Editor's Note

On November 22, EAI and the Brookings Institution co-hosted "The Future of Alliances, Partnerships, and the Indo-Pacific Regional Order." Eleven experts from South Korea, the U.S., and Southeast Asia discussed the potential U.S. `retrenchment` from the Indo-Pacific under a second Trump administration, emphasizing the role of middle powers in sustaining multilateralism and regional stability. This publication includes a summary and full transcript of the discussions.

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I. Trump’s Economic & Foreign Policy Outlook and Regional Implications

 

o Economic Protectionism and Tariff Policies: Trump’s emphasis on tariffs, including proposed universal tariffs and potential selective tariffs on trade surplus countries like ROK and Japan, could lead to trade wars and heightened economic uncertainty. Some countries may benefit temporarily from U.S. tariffs on China, but those with trade surplus will soon face pressure as well. Trump’s approach to trade emphasizes short-term bilateral concessions, such as increased purchases of U.S. goods, rather than long-term structural agreements.

 

o Link Between Economic and Security Policies: Although Trump’s security policies will not be very different from his predecessor’s, economic policies may impact the willingness and the ability of partner countries to work closely with U.S. in the security realm.

 

o Internal U.S. Dynamics on Alliance Policy: Despite speculations about Trump’s policy direction, his view on alliance and Asia is not a definitive factor for U.S. foreign policy moving forward. Many in the Republican Party support alliance, which would serve as a counterbalance to Trump.

 

o Regional Implications and Allies’ Response: Trump’s focus on trade imbalances and transactional economics could lead to increased demands on allies to boost imports of U.S. goods or make concessions in key industries. Meanwhile, the allies are expected to accelerate efforts to diversify trade partners and reduce reliance on both U.S. and China.

 

II. Trump’s China Policy Outlook

 

o Hardline Approach: Trump’s nominations of Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz as his key Cabinet members signal a hawkish approach toward China. This team indicates a continuation of U.S.-China strategic competition, especially in the realm of technology. Trump also proposed measures like tariffs to exert pressure on China. This would likely disrupt supply chains and affect U.S. allies like ROK and Japan, whose economies are deeply interconnected with China.

 

o Decoupling and Strategic Competition: Overall, whether Trump views China strictly as an economic threat or security threat is yet to be determined. Trump administration will likely double down on decoupling strategies, particularly in technology and supply chain resilience. But whether tariffs would be an effective tool for achieving reshoring is questionable. Prior tariffs under Trump’s first term resulted in diversification, not reshoring.

 

o Security Dimensions of U.S-China Competition: U.S.-China competition can be interpreted as a battle over regional order, with China promoting its alternative frameworks. The strategic competition puts pressure on U.S. allies to align with Washington’s strategic objectives, potentially straining their economic relationships with China. It could also weaken allied cohesion against China.

 

o China’s Response: Xi Jinping is likely to pursue a cautious “wait-and-see” approach, hedging against U.S. pressure by strengthening ties with the Global South, BRICS, and other non-aligned countries. Such partnerships could offset economic and political impacts of U.S. measures. Xi, valuing stability, is expected to avoid direct confrontations while putting blame on U.S. for potential conflicts.

 

III. U.S. Policy on a Taiwan Contingency: Implications for Indo-Pacific Allies

 

ο Trump’s Position: Trump views Taiwan transactionally, seeing it as a financial burden for the U.S. while criticizing its role in global competition, particularly in semiconductor industry. While U.S.-Taiwan ties could deepen in practice, the absence of clear strategic direction risks unpredictability. The lack of clear direction could embolden China while increasing regional instability.

 

ο Implications for Allies: ROK faces challenges in balancing their commitments to alliance with concerns about regional stability. Possible China-DPRK collaboration could lead to a two-front battlefield for South Korea, diverting resources including USFK from domestic security priorities. Potential conflict over Taiwan could test the ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation. Both ROK and Japan’s responses would depend heavily on U.S. leadership and strategic clarity, which Trump would lack.

 

ο Regional Dynamics and Responses: Southeast Asian nations like the Philippines and Singapore prefer pragmatic, balanced engagement to avoid destabilization from U.S.-China tensions over Taiwan. For instance, the Philippines, despite its alignment with the U.S., has shown reluctance to escalate tensions with China. On the other end, China would seek to project strength without triggering direct confrontation. Nevertheless, its actions could test the resilience of U.S. alliances and exploit potential gaps.

 

ο Way Forward: Taiwan’s ability to bolster domestic resilience and enhance its international profile will be the key. Trump administration may prioritize assisting Taiwan’s military modernization while maintaining limited engagement on broader regional implications.

 

IV. Potential U.S. Retrenchment in the Indo-Pacific: Challenges and Allies’ Responses

 

o Retrenchment Risks: Allies are concerned about U.S. disengagement from multilateral frameworks, leaving a leadership “vacuum” in the Indo-Pacific. Yet past retrenchments (i.e. the Nixon Doctrine era) were followed by renewed global leadership of the U.S. The problem now is that a prolonged retreat under Trump may create conditions for China to expand its influence in the region, making U.S. return to leadership more challenging.

 

o Impact on Regional Security Arrangements: U.S. retrenchment might lead to reduced emphasis on multilateral security frameworks like ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation. Allies fear a return to hub-and-spoke model. However, Trump’s hawkish stance against China could strengthen alliances that are deemed critical for countering China. In this context, Trump may continue to pursue initiatives like U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, partnership with India, and resurrecting Quad.

 

o Economic Implications: The risk of economic retrenchment under Trump, particularly through withdrawal from frameworks like IPEF or imposition of universal tariffs, would further weaken U.S. economic engagement in the region, potentially driving U.S. allies toward greater dependence on China. This economic vacuum would increase burden on allies like South Korea to sustain regional economic cooperation independently.

 

o Allies’ Responses: Countries like ROK and Japan are likely to explore independent or collective strategies, including strengthening trilateral partnerships and reinforcing ties with ASEAN, India, and Europe. Enhanced multilateral engagement could help counterbalance U.S. retreat. Allies must actively advocate for continued U.S. engagement in the region by emphasizing shared security and economic goals. It is critical to align allied strategies with U.S. policies to ensure a unified approach to challenges like North Korea’s nuclear program and China’s strategic ambitions.

 

o ROK’s Strategic Dilemma: South Korea faces dual challenge of relying on U.S. extended deterrence while addressing the risks of U.S. disengagement. ROK must develop greater strategic autonomy to protect its interest, particularly in the face of North Korea’s growing nuclear threat and the possibility of being entrapped in U.S.-China competition.

 

o Hint of Optimism: Despite potential reductions in U.S. engagement, significant influence will be maintained through mechanisms such as the Indo-Pacific Command, diplomacy, business ties, and NGO activities. Regardless of who serves as President, the U.S. presence in Asia is likely to persist to some extent.

 

V. The Future of Multilateral/Minilateral Frameworks in the Indo-Pacific

 

o Quad and AUKUS: These frameworks have gained momentum under Biden administration but face uncertainty under Trump, given his transactional approach. Quad’s focus on countering China may persist, but U.S. leadership in promoting multilateralism may decline. AUKUS could be relevant, especially in defense and technology cooperation, but allies may have to bear more costs.

 

o Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF): IPEF was designed to demonstrate U.S. economic presence and engagement in the Indo-Pacific but remains non-binding and incomplete. If Trump sidelines IPEF and shifts to bilateral approach, it may lose its relevance, as its design relies on U.S. leadership to sustain goodwill-based cooperation. Regional partners may turn to more predictable, binding agreements like CPTPP.

 

o Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP): With the Trump administration unlikely to rejoin CPTPP, middle powers like Japan are poised to update its provisions, addressing new challenges like supply chain resilience and economic coercion. It could be deemed as a key mechanism for rules-based trade in the absence of U.S. participation. While domestic politics and the focus on IPEF have kept ROK from joining the CPTPP, rising U.S. protectionism makes joining increasingly important as a means to counterbalance trade turbulence stemming from the U.S.

 

o Global South Engagement: Regional powers like ROK, Japan, and ASEAN countries emphasize engagement with the Global South to counterbalance U.S.-China competition. However, U.S. disengagement under Trump could weaken collective efforts, leaving space for China to expand its influence.

 

VI. Inter-Korean Relations and Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

 

ο Diplomatic Risks: Trump’s transactional approach to North Korea could lead to risky negotiations. Potential unilateral deals with Pyongyang might undermine ROK’s security interests by condoning DPRK’s nuclear capabilities. The unpredictability of Trump’s summit-driven diplomacy and his preference for a top-down communication could repeat previous failure at Hanoi. Trump’s unilateral style could bypass key stakeholders like South Korea, leading to agreements that lack regional consensus and sustainability. Kim Jong Un is unlikely to accept previous terms and would demand greater concessions due to its expanded nuclear capabilities and its growing alignment with China and Russia. DPRK’s leadership now demands comprehensive guarantees of regime survival, including economic support, which complicates the prospects for successful negotiations.

 

ο Security Concerns: A passive approach by Trump, allowing DPRK to expand its nuclear arsenal while sanctions erode due to support from Russia and China, presents significant risks to South Korea’s security and the regional stability.

 

ο Rising Public Sentiment: Growing DPRK nuclear threat fueled domestic calls within ROK for developing its own nuclear weapons. Excessive U.S. demands on burden-sharing or reduced commitments to extended deterrence could amplify these demands, destabilizing regional security framework. Also, perceptions of U.S. disengagement or transactional diplomacy could spark resurgence of anti-American sentiment in ROK.

 

VII. The Future of ROK-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Partnership

 

ο Biden’s Legacy?: Camp David Summit institutionalized mechanisms for trilateral consultation at multiple levels. The trilateral cooperation has bipartisan support in Korea, and all parties seem to recognize the strategic imperative of this partnership. Yet Trump’s transactional approach to alliances and his preference for bilateral over multilateral frameworks could undermine the progress achieved under Biden. The absence of sustained U.S. leadership may weaken institutionalization of trilateral cooperation.

 

ο Challenges to Trilateral Cooperation: Historical grievances and nationalist sentiments in South Korea and Japan remain significant obstacles. For Japan, weak support base for Ishiba could also limit his capacity for defense spending. Without strong U.S. leadership, ROK and Japan may struggle to maintain momentum in trilateral cooperation.

 

ο Opportunities for Collaboration: Regional threats like DPRK nuclear and missile programs provide incentives for closer trilateral alignment. Unified responses to deter these threats and stabilize the region is important. Shared concerns have already led to enhanced trilateral defense cooperation. Polling indicates that South Korea acknowledges the importance of trilateral partnerships, and Japan has no clear incentive to disengage, offering hope for the continuity of such efforts.

 

VIII. South Korea’s Strategic Role in the Indo-Pacific

 

ο ROK’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Global Pivotal State Vision: President Yoon’s initiatives are grounded in robust ROK-U.S. alliance, which presents both opportunities and challenges. Under Trump’s transactional approach, South Korea could face significant setbacks due to the heavy reliance of its policies on the U.S. relationship. However, these strategies have also diversified South Korea’s partnerships, including strengthened ties with ASEAN, collaborations with the EU, and engagement with NATO. This diversification provides South Korea with greater flexibility and options to navigate potential shifts in its alliance with the U.S.

 

ο Leadership Outreach: South Korea has been actively working to reinvigorate mechanisms such as the UN Command to bolster its regional leadership role. It has also prioritized strengthening trilateral cooperation and advancing initiatives like the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG). Despite concerns about potential U.S. disengagement under Trump, ROK remains committed to sustaining these frameworks at the working level.

 

ο Economic Strategy: In response to Chinese economic coercion, ROK has been diversifying supply chains and investments by fostering trade relations with Southeast Asia and the Global South. Yet dependence on China on key industries like semiconductors remains critical vulnerability. While diversification is priority, China is ROK’s largest trading partner, requiring Seoul to carefully mitigate risks from geopolitical tensions.

 

IX. Roles and Responsibilities of Middle Powers Amid U.S. Leadership Transition

 

ο Middle Powers as Stabilizers: Middle powers like ROK and Japan are expected to step up in sustaining regional stability. Their role includes fostering multilateralism and supporting a rules-based order.

 

ο Maintaining Regional Norms: Middle powers are key to ensuring that multi- and minilateral frameworks like Quad, AUKUS, and CPTPP remain effective. ROK and Japan are extending outreach to the Global South to balance U.S.-China competition.

 

ο Ensuring U.S. Engagement: Middle powers are also tasked with encouraging consistent U.S. involvement by highlighting shared interests and mutual benefits, particularly in countering shared threats and advancing global stability.

 


 

Edited by: Jisoo Park, Research Associate
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr
 

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