■ See Full Version on ASPI Website

The world is not returning to a new Cold War or spheres of influence – labels that are too readily applied. Despite de-risking and supply chain reorganisation, the US, China and the wider world remain deeply economically integrated, unlike during the Cold War. Nor does multipolarity capture the landscape: beyond the US and China, it is difficult to identify poles of comparable strategic weight. Russia, while a legacy great power with residual regional influence, does not carry the same weight as the US or China.

What we are witnessing is an unstable hybrid order, in which competing organising principles asserted by the US, China and Russia contest without strategic settlement. Acknowledging this reality is critical for NATO–IP4. Such an acknowledgement disentangles the partnership from disinformation that frames it as an ‘Asian NATO’ or bloc politics. It also reinforces the rationale for cooperation: it is at this juncture that middle powers of the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic can collectively reshape the international order in ways that redress its past flaws.

Despite divergent threat perceptions across the two oceans, middle powers that benefited most from the post-Cold War order share the challenges of global readjustment. NATO–IP4 offers an excellent mechanism for interconnecting cooperation in security, defence, industrial resilience, emerging technologies and AI regulation. Moreover, NATO–IP4 members and NATO itself continue to engage China bilaterally and multilaterally. Increasing transparency of that engagement while deepening concrete coordination – in maritime industrial ecosystems, civilian infrastructure protection, cybersecurity and technology standards within NATO–IP4 – will weaken disinformation and ensure NATO–IP4 connects, rather than fragments, the regions of the world. ■ 

■ Inhwan OH is a Senior Research Fellow and Executive Director at EAI.

■ Edited by Sangjun LEE, EAI Research Associate
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr