai.com/english/node/8717. [9] See Federico Ferrara, The Political Development of Modern Thailand, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, ch. 3. [10] “Announcement of the People’s Party No. 1 (1932),” in Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit (eds), Pridi by Pridi. Selected Writings on Life, Politics, and Economy, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2000, pp. 70-72. [11] Kevin Hewison, “Monarchy and Succession,” in Pavin Chachavalpongpun (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Thailand, London: Routledge, pp. 118-133. [12] Kevin Hewison, “The Monarchy and Democratisation,” in Kevin Hewison (ed.), Political Change in Thailand. Democracy and Participation, London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 58-74. [13] Duncan McCargo. “Network monarchy and legitimacy crises in Thailand,” The Pacific Review, 18 (4), 2005, pp. 499-519. [14] Porphant Ouyyanont, “The Crown Property Bureau in Thailand and the crisis of 1997,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38 (1), 2008, p. 184. [15] Kevin Hewison, “Crazy Rich Thais: Thailand’s Capitalist Class, 1980–2019,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 51 (2), 2021, DOI: 10.1080/00472336.2019.1647942. [16] See Ilya Garger, “The Color of Money: Political Affiliations of Thai Business Families,” Capital Profile Special Report, August 28, 2014. [17] On erasure, see Panu Wongcha-um and Panarat Thepgumpanat, “In Thailand, it's statues of democracy leaders that are disappearing,” Reuters, June 24, 2020, accessed November 2, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-democracy-monuments-idUSKBN23V024. For the protesters’ response, see Tassanee Vejpongsa, “Thai protesters install plaque symbolizing democracy,” AP, September 20, 2020, accessed November 2, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/bangkok-thailand-archive-democracy-f29b2b08490dce3f2716780eb4131bcf. [18] Hewison, “Monarchy and Succession,” pp. 125-127. [19] David Streckfuss, “Lèse-majesté within Thailand’s regime of intimidation,” in Pavin (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Thailand, pp. 134-144. [20] Hathairat Phaholtap and David Streckfuss, “The ten demands that shook Thailand,” New Mandala, September 2, 2020, accessed November 3, 2020, https://www.newmandala.org/the-ten-demands-that-shook-thailand/. [21] “Thanathorn wants more transparency in annual budget for monarchy,” The Nation, September 6, 2020, accessed November 3, 2020, https://www.nationthailand.com/news/30394107. [22] Paul Chambers and Napisa Waitoolkiat, “The Resilience of Monarchised Military in Thailand,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 46 (3), 2016, pp. 425-444. [23] Paul Chambers, “Red rim soldiers: the changing leadership of Thailand’s military in 2020,” New Mandala, September 21, 2020, accessed November 3, 2020, https://www.newmandala.org/the-changing-leadership-of-thailands-military-in-2020/. [24] Puangthong Pawakapan, The Central Role of Thailand's Internal Security Operations Command in the Post-Counter-insurgency Period, Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute TRS17/17, 2017, p. 1. [25] Puangthong, The Central Role, pp. 25-26. [26] Hewison, “The Monarchy and Democratisation,” p. 74.     ■ Kevin Hewison is the Weldon E. Thornton Emeritus Distinguished Professor of Asian Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and an adjunct professor with the University of Macau. His Research interest includes globalization and social change in Southeast Asia, especially Thailand, democratization, and labor issues. His recent publication include: “Black Site: The Cold War and the Shaping of Thailand’s Politics,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 50 (4), 2020 and Thai Constitutional Court dissolves another major party, East Asia Forum, and “Monarchy and Succession,” in Pavin Chachavalpongpun (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Thailand, London: Routledge.   ■담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구원               문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) / [email protected]     [EAI이슈브리핑]은 국내외 주요 사안에 대해 다양한 분야의 전문가들이 심층적인 분석을 통해 의견을 개진하고 정책적 제언을 발표할 수 있는 담론의 장을 마련하고자 기획된 시리즈입니다. 인용할 때에는 반드시 출처를 밝혀주시기 바랍니다. EAI는 어떠한 정파적 이해와도 무관한 독립 연구기관입니다. EAI가 발행하는 보고서와 저널 및 단행본에 실린 주장과 의견은 EAI와는 무관하며 오로지 저자 개인의 견해임을 밝힙니다.    

동아시아연구원(원장 손열)은 다섯 번째 [민주주의 협력] 온라인 세미나 시리즈,”민주주의의 새로운 위협: 소셜미디어를 통한 가짜뉴스의 확산”을 개최하였습니다. 본 회의에서 EAI는 아시아민주주의연구네트워크(ADRN)의 멤버들과 함께 소셜미디어에서 퍼지는 가짜뉴스가 민주주의에 던지고 있는 도전과제를 동북아시아, 동남아시아와 남아시아의 사례를 통해 살펴보았으며, 소셜미디어상에서의 표현의 자유와 민주주의 원칙 간 균형을 꾀하는 방법을 모색하였습니다.   일시: 2020년 10월 26일 12:00-13:30 (한국 시간) 발표자: Maiko Ichihara (Associate Professor, Hitotsubashi University; Study team co-director, Democracy for the Future project, JCIE), Sook Jong Lee (Professor, Sungkyunkwan University; Senior Fellow, East Asia Institute), Francisco A. Magno (Research Fellow, Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance), Sri Nuryanti (Senior Researcher, Center for Political Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences), Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay (Director, Society for Participatory Research in Asia), Aasiya Riaz (Joint Director, Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency) 사회자: Chin-en Wu (Associate Research Fellow, Academica Sinica)     I. Rise of Social Media as Disinformation and Polarization Tools The popularity of social media in Asia has grown at an exponential rate, in line with new and advanced technological innovations. While such advances aim to provide people with assistance in everyday life, there is an ongoing heated debate on social media’s influence on the political landscape of democracies. Social media allows the public to communicate their political expressions and share ideas that can be translated to offline actions. It can be a liberating technology for those who are oppressed. On the other hand, social media can threaten democracy by further dividing the society through its echo-chamber function or by spreading disinformation and fake news which jeopardize democratic governance and weaken democratic institutions. Meanwhile, it is relatively unclear as to what impact social media poses on governance in Asia mainly due to the lack of in-depth research on this topic. This online seminar aims to provide a preview of the upcoming publication by the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) “Social Media, Disinformation and Democracy in Asia,” which encompasses research from 14 countries in Northeast Asia (Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan), Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand), and South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka). The full publication will be uploaded on the ADRN website (www.adrnresearch.org) in November 2020.   II. Country Cases of Disinformation in Social Media                                                       Japan: Japanese Online Trolls Provoke Anti-Korean Sentiments Record China, a Japanese domestic portal site on China-related news, has been distributing news with intentions to improve the image of China, promote positive Japan-China relations, and spread the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda. It also has instigated negative views on South Korea, highlighting a starkly negative view on Japan-Korean relations, which could have contributed to an increase in anti-Korean sentiments in Japan in recent years. Pro-China, Anti-Korea: In 2019, Record China only covered non-political issues on China including sports, celebrities and trade despite the ongoing political tension between Japan and China, creating pro-China sentiments. On the other hand, the majority of Korea-related topics that Record China covered included sensitive diplomatic issues including Korean boycotts of Japanese products, comfort women, trade disputes, and the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Effects on democratic values: This potentially undermines the quasi-alliance between Japan and Korea, the two major democracies in the region whose cooperation is essential in maintaining peace, stability, rule of law, and freedom in Asia. Such bias further polarizes the Japanese society along a social cleavage between supporters and opponents of human rights protection for people who have roots in foreign countries. In this end, the Japanese viewers further need to raise awareness of Chinese influence in Asia, and cautions against China’s potential manipulation behind pro-China and anti-Korean sentiments in Japanese news outlets.   South Korea: Already Polarized Korean Politics Worsens Under the Attack of Disinformation While the function of social media as a liberation tool still continues in South Korea, the rise of its negative functions also emerged, threatening democracy. In the context of South Korea, the amplifying effect of political polarization posed by social media is deemed the most serious challenge, as can be observed in the disinformation and political polarization cases. Disinformation: Two opinion rigging scandles in the 2012 presidential election by National Intelligence Service (NIS) and another in 2017 by a blogger who is related to an influential governor are two major examples of political disinformation on social media. During the 2012 presidential election, the NIS chief was involved in the case where NIS staff uploaded negative comments on social media against the liberal candidate, which led to the imprisonment of the NIS chief. In 2017, pro-liberal blogger named “Druking” allegedly used a macro system to sway the public opinion more favorable toward the liberal candidate. Political polarization: The political setting of South Korea in which civil society and political society are sharply divided allows social media to play a perfect role as an echo chamber. The tendency of people communicating with the group sharing similar beliefs reinforces their political views and blocks the chance to get exposed to alternative views. Extreme and often incorrect views tend to prevail in social media and contribute to political polarization. Political leaders try to align with the staunch, opinionated supporters who are active on social media. This hinders the middle ground between the two opposite forces, not allowing enough room for democratic compromise and deliberation. Policy recommendations: Detailed laws and regulations that seek a smart balance between guaranteeing freedom of expression and regulating disinformation, as well as principles and practices that filter facts from disinformation need to be established. At the same time, the users on social media should also be vigilant on and be aware of dangerous functions of social media.   The Philippines: Marcos Family Rose from Dictator to Hero with Social Media on Its Backing Marcos family and social media: In the Philippines, social media evidently became a platform for mobilizing political support especially during elections. In an effort to refurbish the image of the former President Ferdinand Marcos and reverse its losing streak in national elections, his son Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr., intensively used social media to highlight the golden age of history under the Marcos regime. Through an enormous propaganda and disinformation drive on a network of webistes, Facebook, Youtube and social media influencers, the Marcos Jr. spread contents that denied the corruption, economic plunder and human rights transgressions of the Marcos time, while exaggerating its achievements. The disinformation campaign succeeded, as Bongbong Marcos was elected Senator in 2010 and his sister Imee Marcos was also elected Senator in 2019. Disinformation and democracy: Social media strategists are now fully centralized and integrated in the overall architecture of the candidates’ political campaigns both at national and local levels. Populist leaders employ elite public relations firms and have engaged social media to spread their anti-establishment discourse. Such efforts include rejection of the legitimacy of prevailing democratic rules, dismissal of mainstream media, and allegations against liberal institutions that protect civil liberties and human rights. The spread of disinformation through social media has further strengthened personality-based politics and weakened rules-based governance in the Philippines.   Indonesia: Black Campaign Sways Voter Preference and Undermines Electoral Process Two major types of disinformation can be examined in Indonesia during the 2019 simultaneous election, in a country where social media exerts strong influence on political events with its people spending more than eight hours per day on social media in average. Disinformation aiming candidates: One case of disinformation was aimed to presidency and vice presidency candidates, to purposedly defeat the contestants and shift the voting preference of the people by falsely accusing the candidates of being involved in social taboos of Indonesia. Black campaign spread where an Indonesian politician allegedly invited people to eat pork (“babi”) after the election, which is a highly sensitive issue in Indonesia where the majority of the population is Muslims. However, the politician in fact mentioned of eating noodles (“bakmi”). Disinformation aiming the General Election Commission: The second case of disinformation targetted the General Election Commission during the 2019 General Election, with intentions to undermine the electoral process and the authority of the elected candidate. Hoax campaigns were carried out to deliver the fake news that ballot papers were sent from China in order to manipulate the election. Misinformation also spread that Arief Budiman, the chairperson of the General Election Commission, is a Chinese descendant and lacks integrity. These altogether undermined the credibility of the electoral system and democracy as a whole.    India: Fight against Fake News amid Pandemic In India, the market share for WhatsApp application is phenomenal with more than 400 million active users in India, making it as one of the rapidly-growing platforms. Fake news on WhatsApp poses a bigger problem given its encrypted nature, and the fact that it is challenging to identify, report and remove contents. The Indian government has held social media intermediaries liable for curbing the spread of fake news and misinformation on social media, while the Facebook and Twitter maintained the stance that they were only platforms, not publishers, and therefore are not responsible for the content that is published on their platforms. COVID-19: Amid pandemic, Indian society is undergoing a surge of fake news and misinformation on social media often including conspiracy theories scapegoating certain countries, groups or communities for the spread of the virus. Two categories of misinformation have been spreading consistently-regarding Muslim culture and the government. In early March 2020 when the Tablighi Jamaat religious congregation took place in a mosque in Delhi, several thousand participants were confirmed with coronavirus, sparking a plethora of misinformation blaming the entire Muslim community. Another trend of misinformation includes using politicians or institutions as a believable source of misinformation on government announcement and advisories, as well as doctored statistics on positive cases or deaths.  Policy recommendations: First, the government must enact appropriate legislations to hold social media intermediaries and culprits liable, while at the same time allowing freedom of expression. The social media industries should also develop and deploy technology that identifies fake news, and the media should promote self-regulation. The civil society and educational institutions, together with fact-checkers, need to increase digital literacy and raise awareness of its citizens.   Pakistan: Social Media is the Last Civic Space for Democratic Discourse Although in Pakistan social media is gaining prominence as a communication tool for political discourse, state regulation against social media and its hybrid democracy where military still holds dominance greatly restrict the freedom of speech on social media. Whereas legal regulation against social media began as an anti-terrorist action against hate speech and extremism, it is now being used for political purposes in the legal regime of Pakistan, curbing people’s rights and freedom. State regulation: In Pakistan, the government has the authority and the ability to enforce a strict policy against social media, often imposing disproportionately harsh punishments. For example, government organizations such as the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA) have the authority to arbitrarily block or remove unlawful contents that are against the “glory of islam, integrity, security, defense, public order, contempt of court, decency, morality, incitement of any offense, etc.” By law, social media companies including Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, etc. operating in Pakistan are obliged to follow the guidance of the PTA. Such regulations also target journalists, opinion leaders and whistleblowers, leading to the self-censorship in media. Political intentions: In Pakistan’s hybrid governance, social media is considered a tool of propaganda rather than a platform of information sharing. The government announced the “5th generation warfare” or “hybrid warfare” against social media, implying that social media is not deemed an independent source of information. In addition, systematic use of troll armies have been used by the state and political parties, labeling anyone who stands for citizens rights an anti-state activist. While traditional media is already under the state control, no TV channels are allowed to broadcast real-time and such regulation is also being applied on social media as well, making any kind of open discussion among citizens challenging. ■     III. Moderator & Panelists   ■ Chin-en Wu is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, Taiwan. He received his PhD from the University of Michigan. He serves as one of the co-PIs of the Asian Barometer Survey. His main research interests include political economy, democratization, and the relationship between regime type and economic reforms. ■ Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay is the director of Participatory Research in Asia, New Delhi, working on participation, democratic governance, and civil society development for more than three decades. He has 25 years of professional experience working with universities, research institutions, and CSO s. He serves on the Steering Committee of ADRN and the Asia Democracy Network (ADN). He holds a PhD in anthropology for his work with the Parhaiya tribes of Chotanagpur in India. ■ Maiko Ichihara is Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Law and the School of International and Public Policy at Hitotsubashi University, Japan, a study team co-director of Democracy for the Future project at Japan Center for International Exchange, and a Visiting Scholar in Democracy, Conflict, and Governance program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Throughout her career, she has undertaken research on international relations, Japanese foreign policy, and democracy assistance. She earned her Ph.D. in political science from the George Washington University and her M.A. from Columbia University. Her recent publications include: "Universality to Plurality?: Values in Japanese Foreign Policy," in Yoichi Funabashi and G. John Ikenberry, eds., The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism: Japan and the World Order (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020); and Japan’s International Democracy Assistance as Soft Power: Neoclassical Realist Analysis (New York and London: Routledge, 2017). ■ Sook Jong Lee is a professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan University and senior fellow of the East Asia Institute. She has been directing the Asian Democracy Research Network since its formation in 2015, leading a network of about nineteen research organizations across Asia to promote democracy with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed. 2016), and Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013 and 2016). ■ Francisco A. Magno teaches Political Science and Development Studies at De La Salle University (DLSU), Manila, Philippines. He is the Founding Director of the DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance. He served as president of the Philippine Political Science Association from 2015 to 2017. He completed his PhD in political science at the University of Hawaii. ■ Sri Nuryanti is a researcher at the Center for Political Studies, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Jakarta, Indonesia. She is the former Election Commissioner of the Indonesian General Election Commission 2007–12, where she successfully oversaw the Parliamentary election and Presidential election 2009, as well as local elections from 2007 to 2012. She is an active participant in various academic activities at the national as well as the international level. She is a Co-Secretary General of the Asia Pacific Peace Research Association and the Executive Council member of the International Peace Research Association. She is director in charge of the Electoral Research Institute, Jakarta, Indonesia. ■ Aasiya Riaz is joint director at PILDAT, the leading Pakistani think tank she co-founded in 2001, and she leads PILDAT’s projects and activities. Trained in the field of media and political communication at the London School of Economics, UK, Aasiya has also worked with the mainstream press and electronic media in Pakistan as a political analyst. She has been a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy, as well as a distinguished fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at the Stanford University.     ■ 담당 및 편집: 임현진 EAI 연구원                  문의: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 203) [email protected]

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} 동아시아연구원(원장 손열)은 세 번째 민주주의 협력 온라인 세미나 시리즈, ‘인도·태평양 지역 내 민주주의 파트너십 강화’을 개최하였습니다. 본 회의에서 EAI는 미국, 인도, 인도네시아, 일본, 필리핀, 한국 등 민주주의 6개국의 석학과 함께 인도·태평양 지역에서의 민주주의 협력을 위한 비전과 그 도전과제를 논의하였으며, 민주주의 협력 증진을 위한 방안을 제시하였습니다.   일시: 2020년 9월 18일 10:00-11:30 (한국 시간) 발표자: Teresita Quintos Deles (Co-Founder and Chair, International Center for Innovation, Transformation and Excellence in Governance), Michael J. Green (Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, CSIS; Director of Asian Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University), Dhruva Jaishankar (Director, U.S. Initiative, Observer Research Foundation), Marty Natalegawa (Former Foreign Minister of Indonesia), Yukio Takasu (Chairman of the Study Team on the Future of Democracy, Japan Center for International Exchange; Former Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations) 사회자: Sook Jong Lee (Professor, Sungkyunkwan University; Senior Fellow, East Asia Institute)      I. 인도·태평양 지역이 마주한 민주주의 위협   민주주의의 퇴보는 2000년대 중반부터 지속되어 온 국제적 현상이다. 엎친데 덮친 격으로 코로나19 사태는 전세계 국가들의 민주주의적 원칙과 회복력에 부담을 가중시키고 있다. 권위주의적 통치와 포퓰리즘 정치가 만연한 인도·태평양 지역도 그 예외는 아니며, 최근 코로나 19 위기로 인해 더욱 급격한 민주주의 퇴보의 양상을 보이고 있다. 미중 패권 경쟁의 주요 전략적 지역이자 최근 팬데믹 사태로 혼란이 가중된 인도·태평양 지역의 민주주의를 보호 및 발전시키는 것은 역내 지정학적 위기를 완화하기 위한 핵심 과제이다.   II. 민주주의 협력에 대한 국가 차원의 견해                                                       민주주의에 대한 미국의 입장 변화 현재 미국 국민과 지도자들은 자국의 민주주의를 안정화함과 동시에 민주적 가치를 전세계로 확산하는 일에 그 어느 때보다 더 열정을 기울이고 있다. 러시아와 중국의 위협으로부터 미국의 가치를 보호하겠다는 강한 신념 아래 미국의 대중과 정치인들이 결집하였다. 동맹과 파트너십 강화를 위한 대중적·지적 지지도 사상 최대 수준으로 나타나고 있으며, 아시아 민주화의 성공을 직접 목격한 미국의 신세대는 이제 아시아에서 민주주의와 인권의 가치를 진전시키기 위해 표적 제재까지 지원하겠다는 입장이다. 이는 과거 민다나오 섬에서의 대(對)반란 캠페인이 크게 실패하자 민주주의의 증진에 대한 국민들의 실망감이 증가했던 상황과는 정반대의 양상을 보여주고 있다.   트럼프와 바이든, 그 결과와 무관한 민주주의의 중요성 바이든 대선후보는 국제관계 평론지 ‘포린 어페어스(Foreign Affairs)’ 기사와 주요 연설에서 그의 외교정책의 핵심을 민주주의로 내세우며 바이든 정권에서 민주주의가 중점으로 작용할 것임을 분명히 했다. 그리고 이러한 추세에 따라 트럼프 재선 시, 제2의 트럼프 정권 또한 기존의 반민주적 경향에서 벗어나 민주적 규범의 중요성을 인식하고 이를 대외정책에 반영해야 할 수밖에 없을 것이다. 그렇지 않으면 이러한 제로섬(zero-sum) 이념적 프레임이 민주적 거버넌스를 강화하기 위한 그간 미국의 대외정책적 노력을 저지할 우려가 있기 때문이다.     민주화 협력으로 민주주의의 꽃을 피운 나라, 필리핀 마르코스 독재 정권을 거쳐 민주주의 체제로 이행한 필리핀 정권은 적극적인 지역적·국제적 연대를 통해 지속해서 민주적 가치를 유지해 나가고 있다. 이와 같이 민주주의 협력은 필리핀에 중요한 가치를 지니며, 민주주의를 위한 역내 네트워크와 협력은 민주주의를 위협하는 요소들에 대한 공동의 이해를 증진하고, 민주적 가치 보호를 위한 각국의 경험과 지식을 공유하며, 지역 및 전 세계적 저항의 목소리를 확대시켜준다. 그러나 최근 필리핀에서 포퓰리즘과 원리주의 확산과 중국의 간섭까지 이어지면서 민주주의가 조금씩 흔들리고 있다. 민주주의의 퇴보를 막기 위해서는 지역적, 국가적, 조직적, 개인적 차원, 즉 다차원적으로, 실현가능한 모든 정책을 추진하며 해결 방안을 찾아나서야 할 것이다.   세계 최대의 민주주의 국가, 인도 인도의 민주적 협력은 크게 ①조정(coordination)과 규범 설정(norm-setting), ②개발협력, ③기술 지원 및 훈련 지원의 세 가지로 요소로 구성된다. 그러나 현재 인도가 추진하고 있는 민주적 협력은 양자관계에서만 주로 이루어지는 만큼, 민주주의 증진에 있어 미국, 일본, 유럽 등 다른 국가와의 공동 프로젝트 추진에 더욱 적극적인 노력을 기울일 필요가 있다.   인도네시아의 난제: 민주주의 vs. 불간섭, 둘 다 가능한가? 민주주의 확산과 내정불간섭의 원칙 사이에서 균형점을 찾으려는 노력의 일환으로 인도네시아는 ASEAN 정치 · 안보 공동체(ASEAN Political-Security Community, APSC) 출범을 구상하였다. APSC에 대한 인도네시아의 구상은 경제뿐만 아니라 민주주의의 발전과 거버넌스, 그리고 인권 보호의 영역에서도 국가 간 협력이 필요함을 골자로 한다. 그러나 현재 인도네시아는 이를 실행에 옮기고 민주주의 증진을 위한 프로그램을 실행할 만한 확고한 리더십을 보여줄 수 있느냐의 문제에 직면해있다. 더불어 내정불간섭의 원칙을 위배하지 않는 선에서 민주적 가치를 보호하고, 더 나아가 증진해야 하는 딜레마에 놓여있기도 하다.   일본, 전세계 민주주의의 역행 막기 위해 더 노력해야 아베 신조 총리는 2016년부터 ①민주주의, ②경제 번영, 그리고 ③평화와 안정이라는 3대 축 아래 자유롭고 개방적인 인도 · 태평양(Free and Open Indo-Pacific, FOIP)의 비전을 추진해왔다. 하지만 마지막 두 축에서와 달리 민주주의 전선에서의 일본의 노력은 정치·역사적 민감성과 오로지 각 국가의 요청에만 응하는 일본의 ‘정부 대 정부 원칙’ 때문에 한계가 있었다. 그러나 민주주의 거버넌스와 자유무역, 그리고 규범에 기반한 국제질서의 역행을 방지하기 위해 노력하는 것은 일본의 책임이자 의무이다. 특히 코로나19 사태로 인해 민주주의의 퇴행이 우려되는 최근 추세로 미루어보아, 일본은 경제 번영과 평화와 안정에 쏟는 노력과 동등한 수준의 관심을 민주주의 분야에도 기울여야 할 것이다.       III. 민주주의 협력의 비전   민주주의의 다양성을 수용하고, 동류(like-minded) 민주주의 국가 간 공동의 목표 추구해야 마이클 J. 그린 (Michael J. Green) 박사는 그 어떤 민주주의 체제도 동질적(monolithic)이지 않으며, 혼합적(eclectic) 양상을 보임을 강조하며, 동류(like-minded) 민주주의 국가 간 공동의 목표를 추구할 수 있는 공간(caucus)이 필요함을 역설했다. 이를 위해 동아시아정상회의(East Asia Summit, EAS), 아시아태평양경제협력체(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC), 남아시아지역협동조합(South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, SAARC), 동남아국가연합(Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN) 등이 있으며, 이러한 caucus는 인도태평양 지역 내 공동의 전략적 목표를 설정하고, 각국의 강점을 활용하는 방법(matrix of tools)을 모색함과 동시에 민주주의의 다양성을 포용해야 한다. 드루바 자이샨카르 (Dhruva Jaishankar) 디렉터는 개발도상국 내 민주주의 협력은 민주주의에 대한 도전과 위협이 다양하다는 인식을 공유하는 것에서부터 출발함을 강조했다. 이는 일본 사회의 경우 동질성이 높은 데에 비해 인도나 인도네시아의 경우 보다 다원적인 공동체를 이루고 있듯이, 국가별로 서로 다른 민주주의의 전통을 보유하고 있기 떄문이다. 더불어 효과적인 민주주의 협력은 유럽연합과 ASEAN 사이의 중간 지점의 형태로 실행될 것이라고 전망했다. 각국이 잘 할 수 있는 ‘스몰 d(small d)’ 민주주의 범례를 공유하는 것이 중요하다고 주장했다. 마티 나탈레가와 (Marty Natalegawa) 장관은 민주주의에 관한 협력 (partnership ‘on’)이 민주주의 국가들의(partnership ‘of’) 협력보다 우선되어야 하며, 비민주적 국가들도 포괄하여 진행되어야 함을 주장했다. 전자의 협력은 보다 포용적이며, 다양한 국가들의 민주주의에 대한 서로 다른 견해와 이에 따른 다양한 민주주의 이행단계를 포함한다. 이러한 포괄성은 미얀마와 피지, 그리고 태평양의 일부 국가들의 민주화 사례에서 보여준 것처럼 긍정적인 연쇄 효과(contagion effect)와 승수 효과(multiplier effect)를 가져올 것으로 기대된다. 민주주의 협력은 권위주의적인 해법이 아닌 민주적 방안으로써 여러 사회적 문제에 대한 효과적인 해결 방안을 제시해줄 것이다. 더불어, 미국 주도가 아닌 아시아 주도 민주협력이 되어야 한다고 주장했다. 유키오 다카스 (Yukio Takasu) 대사는 민주주의 거버넌스를 논의함에 있어 민주주의의 ‘통합(unity)’이 아닌 민주주의 ‘협력(partnership)’을 추구해야 함을 강조하며, 민주주의의 ‘확산(promotion)’이 아닌 민주적 거버넌스에 대한 ‘지지(support)’가 필요하다고 말했다.  이는 민주주의의 다양한 형태를 인정하고, 배타적이기보단 포괄적인 협력 관계를 형성하며, 동질적인 형태의 민주주의를 추구하지 않는 것이 중요함을 뜻한다. 각 국가는 해당 사회에 적합한 정치 체제를 선택할 권리를 지니지만, 좋은 거버넌스, 책임과 투명성, 평등, 법치, 표현의 자유 등을 포함한 보편적 가치는 보호되어야 한다.   민주주의 협력을 이끄는 정치 리더십 테레시타 퀸토스-델레스 (Teresita Quintos-Deles) 대표는 민주주의의 가장 큰 위협이 국가 내부로부터 발생하는 필리핀의 경우, 필리핀의 민주주의 세력이 민주화 정부들 및 시민사회와 연대를 구축해야 한다고 주장했다. 나아가 정부 관계자들은 필리핀 민주주의의 퇴행이 단지 민주화뿐 아니라 다른 여러 경제 협력 프로젝트들의 실패로도 이어질 수 있다는 사실을 인지해야 한다고 말했다. 마티 나탈레가와 (Marty Natalegawa) 장관은 ASEAN 국가들이 합의한 원칙에 명백히 어긋나는 상황에 대해 ‘묵묵부답(deafening silence)’으로 일관하며 ‘무능력(incapability)’을 보여주는 현 지도자들에 대한 경고를 날렸다. 성공적인 민주주의 협력을 위해서는 국가 대 국가 차원의 리더십 부재와 시민 사회 파트너십 결여의 문제를 중점적으로 다루어야 한다.      국가적 리더십과 더불어 필요한 시민사회의 리더십 테레시타 퀸토스-델레스 (Teresita Quintos-Deles) 대표는 소외계층과 청년층의 참여를 촉진하고 이들의 목소리를 확대하는 것의 중요성을 강조했다. 공공 조직(formal organizations)들과 엘리트 리더십에 의해 민주주의 프로젝트가 진행될 경우 소외 계층의 요구는 비교적 받아들여지지 않기 때문이다. 동시에 젊은 세대는 그 담론에 참여하며 민주주의 발전의 제약을 해소함에 있어 주도적인 역할을 할 필요가 있다.  유키오 다카스 (Yukio Takasu) 대사는 민주주의 협력이 정부 차원뿐만 아니라 싱크탱크, 학계, 그리고 특히 시민사회 등 다양한 영역에서 추진되어야 한다고 말했다. 현재 일본은 민주주의 협력을 촉진하기 위해 정당   조직으로부터 정치적 지지를 이끌어냄과 동시에, 더 나아가 연구 기관과 파트너십을 구축하고 시민사회 단체들과 연대하는 등 다양한 노력을 기울이고 있다.   미국 주도가 아닌, 아시아 주도의 역내 협력 유키오 다카스 (Yukio Takasu) 대사는 미국이 아닌 아시아 국가들이 주도하여 역내 파트너십을 추진해야 한다고 강조했다. 민주주의 협력은 중국의 위협에 맞서 세력 균형을 꾀하는 미국의 의도가 아닌, ‘파트너십 증진’이라는 아시아 국가들의 공동의 비전 하에 이루어져야 한다는 것이다. 마이클 J. 그린 (Michael J. Green) 박사는 정보 전쟁(information warfare) 이래로 중국에 의해 민주주의가 공격 받고 있다고 설명하며, 민주주의 가치를 지켜내기 위해서는 아시아 각국이 보다 주체적인 역할을 해야 할 것이라고 강조했다. 그러나 미국은 민주주의 확산을 위해 가장 큰 예산을 투자하고 있으며, 다년간의 성공과 실패 경험이 축적되어있다는 점에서 민주주의 증진에 있어 계속해서 중요한 행위자로 자리할 것이다.  ■   IV. 발표자 및 사회자 약력   ■ 이숙종_ 동아시아연구원(EAI) 시니어 펠로우·이사, 성균관대학교 행정학과 교수, 아시아민주주의연구네트워크(Asia Democracy Research Network) 공동대표. 미국 하버드대학교(Harvard University)에서 사회학 박사학위를 취득하였으며, 세종연구소 연구위원, 미국 브루킹스연구소(Brookings Insitute) 객원 연구원, 존스홉킨스대학교(Johns Hopkins University) 교수강사, 현대일본학회 회장, 외교부 정책자문위원, EAI 원장 등을 역임하였다. 최근 편저에는, Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea‟s Role in the 21st Century (편), Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia (공편), 《세계화 제2막: 한국형 세계화와 새 구상》(공편), 《2017 대통령의 성공조건》(공편) 등이 있다.   ■ 테레시타 퀸토스-델레스 (Teresita Quintos-Deles)_ 필리핀의 평화 이니셔티브에 앞장서고 있는 사회 운동가  이자 공직자. 필리핀 평화 프로세스(Peace Process) 대통령 보좌관으로 임명된 첫 여성으로, 2003년부터 2005년과 2010년부터 2016년에 보좌관으로 활동하였다. 2014년 그녀의 감독 하에Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro(CAB)가 체결됐으며, 1991~1994년에는 유엔 여성차별철폐위원회(UNCEDAW)의 전문가위원으로 참석했다. 2017년에는 특별히 ‘젠더’와 ‘포용’에 중점을 두고 유엔 선임 중재 고문을 지냈다. 그녀는 현재 2005년에 공동 설립한 International Center on Innovation, Transformation and Excellence in Governance(INCITEGov)의 회장을 맡고 있으며, 여성 연합인 EveryWoman의 의장직을 맡고 있다.   ■ 마이클 J. 그린 (Michael J. Green)_ 국제전략문제연구소(CSIS)의 아시아·일본 담당 선임부소장, 조지타운대학교(Georgetown University) Walsh School of Foreign Services 아시아 학과장. 2001년부터 2005년까지 국가안전보장회의(NSC)에서 근무했다. By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in Asia Pacific Since 1783(Columbia University Press, 2017) 등 동아시아 안보에 관한 수많은 책과 기사를 저술했다. 존스홉킨스대학교 국제대학원에서 석박사 학위를 취득하였으며, 도쿄대학교(University of Tokyo)과 매사추세츠공과대학교(Massachusetts Instiute of Technology)에서 박사후 연구원을 지냈다. 케년대학교(Kenyon College)에서 학사   학위를 취득하고 최우등졸업했다.   ■두루바 자이샨카르 (Dhruva Jaishankar)_ 로위연구소(Lowy Institute)의 비상임펠로우, 옵저버연구재단(Observer Research Foundation)의 미국 이니셔티브 디렉터. 브루킹스 인도(Brookings India)와 브루킹스연구소(Brookings Institution) 前 펠로우를 지냈으며, 특히 인도의 미국, 아시아, 인도-태평양, 유럽관계을 중점으로, 국제 시스템 내 인도의 역할과 국제 발전이 인도의 정치, 경제, 사회에 미치는 영향을 연구한다. 자이샨카르는 마칼레스터 대학(Macalester College)에서 역사와 고전학 학사 학위를, 조지타운대학교(Georgetown University)에서 안보학 석사 학위를 취득했다.   ■ 마티 나탈레가와 (Marty Natalegawa)_ 前인도네시아 외무장관(2009~2014), 前 유엔의 인도네시아 상임대표(2007-2009), 前 영국 주재 및 아일랜드 대사(2005-2007)를 지냈다. 주요 저서로는 Does ASEAN Matter? A view from Within (2018)이 있다. 유엔 사무총장의 고위급 중재 자문위원, 옥스포드 이슬람연구센터(International Academic Advisory Committee of the Oxford Centre)의 국제학술자문위원회, CSIS의 동남아시아 자문위원회,  국제위기그룹(International Crisis Group) 신탁관리위원회, 제주포럼의 글로벌 자문위원회, 서부호주대학교 공공정책연구소 자문위원회, 오타와 다원주의 국제 센터(Global Centre for Pluralism)의 이사회 멤버를 역임하고 있다. 인도네시아 은행 연구소(Baqnk of Indonesia Institute)의 명예 이사회 회원이자 저명한 연구 학자이자, 유엔 사무총장의 군축 자문 위원회와 유엔군축연구소(UNIDIR)의 이사회 멤버이다. 호주국립대학교(Australian National University)에서 박사 학위를, 캠브릿지대학교(Cambridge University)에서 석사 학위를, 그리고 런던정치   경제대학교(London School of Economics and Political Science)에서 학사 학위를 받았다.   ■ 유키오 다카스 (Yukio Takasu)_ 유엔사무총장 인간안보 특별자문관. 前유엔 관리 사무차장과 前유엔 주재 일본 대사를 역임했으며, 현재 일본국제교류센터(JCIE)의 아시아의 민주주의 거버넌스 지원 확대에 관한 ‘민주주의의 미래’ 연구 프로젝트(2018~2022)를 맡고 있다. 리츠메이칸대학교(Ritsumeikan University)의 초빙 교수를 역임하며, 하버드대학교, 도쿄대학교 정책대학원에서 교수직을 지냈다. 도쿄대학교(법학과)와 옥스퍼드대학교(Oxford University) Merton College에서 학위를 취득하였으며, 최근 저서로는 SDGs and Japan: Human Security Index of Japan (2019)이 있다.   ■ 담당 및 편집: 임현진 EAI 연구원                  문의: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 203) [email protected]  

Editor's Note South Koreans’ attitudes toward democracy have changed over time. In this issue briefing, Prof. Woo Chang Kang examines the public’s changing attitudes towards democracy since the mid-2000s by analyzing the public support for democracy based on three aspects: democratic principles, performance and institutions. Based upon the survey data, Prof. Kang states that compared with the relatively low level of support for democracy in the early 2000s, support for democracy has been constantly increasing in all aspects since then, marking the highest in the 2020 survey. Prof. Kang argues that while the increasing support indicates the maturity of democracy in the country, it is to be seen whether the public would continue the high level of support for democracy when the COVID-19 pandemic is over, as the survey was conducted during the period when the pandemic was effectively under control.      Public support is crucial for the vitality and stability of democracy. A low level of public support weakens the legitimacy of a regime in a normative sense and hinders the effective operation of governance in practice. Public support is even more important in new democracies, in which democratic norms and principles have not been firmly established in society and legacies from previous authoritarian regimes sustain. There are increasing concerns about waning public support for democracy in both developed and newly democratized countries. South Korea is not an exception. Based on the analysis of the survey data from 1996 to 2006, for instance, Park (2011) concluded that “the public evaluation of democracy in practice has been largely negative, while the public acceptance of democracy as an idea has been mixed”. In this paper, we examine how public attitudes toward democracy in South Korea have changed since the mid-2000s.   Examining Support for Democracy Following Park (2011), we disaggregate support for democracy into three aspects: principles, performance and institutions. Support for democratic principles reflects whether the public prefer democracy as the preferred form of government to alternatives. We measure it using the question which asks respondents to select one of the following three statements: ‘Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government’, ‘Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one’, and ‘For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non-democratic regime.’ Figure 1 shows that support for democracy as the preferred form of government significantly increased between 2005 and 2020. Those who answer that democracy is always preferable increased from 43% in 2006 to 66% in 2011, 63% in 2015 and 70% in 2020. Those who answer that an authoritarian government can be preferable under some circumstances decreased from 36% in 2006, to 20% in 2011, 25% in 2015 and 20% in 2020.       To examine the public evaluation of democratic performance, we rely on the question that asks how many respondents are proud of maturity of South Korean democracy. In Figure 2, we can also see that satisfaction with democratic performance also significantly increased during the same period. Those who choose positive responses combining ‘to a great extent’ and ‘somewhat’ increased from 43% in 2005 to 50% in 2010, 52% in 2015 and 74% in 2020. In contrast, negative responses combining ‘very little’ and ‘not at all’ declined from 57% in 2005 to 50% in 2010, 48% in 2015 and 26% in 2020.         As a measure of public support for democratic institutions, we examine public confidence in three key political institutions: president, national government and the National Assembly. Figure 3 depicts the proportion of survey respondents who answer that they have trust in each institution. In general, the public demonstrate the greatest level of confidence in president followed by the national government. The level of confidence in the National Assembly remains the lowest. In 2006, public confidence in all three institutions remained low. Only about 20% of respondents said that they have trust in president and about 15% said that they have trust in the national government. Only about 7% replied that they have trust in the National Assembly. Since then, however, public confidence in president has rapidly increased to 39% in 2011, 49% in 2015 and 62% in 2020. Similarly, public confidence in the national government has increased to 22% in 2011, 30% in 2015 and 54% in 2020. In contrast, public confidence in the National Assembly has been stagnating. It increased to 10% in 2011, 13% in 2015 and 18 % in 2020. Overall, South Korean attitudes toward democracy have become more positive in all three aspects of regime evaluation. One possible explanation for such a high level of support in 2020 would be successful responses to the COVID-19 outbreak by the South Korean government. We can see that public satisfaction increased to a greater extent in the evaluation of regime performance between 2015 and 2020, which is similar to patterns for public confidence in the national government that is in charge of addressing the COVID-19. Yet, the earlier trend indicates that this is not the whole story. In terms of support for democratic principles, for example, it was between 2006 and 2010 when support for democracy increased the most. The change between 2015 and 2020 is somewhat qualified. Similarly, we can see that confidence in president has been increasing since 2011. In other words, all three indicators suggest that public support for democracy has started recovering since the mid-2000s.                                                  Determinants of Democratic Support   To better understand the determinants of democratic support in South Korea, a number of analysis have been conducted and presented here. First, there is some evidence that public attitudes toward democracy have been politicized during this period. In particular, Figure 4 depicts how support for democratic performance varies by respondents’ partisan support and ideology. In panel (a), 52% of liberal party supporters and 44% of conservative party supporters provided positive evaluation about the maturity of democracy in 2005. Since then, the gap between different partisan supporters has widened over time. The positive evaluation increased among the conservative party supporters up to 59% in 2010 and 64% in 2015, reflecting that the conservative party was in power. During the same period, the positive evaluation among the liberal party supporters decreased to 47% in 2010 and 46% in 2015. In 2020 when the liberal party was in power, the positive evaluation among the liberal party supporters ascended up to 81%. Interestingly, the level of support among the conservative voters did not decrease but increase by 5%, possibly reflecting that even the conservative party supporters acknowledge that the government addresses the COVID-19 pandemic effectively. In panel (b), we observe the similar pattern. In 2005, the evaluation of democratic maturity was not distinct among voters with different ideological characteristics but has become more salient over time. Voters who share the ideological characteristics with the governing party tend to evaluate democracy more favorably than others.      Support for Democratic Performance by Voter Characteristics>   Secondly, consistent with the findings of the previous literature on democratic support, different factors affect different dimensions of democratic support. Economic performance of the government and electoral outcomes primarily affect support for democratic performance. Those who evaluate the state of the economy positively also evaluate the maturity of democracy favorably. Also, voters who reside in the governing party’s stronghold provide the positive evaluation of democracy, while those in the opposition party’s stronghold are less satisfied with democratic performance. However, the evaluation of the national economy does not affect support for democratic principles. On the other hand, citizenship and the perception of political polarization affect support for democratic principles, but do not affect support for democratic performance. Citizenship taps whether the public embrace a shared set of norms which are expected from a good citizen. Our analysis shows that those who approve citizenship norms are more likely to provide greater support to democratic principles. In contrast, those who perceive that political polarization among major parties is serious tend to be more skeptical about democracy in principle.   Implications for South Korean Democracy In the 2020 Korean Identity Survey, about 70% of the respondents prefer democracy to the authoritarian government, 74% approve the maturity of Korean democracy, and 62% answer that they have confidence in president. It is noteworthy that support for democratic performance improves even among conservative party supporters, in contrast with the general perception that the electoral defeat degrades support for democratic performance among supporters of the opposition party. Compared with the low to moderate support for democracy reported in the early 2000s, the high level of support for democracy in all aspects of consideration is an indication that democracy in South Korea is in a better shape as the only game in town. Yet, we need to keep in mind that the survey was implemented during the period when the COVID-19 was effectively contained. In this respect, it is questionable whether the public would continue to provide the high level of support for democracy, particularly in terms of the evaluation of regime performance when the pandemic is over and politics return to normal.   ■담당 및 편집: 이은지 EAI 연구원               문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 207)  |  [email protected]   [EAI이슈브리핑]은 국내외 주요 사안에 대해 다양한 분야의 전문가들이 심층적인 분석을 통해 의견을 개진하고 정책적 제언을 발표할 수 있는 담론의 장을 마련하고자 기획된 시리즈입니다. 인용할 때에는 반드시 출처를 밝혀주시기 바랍니다. EAI는 어떠한 정파적 이해와도 무관한 독립 연구기관입니다. EAI가 발행하는 보고서와 저널 및 단행본에 실린 주장과 의견은 EAI와는 무관하며 오로지 저자 개인의 견해임을 밝힙니다.

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Note Since democratization, South Korean party politics has been featured by increasing party polarization and incomplete party sorting. In this issue briefing, Prof. Jung Kim examines several factors that have led to party polarization and incomplete party sorting in the country’s politics. Prof. Kim argues that under the two-and-a-half party sys-tem, political representation has been unequal, as it over-represents progressive and conservative voters while under-representing centrists, thereby increasing polarization between progressive and conservative parties. At the same time, Prof. Kim argues that the number of centrist voters who do not fall under the ideological distributions of the major parties remains significant, which indicates that party polarization has not been corresponding with party sorting, leaving centrist voters in drift.     This essay seeks to illustrate party politics in South Korea that has unfolded since its democratic transition that took place in 1987. For starters, it argues that South Korea’s party sys-tem has brought about an asymmetric structure of political representation that over-represents progressive and conservative voters while under-representing centrist voters. It also claims that unequal political representation has engendered party polarization in South Korean politics. It further argues that party sorting has been incomplete whereby parties have difficulty shaping political issues in a partisan way to exploit their electoral advantages. Increasing party polarization and incomplete party sorting capture the evolving nature of party politics in South Korea since its democratic transition.    Asymmetric Political Representation South Korea’s party politics has been gradually stabilized since its democratic transition, producing a two-and-a-half party sys-tem. The average number of legislative parties has changed from 2.77 in the 1990s to 2.63 in the 2000s, and 2.41 in the 2010s This two-and-a-half party sys-tem consists of ‘two’ parties that have managed to maintain the continuity of partisan brands as progressive and conservative respectively, and ‘half’ parties that have inevitably faced the interruption of partisan brand as centrist. Progressives have altered their party labels from Peace Democratic Party (1987-1991) to Democratic Party (1991-1995), National Congress for New Politics (1995-2000), Millennium Democratic Party (2000-2005), Uri Party (2003-2007), Unified Democratic Party (2007-2011), Democratic Unified Party (2011-2014), and Democratic Party (since 2014). Likewise, party labels for conservatives have changed from Liberal Democratic Party (1990-1995) to New Korea Party (1995-1997), Grand Korea Party (1997-2012), Saenuri Party (2012-2017), Liberty Korea Party (2017-2020), and United Future Party (Since 2020). Despite recurrent relabeling, South Korea’s progressive and conservative voters have acknowledged the succession of partisan brands from one party to another, attaching their partisan loyalty, however tenuous it might be, to the ‘two’ parties.  For South Korea’s centrist voters, no such continuity of partisan brand has been established from United People’s Party (1992-1995) to United Liberal Democrats (1995-2006), Creative Korea Party (2007-2012), People’s Party (2016-2018), and Bareun Party (2017-2018), simply because these parties were not successor parties one another.  Consequently, centrist voters have found themselves in a situation in which their efforts to attach partisan loyalty to centrist parties are destined to be interrupted. The National Assembly members are selected by the majoritarian mixed-member electoral sys-tem consisting of 85% of seats from single-member districts and 15% from proportional representation lists, which institutionally favors two larger parties at the cost of smaller parties. Under such a ‘winner-take-all’ sys-temic pressure, centrist voters, which consist of more than 40% of the electorate, according to a recent opinion survey, tend to abstain or to be compelled to cast their ballots for one of the larger parties in order not to waste their votes. Centrist voters with the weak partisan attachment are less likely to have strong incentive to engage in political life. In fact, a study shows that voters with strong partisan identities are more likely to vote than voters with weak partisan identities during recent presidential elections in South Korea.  In sum, South Korea’s two-and-a-half party sys-tem has brought about an asymmetric political representation, in which voters with strong partisanship tend to be over-represented, while voters with weak partisanship tend to be under-represented. This is why political scientist Jang Jip Choi claims that the “greatest cleavage in contemporary Korean politics is between a representation sys-tem with no social foundation and the nonvoters who resist and cannot gain representation through that sys-tem.”    Increasing Party Polarization The asymmetric structure of political representation, in which progressive and conservative voters are more actively involved in politics in general and elections in particular than centrist voters are, has made electoral strategies of two large parties depart from the median voter theorem and resort to strategic extremism. To put it differently, the two large parties are more likely to rely on ‘mobilization’ to push for voters with strong partisan identities who will vote for them to go to the polls rather than ‘persuasion’ to convince voters with weak partisan identities who are more predisposed against, but not adamantly opposed to, them to change their opinion. Once the two parties decide to abjure ‘persuasion’ and to embrace ‘mobilization’ as their dominant electoral strategy, then party polarization would kick in. Figure 1 demonstrates this logic of party polarization with the disappearing centrists.      Note: Author’s representation based on the data extracted from Institute of Korean Political Studies, Seoul National University http://www.ikps.or.kr/board03/list.asp (accessed on August 25, 2020)   Figure 1 represents ideological means and variances of the National Assembly members from progressive and conservative parties from 2000 to 2016. The distance of ideological means between the two parties has clearly inclined from 1.54 in 2000 to 1.96 in 2004, 2.37 in 2008, 3.15 in 2012, and 3.67 in 2016. The average ideological variances that represent the degree of partisan coherence of each party has steadily declined from 1.12 in 2000 to 0.69 in 2016 for progressives and from 1.41 in 2000 to 0.83 in 2016 for conservatives. It is important to note that there were overlapping areas between progressive and conservative parties in the 2000s, in which bipartisan cooperation was expected. Such overlapping areas to expect bipartisan cooperation no longer existed in the 2010s, which indicates that party polarization deepened and widened with increasing intra-party homogeneity and inter-party heterogeneity. In other words, it implies that centrist legislators have disappeared in the National Assembly of South Korea.   Incomplete Party Sorting To complete the picture of South Korea’s party politics, it is essential to note that party polarization resulted from the misalignment of representation between politicians and voters. In other words, as ideological distributions of parties have continuously lost correspondence to those of voters over time, progressive and conservative parties have become more distant from each other, leaving the voice of centrist voters unheard. Figure 2 illustrates that such representation misalignment captures part of South Korea’s party politics.       Note: Author’s representation based on the data extracted from Korea Social Science Data Archive https://kossda.snu.ac.kr/ (accessed on August 25, 2020)   In Figure 2, the number of voters who self-identify themselves as centrists is significant among South Korea’s electorate in the 2000s and the 2010s. Specifically, the average share of centrist voters is 32.0 percent in the 2000s and 31.2 percent in the 2010s. The stability of centrist voters in size is remarkable, considering the changes in the average share of moderate progressive voters up from 25.1 percent in the 2000s to 31.6 percent in the 2010s and those of moderate conservative voters down from 29.4 percent in the 2000s to 24.2 percent in the 2010s. In this respect, it is not unreasonable to claim that unlike increasing party polarization, there has been little progress on party sorting – migrating centrists toward progressive or conservative parties – in South Korea.  The finding that the ‘unimodal’ ideological distribution of voters has been at odds with the ‘bimodal’ ideological distribution of parties strongly suggests that party sorting has been incomplete in the country in the sense that centrifugal forces emanated from party polarization are not strong enough to bring about the corresponding party sorting. To simply put, while the two large parties might have become more polarized in the political marketplace, they have not succeeded in polarizing the electorate at large. Compared with the United States where voters’ social identities grow increasingly party-linked and parties become more influential in political decision-making due to escalating party polarization and party sorting, the effect of partisanship on policymaking is less pronounced, which makes voters more open to alternative policy ideas in South Korea.  In conclusion, although the combination of increasing party polarization and incomplete party sorting is far from the best case scenario that helps South Korea’s democracy work, it at least enables the democracy to avoid the worst case scenario that falls victim to the partisan divide in society at large.■     ■ Jung Kim is currently an Assistant Professor at the University of North Korean Studies, South Korea. He teaches courses on International Relations in East Asia and Political Economy of the Two Koreas, among others. Prior to this, from 2009-2015, he was a Lecturer at the Underwood International College and Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University. During this time, Mr. Kim was also a Chief Researcher at The East Asia Institute. He pursued his Bachelors and Masters in Political Science at Korea University and went on the pursue his Ph.D. at Yale University. His research interests include Comparative Politics and International Relations in East Asia.   ■담당 및 편집: 이은지 EAI 연구원               문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) / [email protected]     [EAI이슈브리핑]은 국내외 주요 사안에 대해 다양한 분야의 전문가들이 심층적인 분석을 통해 의견을 개진하고 정책적 제언을 발표할 수 있는 담론의 장을 마련하고자 기획된 시리즈입니다. 인용할 때에는 반드시 출처를 밝혀주시기 바랍니다. EAI는 어떠한 정파적 이해와도 무관한 독립 연구기관입니다. EAI가 발행하는 보고서와 저널 및 단행본에 실린 주장과 의견은 EAI와는 무관하며 오로지 저자 개인의 견해임을 밝힙니다.  

동아시아연구원(원장 손열)은 두 번째 민주주의 협력 온라인 세미나 시리즈, ‘민주주의 원칙, 시험대에 오르다: 아시아 민주국가들의 팬데믹 대처법’을 개최하였습니다. 본 회의에서 EAI는 아시아민주주의연구네트워크(ADRN) 멤버들과 함께 코로나19 팬데믹이 민주주의에 어떤 도전 과제를 던지고 있는지를 살펴보았으며, 팬데믹이 민주주의에 끼치는 부정적 영향과 공공 안전과 민주주의 원칙 간 균형을 꾀하는 방법에 대하여 논의하였습니다.   일시: 2020년 8월 28일 12:30 – 14:00 (한국 시간) 발표자:  Ketty Chen (Vice President, Taiwan Foundation for Democracy), Maiko Ichihara (Associate Professor, Hitotsubashi University; Study team co-director, Democracy for the Future project, JCIE), I Ketut Putra Erawan (Executive Director, Institute for Peace and Democracy), Jung Kim (Assistant Professor, University of North Korean Studies), Niranjan Sahoo (Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation) 사회자: Sook Jong Lee (Professor, Sungkyunkwan University; Senior Fellow, East Asia Institute)     I. Executive Summary The COVID-19 pandemic presents democratic countries with the dual agenda of managing and controlling the pandemic meanwhile maintaining and preserving democratic principles. Democracies in Asia including South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, India and Indonesia have taken different measures in response to the pandemic. In terms of both the number of infected people and the infection rate adjusted to the population size, these five Asian countries are most infected in the order of India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Panelists of this webinar explain the quarantine measures and the challenges posed to their democratic governance.                                                 How Did Asian Democracies Respond to COVID-19?                                 Immigration Control and Domestic Lockdowns: Five Asian countries have taken immigration control measures to stop the inflow of the virus from other countries. Taiwan took preemptive immigration control measures while South Korea and Japan have attempted to maintain open borders, by administering tests and social distancing guidance. Some measures are more conspicuous than those related to immigration. South Korea, Japan and Taiwan stand out as three countries that did not impose domestic lockdowns unlike India and Indonesia which enforced complete and partial lockdowns respectively. India enforced a 21-day nationwide lockdown within only four hours of prior notice, causing significant domestic chaos. This measure has put many urban migrant workers, who are anxious to return to their hometown, in a predicament. 3Ts (Test-Tracing-Treatment): South Korea and Taiwan implemented 3T strategies more extensively whereas Japan, Indonesia and India showed limited testing capacity. South Korea and Taiwan tracked individuals who tested positive and those entering the country using mobile applications, with South Korea even using GPS data, credit card records, and security cameras for contact tracing. On the other hand, only one percent of the Japanese population was tested, one of the lowest testing rates worldwide. Indonesia’s provincial governments and local hospitals did not have enough resources to match up to the testing and treatment requirements. India, despite having managed to increase its daily testing capacity to more than a million, still has long way to go due to its under-resourced public health system.   Combat the Virus or Save the Economy? Quarantine vs. Economy: Achieving balance between lockdown and daily economic life arises as a crucial concern for democracies, especially as the pandemic is expected to continue until next year. Indonesia’s policy, Pembatasan Aktivitas Bersekala Besar (PSBB), is an illustration of such a concern. It limits the movement of citizens to certain locations with guidelines are provided by experts. South Korea has also been recognized as a country that has sought for balance by partially reducing people’s mobility based on mass testing and contact tracing and by utilizing the public quarantine strategy that avoids extreme limitations. These measures were met by bottom-up efforts to cooperate with the government guidelines.   Rule of Law: Crisis or Chance? Democracy continued in some countries, but others took advantage of the pandemic situation as a pretext for the misuse of democratic values. Japan saw continued support for rule of law even after the situation was declared a national emergency, as freedom of press, speech and assembly, as well as access to information were allowed as long as there was social distancing. The government also refrained from using contact tracing due to privacy concerns. South Korea, according to Varieties of Decmoracy’s Pandemic Democratic Violation Index, is one of the 24 countries out of 146 that did not violate democratic values in responding to COVID-19: there was no time limit on emergency measures; no discrimnatory measures; no de-jure violation of non-derogable rights; no restriction on media freedom; no disproportionate limitation on the role of legislature; and no abusive enforcement. Taiwan safeguarded its democracy from information warfare and disinformation campaigns. The Taiwanese administration attempted to deter authoritarian attempts to spread disinformation defamining its performance by acting swiftly and effectively to share correct information. India is experiencing misuse of emergency power from the executive branch, with the pandemic as an “easy excuse” for extending its power: many states are imposing censorship on media reporting, penalizing and in some cases, arresting people who raise inconvenient questions about the state response to pandemic. At the same time, India’s judiciary and legislative pillars are being largely paralyzed as COVID-19 closed operations within the parliament and state assemblies, and as courts operate virtually to hear urgent matters, making room for almost “draconian” executive branch to pass ordinances.   Bipartisan Consensus: Fighting Together or Fighting Against One Another? Bipartisan consensus and the conveying of a consistent message remain a priority during a crisis when citizens become highly vulnerable to fake news and disinformation. Most Asian countries have effectively done so, with Taiwan overcoming the politically divided bipartisan system and both parties jointly responding with “one heart.” South Korea’s ruling and opposition parties also reached consensus in handling the pandemic, and successfully gained public trust, helping the nation to rise as an exemplary case in responding to the pandemic. Nevertheless, this did not lead to unconditional bipartisan agreement, as viewed by a drastic fall in President Moon’s approval rating from 71 percent in May to 39 percent in August after the proposal of several bills unrelated to COVID-19. This shows that political support for the government depends heavily on voters’ perception of its performance rather than its partisanship. India saw bipartisan support in the beginning of pandemic but soon entered a period of sharp polarization between the ruling and opposition parties, greatly harming collective efforts to fight the rapidly spreading pandemic. Indonesia did not see harsh opposition as major opposition leaders have been absorbed in the Jokowi Kabinet since 2019. However, some opposition leaders and parties have questioned the concept of emergency stated in the decree.   Hand in Hand with Civil Society? Taiwan is a country of highly vibrant civil societies in the region, which was once again manifested in the time of pandemic. Civil society has collaborated with the government to fight against COVID-19, beginning with the development of mobile applications to let citizens know of stocks of facial masks, and the creation of effective information campaigns for encouraging its citizens to follow the government’s rules. Similarly, Japan was able to maintain democracy by preserving its civic space and media freedom. Civil society in Indonesia is struggling, but it is continuing to exercise checks and balance against the government. However, the mainstream media, which is largely owned by political leaders, remains politicized and polarized, making it difficult to share right information and maintain freedom of expression.     Where Do Minorities Stand? Emergency crisis further marginalizes the minority, as illustrated by the case of Indonesia where 90 percent of its population works in the informal sector with no money to pay the rent and no means to work from home. The Muslim community in India has also been the target of Islamaphobia (linked to the Tablighi Jamaat incident in mid-March) and stigmatized as a spreader of the virus. Similarly, religious minorities in South Korea including Sincheonji, a religious cult, and far-right Protestant churches are confronting rising criticisms. In Japan, the government implemented discriminatory policies towards the vulnerable minority including schoolchildren of Korean schools by excluding them from the list of recipients eligible for the government’s economic support. However, Taiwan is effectively protecting its minority, protecting migrant workers by requiring employers to provide them with facial masks.   Challenges ahead of the ‘Nth Wave’? South Korean government’s capacity to respond to the pandemic is now being tested, in the face of its second big wave. Dealing with the religious minority including Protestants, whose size is expected to grow, and striking the balance between liberty and security will be necessary. Japanese government’s decision-making process lacks a science-based approach, and does not provide full-scale testing capacity. Japan made policy, such as the "Go To Travel” campaign, without sufficient prior consultations with public health experts, leading to an increase in confirmed cases. Japan also needs to enhance its testing capacity, by moving away from the current system where citizens have to go through health centers to ask permission for testing. Indonesia's key governmental agenda is to address the problem of inequality. Currently, the majority of its population faces the threat of losing livelihoods. Networks of activism in civil society, media and the government should all conjoin to cooperatively deal with the problem.  Similarly, India’s millions of migrants and low-wage laborers were hit hardest by the lockdown, one of the toughest of its kind. The lockdown made life difficult for millions and made them incapable of paying their monthly rents. This is critical as 90% of Indian laborers belong to the informal sector, of which 70 % do not have regular social protection such as pensions or health insurance. Adding to woes, India’s GDP has contracted (24%) to an all time low raising doubts about the state’s capacity to fight the prolonged pandemic. ■     ■ Sook Jong Lee is a professor of public administration at Sungkyunkwan University and senior fellow of the East Asia Institute. She has been directing the Asian Democracy Research Network since its formation in 2015, leading a network of about nineteen research organizations across Asia to promote democracy with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed. 2016), and Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013 and 2016). ■ Ketty W. Chen is the Vice President of the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD). She is responsible for overseeing international affairs and general administration at the TFD. Dr. Chen is a political scientist by training and received her doctoral degree in political science from the University of Oklahoma, specializing in comparative politics, democratization, international relations and political philosophy. Dr. Chen also holds two Master’s degrees in political science and international relations from the University of Oklahoma and dual Bachelor of Arts degrees in political science and psychology from the Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas.  Dr. Chen also served as the Chair of the Women’s Rights Working Group for Liberal International and has been referenced in a number of publications and international media outlets, including the Wall Street Journal, the Associated Press, Al Jazeera, LA Times, New York Times, Financial Times, Voice of America, BBC-World, Libération and Le Monde. Her book chapters on Taiwan’s social movement in “Taiwan’s Social Movements Under Ma Ying-jeou” and “Cities Unsilenced” were published in 2017. ■ Maiko Ichihara is an Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Law and the School of International and Public Policy at Hitotsubashi University, Japan. She is a committee member of the World Movement for Democracy, East Asia Democracy Forum, and Partnership for Democratic Governance (Japan). Throughout her career, she has undertaken research on international relations and democracy assistance. She earned her Ph.D. in political science from the George Washington University and her M.A. from Columbia University. Her recent publications include: "Universality to Plurality?: Values in Japanese Foreign Policy," in Yoichi Funabashi and G. John Ikenberry, eds., The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism: Japan and the World Order (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020); and Japan’s International Democracy Assistance as Soft Power: Neoclassical Realist Analysis (New York and London: Routledge, 2018). ■ I Ketut Putra Erawan is an active scholar and researcher working on democracy issues in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. He is the executive director of Institute for Peace and Democracy, an Indonesian think-tank and the implementing agency of the Bali Democracy Forum. In 2005-2009, Dr. Erawan served as director of the Graduate Program in Political Science at Gadjah Mada University. He was a special advisor for the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, an expert for the Ministry of Interior Affairs of Indonesia, a member of the Steering Committee for the Australia and Indonesia Governance Research Partnership, a member of the Academic Committee of the Rotary Peace Center at the Chulalongkorn University in Thailand,, and a consultant for the World Bank, World Bank Institute, UNDP, and various Indonesian agencies. ■ Jung Kim is currently an Assistant Professor at the University of North Korean Studies, South Korea. He teaches courses on International Relations in East Asia and Political Economy of the Two Koreas, among others. Prior to this, from 2009-2015, he was a Lecturer at the Underwood International College and Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University. During this time, Mr. Kim was also a Chief Researcher at The East Asia Institute. He pursued his Bachelors and Masters in Political Science at Korea University and went on the pursue his Ph.D. at Yale University. His research interests include Comparative Politics and International Relations in East Asia. ■ Niranjan Sahoo is Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi since 2004. He has published extensively on issues of democracy, human rights, decentralized governance, constitutionalism, and nation-building in South Asia. His current research focuses on the domestic drivers of India’s foreign policy objectives with regard to democracy and human rights in South Asia as well as new social movements and the changing nature of democracy in India. A recipient of 2010 ASIA Fellow Award (funded by The Ford Foundation), Dr. Sahoo recently was a Visiting Asia Fellow at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur.   ■ 담당 및 편집: 임현진 EAI 연구보조원  |  문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 203)  [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Note Under the “One Country Two Sys-tems” principle, Hong Kong is supposed to enjoy a degree of autonomy from mainland China. Professor Ma Ngok of the Chinese University of Hong Kong analyzes the content and context of the Hong Kong National Security Law (HKNSL), which was enacted by China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) in May-June 2020. Its enactment is considered as China's responsive measure to the anti-extradition protests in Hong Kong and other political fallouts. Professor Ma Ngok argues that since HKNSL was only announced an hour before it came into effect and was drafted without prior consultations with Hong Kong, it is considered as a violation of the Basic Law by the Hong Kong Bar Association. In addition, HKNSL also led the U.S. to pass Hong Kong’s Human Rights and Democracy Act as well as enforce sanctions upon China and individuals responsible for the law and other human rights violations. As such, Professor Ma Ngok contends that HKNSL should be analyzed within the wider framework of intensifying U.S.-China competition.     Hong Kong people were shocked by the sudden enactment of the Hong Kong National Security Law (HKNSL) by China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) in May-June 2020. HKNSL signaled Beijing’s hard line against the opposition movement and protests in Hong Kong. Throughout the two months since the law’s enactment, Hong Kong’s image as a free city has taken a severe blow. The HKNSL promptly drove the United States government to announce the end of “One Country, Two Sys-tems” for Hong Kong, impose sanctions on China and Hong Kong officials, and pursue other punitive moves amidst a period of heightened Sino-U.S. tensions.  HKNSL can be seen as Beijing’s response to the months of anti-extradition protests in Hong Kong since June 2019, and its various political fallouts. In the beginning, the protests were directed against a bill that would allow criminal suspects residing in Hong Kong to be extradited to areas outside Hong Kong for trial, including mainland China. Critics saw the proposed law as a threat to the autonomy and human rights in Hong Kong, as many Hong Kong residents do not have strong confidence in mainland China’s legal due process and rights protection. After the two million-people demonstrations in June 2019, the movement escalated into more violent crashes which were met with a forceful crackdown by the Hong Kong police. Protesters initiated a wide range of actions including peaceful protests, strikes, blocking traffic, and attacks on pro-government shops and police stations. Throughout the seven months of clashes in 2019, the Hong Kong police made more than 9,000 arrests, from which 2,000 were charged with various offences. HKNSL was seen as a drastic move by Beijing to circumvent the normal legislative procedures in Hong Kong. It was met by accusations of violating the “One Country Two Sys-tems” principle and risked foreign sanctions. Two developments during the 2019 protests were crucial for prompting Beijing’s enactment of HKNSL. In 2019, Hong Kong politicians and activists lobbied extensively overseas for sanctions on China and Hong Kong, placing pressure on the U.S. Congress and government to pass the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act. The Act would enable the U.S. government to cancel Hong Kong’s special trade status if it considers that the autonomy and freedom of Hong Kong are under threat to the extent that the “One Country, Two Sys-tems” is no longer being upheld. The U.S. government may also sanction individuals responsible for damaging Hong Kong’s human rights. The Act was passed by the U.S. Congress and signed by President Trump in November 2019. Hong Kong activists also lobbied for other western countries to follow the U.S. example by enacting Magnitsky-Act-like legislations to sanction people who offend human rights in Hong Kong. The other trend that alarmed Beijing was the rising support for pro-independence or self-determination ideas in Hong Kong. Anti-China or “localist” sentiments had been on the rise in Hong Kong since 2008, especially among the younger generation. After the 2014 Umbrella Movement failed to bring about full democracy in Hong Kong, residents had been disillusioned by the lack of democratic progress and tighter control from Beijing. They came to believe that Hong Kong would not enjoy true freedom and democracy under Chinese sovereignty. When “Liberate Hong Kong; Revolution of Our Times(光復香港, 時代革命),” a slogan coined by independentist Edward Leung, was used by many as a battle cry during the 2019 movement, Beijing saw the Anti-Extradition protests as a separatist movement. It is believed that Beijing made the decision about HKNSL in the Fourth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in October 2019, whose legislative process is suspected to have been delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Before the enactment of HKNSL there were no laws in Hong Kong to forbid international lobbying against China or Hong Kong, nor ban separatist ideas or actions. Article 23 of the Basic Law stipulates that the Hong Kong government should enact laws on its own to prohibit treason, secession, sedition, subversion, theft of state secrets, and prohibit foreign political organizations from conducting political activities in Hong Kong. In 2003, the Hong Kong government proposed a National Security Bill, but was forced to withdraw it after 500,000 people took to the streets to protest the Bill. By 2019, Hong Kong still had not enacted laws under Article 23, which Beijing saw as a major “constitutional loophole.”  HKNSL came as a shock for various reasons. Many in Hong Kong had believed that while Beijing was unhappy about the aforementioned “loophole,” the National Security Law would be enacted through Hong Kong’s legislative process as stipulated in the Basic Law. In contrast, the law was drafted in Beijing and within the national legislature, without prior consultations with Hong Kong. The contents of the law were decided by the NPC Standing Committee, and the provisions were disclosed on June 30, 2020, one hour before it came into effect. The Hong Kong Bar Association identified this as a violation of the Basic Law. The provisions of the HKNSL are harsh and all-encompassing. The law generally seeks to forbid four categories of offences: (a) secession; (b) subversion; (c) terrorist activities; (d) collusion with foreign government or external elements. Anybody who organizes, plans, commits or participates in acts that are related to these offences, either with or without violence, and those who incite, advocate or provide financial support to these acts can be found guilty. “Principal offenders” can be sent to jail for no less than 10 years, up to life imprisonment. The law is deemed applicable to non-Hong Kong people and to acts outside Hong Kong (Article 58). A Committee for Safeguarding National Security would be set up in Hong Kong, together with an Office for Safeguarding National Security staffed by mainland officials, which will be responsible for supervising the implementation of the law, investigation and intelligence. The decisions by the Committee are not subject to judicial review in Hong Kong. A group of designated judges, appointed by the Hong Kong Chief Executive, will handle the court cases related to national security. If deemed necessary, trials for national security cases can be without a jury, be closed to the public and the media, and the suspect can be denied bail. Article 55 rules that if the case is too complex, involving foreign elements and there is an imminent threat to national security, the mainland judiciary can take over the case. The writing of HKNSL has a clear eye on the 2019 protests and opposition movements from that period. The “Collusion” section criminalizes those who “request” or “conspire with” a foreign country, institution, organization or individual to impose sanctions on Hong Kong or China. Violent street actions, strikes, the blocking of roads, rail tracks and public transport, which are protest repertoires from 2019, can all be charged under “terrorist activities,” and are punishable by long jail sentences. Filibusters by legislators or attacks on government buildings (e.g. police stations) can be charged under “subversion” since Article 22 (3) and (4) ban acts that “seriously interfering in, disrupting, or undermining the performance of duties and functions” of the Chinese and Hong Kong governments. Mainland officials will come to directly oversee national security matters, and it seems that when a case enters the realm of national security, the defendants can be denied basic legal rights usually enjoyed by individuals under the common law sys-tem. Beijing may have underestimated the international responses to HKNSL. The anti-extradition protests since June 2019 have aroused a lot of western attention to and sympathy for Hong Kong. Amidst heightened Sino-U.S. rivalry, the Hong Kong issue has become an important item on the bilateral negotiation agenda. U.S. attitude to China has taken a sharp turn in recent years. The U.S. government increasingly views China as an economic rival and as a powerful autocratic country that threatens global democracy and freedom. Sympathizing with Hong Kong’s anti-extradition protests, and with the pressure to adopt sanctions that would deter China from further damaging Hong Kong’s freedom, the U.S. government expedited the passing of the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in November 2019. The COVID-19 pandemic further aggravated Sino-U.S. relations, and heightened hostile sentiments of other western and non-western countries towards China. Support for Hong Kong in its battle against China became a bipartisan consensus in U.S. The imposition of HKNSL by the NPC led the U.S. to adopt sanctions against China and Hong Kong. The passing of HKNSL also received condemnation and expressions of concern from Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and others. The U.S. Congress swiftly passed a new Hong Kong Autonomy Act, which was signed into law on July 14 by President Trump. The official position of the U.S. government is that due to HKNSL, Hong Kong has lost its freedom and autonomy to merit a special trade status different from that of China. Therefore, with HKNSL, trade restrictions on China can also be imposed on Hong Kong. In August, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Department announced that goods from Hong Kong could no longer bear the label “Made in Hong Kong,” but should use “Made in China” instead. On August 7, the U.S. announced sanctions on 11 officials from China and Hong Kong, including Chief Executive Carrie Lam, for their roles in the enactment of HKNSL and involvement in human rights violations in Hong Kong during the previous last year. Other western countries have not yet followed the U.S. footsteps in adopting sanctions. Their immediate response was to stop extradition agreements with Hong Kong (including Canada, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, Finland and the U.S.). The United Kingdom and other countries made policy changes that would facilitate Hong Kong people to migrate to or seek political refuge in their state. The United Kingdom (U.K.) government saw HKNSL as a breach of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, and declared that an estimated 2.9 million Hong Kong residents born before 1997 and are eligible for the British National Overseas (BNO) passport, would be allowed to reside and work in the United Kingdom for up to five years, and then convert to a full citizenship a year later. The Chinese and Hong Kong governments have emphasized that HKNSL targets only a small number of separatists, terrorists, or foreign collaborators, and that the “One Country, Two Sys-tems” principle and related freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong people would not be affected. Yet the damages and negative image created by the law far exceed this. Political groups such as Demosisto, a young group led by Joshua Wong, and some other pro-independence groups, dissolved themselves after the enactment of the law. Activist and former legislator Nathan Law, who partook actively in international lobbying, left Hong Kong for London to continue his lobbying work. Politically sensitive books were pulled from shelves of libraries and bookstores. During the two months after the enactment of HKNSL, the number of arrests has not been as extensive as many had feared. On July 1, ten protesters were arrested under HKNSL, mostly for chanting slogans or showing placards related to independence. On July 29, four members of a pro-independence student group, which had disbanded itself on July 1, were arrested for sharing a pro-independence declaration on the internet. Some pro-independence activists, who had fled Hong Kong by July 1, were placed on the wanted list. The most eye-catching arrests took place on August 10, two days after the U.S. announced sanctions on China and Hong Kong officials. Media tycoon Jimmy Lai, whose newspaper Apple Daily has been a most important and popular pro-democracy paper in Hong Kong, was arrested together with his two sons and associates. The photo showing 200 police officers searching the Apple Daily premise did irreparable damage to the image of press freedom in Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s reputation as a free city had taken a severe blow since the 2019 protests, and HKNSL has only exacerbated the problem.   Conclusion Hong Kong has walked itself into the mega-chess game of Sino-U.S. rivalry within a renewed Cold War setup. Since 2019, activists and protesters in Hong Kong thought they needed to raise the stakes of confrontation with Beijing by demanding for western sanctions, looking to extract concessions from China and force political change. The hard-line response from Beijing, including HKNSL, quickly escalated the stakes. The freedom and autonomy in Hong Kong would become an important chip in the Sino-U.S. diplomacy for some time to come. It is still too early to see the full impacts of HKNSL on the freedom and civil society development in Hong Kong. With its broad coverage, vague wordings and heavy penalty, HKNSL hangs as a Sword of Damocles over most dissidents and civil society groups in Hong Kong even without an extensive application. Western pressure and possible sanctions are able to temporarily constrain the law’s extensiveness and harshness. The maintenance of the freedom and autonomy of Hong Kong is taking on much complicated dimensions, embedded in the bigger picture of new Sino-U.S. confrontations.■     ■ Ma Ngok is Associate Professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. His research interest includes Hong Kong Government and Politics, Democratization, Parties and Elections, and social movements. He has published seven books and more than 20 journal articles on Hong Kong politics. His most recent work includes The Umbrella Movement: Civil Resistance and Contentious Space in Hong Kong Amsterdam University Press.   ■담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구원               문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 209)  |  [email protected]   [EAI이슈브리핑]은 국내외 주요 사안에 대해 다양한 분야의 전문가들이 심층적인 분석을 통해 의견을 개진하고 정책적 제언을 발표할 수 있는 담론의 장을 마련하고자 기획된 시리즈입니다. 인용할 때에는 반드시 출처를 밝혀주시기 바랍니다. EAI는 어떠한 정파적 이해와도 무관한 독립 연구기관입니다. EAI가 발행하는 보고서와 저널 및 단행본에 실린 주장과 의견은 EAI와는 무관하며 오로지 저자 개인의 견해임을 밝힙니다.

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} Editor's Note South Korea sets an example for countries undergoing democratic transition, particularly in terms of the transition from military rule to democracy. In this issue briefing, Prof. Nam Kyu Kim examines several factors that made the military retreat from politics and enabled the country to achieve democracy with little risk of authoritarian reversal. Prof. Kim argues that along with the massive pro-democracy movement from below, democratic transition in the country was made possible because of the military’s concession on democratization through bargaining and negotiations, with little incentive for the military to intervene in politics. In this respect, Prof. Kim concluded that searching the ways to incentivize the military to accept the popular demand for democratization is key to successful transition to democracy.     For more than a quarter of the century from 1960 to 1987, South Korea was under the rule of two military dictatorships. When faced with massive pro-democracy movements in 1987, however, the militaries returned peacefully to their barracks and remained in the military domain. Since then, South Korea has become a consolidated democracy that faces little risk of authoritarian reversal. South Korea’s experience of democratic transition provides useful lessons for other transitional democracies. In particular, South Korea’s successful transition from the military rule provides great insight for overcoming what Huntington called “the praetorian problem”[1]— one of the most critical problems plaguing many fledgling democracies. This essay briefly discusses why the South Korean military decided to retreat from politics and what factors prevented the military from intervening in politics following democratization.   Importance of Establishing Civilian Control Democratic accountability requires that elected officials exercise effective governing power without challenges from non-elected authorities. However, newly-established democratic regimes often remain susceptible to military intervention. The military, as a permanent part of the state apparatus, protects the state from internal and external adversaries and thus has privileged access to coercive resources. The military’s special position within the state enables it to contest policies promoted by elected officials and even overthrow democratically-elected governments. Therefore, curtailing the military’s political power and privileges as well as establishing civilian control are critical to successful democratic consolidation. However, these measures are particularly difficult for young democracies transitioning from military rule. Establishing civilian control in these democracies requires two steps. Firstly, the military must withdraw from politics. Secondly, the democracy must institute civilian control that eliminates the military’s reserved domains, establishes the civilian government’s ability to monitor and control military officers, and familiarizes officers with military professionalism and democratic norms. Without the second step, young democracies remain vulnerable to military interventions and coups, as illustrated in countries such as Honduras, Pakistan, and Thailand. Militaries may again intervene in politics when they feel their interests are threatened or believe that their entry into politics is necessary to stabilize the country. Many political science studies demonstrate that democracies established after military dictatorships are much less likely to survive than those transitioning from civilian dictatorships. A recent empirical study shows that a democracy preceded by a military dictatorship is about 50 percent more likely to break down than a democracy preceded by a civilian dictatorship or a monarchy.   Why Concession to Democratic Reforms? South Korea’s democratic transition was driven by pressure from below through the mobilization of the masses rather than by the ruling elites. Although the elite bargaining between military rulers, including President Chun Doo-hwan and his chosen successor, Roh Tae-woo, and opposition leaders, including Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, ushered in direct presidential elections, mass movements for democracy were the ultimate reason for compelling ruling elites into negotiations. These culminated in constitutional reforms that introduced the 1987 presidential and 1998 legislative elections. Bottom-up demands for democracy continued throughout the term of President Chun who suffered from a persistent legitimacy crisis due to both the manner of his entry into power and the Kwangju Massacre in the spring of 1980. In 1987, which was the final year of President Chun’s seven-year presidential term, mass protests in South Korea demanding for direct presidential elections and democratic reform were at their height, posing a significant threat to Chun’s military regime. Faced with such pro-democracy protests, the military regime decided to accept democratic reform rather than to repress the protests. Several factors led the military regime to arrive at this decision. First of all, one of the most important reasons why the ruling elites decided to withhold harsh suppression measures and instead yield to democratization was due to the characteristics of the pro-democracy movement. The movement for democracy was a broad-based and cross-class coalition involving middle class people, workers, students, and church leaders, and had mainly adopted nonviolent tactics after 1987. Nonviolent protests tend to reduce the cost of participation, easing the collective action problem, and have a broad appeal across various societal groups. Therefore, these protests, which are perceived as less threatening, are able to mobilize a larger number of citizens and are more likely to facilitate negotiation with authoritarian elites compared to violent protests. Along with the previous experience of the Kwangju tragedy and pressure from the United States, the cross-class and nonviolent nature of the democracy movement made it difficult for the regime to respond with violent repression. Even inside the regime where hard-liners and soft-liners tended to disagree, hard-liners found repressive options too costly to adopt. Another important reason for the military regime’s decision to agree to democratization was the military ruling elites’ expectation that their positions and interests would not be threatened by the democratic rule that would follow. Their certainty was based on three structural factors. Firstly, economic conditions were favorable to ruling elites when democratic transition was underway. Economic growth rates were 12.6% in 1986 and 12.3% in 1987 respectively. The two military regimes, including that of the predecessor Park Chung-hee, had successful economic records. The successful economic records of past military regimes helped to convince the Chun regime that their military would be able to retain public support even in the case of democratization, and hence contributed to the smooth transition to democracy. Secondly, military dictatorships’ ruling strategies also led to reduced concerns about democracy. Unlike military dictatorships in Latin America, the military did not directly rule as an institution. Under the ‘quasi-civilianized’ rule, the military exercised indirect influence, and only members of the dominant Hanahoe faction were the ones to truly reap the benefits of military rule. Moreover, unlike other military regimes in Pakistan and Indonesia, the military was prohibited from operating enterprises and owning business assets. This lack of perks meant that the majority of military officers who remained in the barracks were not incentivized to strongly defend the military rule in the face of massive protests. At the same time, the ruling and legitimation strategies of the Chun government played an important role. President Chun Doo-hwan allowed multiparty elections for the legislature, though elections were neither free nor fair. President Chun removed all appointed legislative seats under the previous Yushin sys-tem established by his predecessor President Park Chung Hee. Like his predecessor Park, President Chun established a political party called “Democratic Justice Party (DJP)”, upon which he relied to mobilize mass support and hold legislative elections. Because of these strategies, the military regime was left with a strong political party that possessed organizational resources and networks. The ruling party’s institutional strength and its confidence helped to prepare for democratic elections. Given that a split in the opposition bloc was also likely to occur because of the coordination failure between the two Kims from the democratic force, military elites anticipated that they might be able to stay in power even after democratization. Lastly, the security environment in the Korean Peninsula provided an important structural context for the military’s decision to retreat from politics without worrying about the loss of their power. Due to South Korea’s hostile relations with North Korea, armed forces did not need to worry about their organizational resources and autonomy being significantly undermined. As a result, the regime was assured that South Korea’s substantial and ongoing security need would prevent the next regime from cutting the national military expenditure.   Why Did the Military not Intervene again? Taken together, bottom-up pressure from the pro-democracy movement and the ruling elites’ strategic calculation brought about democratic transition via negotiation. This transition mode allows military elites to negotiate their withdrawal with the relatively high level of leverage. In the first democratic presidential election held in 1987, Roh Tae-woo was elected, as the two Kims participated in the election and split the opposition votes. President Roh placed officers with close ties to him in key positions in both the government and the military, and did not undertake any major military reform, although he weakened the pro-Chun group in the Hanahoe faction. Military elites remained politically powerful and satisfied during the early years of democratization. Unlike many transitional democracies that often experience economic crises and political instability, the Roh regime inherited a strong economy and was spared any insurmountable political crisis. These economic and political conditions enabled a smooth transition to democracy without triggering military interventions. Combined with citizens’ strong support for democracy, this smooth transition paved the way for the establishment of civilian control. Citizens were satisfied with democracy and strongly supported these reforms, while public criticism over military elites’ continued influence increased. This allowed the next President, Kim Young-sam, to undertake the massive purges on the Hanahoe faction. As the first democratically-elected civilian President following the Yushin sys-tem, President Kim enjoyed the high level of popular support, which further protected the democratic regime against any potential opposition that might arise from the military. President Kim also exploited divisions within the military. Non-Hanahoe officers supported the purges and the prosecution of politically-influential officers, which hindered Hanahoe faction officers from resisting the military reform.  In conclusion, South Korea sets an example for countries undergoing democratic transition, particularly in terms of successfully overcoming legacies of the military rule. The South Korean case clearly demonstrates the importance of a strong civil society in driving democratic transition and consolidation. Strong social movements initiated democratic transition and promoted democratic consolidation. At the same time, the South Korean case highlights the importance of both the legacy from the previous authoritarian regimes and the negotiated transition to democracy. These factors allow South Korea to successfully achieve democratic transition and consolidation without any major setback. In the end, searching the ways to incentivize the military to accept the popular demand for democratization is critical for successful transition from the military rule to democracy.■     ■ Nam Kyu Kim is an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University. His research interests include the politics of authoritarian regimes, civil-military relations, democratization, and the interaction between domestic politics and international relations. His work has appeared in Comparative Political Studies, Democratization, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, Political Research Quarterly, and others. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Michigan, and previously taught at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and Sungkyunkwan University, before moving to his current post in 2020.   ■담당 및 편집: 이은지 EAI 연구원               문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) / [email protected]     [EAI이슈브리핑]은 국내외 주요 사안에 대해 다양한 분야의 전문가들이 심층적인 분석을 통해 의견을 개진하고 정책적 제언을 발표할 수 있는 담론의 장을 마련하고자 기획된 시리즈입니다. 인용할 때에는 반드시 출처를 밝혀주시기 바랍니다. EAI는 어떠한 정파적 이해와도 무관한 독립 연구기관입니다. EAI가 발행하는 보고서와 저널 및 단행본에 실린 주장과 의견은 EAI와는 무관하며 오로지 저자 개인의 견해임을 밝힙니다.