EAI는 아시아 지역의 민주적 거버넌스와 인권 증진에 관련된 연구를 진행하기 위해 2013년 11월 아시아민주주의연구네트워크(Asia Democracy Research Network: ADRN)를 발족했다. EAI는 국내 싱크탱크의 대표기관인 동시에 아시아 지역 싱크탱크의 직능대표로서 소속된 연구기관들의 민주주의 관련 연구지원 및 관리를 담당하고 있다.

ADRN은 아시아 지역이 직면한 민주주의 위협 요인을 분석하고 민주주의 전환 및 공고화에 기여할 수 있는 실무형 연구과제를 논의하고 확산하고자 창립되었다. ADRN은 연구에 기반한 정책 제시를 목표로 아시아 민주주의의 위협 요소와 당면과제를 점검하고 지역적 차원에서 바라보는 민주주의 발전을 위한 실천적 의제를 발굴하고 연구하고 있다. 네트워크에는 한국의 EAI를 비롯하여 대만, 말레이시아, 몽골, 미얀마, 방글라데시, 스리랑카, 인도, 인도네시아, 일본, 태국, 파키스탄, 필리핀 등 아시아 14개국 22개의 주요 싱크탱크들이 참여하고 있다. 

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[ADRN Working Paper] South Korea’s COVID-19 Pandemic Policy Optimization between Health and Economy

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} Editor’s note Ranking 8th among participating countries for Bloomberg’s Covid Resilience Ranking, South Korea has been relatively successful in combating the COVID-19 pandemic. How have countries like South Korea effectively handled the pandemic, while some failed to do so? Jung Kim, Assistant Professor at the University of North Korean Studies, explores what factors are important in pandemic policy optimization. In responding to national crises, policymakers face trade-offs between health and the economy – should policies prioritize lives or livelihoods? He claims that contrary to common thought that social capital is the most decisive factor in national policy performance, social risk is actually more decisive during a time of crisis politics such as a pandemic. That is, the higher the level of social risk, the more likely the government will be able to facilitate large-scale collective action that induces voluntary civic compliance with government Nonpharmaceutical Interventions (NPI) policies. He further explains why some countries have succeeded in their response against the pandemic while some failed through a statistical analysis of the determinants of COVID-19 pandemic policy.     ※ 아래는 일부 내용을 발췌한 것입니다. 전문은 상단의 첨부파일을 확인하시길 바랍니다.   Introduction[1]   How have policymakers and citizens responded to the COVID-19 pandemic policy trade-off between health and the economy? Why have some nations succeeded in minimizing the trade-off between protecting lives and protecting livelihoods, but not others? Why and how has South Korea outperformed most other advanced democracies in dealing with the trade-off?[2] Building on a growing literature that analyzes the trade-off between health and the economy  in designing and implementing national COVID-19 policy responses (Desierto and Koyama 2020; Cheibub, Hong, and Przeworski 2020; Ginsburg and Versteeg 2020), this study attempts to answer the above questions examining the case of South Korea with comparative perspective. This research argues that contra conventional wisdom that social capital is the explanans of variation of national pandemic policy performances, social risk is much more important to facilitate large-scale collective action, which is the political foundation of voluntary civic compliance with government non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) policy recommendation and ultimately successful pandemic policy optimization between health and the economy.  A simple theoretical framework of pandemic policy optimization will be introduced in the next section. The third describes a quarterly comparison of national policy responses across OECD countries in 2020. The following section provides statistical cross-country analyses on the determinants of pandemic policy optimization over time. ■     [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second part will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project. [2] This study answers the first and second questions and leaves the third one to next round of this research project.     Jung Kim is currently an Assistant Professor at the University of North Korean Studies, South Korea. He teaches courses on International Relations in East Asia and Political Economy of the Two Koreas, among others. Prior to this, from 2009-2015, he was a Lecturer at the Underwood International College and Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University. During this time, Mr. Kim was also a Chief Researcher at The East Asia Institute. He pursued his Bachelors and Masters in Political Science at Korea University and went on to pursue his Ph.D. at Yale University. His research interests include Comparative Politics and International Relations in East Asia.   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장 문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

Jung Kim 2021-03-30조회 : 9608
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[ADRN Working Paper] Japan`s COVID Responses: Democratic Measures but Weak Transparency

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} Editor’s note An observation of national responses to the COVID-19 pandemic among Asian countries shows that countries that have implemented democratic processes for pandemic policies have been more successful in handling the pandemic. Japan’s measures against the COVID-19 pandemic, undeniably, conformed to democratic processes and refrained from imposing extreme restrictions on civic liberties. Nonetheless, Japan’s pandemic policy, unlike that of South Korea and Taiwan, yielded limited success. Maiko Ichihara, associate professor at Hitotsubashi University, posits that the Japanese government failed to earn the trust of the public as not only were there inconsistencies among pandemic policies, but there were also no clear indications on the scientific grounds on which the policies were drafted. Additionally, contradictions among press conferences held by government officials and the lack of a single entity responsible for the dissemination of information at the government-level further weakened the public’s faith in the government. Such ambiguity, in fact, has not been limited to the government’s countermeasures to COVID-19, but has long been a prevalent issue. In this regard, the author underscores the pressing need for increased government transparency and accountability.       ※ 아래는 일부 내용을 발췌한 것입니다. 전문은 상단의 첨부파일을 확인하시길 바랍니다.   Introduction[1]   In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, Asia experienced the most prominent decline in liberal democracy of any region in the world. With extreme restrictions on freedom of movement through strict lockdown measures, repression of media freedom under the guise of combatting fake news and cracking down on criticism of the government, the decline of liberal democracy that we have observed over the past fifteen years has accelerated rapidly. Among Asian countries, the crisis of democracy is most pronounced in South and Southeast Asia,[2] while the Northeast Asian region has remained relatively stable. South Korea and Taiwan, in particular, have gained international respect for their democratic COVID-19 measures. The South Korean government implemented a COVID tracing sys-tem that, while not entirely problem-free, recognizes privacy rights and became a model for combatting COVID-19 as a democracy. In the case of Taiwan, there has been a strengthening rather than a decline of democracy, with increased cooperation between the civic tech community and the government. In terms of damage caused by the pandemic, there is a difference between the democratic countries in the subregions of Northeast Asia and Southeast/South Asia. India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, countries that have sought to contain COVID-19 by undermining democracy (by, for instance, enacting anti-fake-news laws to restrict media freedom and making examples of lockdown violators through inhumane treatment), have the highest number of COVID-19 cases in Asia. By contrast, Taiwan and South Korea, which implemented democratic COVID-19 control measures, succeeded in restraining the pandemic to a significant degree. This observation suggests that the degree of compliance with democratic processes may be correlated with the effectiveness of COVID-19 countermeasures. Such seems to be the case in other parts of the world as well: while countries with populist political leaders such as the United States, Brazil, and India have the highest number of COVID-19 cases, democracies with non-populist political leaders and high levels of trust in government such as Australia, Finland, Norway, and New Zealand have controlled the pandemic successfully.[3] Looking at Northeast Asia, it can be said that that Japan, like South Korea and Taiwan, is a democracy where populism is relatively well contained. However, unlike Taiwan and South Korea, Japan has not been internationally recognized for its COVID-19 response. This is because although Japan’s COVID countermeasures are relatively democratic, the government has not won the trust of the public due to the lack of transparency in the information distributed. ■     [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second part will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project. [2] Joshua Kurtlantzick, “Addressing the Effect of COVID-19 on Democracy in South and Southeast Asia," Council on Foreign Relations Discussion Paper (November 2020). https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/dpkurlantzick-front-and-back-cover_final_0.pdf [3] Sebastian Strangio, “The Riddle of COVID-19 and Democracy in Southeast Asia,” The Diplomat (September 22, 2020). https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/the-riddle-of-covid-19-and-democracy-in-southeast-asia/?fbclid=IwAR0uA86wbYLmgE7M8fPY1Gby-QlTXsH9asILdq0NscsNQOizLm4K9t0EF2Y; Joshua Keating, “The Pandemic Threatened Global Democracy. Instead, It's Strengthened It,” SLATE (October 30, 2020). https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/10/covid-democracy-threat-stronger.html?fbclid=IwAR0uA86wbYLmgE7M8fPY1Gby-QlTXsH9asILdq0NscsNQOizLm4K9t0EF2Y; Robin Niblett and Leslie Vinjamuri, “Op-Ed: Why Democracies Do Better at Surviving Pandemics,” Los Angeles Times (May 26, 2020). https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-05-26/democracies-autocracies-coronavirus-pandemic-response?fbclid=IwAR3YNw2SI6roSixTbPSRxI7UM1ji8lY2UxAWbs_EZJZsxq56emO8MjQ_xsI     Maiko Ichihara is an Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Law at Hitotsubashi University, Japan, and a Visiting Scholar in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She is also a co-chair of the Democracy for the Future project at the Japan Center for International Exchange. Throughout her career, she has undertaken research on international relations, democracy support, and Japanese foreign policy. Her recent publications include: “Universality to Plurality? Values in Japanese Foreign Policy,” in Yoichi Funabashi and G. John Ikenberry, eds., The Crisis of Liberalism: Japan and the International Order (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020); and Japan’s International Democracy Assistance as Soft Power: Neoclassical Realist Analysis (New York and London: Routledge, 2017).   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장 문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

Maiko Ichihara 2021-03-30조회 : 9346
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[ADRN Working Paper] Global Pandemic: Challenges and Opportunities for Democracy in Mongolia

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:1.6em;} Editor’s note Mongolia effectively manifested its capacity to swiftly respond to the COVID-19 pandemic as early as January 2020 by closing its Chinese borders. However, it has now become evident that the public bestows little faith in the government’s decision to transition the society into the “total readiness stage.” On one hand, measures taken by the Mongolian government during the COVID-19 pandemic abided by the principles of democratic governance and protected civil rights and freedom. However, the rather abrupt transition, along with the dissemination of inconsistent information and unclear regulations on day-to-day activities were more than enough to cast doubt upon the efficacy of the government. In this regard, Ariunbayar Bazarvaani, the CEO of The Academy of Political Education, and Bumdari Dagva-Ochir, Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science of the National University of Mongolia, explore the factors that led to overall public distrust on the government and its capacity to set appropriate measures. Their results show that the Mongolian government’s responses, while adhering to democratic principles, were economically flawed and detrimental to the state budget. The transition into the “total readiness stage” also infringed on human rights. In addition, while the government’s regulations on media were an attempt to control fake news, it may have stifled the media and the freedom of expression.     ※ 아래는 일부 내용을 발췌한 것입니다. 전문은 상단의 첨부파일을 확인하시길 바랍니다.   Introduction[1]   As countries around the world have begun to implement their own risk management policies, the World Health Organization (WHO) has declared COVID-19, the new infectious disease, a pandemic. According to article 11.2 and 11.3.3 of the Law on Disaster Protection, issued by the State Emergency Committee (SEC) on February 13, 2020, the “high level of readiness” against COVID-19 was partially initiated in Mongolia. This resolution was pursuant to Article 4, Resolution No. 62 of the February 12, 2020 Resolution of Government of Mongolia. [2]  The Law on Disaster Protection identifies and specifies the measures for three levels of readiness to combat the coronavirus: everyday level of readiness, high level of readiness and all-out level or readiness. In Mongolia, the first verified community transmission case was announced on November 11 and as suggested by the SEC, the government shifted country to the “Total Readiness Stage” on November 12. However, there was a strong sense of uncertainty and mistrust in Mongolian society regarding the transition to the “total readiness stage.” The Mongolian government declared the country to be at this level as the first week was filled with panic, with all decision changed daily and discrepancies in the information source. Mongolian citizens also became frustrated with the economic situation of businesses and individuals and the lack of clarity on how to regulate day-to-day activities. However, the ten months of high alert regulations set by the SEC did not yield substantive results. Therefore, this research aims to study the factors that contributed to the social atmosphere that doubts the viability of government and their ability make appropriate recommendations. The main goals of the research are the following: - To determine whether Mongolia has a political risk management sys-tem - To identify positive effects of quarantine on governance (the ability to differentiate between populist politicians and whether democratic governance can be more efficient in correcting decisions and information) - To identify Psycho-social features that are caused by quarantine and government decisions and their implementations (Psycho-social refers to the interrelationship of social factors and individual attitudes, thoughts, and behaviors). ■     [1] Throughout the year, ADRN members will publish a total of three versions of the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Asia Research to include any changes and updates in order to present timely information. The first and second part will be publicized as a working paper and the third will be publicized as a special report. This working paper is part I of the research project. [2] ‘Disaster Protection Law’, Law of Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar city, https://www.legalinfo.mn/law/details/12458?Lawid=12458; ‘On transfer to the ready rate’, Article 4, Number 62, Resolution of the government of Mongolia, https://www.legalinfo.mn/law/details/15081?Lawid=15081.     Bazarvaani Ariunbayar is the CEO of the Academy of Political Education and the project manager of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Mongolia. He holds a Master of Arts in Political Science, Graduate School of Arts and Science, National University of Mongolia.   Dagva-Ochir Bumdari is an associate professor at the Department of Political Science of the National University of Mongolia. She was awarded a doctoral degree by Kokushikan University in 2013.   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장 문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

Bazarvaani Ariunbayar & Dagva-Ochir Bumdari 2021-03-30조회 : 23469
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[ADRN Issue Briefing] No Better Way to Promote Human Rights and Peace on the Korean Peninsula? Propaganda Leaflet Dropping and the South Korean Government’s Leafleting Ban

[Editor’s note] Anti-North Korea leaflets that are flown across the inter-Korean border to North Korea have consistently been a topic of controversy. While South Korean activists deem the practice crucial for promoting human rights in North Korea, North Korea has vocally criticized the act in fear that the leaflets could delegitimize its regime. Following a series of psychological warfare acts of propaganda leaflet dropping, the South Korean National Assembly passed a bill prohibiting the act of sending anti-North Korea leaflets. This was done in hopes of alleviating rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula and inducing North Korea into opening up for more dialogue and contact among the two Koreas. However, Youngsoo Yu, professor at the University of North Korean Studies, provides commentary critical of the government’s decision, claiming that the government has not only acted against the principles and values shared by the international community, but was also mistaken in prioritizing political purposes over the defense of human rights. Additionally, South Korea has not taken the appropriate measures to improve human rights conditions in North Korea. Moving forward, he claims that it is crucial for South Korea to work together with the international community and revamp its strategies to promote greater engagement with the hermit kingdom.   1. An old problem in a new context   Late last year, the South Korean National Assembly passed a bill prohibiting the act of flying anti-North Korea leaflets across the inter-Korean border. The legislation, which came amid months of domestic controversy over seeking peace through “disgraceful submission” to the North, now brought strong criticism from the international community that the ban could undermine the right to freedom of expression in South Korea and the North Korean people’s right to know. Propaganda leaflet dropping, together with loudspeaker and radio broadcasts, has been used by both South and North Korea since the Korean War as a means of psychological warfare. In the past, particularly during the Cold War, the two Koreas put considerable effort into propaganda activities toward each other for the purpose of advocating the superiority of their own sys-tem and even overthrowing the opposing regime.  In 2000, when the first, historic inter-Korean summit took place, loudspeaker broadcasts ceased and it was agreed at the subsequent lower-level negotiations to stop the exchange of antagonistic words. Hence, propaganda leaflet dropping by the South Korean government ended and the magnitude and frequency of North Korean leafleting was seriously reduced. Loudspeaker broadcasts have repeatedly stopped and resumed since 2000. Propaganda leaflets, however, continued to be sent toward North Korea. Civic groups including North Korean defector organizations and Christian activist organizations began to send not only propaganda leaflets but also rice, dollar bills, movies and TV shows on USB drives, and Bibles. According to the statistics provided by the Ministry of Unification, from 2008 to mid-2020 leaflet balloons were sent more than 100 times by civic groups, attempting to drop about 20,000,000 leaflets in total. The North Korean authorities are extremely sensitive about propaganda leaflets because the leaflets contain criticism of their leader and information that they want to withhold from their people. The North Korean authorities have demanded that the ROK government keep civic groups from sending leaflets if it wants to improve inter-Korean relations. Sending leaflets has led to clashes between the two Koreas. In October 2014, North Korean border troops fired at balloons from South Korea prompting the South Koreans to return fire, which was enough to startle border residents into applying for a court injunction to halt leafleting. In June 2020, Kim Yo-Jong, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un, threatened military action over the leaflets and subsequently carried out her threat by blowing up the inter-Korean liaison office. The responses of the South Korean public diverged: one side asserted that peace and safety should be prioritized, while the other argued that North Korea’s deed was egregious and it was the North that had ruined the peace. What was worse, safety concerns, human rights issues, and anti-North Korea sentiment were all mixed up.   2. What did the ROK government do wrong exactly?   First, the ROK government has not done as much as it could to avoid violating the principles and values shared by the international community. As an advanced democracy, South Korea, both the government and the people, should have appreciated how much effort and sacrifice have been made for humanity to achieve the current level of respect and protection of fundamental human rights, including the right to freedom of expression, and carefully considered the concerns of the international community. A government cannot be too careful when attempting to restrict the right to freedom of expression, including for reasons of protection of national security and respect of the rights or reputations of others. The ROK government should not have decided to halt the leafleting based solely on its own judgment. It should have consulted with the international community, that is, international organizations, domestic and external human rights experts, and other governments if necessary in the spirit of international human rights cooperation. Second, the ROK government can hardly escape the accusation that it has switched its human rights policies for political purposes. Whereas it had once made clear that “there were no legal grounds for stopping the launches (of leaflets), out of respect for the Constitutional value of freedom of expression,” the ROK government, now only six years later, defends the leaflet ban on the grounds that “freedom of expression is not absolute and can be limited.” How could a constitutional democratic government reverse its decision on the Constitutional value of the freedom to leaflet so easily? The earlier decision may have turned out to be wrong, or circumstances may have changed, of course. But nonetheless, the ROK government, as a continuous constitutional government, should have provided a persuasive explanation as to why it had to reconsider and overturn the previous decision and articulated principles and standards to guide future decisions. Third, the ROK government has not taken steady steps to promote human rights in North Korea. This has caused misgivings among the international community, misunderstanding among its own people, and disregard from Pyongyang about its commitment to human rights promotion in North Korea, including the North Korean people’s right to know. In 2019 and 2020, the ROK government declined to co-sponsor the North Korea Human Rights Resolution submitted to the United Nations General Assembly’s Third Committee despite putting its name on the list of co-sponsoring countries for 11 years from 2008 to 2018. Earlier in 2003, 2005, and 2007 the ROK government abstained or did not participate in votes at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the Assembly’s Third Committee. When looking at the inconsistent behavior of the ROK government, foreign observers feel that it is ignoring human rights violations committed by the North Korean authorities, while some South Korean people believe that their human rights policies toward the North ought invariably to be subject to political considerations, and North Korean authorities may have the impression that they have the ROK government in their palm.   3. What does the ROK government intend to do?   With all the criticism, the ROK government wants to ban leafleting by civic groups. Why? The safety of border residents is not the only reason. The ROK government is anxious to attract Pyongyang to the negotiation table and ultimately bind North Korea to a path of engagement in the hope that human rights in North Korea will improve as the two Koreas build peace and prosperity on the basis of reconciliation and cooperation. Once North Korea opens up, there will be comprehensive development projects in North Korea pursued by the South, neighboring countries and more. In addition, human rights projects as well as humanitarian assistance for the North Korean people will be made easier while peace will be strengthened within North Korea as well as between the two Koreas. All of these will contribute to the promotion of civil and political rights in North Korea. This idea of making progress through increasing contact and cooperation and creating appropriate conditions was briefly but clearly introduced in the “Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea” submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Council. The Commission Of Inquiry report recommends that “people-to-people dialogue and contact” should be increased and strengthened in as many sectors and ways as possible, specifically highlighting culture, science, sports, and business. The report further lists exchanges of young people, women’s groups, professional organizations, and development of sister city relationships. Favorable conditions for planning overall development, including in the realm of human rights, will follow the “re-establishment of transport and communication links” between the Koreas and increased opportunities for North Korean people “to exchange information and be exposed to experiences outside their home country.” According to the logic of the ROK government, this will lead to improvements in not only the North Korean people’s right to know but their other rights as well. Academic research adds value to the grand design of the ROK government. Studies conducted over the last twenty years suggest that political changes for human rights improvement, or socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices, can be achieved through the work of transnational human rights networks of both domestic and international actors who promote shared values, principled ideas, and norms. North Korean domestic groups who are well aware of international norms and standards and able to envision and pursue political, social, and economic development of their own country, and are willing to work with the international community, can play a crucial role in the sustainable long-term advancement of human rights. Thus, it is essential to help create and develop such domestic groups in North Korea through engagement and cooperation.   4. What should be done going forward?   As the ROK government itself emphasizes, it is the North Korean authorities and people who can make a change. It is important to help them understand the values, ideas and norms shared by international society. It is not force but rather persuasion that will guide them to where human rights are respected and protected. Without South Korea’s commitment to international human rights norms, however, its bright ideas and plans may collapse like a house built on sand. There can be no concessions or compromise on basic principles because North Korea must be guided to follow the principles. Thus, the ROK government has to make its commitment clear and strong, formulate and implement consistent human rights policies in inter-Korean relations as well as in international society, and work with the international community to advance human rights in North Korea. States, international organizations, and civil society organizations in the international community should engage in opening up the country in a more practical manner. They are responsible for not only addressing human rights violations but also assisting states in building their own capacity to protect the human rights of their own people. They also share the task of providing opportunities for North Koreans to know about the outer world and for more people to know about the human rights situation in North Korea. In doing so, the international community will come to clearly understand the situations, problems, and remedies for North Korean human rights and be ready to work out a comprehensive plan for development, peace, and human rights on the Korean Peninsula. It is not the time to continue the controversy over the old-fashioned propaganda leaflets and the undue criminalization of leafleting. Rather, we must now discuss and articulate strategies for engaging North Korea anew. All of the stakeholders have to go back to fundamentals. South Korean civic groups should work with the international community to cleverly promote the right of North Koreans to know. The ROK government should try to persuade civic groups and domestic constituencies and reach a consensus. The international community needs to pay more attention to the actual life of North Koreans, help them overcome the present difficulties, and move forward for a better future. ■     Youngsoo Yu is an Assistant Professor in International Politics and Security at the University of North Korean Studies (UNKS). He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Binghamton University. He is an active analyst on issues surrounding human rights violations whose works have been published in leading academic journals including the Journal of International and Area Studies, Journal of East and West Studies, and the Korean Journal of International Studies. His most recent articles include The 2019 Hong Kong Protests and (Re)actions of the Chinese Government, Flashpoints that do not Ignite? Nonviolence and the 2016-2017 South Korean Impeachment Protest and Implementing the Networked Approach: Regional Human Rights Education in Asia and Sustainable Social Infrastructures.   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장 문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

Youngsoo Yu 2021-03-18조회 : 12179
논평이슈브리핑
[ADRN Issue Briefing] Strengthening the presidency, weakening democracy: A brief analysis of the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka

[Editor’s note] The enactment of the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka (20A), a reversal of its precedent 19A at large, is a worrisome development hinting at the potential demise of democratic values. The new constitution bolsters the power of the executive president while undermining the power of all other institutions, virtually tearing down the sys-tem of checks and balances. Verité Research, a Sri Lankan ADRN member, outlines how the enactment of 20A marks a backtracking for Sri Lanka in its road towards democracy. It asserts that not only has 20A repealed the efforts of 19A to democratize and depoliticize governance, but has also obscured the transparency of the government and eliminated its accountability.   On 22 October 2020, the Twentieth Amendment (20A) to the Constitution of Sri Lanka was enacted.[1] The 20A reversed much of the reforms introduced by the preceding Nineteenth Amendment (19A) to the Constitution, with the primary effect of the 20A being the consolidation of power in the office of the executive president. This article explores the 20A and is divided into two main sections. Firstly, it will briefly set out the background to the passage of the 20A. Second, the features of the 20A will be discussed in respect of their implications on governance and the constitution.   I. Background to the passage of the 20A The passage of the 19A: Yahapalanaya on the rise The 19A was passed in April 2015 by the then Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) - United National Party (UNP) coalition government (Yahapalanaya government).[2] The 19A sought to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment (18A), which was notable for hyper-strengthening the office of the executive president and removing key checks and balances.[3] The 19A introduced several reforms to the constitution, with the expectations of democratising and depoliticising governance.[4] Some of these reforms included: re-introducing the Constitutional Council (CC) to approve the president’s appointments and removals of high-ranking officials and members of independent commissions; restricting the immunity of the president by allowing Fundamental Rights applications to be filed against decisions of the president; and limiting the number of cabinet ministers that can be appointed and the number of ministerial portfolios that can be held by the president.[5] The undoing of the 19A: Yahapalanaya in disarray The Yahapalanaya coalition soon began to disintegrate, as reports of disagreements between the former President Maithripala Sirisena led-SLFP faction and the former Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe led-UNP faction began to regularly surface.[6] These disagreements culminated in the 2018 ‘constitutional coup’, where President Sirisena sought to remove Prime Minister Wickramasinghe from the post of prime minister and prematurely dissolve parliament.[7] This plunged Sri Lanka into a two-month long constitutional impasse, where the 19A was sharply criticised as having created an unworkable governance structure.[8] In April 2019, a serious lapse in national security resulted in the Easter Sunday Attacks. Many opponents of the 19A attributed this set back to inherent issues in the 19A.[9] In particular, the reduced powers of the president under the 19A were pointed out as having compromised national security, bringing security concerns to the forefront of political discourse.[10]   The mandate to repeal the 19A: 2019 presidential election and 2020 general election In this background, Sri Lanka held its presidential election on 16 November 2020. The main contender was the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) candidate Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who served as defence secretary during his brother, Mahinda Rajapaksa’s tenure as president. Gotabaya Rajapaksa ran on the ticket of strengthening national security and stabilising the economy, which he intended on achieving by repealing the 19A.[11] At the election, Rajapaksa secured a clear mandate, having obtained 52.25% of the popular vote and approximately 1.3 million more votes than the next contender; Sajith Premadasa of the Samagi Jana Balawegaya.[12] Immediately after Rajapaksa’s victory, politicians called for fresh parliamentary elections to enable the SLPP to secure a two-thirds majority in parliament to enable the repeal of the 19A.[13] As the COVID-19 pandemic further crippled the economy, the calls to repeal the 19A and create a strong executive who can stabilize the economic and security interests were amplified. These political trends and shifts dominated the media and significantly shaped public discourse on governance.[14] At the parliamentary elections held on 05 August 2020, the Rajapaksa led political alliance secured more than 150 of the 225 seats, thereby obtaining a two-thirds majority.[15] Soon thereafter, repeal of the 19A was called for, and the newly appointed cabinet of ministers appointed a committee to draft a Bill to repeal the 19A.[16]    The replacing of the 19A and passage of the 20A The 20A Bill was published in the Gazette on 28 August 2020 and was subsequently challenged in the Supreme Court.[17] On 20 October 2020, the Speaker formally conveyed to parliament that the Supreme Court had determined that the 20A Bill could be passed by a two-third majority, except for four clauses that required further approval at a referendum.[18] The 20A Bill was debated in parliament on 21 and 22 October 2020. Notably, the final Bill presented to parliament did not contain the four clauses that required approval by a referendum, as determined by the Supreme Court. Despite the opposition vehemently opposing the 20A Bill, a total of 156 parliamentarians voted in favour of the 20A Bill, thereby passing the 20A and effectively replacing the 19A.[19]   II. Features of the 20A and their implications   The 20A has far reaching implications on the constitution and governance of Sri Lanka. The implications of the 20A will be explored in light of six aspects of the constitution: 1) the executive president; 2) the Parliamentary Council; 3) the cabinet of ministers; 4) the parliament; 5) the judiciary; and 6) independent commissions.   The Executive President It is evident that bolstering the office of the executive president was the predominant feature of the 20A. Four key features are analysed in respect of their implications on the executive presidency.   The power to appoint and remove high-ranking officials and independent commissions Under the 20A, the president is required to seek the observations of the Parliamentary Council (PC) before appointing high-ranking officials[20]  and the members of independent commissions.[21] However, the president is not bound by the observations of the PC. Thus, the president is effectively vested with complete discretion when making appointments. This is in contrast to the 19A, where the CC’s approval was necessary before the president could make such appointments. The 20A also vests the president with the power to remove high-ranking officials and members of independent commissions where the constitution or other law does not set a procedure for removal.[22] These offices and commissions embody key institutions, whose independence is vital for democratic governance. Under the 20A, the president has full control in determining the holders and composition of these offices, effectively granting the president the ability to influence several key aspects of governance. Consequently, the independence of these institutions is undermined, and can result in public confidence in these institutions being eroded.   The power to assign ministerial portfolios to himself The 20A also allows the president to ‘assign to himself any subject or function and shall remain in charge of any subject or function not assigned to any Minister’.[23] Thus, the president can assign any ministerial subjects or functions to himself and be vested with extraordinary control over state affairs. Such disproportionate strengthening of a single institution undermines the sys-tem of checks and balances in government. This ability of the president to control key ministerial subjects and functions and drive policy decisions at his discretion also undermines the collective independence of the cabinet of ministers. Under the 19A, by contrast, the president did not possess the power to assign ministerial functions and subjects to himself.[24]    The power to dissolve parliament after two and a half years The 20A grants the president the power to dissolve parliament after the lapse of two and half years after its first sitting.[25] By doing so, the president can prematurely call for fresh elections in a bid to secure a more favourable parliamentary composition, which will support his agenda. Such circumstances can significantly undermine the independence and integrity of parliament. Under the 19A, the president had the discretion to dissolve parliament only upon the lapse of four and a half years since its first sitting.[26]   The power to remove the prime minister Sri Lanka’s parliament follows the traditions of the Westminster model, which recognises the prime minister as a key official in conducting parliamentary business on behalf of the government. Under the 20A, the president has the power to unilaterally remove the prime minister from office.[27] This unrestricted power of the president to remove the prime minister severely weakens the independence of the prime minister and, by extension, the integrity of parliament. Consequently, the role of parliament in serving as a check against the president and the executive arm of government is seriously undermined. Under the 19A, the prime minister was removed from office by his resignation or if he ceases to be a member of parliament (MP).[28]   The Parliamentary Council (PC) The PC was introduced to replace the CC. The CC functioned as a check on the discretion of the president by approving appointments/removals made by the president in order to safeguard the independence of government and democratic institutions.[29] The CC was composed of ten members, three of whom were ‘independent members’.[30] The PC, on the other hand, could only make “observations” in respect of the decisions of the president, and the president is not duty bound to comply with the observations of the PC.[31] Accordingly, the president’s discretion in appointing and removing high ranking officers and members of commissions is virtually unrestricted under the 20A. Further, the PC comprises of five MPs.[32]   The Cabinet of Ministers In addition to the president’s ability to assign any subject or function to himself without any limitation, the following change introduced by the 20A has the effect of making the cabinet of ministers further subservient to the president:   The president determines the composition of Cabinet at his discretion The 20A empowers the president to appoint MPs to be cabinet ministers in consultation  with the prime minister only where the president ‘considers such consultation to be necessary’.[33] In effect, the president has full discretion in determining the cabinet of ministers. Thus, cabinet ministers would appear to hold their portfolios at the pleasure of the president, thereby undermining its ability to function independently. The position under the 19A was that the president was obliged to seek the advice of the prime minister when determining and making changes to the composition of the cabinet of ministers.[34]   The Parliament Apart from the power of dissolution of parliament, two further amendments introduced by the 20A have implications on the accountability of parliament:   The passing of ‘urgent’ Bills without public scrutiny The passing of ‘urgent’ Bills without the opportunity for the public to challenge it in the Supreme Court was abolished by the 19A. However, the 20A re-introduced the process to pass such ‘urgent’ Bills. ‘Urgent’ Bills on matters relating to i) national security and ii) disaster management can be directly referred to the Supreme Court for determination within 24 hours (which may be extended by the president for a period not exceeding 72 hours).[35] Thus, laws on the above matters can be passed by parliament, without the public getting an opportunity to voice their concerns regarding the constitutional implications of such laws.   Reduction of minimum period of prior publication of Bills When a Bill is placed on the Order Paper of parliament, the public is given a period of seven days to petition the Supreme Court to challenge its constitutionality.[36] Under the 19A, a Bill was required to be published in the Gazette at least 14 days before it is placed on the Order Paper.[37] The effect of this is that the public would have at least 21 days to petition the Supreme Court.[38] However, the 20A requires that a Bill be published in the Gazette only seven (07) days prior to it being placed on the Order Paper.[39] This amendment effectively reduced the time granted to the public to scrutinize the Bill and petition the Supreme Court from 21 days to 14 days, restricting the already limited time frame available to the public to meaningfully challenge a Bill.   The Judiciary In addition to the unfettered presidential power over judicial appointments to superior courts, two other aspects of the 20A have further implications on the independence of the judiciary:   Changes to the composition of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) The JSC has the constitutional mandate of determining policy in respect of the administration, transfers, promotion and disciplinary action of judicial officers of the lower courts and courts of first instance.[40] Under the 19A, the Chief Justice and the two most senior judges of the Supreme Court constituted the JSC.[41] Thus, the composition of the JSC was pre-determined and could not be directly influenced by the president. Under the 20A, the president directly appoints the other two judges of the JSC at his sole discretion.[42] Therefore, the president can directly affect the composition of the JSC, and thereby influence judicial policy in respect of judicial officers. This has the potential to seriously undermine the independence of the judiciary.   Increasing the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal benches The 20A Bill that was published in the Gazette and reviewed by the Supreme Court did not propose amendments to the composition of apex courts of Sri Lanka. However, as a last-minute committee stage amendment, it was proposed that the bench of the Supreme Court be increased from 10 to 16 judges and the bench of the Court of Appeal be increased from 11 to 19 judges.[43] This amendment was passed along with the 20A. During parliamentary debates, the government claimed it was ‘strengthening’ the capacity of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal through this amendment.[44] However, the appointment of the new judges will now be carried out unilaterally by the president under the 20A. Appointing such a high number of new judges to the apex courts at the discretion of the president can have far-reaching implication in terms of the independence of the judiciary.   Independent Commissions The 20A vests the president with the authority to appoint members of the independent commissions at his sole discretion. Thus, the independence of these commissions is undoubtedly compromised. However, the 20A sought to undermine several of the independent commissions even further.   Abolishing the National Procurement Commission (NProC) and the Audit Service Commission (ASC) The NProC and the ASC were established by the 19A. The NProC had a mandate to formulate procedures and guidelines for all government procurement and to monitor and report on the public procurements.[45] The ASC was empowered to make independent rules and policies in respect of the administration, transfer, promotions, and disciplinary matters of the audit service of Sri Lanka.[46] Both these commissions were established to enhance public accountability and transparency. Nevertheless, both the NProC and the ASC were abolished by the 20A.[47]   Reducing the mandate of the National Police Commission (NPC) Under the 19A, the NPC was to function as an independent body in charge of the administration of the police service. Thus, the NPC was vested with the authority to determine the appointment, transfer, promotion, dismissal, and disciplinary control of police officers. However, under the 20A, the NPC’s mandate was reduced to merely hearing complaints from the public against police officers. Thus, the police service no longer functions under the oversight of an independent commission.   Conclusion   The above analysis demonstrates how the principal outcome of the 20A was to elevate the office of the executive president to a position of immense power. The 20A achieved this outcome by undermining the independence of other institutions and weakening the sys-tem of checks and balances. Consequently, the separation of powers in the Constitution of Sri Lanka and, by extension, the accountability and transparency of government has been significantly diminished by the 20A. These consequences of the 20A can potentially whittle down democratic values and pave the way for espousal of authoritarian practices in Sri Lanka. ■     [1] Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution, certified on 29 October 2020, [hereinafter ‘20A Act’]. [2] Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution, certified on 15 May 2015, [hereinafter ‘19A Act’]. [3] Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, certified on 09 September 2010. [4] See, Gehan Gunatilleke and Nishan de Mel, The Wins, the Losses and the In-betweens (Verité Research June 2015), at https://www.veriteresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Verit%C3%A9-Research_19th-Amendment-The-Wins-the-Losses-and-the-In-betweens-1.pdf [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [5] Other reforms introduced by the 19A included restricting the discretion of the president to dissolve parliament, abolishing the passage of ‘urgent’ Bills without the opportunity for public scrutiny, and establishing independent institutions to regulate and promote transparency in government procurement and public auditing. [6] Hilmy Ahamed, ‘The Farce that is Yahapalayana: Two years on and failing’, Daily FT, 13 January 2017, at http://www.ft.lk/article/591099/The-farce-that-is-Yahapalanaya--Two-years-on-and-failing [last accessed 11 January 2021]; ‘Sri Lanka’s Transition to Nowhere’, International Crisis Group, Asia Report N 286, 16 May 2017, at https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/286-sri-lanka-s-transition-nowhere [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [7] ‘Sri Lankan president suspends parliament after firing prime minister’, Reuters, 27 October 2018, at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-politics/sri-lankan-president-suspends-parliament-after-firing-prime-minister-idUSKCN1N107E [last accessed 11 January 2021; Website of Manthri.lk, ‘Extracts from the Parliamentary Hansard concerning the No-confidence motion presented in Parliament on the 14th of November 2018’, at http://www.manthri.lk/en/blog/posts/extracts-from-the-parliamentary-hansard-concerning-the-no-confidence-motion-presented-in-parliament-on-the-14th-of-november-2018 [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [8] A seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court unanimously declared that these actions by President Sirisena were unconstitutional. See Rajavarothiam Sampanthan v. The Attorney General, S.C. (F.R.) No. 351/2018, (Supreme Court of Sri Lanka), Judgement delivered on 13 December 2018, at http://www.supremecourt.lk/images/documents/sc_fr_351_2018.pdf [last accessed 11 January 2021] [9] ‘Sirisena demands repealing of 19th Amendment, blames it for political instability’, The Times of India, 23 June 2019, at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/sirisena-demands-repealing-of-19th-amendment-blames-it-for-political-instability/articleshow/69914507.cms [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [10] ‘19A jeopardized national security – PM Rajapaksa’, Ceylon Today, 22 October 2020, at https://ceylontoday.lk/news/19a-jeopardised-national-security-pm-rajapaksa [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [11] Website of the Office of the President, ‘Vistas of Prosperity and Splendor’ (Official Presidential Manifesto of Gotabhaya Rajapaksa), at https://www.presidentsoffice.gov.lk/wp-content/uploads/2019/16/Gotabaya_Manifesto_English.pdf [last accessed 11 January 2021] p. 09. [12] Website of the Election Commission of Sri Lanka, Presidential Election – 2019 Results, at https://elections.gov.lk/web/wp-content/uploads/election-results/presidential-elections/pre2019/PRE_2019_All_Island_Result.pdf [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [13] ‘We are studying 19th Amendment to plan immediate plan of action: Mahinda Rajapaksa’, Lanka Business Online, 17 November 2019, at https://www.lankabusinessonline.com/we-are-studying-19th-amendment-to-plan-immediate-programme-of-action-mahinda-rajapaksa/ [last accessed 11 January 2021]; ‘We need a strong parliament to discard the 19th amendment: President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’, Newsfirst.lk, 29 December 2019, at https://www.newsfirst.lk/2019/12/29/we-need-a-strong-parliament-to-discard-the-19th-amendment-president-gotabaya-rajapaksa/ [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [14] Verité Research, ‘19A in reverse gear’, (23 August 2020), 10 (34) The Media Analysis [last accessed 11 January 2021]; Verité Research, ‘20A: Legitimacy in the balance’, (4 October 2020) 10 (39) The Media Analysis [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [15] Website of the Elections Commission of Sri Lanka, Parliamentary Elections Results 2020, at http://elections.gov.lk/en/elections/PE_RESULTS_2020_E.html [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [16] ‘Government to table 20th amendment by mid-September’, Newswire, 14 August 2020, at http://www.newswire.lk/2020/08/14/government-to-table-20th-amendment-by-mid-september/ [last accessed 11 January 2021]; ‘Education Minister levels criticism over 19th Amendment, says Easter Genocide was its outcome’, LankaNewsWeb, 23 August 2020, https://www.lankanewsweb.net/67-general-news/67142-Education-Minister-levels-criticism-over-19th-Amendment-says-Easter-Genocide-was-its-outcome [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [17] In re The Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka, S.C (S.D.) 01/2020, (Supreme Court of Sri Lanka) at http://www.supremecourt.lk/images/documents/sc_sd_01_39_2020.pdf [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [18] ibid. [19] Website of Manthri.lk, ‘How did MPs vote for the 20th amendment?’, at http://www.manthri.lk/en/blog/posts/how-did-mps-vote-for-the-20th-amendment [last accessed 11 January 2021]. [20] This includes the offices of Chief Justice, President of the Court of Appeal, the judges of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, the Attorney-General, the Auditor-General, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (Ombudsman), the Secretary-General of Parliament, the Inspector General of Police, as well as the members of the Election Commission, the Human Rights Commission, the Public Service Commission, the Bribery Commission, the National Police Commission, the Finance Commission and the Delimitation Commission. [21] Section 6 [Article 41A(1)], 20A Act. [22] Section 6 [Article 41A(10)], 20A Act. The following offices do not have a prescribed procedure for removal from office: the Auditor-General, the Ombudsman, and the Secretary-General of Parliament, and members of the Public Service Commission, the National Police Commission, and the Finance Commission. [23] Section 7 [Article 44(2)], 20A Act. [24] See, Section 9 [Article 44], 19A Act, which does not provide for the president assigning cabinet functions to himself. [25] Section 12 [Article 70(1)(a)], 20A Act. [26] Section 17 [Article 70(1)], 19A Act. [27] Section 7 [Article 47(2)(a)], 20A Act. [28] Section 9 [Article 46(2)], 19A Act. [29] Section 8 [Article 41B (1) and (5)], 19A Act. [30] Section 8 [Article 41A (1)], 19A Act. See also Articles 41A (4) and (5), for criteria for independent members of the Constitution Council. [31] Section 6 [Article 41A (1)], 20A Act. [32] ibid. See also Proviso, for criteria for members of the Parliamentary Council. [33] Section 7 [Article 44(1)], 20A Act. [34] Section 9 [Article 43(2)], 19A Act. [35] Section 26 [Article 122], 20A Act. [36] Article 121, The Constitution 1978. [37] Section 18 [Article 78(1)], 19A Act. [38] The 21 days is computed on the basis of the 14 days between publication in the Gazette and the Bill being placed on the Order Paper, and the 07 days after the Bill is placed on the Order Paper. [39] Section 13 [Article 78(1)], 20A Act. [40] Article 111H, The Constitution 1978. [41] Section 28 [Article 111D (1)], 19A Act. [42] Section 23 [Article 111D (1)], 20A Act. [43] Section 25 [Article 119] and Section 31 [Article 137], 20A Act. [44] ‘Official Report of Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) of 22 October 2020’, https://www.parliament.lk/uploads/documents/hansard/1604463391079193.pdf [last accessed 11 January 2021], pp. 1834-1838. [45] Section 46 [Article 156C], 19A Act. [46] Section 35 [Article 153C], 19A Act [47] Sections 35 and 56, 20A Act.     Verité Research is a private think tank that provides strategic analysis for Asia. Its main research divisions are economics, politics, law and media. This think tank is a member of the Asia Democracy Research network (ADRN).   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장 문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

Verite Research 2021-03-11조회 : 19754
논평이슈브리핑
[ADRN Issue Briefing] A Critical Juncture for American Democracy

[Editor’s note] It has been less than a month since Joe Biden’s inauguration as the 46th president of the United States. The Biden administration has been swift in addressing the remnants of the former Trump era including a steepened economic downturn, exacerbated racial injustice, and the ongoing COVID-19 –pandemic that has cost the lives of almost half-a-million Americans. In response, the new U.S. administration has sought to coordinate against the nation’s most pressing challenges. According to Paul Pierson, John Gross Endowed Chair of the Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley, Biden faces a much deeper challenge than those aforementioned: the political juncture that the U.S. stands over the future of its democracy. Professor Pierson highlights how its institutional features make the U.S. particularly vulnerable to democratic backsliding. By navigating the devolution of the Republican Party and the protracted workings of the country’s political sys-tem, he argues that the U.S. must transform itself politically into an institution better capable of addressing challenges of the 21st century in order to retain its democratic leadership in the world.     Although incumbent American presidents rarely lose, Joe Biden’s defeat of Donald Trump – the only president never to reach a 50% approval rating in national polls – was not really unexpected. What was unexpected was just about everything else that happened in the three tumultuous months that followed. The election itself was closer than polls anticipated, leading to political uncertainty. That uncertainty was heightened by the peculiar American institution of the Electoral College, which made the vote in a few closely-fought states, rather than the overall popular vote, decisive. Republicans also did better than expected in elections to Congress. This left control of the legislature in doubt until January, when Democrats narrowly won the two critical Senate elections held in the state of Georgia. Those Georgia elections took place against the backdrop of Trump’s astonishing and baseless efforts to contest the election. He sought to convince his supporters that his defeat was fraudulent, leading to the frightening spectacle of January 6th. A “stop the steal” protest in Washington, D.C., promoted by Trump and many of his supporters, turned its fury on Congress and stormed the capitol. The insurrection left five people dead. It left anxious observers everywhere wondering what had become of the world’s oldest democracy.   Three Crises in American Democracy   Indeed, anxiety about the American political sys-tem has been building, with observers of American politics expressing growing concern about the prospect of “democratic backsliding” – a gradual erosion of democratic practices like that seen in Hungary, Poland and Turkey. That path might leave in place some of the trappings of electoral politics, but concentrates true authority in the hands of a single party or political figure. Trump himself clearly aspired to be such a figure, but he has lost his hold on power. His successor, Joseph Biden, is an emphatically traditional figure, and has sought to project a calming presence. Yet the events of January 6th made clear that this is no ordinary transition, and it would be naïve to anticipate a return to ordinary politics. With a razor-thin Democratic majority in Congress – one that most analysts project is likely to last only two years – the need for the Biden administration and its allies to turn things around is urgent. Understanding what might come next requires that we understand what has gone wrong. Some of the challenges bedeviling the United States are shared with other wealthy democracies. Like them, the United States has undergone a disruptive transition from an industrial manufacturing economy to a postindustrial knowledge economy. That transition has tilted opportunity and wealth toward those at the very top. It has concentrated growth in a select group of successful cities, while sucking economic vitality out of rural areas and small towns. Like the U.S., many wealthy democracies are experiencing increased immigration.  Growing diversity combines with economic disruption in “left behind” areas to create large pools of voters (mostly white, older, less educated, and disproportionately male) who are open to a racialized right-wing populist politics of grievance.  This is a familiar story, applicable in many countries. Yet three interrelated political crises – of the nation’s right-wing party, of its constitutional design, and of its governance – make the situation in the United States especially dangerous.    1. The transformation of the Republican Party   The first crisis concerns the remarkable transformation of the Republican Party. Over the last two and a half decades, the Republican Party has mutated from a traditional conservative party into an extremist party. It is dismissive of climate change, hostile to both the welfare state and the regulatory state, and fiercely committed to huge tax cuts for the rich and corporations—positions that make it an outlier even among conservative parties in rich democracies. Perhaps even more troubling, the party now displays characteristics of what scholars of comparative politics call an “anti-sys-tem party”—one that seeks to foment tribalism, distort or discredit elections, and subvert political institutions and norms. All in all, its posture increasingly resembles that of far-right parties like Marine Le Pen’s National Rally party in France, rather than conventional center-right parties like the German Christian Democrats or the British Tories. The anti-sys-tem qualities of the contemporary Republican Party flourished under Donald Trump. He and his allies launched attacks on the foundations of democracy—the press, the courts, law enforcement, the political opposition—with virtually no pushback or even complaints from within their party. These norm-exploding stances raised the specter of democratic backsliding of a kind that seemed impossible to imagine in the United States only a few years ago. Yet while Trump gave these anti-democratic and tribalistic expressions new prominence and intensity, it is crucial to recognize that they were less a departure from the recent history of the Republican Party than a hastening of its march down an alarming path. Since at least Newt Gingrich’s House speakership in the 1990s, Republicans in Washington have deployed aggressive strategies designed to disrupt government, delegitimize the party’s opponents, and convince supporters that the alternative to Republican rule was terrifying. Republicans built, became dependent upon, and ultimately lost control to an “outrage machine” built around a formidable right-wing media apparatus and increasingly extreme movement groups like the National Rifle Association and the Christian Right. As the party embraced these efforts, its leading ranks gradually filled with ambitious politicians who accepted this new kind of politics, and recognized the power of the right wing to break them politically if they did not.  Far from vanquishing these forces within the Republican Party, Trump’s defeat seems to have strengthened them. Even after the insurrection of January 6th, a large majority of House Republicans took the astonishing step of voting not to accept the results of several states (and millions of voters) despite the lack of any credible evidence of fraud. Roughly two-thirds of Republican voters say Biden’s victory was illegitimate. With Trump determined to continue exerting influence over the party, there seems to be little appetite among Republican elites to change course. Efforts at compromise are certain to generate reprisals from right-wing media and the party’s electoral base. Given these incentives, there is little reason to anticipate anything other than scorched earth opposition to Biden’s presidency.   2. The Antiquated Constitutional Order   The likelihood that Republicans will oppose Biden tenaciously raises the significance of the second crisis: the nation’s antiquated constitutional order. The increasingly rickety structure of American political institutions contributes both to the worrisome evolution of the Republican Party and to the steadily eroding quality of American governance. Always sluggish, the peculiar structure of American government has left the country more vulnerable to extremism and less and less capable of responding to emerging challenges. One aspect of the problem is an unusually high threshold for passing legislation. National laws must clear four distinct hurdles – approval of the House, the Senate, the President (unless Congress overrides a veto), and acquiescence by the nation’s powerful courts. Each of these hurdles creates a distinct challenge. The difficulties have grown as the two parties are increasingly polarized since no single party is likely to control all four veto points. The result, most of the time, is stalemate – except over small things, or when events absolutely force some kind of cooperative action. The Senate’s “filibuster” rule, which requires most legislation to gain the support of 60 of the 100 senators, makes the problem of gridlock far worse. American institutions have a second worrisome feature: increasingly, they promote minority rule. The U.S. electoral sys-tem rewards parties whose supporters are dispersed across large swaths of sparsely populated territory. As the parties have increasingly polarized along geographic lines – Democrats the urban-based party and Republicans based in rural areas, outer suburbs, and small towns, this institutional bias has favored Republicans. They have been able to flout majority sentiment while sustaining, or even expanding, their political power. In recent House elections, Republicans’ share of congressional seats has exceeded their share of the two-party vote by roughly five percent. The Senate, with its huge bonus for people living in low-population states, is far worse. Republicans have represented a majority of voters in the Senate for only two years in the last twenty, but they have had a majority of senators for half that period. Republicans have also lost the popular vote in seven of the past eight presidential elections – a losing streak without precedent in American history. Yet the archaic Electoral College has twice awarded Republicans the presidency even as they lost the popular vote. It almost did so again in 2020. These “minoritarian” advantages compound. Thanks to the skew of the Senate and the Electoral College, Republican-appointed justices now have a 6-3 majority on the nation’s powerful Supreme Court. In the states, Republicans have taken advantage of a similar rural bias to gain disproportionate power over election laws and increase their edge in the House by drawing favorable Congressional district lines. This Constitutional crisis, in short, has fed the partisan one. It has emboldened the Republican Party even as Republicans have moved rightward, heightening the party’s ambivalence about democracy itself. The concept of majority rule has lost legitimacy in the Republican Party. Trump’s campaign never really tried to gain majority support – counting on the Electoral College’s bias to save him. And Trump’s cries of fraud were just more extreme versions of a steady drumbeat (often with strong racial overtones) within the party claiming that Democrats only win elections because of fraud. There is a direct line from years of these allegations to the “stop the steal” insurrection of January 6th. Rather than recoiling from that horrific event, however, Republicans in many states are using the “controversy” about the election as an excuse to advance proposals to make it more difficult for Democrats, and racial minorities in particular, to cast ballots in future elections.   3. Erosion of the Governing Capacity   The crisis of the Republican Party and American institutions is reinforced by a third, less obvious crisis: a staggering erosion of the nation’s governing capacity. Over the past generation, the ability of the United States to harness governmental authority for broad public purposes has been in steep decline. Polarization and gridlock have shackled government. Moreover, this dwindling capacity has emerged even as the need for effective governance in a complex, interdependent world has grown. It was the United States that triggered the “Great Recession” of 2007-2009 by letting its financial regulations wither. As the dangers of climate change have become obvious the United States has been immobilized; it now leads the world in promoting climate denialism and protecting the fossil fuel industry. Once the unquestioned leader in higher education and the promotion of science, the United States has been steadily falling down the global ranks of educational attainment. Perhaps most revealing, the U.S. stands out among rich democracies in trends in life expectancy – a key measure of broad social prosperity. In relative terms the U.S. has been losing ground to other rich democracies for decades. In recent years, the decline became not just relative but absolute. Driven by a rise in what economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton call “deaths of despair” – suicides, drug overdoses and alcohol abuse – life expectancy has actually fallen in the United States since 2014. And given the very poor performance of American government in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, life expectancy is expected to fall even further. All of these trends have fed on one another, creating a kind of doom-loop of growing extremism, poor governance, and skepticism about American democracy. The Democratic Party certainly deserves some of the blame here: both the Clinton and the Obama administrations did too little to address the dislocations caused by trade or the growing geographic divergence in economic outcomes. But the biggest barrier to serious action has been the Republican Party. Effective governance is elusive not because the problems Americans face are insuperable, but because the Republican Party has radicalized in reaction to economic and social trends and the nation’s aging political institutions are poorly equipped to handle an anti-sys-tem party with broad support. Indeed, Republican leaders from Newt Gingrich to Mitch McConnell have learned that obstructionist tactics that alienate voters from government are good politics. In the absence of competent government, places left behind by economic and cultural change have proved fertile terrain for fear-mongering by right-wing media and, increasingly, Republican campaigns. And as the GOP has alienated the racial and ethnic minorities that make up a growing share of the electorate, it has found itself drawn to strategies that undermine not just effective governance but also representative democracy itself.   Challenging Prospect for American Democracy   President Biden’s election thus represents a critical moment. Given enough time, Democrats might gain the upper hand, and electoral incentives might force Republicans to repudiate their destabilizing course. The Republican Party is deeply unpopular with rising demographic forces in the country. It has turned to a polarizing and increasingly anti-democratic strategy precisely because the groups at the heart of its coalition know that they are in a race against time. South Carolina Senator Lindsay Graham – once a fierce Trump critic but now, like most in the party, a dutiful follower – once warned “we’re not generating enough angry white guys to stay in business for the long term.” Sadly, the United States does not have time to wait, and the forces that have driven the United States into such a perilous state will not be dispersed easily. To its credit, the Biden administration seems to recognize the urgency, and is moving quickly to use the power at its disposal to address many of the challenges just described. Biden has emphasized that his top priorities are to address the pandemic, the economic downturn, climate change, and racial justice. Yet the antiquated American political sys-tem makes serious reform extremely difficult under the best of circumstances, and these are far from the best of circumstances. Biden can anticipate monolithic Republican opposition in Congress and the conservative media. The Senate filibuster will enable Republican senators to block any legislation except a few (albeit important) budgetary measures. Republicans are well aware that relentless legislative obstruction has delivered them political gains in the past. The Democrats’ tiny majority in the Senate also means any disagreement within the party could derail their efforts. Finally, Biden will also face an extremely conservative Supreme Court. Before these judges, even popular and essential reforms passed by any Democratic-controlled Congress would face a highly uncertain fate. These daunting obstacles highlight the precariousness of this moment. The stakes could hardly be higher in what remains the world’s most powerful nation. The United States is at a crossroads. One fork in the road leads to a democratic future, in which the Republican Party must adapt to remain competitive in a multi-racial society, and jettisons its ethno-nationalist appeals for a program that attempts to address the genuine challenges American citizens face. The other fork leads to something like what we have witnessed in Hungary under Victor Orban: further backsliding from democracy, voter suppression, the rigging of electoral districts, harassment of the press, and the use of a partisan judiciary and politicized law enforcement to reward allies and punish enemies. Donald Trump has lost the election, but we likely have not seen the end of his brand of politics. ■     Paul Pierson is the John Gross Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Yale University. He is an active commentator on public affairs, whose writings have appeared in such outlets as The New York Times, The New York Times Magazine, and The Washington Post. He has served on the editorial boards of The American Political Science Review, Perspectives on Politics, and The Annual Review of Political Science. He has also served as Chair of the Berkeley political science department. His research focuses on the fields of American politics and public policy, comparative political economy, and social theory. He is the co-author (with Jacob S. Hacker) of the forthcoming Let Them Eat Tweets: How the Right Rules in an Age of Extreme Inequality. Earlier books include Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer and Abandoned the Middle Class (2010), co-authored by Jacob Hacker, and Politics in Time: History, Institutions and Social Analysis (2004). He also authored Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment (1994), which won the American Political Science Association's 1995 prize for the best book on American national politics, and “Path Dependence, Increasing Returns and the Study of Politics,” which won the APSA’s prize for the best article in the American Political Science Review in 2000, as well as the Aaron Wildavsky Prize in 2011.   담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장 문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I [email protected]  

Paul Pierson 2021-02-18조회 : 11661
논평이슈브리핑
[ADRN Issue Briefing] A Struggle for Democracy in Divided Thailand

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} 편집자 주 Since the early 20th century, Thailand’s democratization has often been hindered by the Monarchy’s authoritarian system and its military coups despite advancements in creating a more inclusive and representative government. In this article, Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, assistant professor at the Institute of Asian Studies at Chulalongkorn University, argues that the 2020 youth-led protests represented a turning point in this struggle, as the movement undermined the legitimacy of the established monarchical government. Utilizing new forms of social organization and media outreach, Sombatapoonsiri outlines how protestors articulated their dissatisfaction with the authority’s suppressive rule and increasing socio-economic disparity, and produced an all-encompassing awareness campaign that is helping to reassert the country’s path towards a more democratic future. By navigating Thailand’s historic fluctuation between democratic advancement and monarchical dominance, Sombatopoonsiri warns that future pro-democracy efforts will be met by a pendulum of royalist sentiment, only deepening the divisions of an already politically polarized citizenry.     There are two Thailands. One is defined by the traditional streak that regards the monarchy as the soul of the nation, and the other is characterized by democratic credentials that highlight the “people” as the priority. The clash between these two political orders is age-old, but the youth-led protests last year brought it to a new level. The battleground is both on the streets and on screen.   Polarization-cum-autocratization Thailand’s polarization is underpinned by elite power struggle and bifurcated populace mobilized to support two political orders: royal nationalism and democracy. The struggle dates back to the early 20th century when a group of young bureaucrats introduced the notion of popular sovereignty and replaced Thailand’s then absolute monarchy with constitutional monarchy. However, this democratic aspiration has been short-lived as the military-monarchy nexus resurged to dominate the country’s political landscape, setting the stage for endless military coups and repeated episodes of authoritarianism. In 1973, students-led movements precipitated a democratic breakthrough, only to be reversed in 1976. The spell of authoritarian rule was briefly broken in 1992, following a popular uprising that damaged the credibility of the military and introduced the 1997 constitution that is considered as the most democratic of its kind. Nonetheless, this change did little to challenge the royal nationalist ideology. Meanwhile, royalist elites occupied “reserve domains,” or bastions of nondemocratic political power, that allowed them to constrain an elected government’s control over the passage, implementation, and enforcement of its own policies. This dominance of elite networks was challenged from 2001 onwards, setting the scene for democratic breakdown and polarization. The media tycoon-turned politician, Thaksin Shinawatra, founded the Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) that won a landslide victory in the 2001 elections. This was mainly because its platform responded to Thailand’s socio-economic transformations which had been occurring since the 1980s, creating a new clientele for welfare-driven policies. For the economically marginalized population, these policies were seen as a source of not merely social mobility but also social dignity. TRT supporters based their ideational premise on a new sense of being Thai citizens granted with equal rights, rather than regarding them as subjects under royal tutelage. The royalist establishment, however, viewed this tendency as a threat. Not only did Thaksin’s fast-growing popularity begin to rival that of the king but also TRT’s efforts to promote social mobility challenged the hierarchical worldview of Thailand’s establishment, which negates the notion of social equity. In defense of the old world, the palace, army, the courts and allied businesses coalesced to undermine new political forces, which resulted in hardening the anti-establishment sentiment. This ideational conflict also prompted the shift from the elites’ power struggle to the confrontation between popular supporters of the two political visions, plunging Thailand deep into a spiral of toxic polarization. While TRT supporters and pro-democracy activists formed the “red shirt” movement in countering what they deemed as an elite onslaught of electoral democracy, royalist nationalists rallied behind the pro-establishment “yellow shirt” movement to protect national pillars from what they considered as “parliamentarian tyranny.” Red and yellow shirts engaged in the tit-for-tat disruptive demonstrations that at times brought Thailand to a standstill by ousting governments representing their respective antagonists in 2005, 2008, 2009-2010 and 2013-2014. Notably, the outcome of red shirts’ street politics was often decided on the ballot which at times brought to power its favorable party. In contrast, yellow shirts’ mass protests usually set the stage for a judicial intervention or military coup that sought to dismantle red shirts’ power base. It is this relationship between antidemocratic institutional actors such as the Constitution Court and the armed forces, on the one hand, and mass movements, on the other, that broke down Thailand’s democracy and set the country on an autocratic path in 2006 and between 2014 and 2019.   2020 Anti-establishment Movement: Drivers and Characteristics Upon its seizure of power in 2014, the military promised to bring “happiness” to Thailand by restoring order and bringing about reconciliation. Behind the rhetoric, however, was the frantic suppression of dissent and the rearrangement of power dynamics that would concentrate wealth and power to the elites and their allies. Over the course of five-year military rule, cases of human rights violation skyrocketed; corruption and abuse of power were rampant; governance was poor; and income gap between the rich and the poor was unprecedentedly widened. Despite growing criticisms, the regime frequently sustained its rule partly by claiming that its various policies were to defend the imperiled monarchy. As the latter’s political capital remains high in Thai society, this excuse has worked effectively to attract public support and deter the opposition—that is until it has ultimately reached a certain point. The revolt from July to December 2020 signifies this turning point: a crisis of royal legitimacy. Several factors drive the resurgent anti-establishment movement that morphed from the protest against the junta to public defiance of royal power. First, military rule has entrenched the unchecked power of the palace and related institutional actors at the expense of eroding the rule of law. In fact, laws have increasingly been weaponized to quell dissent, and the privileged elites have the ability to uphold their impunity. Second, this development—together with rising economic inequality—has generated widespread grievances and public discussions regarding the role of the monarchy in alleviating citizens’ suffering. While the late King Bhumibhol carried the moral image of royal sacrifices for many Thais, such cannot always be the case in the current reign. This growing reluctance contributes to diluting systemic legitimacy of royal nationalism. Third, thanks to rapid economic and technological changes, Thailand’s younger generation increasingly feels alienated from the old order that the junta represents. In contrast to the youngsters’ socially progressive, politically democratic and culturally open-minded traits, the old guards promote traditional values, top-down rule and nationalism. Ongoing repression and dwindling freedom of expression suffocate the Thai youth. Meanwhile, inequality conducive to the lack of opportunities shapes the dimmed prospect among the youngsters that they will not have a bright future in Thailand. Protest slogans such as “it has to end in our generation” (hai man chob tee run rao) epitomizes this pessimism that if changes do not arrive soon, young people’s future will be doomed. Under these circumstances, two events triggered the 2020 mass mobilization. The first was the dissolution of the Future Forward Party (FFP). The FFP is a good example of a pro-democracy force that fell victim not only to Thailand’s autocratic spell but also to enduring polarization. The party embodies the anti-establishment camp, but is considered to be more vocal than the TRT in terms of its democratic agenda. At times the royalists portray the FFP as advocating for republicanism. But for the younger generation, the FFP reminds them that a better future for Thailand is possible. As such the party attracted 6.3 million votes, out of around 53 million voters in the March 2019 election. Through the constitutional manipulation, the military-backed Palang Pracharat Party (PPP) gained the majority of votes, thus currently leading the ruling coalition. Despite this, the establishment and its supporters feel increasingly threatened by the youthful force the FFP has unleashed. In February 2020, the Constitutional Court disbanded the FFP for obscure reasons, sparking initial student protests across more than 50 university campuses and schools. The second trigger event was the forced disappearance of an exile activist, Wanchalerm Saksatsit, in July 2020. Wanchalerm sought refuge in Cambodia after the 2014 putsch. His anti-establishment activism included online criticisms of the junta and the palace, which led many to suspect a high profile involvement in his disappearance. Soon after the news broke out, social media campaigns called to #abolish112 (the 112 Article being the law punishing offenses of the monarchy). Small gatherings calling for the investigation into the Wanchalerm case escalated into a larger political movement that later demanded not only the resignation of General Prayuth Chan-ocha, the 2014 coup leader and current Prime Minister, but also a democratic amendment to the constitution, especially the abolition of the unelected senate, as well as the reform of deeply politicized monarchy in line with constitutional monarchy. As of December 2020, there have been almost 500 protest events organized across Thailand. Key characteristics of the protests are threefold. First, in terms of organization, these are “networked protests” based on loose coordination between different organizations. Initially led by university students, scattered protests subsequently evolved into the broad-based movement, known as Khana Ratsadorn (People’s Party), comprising for instance high school and university student clubs, labor unions, artists and LGBTQI movements. While sharing the aforementioned goals and co-organizing major protest events, members of the Khana Ratsadorn remained autonomous in holding their own protests at convenient sites and addressing specific grievances. Second, social media has played a vital role in the mobilization. Particularly Twitter hashtags have been created to publicize protest events (e.g. #TagYourFriendsToJoinMob) and fundraise; galvanize ideas for ‘hip’ and ‘cool’ protest activities (e.g. #IdeasForMob); mobilize crowds to the police station or the court in the face of arbitrary arrest of activists; and draw international attention to the protests (e.g. #WhatsInHappeningInThailand). Lastly, witty slogans and the use of urban pop culture distinguish the style of ongoing protests from previous pro- and anti-establishment demonstrations. Protesters’ self-made banners are satirical critiques of ruling elites. Many events were inspired by, for example, a popular Japanese manga, the fiction-turned film Harry Potter and a Thai comedy film. Through these novel protests, many onlookers and international media paid attention to protesters’ demands.   “The Elephant in the Room” and Politicized Polarization By resisting autocracy, protesters addressed the “elephant in the room,” which is the place of the monarchy in democratic politics. This bold move can be traced back to a string digital dissent that sent shockwaves due to its transgression of the taboo. In 2019, Twitter users criticized royal privileges in events such as a road blockade by the royal motorcade (e.g. # RoyalMotorcade) and the shutdown of an island due to a royal visit (e.g. #IslandsShutdown). However, amidst the first wave of student protests in early 2020, the most controversial and viral Twitter hashtag was #whydoweneedaking?, which was repeated 1.2 million times in 24 hours, and trended on Twitter on March 22, 2020. Taking things up a notch, a prominent dissent and exile launched the Facebook Page ironically dubbed “Royalist Marketplace” in which gossips and scandalous images of the royal family were shared among millions of page members. This style of hashtags and online “gossip” continued in offline protests in the form of self-made protest banners that mocked the royal lifestyle outside Thailand, royal discourses, the cultural façade of Thai loyalty to the monarchy, and many other royalist practices. This pushing of the cultural boundary reached the peak in early August when a leading activist delivered a speech demanding a democratic reform of the monarchy. The event was a breakthrough for it inspired protest speeches that openly discussed royal power in Thai politics, a traditionally taboo subject that could potentially place offenders in jail for 15 years or more. While public discussions regarding the monarchy are needed for Thailand’s democratic resurgence, what is deemed as popular contempt toward the sacred institution has provoked reactions from both the elite establishment and royalist citizens, thereby inevitably opening old wounds of polarization. For a long while, royalist groups such as the Rubbish Collection Organization allegedly monitored, reported and at times harassed offenders of the monarchy. In the face of the 2020 revolt, pro-establishment groups diversified their tactics by engaging in online disinformation campaigns. Ultimately the battleground is Twitter where the Thai elites struggle to censor criticisms of the monarchy. In September 2020, hashtags as well as posts favorable to the establishment and unfavorable to protesters were generated and retweeted. According to an expert investigation, tens and thousands of these accounts were inauthentic, behaving like bots. However, many royalists claimed that their accounts were genuine and they were the “silent power.”  Regardless of being created by bots or humans, royalist hashtags such as #WeLoveTheMonarchy gained traction and became Twitter trending superseding anti-establishment hashtags on October 20, 2020. A nascent digital royalist group called “Youngsters Love the Monarchy” (Anuchon rak sathaban kasat) went so far as to organize an online training for royalist Twitter users to improve their hashtagging skills. In parallel with this online contestation, pro-establishment supporters took to the streets and in a few incidents clashed with anti-establishment protesters. There were concerns that the apparently acute conflict between the two sides would again pave the way for military intervention. Here is the paradox for Thailand’s ongoing struggle for democracy that reflects the complex relationship between polarization and autocratization. By openly addressing the royal power—a once taboo subject—the anti-establishment movement has explicitly pointed to one of the root causes of Thailand’s entrenched autocracy which needs to be reformed for the sake of long-term democratization.  Yet in doing so, the movement has also contributed to the further accumulation of royalist support for the palace due to the divisive and polarized nature of the issue. One can argue that hardcore royalist groups described above gained critical traction after protest speeches about the monarchy became more open and regular than before. But at the same time, avoiding open discussions on the royal power is counterproductive to democratic sustainability. Is there a way to address the “elephant in the room” without creating a chance for antidemocratic elites to politicize polarization? This could be a question awaiting all of us in 2021.■     ■ Janjira Sombatpoonsiri is currently a research-oriented assistant professor at the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, and an associate at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies. Her research has focused on nonviolent activism and social movements in the context of democratization and autocratization, and recently digital repression.    ■담당 및 편집: 백진경 EAI 연구실장             문의: 02 2277 1683 (내선 209)  |  [email protected]       [EAI이슈브리핑]은 국내외 주요 사안에 대해 다양한 분야의 전문가들이 심층적인 분석을 통해 의견을 개진하고 정책적 제언을 발표할 수 있는 담론의 장을 마련하고자 기획된 시리즈입니다. 인용할 때에는 반드시 출처를 밝혀주시기 바랍니다. EAI는 어떠한 정파적 이해와도 무관한 독립 연구기관입니다. EAI가 발행하는 보고서와 저널 및 단행본에 실린 주장과 의견은 EAI와는 무관하며 오로지 저자 개인의 견해임을 밝힙니다.

Janjira Sombatpoonsiri 2021-02-05조회 : 19400