[편집자 주] Undeniably, the unprecedented outbreak of COVID-19 affected democratic governance around the world. Aasiya Riaz, Joint Director at PILDAT, explains that Pakistan, which has been increasingly identified as a “hybrid regime” has not been an exception. Prior to COVID-19, Pakistan has faced issues pertaining to elections, populism and partisan accountability, institutions acting beyond the constitutional domain, weak political parties, public distrust of politics, and poor democratic performance. To illustrate, Pakistan has created new structures under the administration of the military for pandemic response. While this has been helpful, this solution left grave implications for the relationship between the civil society and the military as it meant a larger role for military intervention in governance. The persistence of the “hybrid regime” has disclosed the weaknesses present in Pakistan’s democratic governance structure.       ※The following is an excerpt from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   Introduction   Since thenovel coronavirus (COVID-19) emerged in China in December 2019, globally, it has caused the death of over 2 million people, infected many millions more, and compelled governments around the world to lock down their population. [1] Since December 2019, where on the one hand the pandemic has upended global life, global economy, national and global health sys-tems, it has also affected democratic governance around the world and has forced many governments and sys-tems to grapple with policies and actions that are feared to leave behind significant geopolitical wreckage.   This paper examines how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected democratic governance in Pakistan, an electoral democracy, which is continuously characterized as a “Hybrid Regime” in the Economist’s Democracy Index Regime, [2] owing to the role and influence of the military in politics and the ongoing concerns regarding the rule of law in Pakistan.   The Phenomenon of the COVID-19 Pandemic   Even though the first statement regarding the cluster of pneumonia cases in Wuhan, China was announced on January 8, 2020, it took the World Health Organization (WHO) over 8 weeks to declare the COVID-19 outbreak as a global pandemic. This declaration was made on March 11, 2020, as more than 118,000 cases were detected in more than 110 countries and territories. By the end of May 2020, more than 5.5 million COVID-19 cases had been reported around the world.   Several leading studies from as early as May 2020 indicated that COVID-19 was undoing years of progress in curbing global poverty as the number of the poverty-stricken, which showed a pattern of a steady decrease earlier in the year, increased rapidly. [3] Studies stated that the pandemic started a human development crisis that was equivalent to levels of deprivation during the mid-1980s. The sectors that were affected were the following: income (with the largest contraction in economic activity since the Great Depression), health (directly causing a death toll of over 300,000 and indirectly leading potentially to an additional 6,000 child deaths every day from preventable causes over the next 6 months) and education (with effective out-of-school rates – meaning, accounting for the inability to access the internet – in primary education expected to drop to the levels of actual rates of the mid-1980s levels). [4]   Many countries have had to declare a state of emergency to protect public health. From March 2020 to May 2020, at least 62 countries and territories had to postpone national and subnational elections, out of which at least 18 countries and territories decided to postpone national elections and referendums. [5] In countries with weak democratic safeguards, there were concerns of autocrats using COVID-19 as an excuse to grab and hold onto power. [6] Through the utilization of political predictions, social scientists and analysts argued that the pandemic might disrupt national politics [7] leading to political instability, especially in developing countries already suffering from economic crises. [8] ■     [1] “Our coverage of the coronavirus,” The Economist, accessed June 10, 2021, https://www.economist.com/coronavirus-pandemic. [2] “Global democracy has a very bad year,” The Economist, accessed April 28, 2021, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2021/02/02/global-democracy-has-a-very-bad-year. [3] “Covid-19 is undoing years of progress in curbing global poverty,” The Economist, accessed May 28, 2020, https://www.economist.com/international/2020/05/23/covid-19-is-undoing-years-of-progress-in-curbing-global-poverty [4] “COVID-19 and Human Development: Assessing the Crisis, Envisioning the Recovery,” United Nations Development Programme, accessed: May 28, 2020, http://hdr.undp.org/en/hdp-covid. [5] “Global overview of COVID-19: Impact on elections,” International IDEA, accessed May 28, 2020,https://www.idea.int/news-media/multimedia-reports/global-overview-covid-19-impact-elections. [6] “Would-be autocrats are using covid-19 as an excuse to grab more power,” The Economist, aaccessed May 28, 2020, https://www.economist.com/international/2020/04/23/would-be-autocrats-are-using-covid-19-as-an-excuse-to-grab-more-power. [7] Alice Wenner, “Our Democracy Depends on A Safe Election in November,” Fsi.stanford.edu, Stanford University, May 26, 2020, accessed May 28, 2020, https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/our-democracy-depends-safe-election-november. [8] Nic Cheeseman, “The Coronavirus Could Topple Governments Around the World,” Foreignpolicy.com, Foreign Policy, March 31, 2020, accessed May 28, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/31/coronavirus-regime-change-could-topple-governments-around-the-world/.     ■ Aasiya Riaz, Joint Director at PILDAT, leads PILDAT‘s projects and activities, a leading Pakistani think tank she co-founded in 2001. Ms. Riaz has over 20 years of experience in providing thought leadership in governance and public policy, managing global partnerships with national and international governments, parliaments and development agencies, and in facilitation of inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary dialogues, in designing and implementing successful strategic communication strategies and promoting strengthening of democratic governance and democratic and political institutions under the overall ambit of rule of law. Trained in the field of Media and Political Communication at the London School of Economics, UK, Aasiya has also worked with the mainstream press and electronic media in Pakistan as a political analyst. She was a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy, USA, as well as a distinguished fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at the Stanford University, USA. Aasiya regularly appears on national and international media for political analysis and commentaries while she is invited to lecture at Pakistan‘s premium public policy institutions as well as many national and international think tanks and universities.     담당 및 편집: 서정혜 EAI 연구원   문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) I [email protected]

[편집자 주] While government plans to impose an island-wide lockdown and place restrictions on travel were initially successful during the first wave, they were inefficient to address the repercussions of the following two waves. The Centre for Policy Alternatives Government explains that such failures resulted from the lack of stringency in the implementation of the restrictions in the latter waves, lack of testing, and dealing with the after-effects of government measures in regards to a decrease in household income and accessibility to necessities. Additionally, the political landscape following the COVID-19 pandemic provided an environment conducive for democratic backsliding in Sri Lanka. Along with the establishment of new governmental structures such as Presidential Task Forces, the military has been increasingly involved during the pandemic. Moreover, the postponement of elections resulted in a constitutional dilemma. Also, minority rights have been left unprotected and political speech against government officials was shut down. The policy decision making process overall during the pandemic has been opaque, with many decisions left unjustified. Moving forward, the author claims that the country needs to put a halt to trends of de-democratization.     ※The following is an excerpt from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   1. Challenges Posed by the Pandemic   The pandemic has posed a number of unprecedented challenges in Sri Lanka, with socio-political effects spanning far beyond the immediate public health and economic crises. Given that the number of issues goes beyond that which can be adequately analyzed in a single article, this working paper will focus primarily on an aspect of the pandemic crisis which is of particular salience in Sri Lanka and from which lessons can be drawn for other countries in the region. Namely, the challenges to democracy that have emerged during the pandemic period. The paper will look at the ways in which the post-COVID-19 political landscape has been a conducive environment for democratic backsliding, focusing on the period between the beginning of the pandemic response in March 2020 until the time of writing in May 2021. It will look, in particular, at how the policy space opened up by the pandemic has created an ideal context for the acceleration of the processes of executive aggrandizement, militarization as well as the infringement of citizens’ civil liberties.   Before we enter this discussion of democratic backsliding, we must consider the public health background against which it has taken place. During the first three months of the pandemic, the number of cases was at a relatively manageable level of less than 100 new cases a day. However, this was followed by a second wave in September 2020 and a particularly damaging third wave beginning in April 2021 which has left Sri Lanka reeling. What was initially lauded as a comparatively effective public health response has proven to be rife with miscalculations and short-sightedness. As of May 21, 2021, Sri Lanka had a seven-day average of 2712 new cases per day.     ■ The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) is an independent, non-partisan organisationthat focuses primarily on issues of governance and conflict resolution.Formed in 1996 in the firm belief that the vital contribution of civil society to the public policy debate is in need of strengthening, CPA is committed to programmes of research and advocacy through which public policy is critiqued, alternatives identified and disseminated.     담당 및 편집: 서정혜 EAI 연구원   문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) I [email protected]

[편집자 주] Nepal has seen a sharp increase in the number of COVID-19 cases upon March; the number remains high yet today. Pradip Pariyar, Executive Chairperson of Samata Foundation, states that government response to the second wave was lacking in several ways to effectively combat against the situation. The passage of undemocratic bills during the pandemic is reflective of government attempts to exploit democracy. Corruption is prevalent in the society as suggested by the survey data used in this article. Furthermore, dire economic conditions have exacerbated the situation via higher unemployment rates and bankruptcy. On top of that, a shortage in medical resources available to rectify the situation remains a key challenge. To this end, the author reinforces the importance of apt governance measures, economic compensation to the heavily affected and marginalized groups, and stronger medical infrastructure in combating national crises as such.       ※The following is an excerpt from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   Introduction   South Asia has turned into the epicenter of the second wave of COVID-19 as most countries in the region, including India, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Pakistan have been badly infected by the coronavirus. The situation is getting more flared up as each day passes. Of late, the situation in Nepal is gradually becoming alarming as two out of five people are being tested positive. [1] Nepal hardly witnessed any impact during the second wave of COVID-19 until the first week of March this year. The number of new cases was merely 89 with one death on March 8. Ever since then, the situation has rapidly been turning to the worse. With a population of nearly 30 million, infections caused by this pandemic soared up to over 9,000 each day. Calculations show that the total infections were probably closer to 120,000 by the end of May, and there were more than 700 COVID-19 related deaths nationwide. [2] The political situation of Nepal took a dramatic turn with the drastic developments in alliances and interest groups. Utilizing various articles from the constitution, the House of Representatives was dissolved for the second time in 4 months while the opposition alliance knocked on the door of the Supreme Court. The verdict is due very soon. The availability of vaccines is uncertain amid the efforts of the Prime Minister to buy popularity and voter sympathy. Though commitments were made by various countries like the USA and China, the quantity of the vaccines still falls short to vaccinate the vast majority until the election dates.   Shrinking Civic Space and Democratic Condition   The government reinforcement of the 'One Door Policy' in April 2019 is still in place. This policy requires interested individuals and NGOs/ INGOs to channel their supplies through the government. [3] As the decisions are still enacted, donors have to undergo bureaucratic hurdles and legal formalities that delay aid delivery. (Foundation 2020). ■     [1] Hari Bansh Jha, “Second Wave of COVID-19 Getting out of Control in Nepal,” ORF, accessed June 20, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/second-wave-of-covid-19-getting-out-of-control-in-nepal/. [2] Kaustubh Dhital, “Nepal Covid-19 Impact Worse than Official Figures,” Nepali Times, May 30, 2021, https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/nepal-covid-19-impact-worse-than-official-figures/. [3] “Govt Adopts One-Door Policy for Relief Distribution,” The Kathmandu Post (The Kathmandu Post), accessed June 20, 2021, https://kathmandupost.com/miscellaneous/2017/08/15/govt-adopts-one-door-policy-for-relief-distribution.     ■Pradip Pariyar is Executive Chairperson of Samata Foundation. Mr. Pradip Pariyar is an alumnus of American University and Tribhuvan University. He specializes in youth empowerment, peace building and capacity building of media professionals. As the elected president of the Association of Youth Organizations Nepal (AYON), he worked closely with government of Nepal to initiate a youth-responsive budget. He was a member of the government task force that developed Youth Vision 2025: a 10-year national youth development policy. He has trained thousands of youths globally on leadership, peace building, and conflictsensitive journalism. He founded the Nepal Youth Forum to focus on policy advocacy, awareness, and youth empowerment. In 2011, Mr. Pariyar was selected as a youth fellow by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. He received “Asia’s 21 Young Leaders Award” in 2018 by Asia Society. Mr. Pariyar also serves as the chairperson of the Nepal Policy Center, a youth-led think tank. In 2015, he received the Youth Leadership Award from the Nepali Government‟s Ministry of Youth and Sports for his decade-long contribution to youth leadership development across Nepal. Traveling throughout the length and breadth of Nepal, Mr. Pariyar witnessed diverse cultures and had encounters with his social offended country people have invigorated his dream fuelled by the unholy dogma of casteism. He dreams of just Nepal; a cohesive society where an individual‟s potential, competence, edification and hard slo define a person rather than his/her status.     담당 및 편집: 서정혜 EAI 연구원   문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) I [email protected]

[편집자 주] Observations of policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic disclosed the wide spectrum of challenges that hindered the successful implementation of a nationwide solution. Bangladesh, despite facing challenges in governance, has initially been quite successful in administering vaccines. Nonetheless, Rezwan-ul-Alam, the Director of the Knowledge Management team at Manusher Jonno Foundation, points out that government plans of vaccine procurement have stirred controversy as this accomplishment was short-lived. In its journey for vaccine procurement, Bangladesh was positioned at a disadvantage in between COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy between India and China. Additionally, challenges to the health sector remain grave as illustrated through frequent incidents of corruption. Attempts to disclose the aforementioned incidents have resulted in charges against the media. The government’s reaction to shut down public dissent has also drawn backlash domestically and internationally, which is attested by Bangladesh’ low performance in the Radar Chart of Varieties of Democracy.     ※The following is an excerpt from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   Introduction   In spite of several mismanagement cases and challenges to governance [1] in handling the COVID-19 outbreak, the Bangladesh government performed remarkably well in administering the vaccination of the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine which began on January 27, 2021. While the government’s performance was extraordinary in terms of the early availability and administering of the vaccines, [2] stock shortage of vaccines led the government to temporarily suspend from administering the first dose of the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine.   This working paper, is the second in the seres, highlighting the governance challenges from January to May 30, 2021.   The objectives of this paper are: 1. To examine the role of the government in procuring COVID-19 vaccines in the backdrop of vaccine diplomacy and the role of India and China in particular; 2. To assess the nature of development assistance by both bilateral and multilateral agencies; and 3. Offer recommendations to overcome governance challenges around COVID-19 vaccine issues.   Methodology   This paper is written through research of secondary material available on the internet. Selected social media posts and comments were analyzed to understand the public perception of the vaccination program of the government. A model developed by the writer is also used to analyze the ongoing governance challenges in Bangladesh centering around the COVID-19 management.   The governance context   Bangladesh’s core governance sys-tems are plagued with serious accountability and transparency deficit. During the COVID-19 period, the linkage between public health outcomes and democracy, human rights, and governance was starkly exposed. [3] However, it should be noted that corruption in the health sector was a regular phenomenon before pre-COVID-19 period. In the 2019 Global Health Security Index that examined six key indicators: prevent, detect, respond, health, norms, and risks, Bangladesh ranked 113 among 195 countries with an overall score of 35. [4]   During the period under review in this paper, the freedom situation on media reporting and freedom of expression further worsened with the mysterious death of the detained writer, Mushtaq Ahmed, in February 2021. [5] Mr. Ahmed was arrested in May 2020 for allegedly criticizing the government’s handling of the pandemic situation. [6] Despite national outcries and international condemnation, the authorities claimed to be innocent concerning his death. [7] Another Cartoonist Ahmed Kabir Kishore was also allegedly tortured in custody. Media analysts feared that such blatant attacks on freedom of expression and media freedom are signs of “growing authoritarianism” in the country. [8]■     [1] Uddin, K. Farid, “COVID-19 Pandemic Is About More than Health: A State of Governance Challenges in Bangladesh, Sage Journal, February 26 2021, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0971523121993344 (Accessed on May 15 2021). [2] BSS, “How did Bangladesh get Covid-19 vaccine so quickly”? Dhaka Tribune, 25 January 2021, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2021/01/25/how-did-bangladesh-get-covid-19-vaccine-so-quickly, (Accessed on May 15 2021). [3] Alam, Rezwan, Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Bangladesh: An Analysis, ADRN Working Paper, 3 May 2021, http://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSLegeq=20493&board=kor_workingpaper, (Accessed on May 15 2021). [4] “Bangladesh, Global Health Security Index”, GHSI, https://www.ghsindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Bangladesh.pdf, (Accessed on 15 May 2021). [5] BANGLADESH: CARTOONIST TORTURED, WRITER DIES IN JAIL: AHMED KABIR KISHORE”, Amnesty International, 8 March 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa13/3800/2021/en/ Accessed on 30 May 2021. [6] “Bangladeshi writer Mushtaq Ahmed dies in jail; cartoonist Kabir Kishore allegedly abused in custody”, Committee to Protect Journalist, 25 February 2021, https://cpj.org/2021/02/bangladeshi-writer-mushtaq-ahmed-dies-in-jail-cartoonist-kabir-kishore-allegedly-abused-in-custody/ (Accessed on 30 May 2021). [7] “BANGLADESH: CARTOONIST TORTURED, WRITER DIES IN JAIL: AHMED KABIR KISHORE”, Amnesty International, 8 March 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa13/3800/2021/en/, (Accessed on 30 May 2021). [8] Hasan, Zia, “What writer Mushtaq Ahmed’s death in jail shows about growing authoritarianism in Bangladesh”, Scroll.in, 4 March 2021, https://scroll.in/article/988495/in-writer-ahmeds-death-in-a-bangladesh-jail-signs-of-awami-leagues-growing-authoritarianism, (Accessed on 30 May 2021).     ■ Rezwan-Ul-Alam is the Director of the Knowledge Management team at Manusher Jonno Foundation, Bangladesh. He has a solid working experience of 23 years at different positions in Advocacy, Communication, Partnership and Media relations in a number of organizations (TIB, World Bank, UNICEF, Bangladesh Government and media). He holds a PhD in Journalism from City University, London.     담당 및 편집: 서정혜 EAI 연구원   문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) I [email protected]

[편집자 주] A year and a half into the COVID-19 outbreak, India remains heavily afflicted by the deadly pandemic. In this article, Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay, director of Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), and Kaustuv Chakrabarti state that repercussions from the pandemic in all domains of the country, encompassing the economy, public health, migrant populations, and dissent over the political sys-tem were very much present in the society. With the pandemic affecting India’s population during a time in which it faced adverse conditions for development, concerns over unemployment have hiked over the past year. Additionally, the public healthcare sys-tem has been diagnosed as inefficient to deal with the sharp increase in COVID-19 patients. Not to mention, the authors argue that the COVID-19 pandemic has disclosed problems associated with the unorganized labor economy, stating that migrant workers have unequal access to support. Furthermore, the authors argue that the recent series of protests shine a light into the issues the Indian government faces. In this regard, the authors argue that significant developments in policy are indispensable.     ※The following is an excerpt from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   Introduction   The COVID-19 pandemic has shaken the foundations of governance in India as in many parts of the world. The lessons emerging from the pandemic reveal that a capable, accountable, inclusive, and participatory state is essential for effectively addressing the challenges posed by the pandemic that will have long-lasting ramifications. Since the end of January, when India identified its first COVID-19 case, 28,212,727 cases of infections and 332,644 deaths have been recorded. A total of 25,994,295 persons have recovered (as of June 01, 2021). India witnessed the second wave of contractions in the middle of February when the daily cases continued to surge until the first week of May 2021 when it reached over 400,000 cases. In the past two weeks, the daily count of infections has redueced but the death count still remains alarmingly high. The COVID-19 pandemic continues to impact the lives and livelihood of millions of people in India. The curfews and lockdowns add to unprecedented misery and suffering of the poor, vulnerable, and informal workers including migrant workers. The economy which was already on a weak footing even before the pandemic continues to suffer. The weak and unprepared health sys-tem in the country proved to be grossly inadequate to handle a pandemic of this magnitude. The pandemic provided a pretext to the ruling dispensation to restrict dissents and civic engagement.   Pandemic and Indian Economy   The COVID-19 pandemic hit India at a time when the Indian economy was going through one of its worst phases with growth in the gross domestic product (GDP). The GDP fell to an 11-year low of 4.2 percent from 2019 to 2020. The economy grew by 3.1 percent in the January-March quarter of 2019-2020, against 5.7 percent at the same time frame the year prior, marking the slowest growth in at least eight years (Sahoo, 2020).   Jobless growth in India was already a major concern among many economists who had repeatedly questioned why employment was not growing as fast as the country’s GDP. They warned that the rate of jobless growth could severely impact India’s economy which depends heavily on the middle-class population that is primarily employed in salaried jobs and entrepreneurship (Das, 2020). The demonetization imposed by the previous National Democratic Alliance (NDA) [1] government in November 2016 slowed down the economy resulting in unemployment all over the country, a trend that the government emphatically denied.   The concern over unemployment was reinforced by the findings of a National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) study. The survey was the first of its kind on employment by a government agency since demonetization. The government delayed the publication but the report was purportedly leaked in the media. The government eventually published NSSO’s annual report (July 2017-June 2018) of the Periodic Labor Force Survey (PLFS) which reported the All India unemployment rate was at 6.1 percent in the given year. This unemployment figure was a 45-year high (Patel, 2019). Facing vociferous critic from the opposition political parties and prominent economists, the government issued a statement that the comparison of the recent and past employment data was faulty as the study had used a new design methodology for the survey. In other words, the government maintains the virus slowed down the economy all around the world and there was nothing particularly unique or alarming about India’s recession (Scroll, 2020).■     [1]The National Democratic Alliance is a coalition of political parties led by the Bhartiya Janata Party which rules the central government in India.     ■ Kaustuv Kanti Bandyopadhyay is the director of Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), a pioneer CSO, who has dedicated more than three decades for work on participation, democratic governance and civil society development. He has twenty-five years of professional experience working with universities, research institutions, and CSOs. He serves on the Steering Committee of the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) and the Asia Democracy Network (ADN). He holds a PhD in anthropology for his work with the Parhaiya tribes of Chotanagpur in India.   ■ Kaustuv Chakrabarti is an independent author, who served as a senior program officer at PRIA. Kaustuv worked on the issues of civic space, multi-stakeholder partnerships, South-South Cooperation, and building CSO capacities. He has been passionately engaged with PRIA‟s work on civic space both at the Asian and South Asian level. He co-authored Civic space under Siege: experiences from South Asia; the “State of Democracy: India” report, and the synthesis report on “Civic Space in Asia: Emerging Issues and PolicyLessons from Six Asian Countries 2018.” He has a Master‟s degree in globalization and development from the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Sussex.     담당 및 편집: 서정혜 EAI 연구원   문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) I [email protected]

Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Souththeast Asia - Part II The outbreak of COVID-19 has proven that new forms of threat can heavily affect the development of democracy as well as democratic practices. COVID-19 is not only a life-threatening issue; it is also evolving into a problem for the maintenance and promotion of democracy. In order to address this global issue, the Asia Democracy Research Network (ADRN) has been conducting research on the Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance based on country cases since 2020. EAI had published eleven working papers for the first part of this research project in March. This second part of the working paper is the updated version that includes any changes and updates that occurred. The second set of Part II working papers includes the cases of Southeast Asia. 1. Sri Nuryanti | Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance: Indonesia’s Experience to Conquer COVID 19 Pandemic 2. Francisco A. Magno | Pandemic Governance in the Philippines: Democratic Recession and Corruption Risks 3. Thawilwadee Bureekul, Ratchawadee Sangmahamad & Nuchaprapar Moksart | Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Thailand

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} [편집자 주] Perpetuated by low public awareness of the pandemic, inefficiency in law enforcement, non-democratic leadership, limited good governance practices, and low resource allocation, Thailand has seen the rise of a third wave of covid-19. In their updated paper from the first article, Thawilwadee Bureekul, Ratchawadee Sangmahamad, and Nuchaprapar Moksart from King Prajadhipok’s Institute analyze the third wave of COVID-19 infections currently impacting Thailand. By taking a closer look at the responses from the government and other sectors, the authors suggest policy recommendations and present lessons learned from the pandemic in Thailand. Along with establishing social and economic policies to reduce the socioeconomic impact of the pandemic, the authors present several policy recommendations to manage a future crisis. Implementing these recommendations would be through applying democratic governance practices and distributing vaccines by allowing the private sectors to import alternative vaccines, providing sufficient social support to its citizens to reduce economic impact during the pandemic, and establishing efficient public communication mechanisms to avoid contracting information.   ※The following is an excerpt from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   Introduction [1] Thailand is currently experiencing a third wave of infections; therefore this paper updates the COVID-19 situation in Thailand, including responses from the government and other sectors; lessons learned from the pandemic in Thailand; and policy recommendations.   COVID-19 in Thailand In the first outbreak, the government of Thailand had effectively limited the spread of the virus. The Thai government launched measures to control the rapid increases of new cases, including political, economic, social, legal, and regulatory actions. Since this crisis was new for Thailand, the COVID-19 Situation Management Center was established as the single information communication center for COVID-19. The Thai government declared a state of emergency decree to prevent a COVID-19 outbreak. The first state of emergency period lasted was from March 26 to May 31, 2020, which included a ban on foreigners entering the country; 14-day state quarantine for those entering Thailand; a nationwide curfew from 10 p.m. to 4 a.m.; recommendations to avoid inter-provincial movement; measures encouraging 50 percent of the workforce to work from home; and mandating the wearing of facemasks.[2] The State of Emergency was extended for eleven times, which expires on May 31, 2021, but some restrictions, such as lockdown measures, were eased. After that, the Cabinet approved the announcement on the twelfth extension for two months until July 31, 2021. The government provided a 5000-baht allowance during the three months (April - June 2020) for each individual who is in the unemployed and vulnerable groups, had been severely affected by COVID-19, and were not eligible for support through the Social Security Act B.E.2533, Section 33. The partnership between the government and civil society was become a crucial factor for Thailand being able to manage the pandemic. Thailand has strengthened its civil society, known as “the warriors in grey shirts,” which has played an important role to help local communities.[3] Approximately 1.04 million village health volunteers have conducted house-to-house visits to monitor the health of community residents.[4] Although COVID-19 has been quite well controlled in Thailand, uncertainties remain, and the risk of further outbreaks persists. Most key informants warn that low-level transmission is most likely to happen, with occasional small outbreaks occurring until vaccines are distributed.[5] The government has begun administering vaccines, but progress has been slow. The opposition filed a censure motion against Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha over his mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic in January 2021.[6] On February 17, 2021, the Thai government was scrutinized in parliament over its coronavirus vaccine policy. Opposition lawmakers accused authorities of delaying the start of inoculations and relying on a single vaccine producer.[7] In February 2021, the first 200,000 doses of Sinovac and 117,600 doses of AstraZeneca arrived in Thailand. Vaccinations were to be provided to those over the age of 60, and those with chronic diseases, in addition to doctors, nurses, and medical staff working closely with infected patients. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet were also part of the first group to receive the vaccine to help build confidence and trust in the vaccination program. The arrival of the vaccines boosted public confidence and many speculated that the public health situation in Thailand would improve, and the economy would begin to recover in time for the Songkran festival in mid-April. However, due to low public awareness of the pandemic, limited law enforcement, and ineffective government management, Thailand faced a third wave of infections in April 2021. The highly contagious alpha COVID-19 variant, commonly known as the UK variant, was reported in Thailand, which resulted in a new nationwide outbreak centered on nightspots in Bangkok’s upmarket Thong Lor area and Krystal Club. Since the Alpha variant is 1.7 times more contagious and deadlier than previous strains, April 2021 saw a sharp rise in new infection cases including police officers, politicians, Japanese diplomats, government officers, celebrities, and doctors. The outbreak centered on Krystal Club was a scandalous state failure to control the pandemic. The outbreak rapidly hit 77 provinces within two weeks after the government allowed people to return home for Songkran. The outbreak severely affected the economy, with experts predicting that the tourism industry would lose a further 130,000 million baht in the first quarter of 2021. The third outbreak fostered public anger, especially among the working class and small businesses owners who were severely affected. Each outbreak in Thailand has caused issues for informal laborers who do not have access to social support. Although the managers of Krystal Club were sentenced to two months in jail,[8] many consider the punishment to be too lenient considering the dire national economic consequences. ■     [1] Bureekul, Thawilwadee, Sangmahamad, Ratchawadee, and Moksart, Nuchaprapar, “[ADRN Working Paper] Pandemic Crisis and Democratic Governance in Thailand,” East Asia Institute, http://www.eai.or.kr/avanplus/filedownload.asp?o_file=20210412232227558402312.pdf&uppath=/data/bbs/eng_workingpaper/&u_file=6.Thailand_PandemicCrisisandDemocraticGovernance.pdf (Accessed April 20, 2021).   [2] United Nations Thailand, “Social Impact Assessment of COVID-19 in Thailand,” Oxford Policy Management, December 23, 2020.   [3] Bangkok Post, “Volunteers on the frontline,” https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/special-reports/1903330/volunteers-on-the-frontline (Accessed April 15, 2021).   [4] WHO, “Thailand`s 1 million village health volunteers - “unsung heroes” - are helping guard communities nationwide from COVID-19,” https://www.who.int/thailand/news/feature-stories/detail/thailands-1-million-village-health-volunteers-unsung-heroes-are-helping-guard-communities-nationwide-from-covid-19 (Accessed August 28, 2020).   [5] United Nations Thailand, “Social Impact Assessment of COVID-19 in Thailand,” Oxford Policy Management, December 23, 2020.   [6] Bangkok Post, “PM faces censure motion over virus fight,” https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2046039/pm-faces-censure-motion-over-virus-fight (Accessed May 4, 2021).   [7] Reuters, “UPDATE 1-Thai government feels heat from lawmakers over vaccine rollout,” https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-thailand-idUSL1N2KN0JH (Accessed May 4, 2021).   [8] Bangkok Post, “Covid hotspot club managers in Bangkok jailed 2 months,” https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2098367/covid-hotspot-club-managers-in-bangkok-jailed-2-months (Accessed April 19, 2021).       ■ Thawilwadee Bureekul is the director of the Research and Development Office at King Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI)where she is involved in the planning, management, implementation, and coordination of the Institute’s research projects. In addition to her role at KPI, Dr. Bureekul is a professor at several universities in Thailand, including the Asian Institute of Technology, Thammasat University, Burapha University, Mahidol University, and Silpakorn University. She succeeded in proposing “Gender Responsive Budgeting” in the Thai Constitution and she was granted the “Woman of the Year 2017” award as a result. ■ Ratchawadee Sangmahamad is a researcher assigned to the Research and Development Office of King Prajadhipok’s Institute. Her research includes citizenship, gender, and election studies. She has published books such as Value Culture and Thermometer of Democracy (with Thawilwadee Bureekul), Thai Citizens: Democratic Civic Education (with Thawilwadee Bureekul and Eugenie Mario), and many articles. ■ Nuchaprapar Moksart is a researcher assigned to the Research and Development Office of King Prajadhipok’s Institute. Her research includes social policy and political economy theory. She also writes on socioeconomic issues     담당 및 편집: 서정혜 EAI 연구원   문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) I [email protected]  

.a_wrap {font-size:16px; font-family:Nanum Gothic, Sans-serif, Arial; line-height:26px;} [편집자 주] During the early stages of the pandemic, The Philippines government had successfully managed the spread of COVID-19. However, the government’s use of strong lockdown measures has plunged the country into a deep economic recession, highlighting the adverse effects of a trade-off between a country’s health and economy. The populist`s rule in the Philippines has led to democratic erosion, weakening the institutional ecosys-tem designed to combat corruption in the country. Francisco A. Magno of the Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance analyzes how the democratic recession has negatively affected public accountability in the Philippines. Using the example of the outbreak of corruption scandals that accompanied the pandemic crisis, the author insists that populism triggered authoritarian tendencies in the country, which then diminished the role of democratic institutions and sys-tems of checks and balances. Francisco A. Magno claims that the revival of democratic institutions is crucial for the Philippines to fight corruption judiciously and sys-tematically.   ※The following is an excerpt from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.   Introduction Previous studies indicate that established democracies show lower levels of corruption than authoritarian regimes or young democracies.[1] In this regard, it is interesting to consider how authoritarian tendencies have diminished the role of democratic institutions and sys-tems of checks and balances that control corruption. The outbreak of corruption scandals that accompanied the Corona Virus Disease (COVID)-19 health crisis in 2020 exemplifies how democratic recession has negatively affected the state of public accountability in the Philippines. This study probes into whether the COVID-19 pandemic further promoted democratic recession and corruption risks in the Philippines. It examines the patterns of irregularities emerging from the implementation of public programs aimed at responding to the crisis. Poorly designed institutional arrangements and weak democratic controls foster opportunities for the commission of illicit transactions in the delivery of public goods and services. Finally, it considers the importance of reviving democratic institutions as a key effort in fighting corruption on a long-term basis. The eruption of the COVID-19 pandemic brought to the fore severe corruption vulnerabilities in many countries. However, even before the pandemic, it is estimated that an average of 10-25 percent of a public contract’s value may be lost to corruption.[2] Globally, over USD 7.8 trillion are allocated annually for public health.[3] With more public funds being made available to fight the pandemic, better safeguards are needed to prevent corruption. The COVID-19 crisis hastened corruption. The potential for corruption in pandemic times is greater, especially when pressures for swift government action may lead to shortcuts that damage the integrity of institutional processes. The main risk areas include the withholding of accurate health data, irregularities in public procurement, the purchase of sub-standard equipment, and misappropriation of health budgets.[4] The COVID-19 pandemic is acknowledged to have begun on November 17, 2019, with the first recorded case of the disease in the city of Wuhan in Hubei Province, China. In the succeeding weeks, cases of people infected with the virus piled up. However, the government kept a tight lid on health data and even reprimanded the local doctors who warned of the new disease. The Chinese government informed the World Health Organization (WHO) of the existence of the virus only on December 31, 2019. Such lack of transparency prevented health authorities globally to take preventive action and contain the transmission of the COVID-19 virus across cities, nations, and borders.[5]■       [1] Ina Kubbe and Annika Engelbert, "Corruption and the impact of democracy." Crime, Law and Social Change 70, 2 (2018) 175-178. [2] UNODC, Guidebook on Anti-Corruption in Public Procurement and the Management of Public Finances. New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013), https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2013/Guidebook_on_anti-corruption_in_public_procurement_and_the_management_of_public_finances.pdf (Accessed on October 18, 2013). [3] WHO, Global spending on health: A world in transition, WHO/HIS/HGF/HF Working Paper, No. 19.4, Geneva: World Health Organization (2019); https://www.who.int/health_financing/documents/health-expenditure-report-2019.pdf?ua=1 (Accessed on February 6, 2020). [4] Sarah Steingrüber, Presentation at the “25 years of fighting with the nation the perennial pandemic of corruption” Virtual Town Hall Discussion, Transparency International-Philippines and Stratbase ADR Institute, August 28 2020. [5] Sarah Steingrüber, Monica Kirya, David Jackson, and Saul Mullard, Corruption in the time of COVID-19: A double-threat for low-income Countries, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 2020.     ■ Francisco A. Magno teaches Political Science and Development Studies at De La Salle University (DLSU). He is the Founding Director of the DLSU Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance. He served as the President of the Philippine Political Science Association from 2015 to 2017. He finished his PhD in Political Science at the University of Hawaii.     담당 및 편집: 서정혜 EAI 연구원   문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) I [email protected]