EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 14

Author

Professor Gi-Wook Shin is the director of Shorenstein APARC; the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies; the founding director of the Korean Studies Program; senior fellow at FSI; and professor of sociology at Stanford University. As a historical-comparative and political sociologist, his research has concentrated on areas of social movements, nationalism, development, and international relations. Dr. Shin has served as editor of the Journal of Korean Studies, a premier journal in the field of Korean studies. Shin is the author/editor of many books and articles that include: Cross-Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia (2007); Rethinking Historical Injustice and Reconciliation in Northeast Asia (2006); Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics and Legacy (2006); North Korea: 2005 and Beyond (2006); Contentious Kwangju (2004); Colonial Modernity in Korea (1999); and Peasant Protest and Social Change in Colonial Korea (1996). His articles have appeared in academic journals such as the American Journal of Sociology, Nations and Nationalism, Comparative Studies in Society and History, International Sociology, Asian Survey, and Asian Perspectives.

Shin has just completed a new book titled One Alliance, Two Lenses: U.S.-Korea Relations in a New Era (Stanford University Press, 2009). It is based on analyses of more than 8,000 newspaper articles published in the U.S. and South Korean media from 1992 to 2004. He has also completed editing two more books with his colleagues, respectively titled Divided Memories: History Textbooks and the War in Asia and First Drafts of Korea: The U.S. Media and Perceptions of the Last Cold War Frontier. He is also engaged in a project addressing historical injustice and reconciliation in Northeast Asia with a particular focus on the U.S. responsibility and role in resolving the history question in that region. Shin is not only the recipient of numerous grants and fellowships but has also actively raised funds for Korean/Asian Studies at Stanford. He gives frequent lectures and seminars on topics ranging from Korean nationalism and politics to Korea's foreign relations and the plight and history of Korean-Americans. He also writes op-eds in Korean and American newspapers and serves on councils and advisory boards in the United States and South Korea.

Before coming to Stanford, Professor Shin taught at the University of Iowa and the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). After receiving his B.A. from Yonsei University in Korea, he was awarded his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Washington. Shin lives in Stanford with wife and three children.

In November 2002, five months after U.S. military vehicles accidentally killed two Korean school girls in a Seoul suburb, Ambassador Thomas Hubbard issued an official apology on behalf of President Bush: “Just this morning, the president sent me a message asking me to convey his apologies to the families of the girls, to the government of the Republic of Korea and to the people of Korea.'' In the past, such accidents would have gone largely unnoticed but this time the U.S. was compelled to issue a presidential apology. A half dozen years later, pressured by massive public protests against importation of US beef, the four-month old Lee government, despite a former agreement with President Bush, demanded the prohibition of U.S. beef more than 30 months old to be exported to Korea. In both instances, the Bush administration was concerned with the potential adverse impact on the alliance as the Korean media were able to mobilize thousands of angry protesters, sparking an influx of anti-American sentiment across the country. Reluctantly, the U.S. accepted the Korean demands. These two cases clearly show that the U.S.-ROK alliance can no longer be deduced down to simple measures of power. Rather relational dynamics have shifted; enabling a former client to make demands on its patron and see such demands materialize.

Observers of Korean affairs note that the Korean media have contributed to the rise of the South Korean public’s adversarial attitude toward the U.S. and its changing perceptions of the alliance with the United States as illustrated by the aforementioned cases. In particular, the progressive media that gained substantial influence during the administrations of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun have promoted ‘nationalist’ views challenging Korea’s dependence on the United States for their national security. Although previous works have documented changes in Korean public “attitudes” or “sentiments” toward the U.S. and the alliance, there is a need to better understand the media’s role in shaping such attitude changes and influencing alliance politics.

Public opinion research has indicated an agenda-setting role within the news media for public discussion of key policy issues; exposure to news can significantly influence public opinion and its perceptions of other nations. Also, by shaping public opinion, the mass media can indirectly influence foreign policy making processes. The media can even provide an important medium in forging a nation’s identity, which would, as constructivists of international relations argue, provide “the foundation of state power and foreign policy.” Building on this media research, this paper examines how the South Korean media have covered the alliance issue and assesses how that has contributed to the increasingly contentious alliance politics in the South. It concludes with policy implications that can be useful to both Korean and American policy makers.

The Role of the Media in Alliance Politics

The mass media address issues and events in two principal ways. First, they offer basic descriptive or factual statements and stories. Descriptive statements and stories are those in which the reporter narrates key events or issues and summarizes related developments. In addition, the media offer evaluative or analytical statements, in which reporters interpret or judge developing events, government policies, foreign nations’ actions and motivations, and so on. Often, evaluative statements deal in norms and values; they commentate on certain phenomena, suggesting how something should or should not be.

A story in the mass media may contain both descriptive and evaluative statements. For instance, if part of a story states that the U.S. and South Korea plan to renegotiate the terms of a specific trade agreement and that story goes on to speculate about certain implications that this new agreement might have for the general health and direction of the alliance, then this story has both descriptive and evaluative elements.

Through these forms of news coverage, the media play a number of important roles. Besides providing readers with factual or descriptive information on key events and issues, news coverage casts the spotlight of public attention on previously obscure or otherwise undisputed issues. Quite significantly, the media can frame the terms on which the public debates and evaluates specific policies. Through these priming and framing roles, the news media often set the agenda for public discussion and debate of key policy issues. Scholars have commented on how exposure to news can significantly influence public opinion on foreign policy issues as well as perceptions of other nations.

In both reflecting and shaping public opinion, the mass media can influence foreign policy-making processes. Public opinion, long thought to be largely irrelevant to foreign policy making, has increasingly been accepted as a significant factor in policy decisions. A number of case studies have established the role of public opinion in particular policy areas, such as U.S. relations with China and arms control issues. In the Monroe study, foreign policy corresponded with the policy favored by the majority of Americans in more than 90 percent of the cases examined, and changes in collective public opinion were followed by congruent changes in policy approximately two-thirds of the time. Both Cohen’s and Powlick’s studies showed that many foreign policy makers see major U.S. newspapers as surrogates for public opinion and often pay particular attention to editorials and opinion columns, which may offer useful ideas or reflect partisan reactions to policies from various segments of the political spectrum.

Most people in the United States and South Korea learn about issues of foreign affairs through the mass media, rather than by direct association or involvement. In the case of South Korea, it is entirely possible that the news media have contributed to the public’s changing perceptions of the United States and the bilateral alliance. In the United States, as well, the news media likely have some influence on Americans’ views of Korea, although probably to a lesser degree (for reasons that will be specified later). Given the media’s influence in the realm of foreign affairs as well as domestic politics, the role it plays in shaping issues related to the U.S.-ROK alliance merits a careful examination.

Media Environments in South Korea and the United States

In understanding media’s role in alliance politics, it is crucial to note the different media environments in the United States and South Korea. In the nineteenth-century United States, most newspapers had an informal party affiliation and openly advocated for their parties’ candidates. The U.S. media environment has evolved significantly since that time, however, and objectivity, nonpartisanship, and high standards of journalistic ethics are now the aims of mainstream media organizations.

In contrast, the media environment in South Korea today is not much different from that of the nineteenth-century United States. The South Korean news media are sharply divided on key policy issues—both domestic and foreign—in accordance with their ideological leanings. As many observers of Korean affairs have noted, a particular Korean media outlet often reflects only one side of a given issue, espousing almost entirely conservative or progressive views, depending on its leadership, orientation, and/or audience. This sharp division includes views of the North Korea issue and South Korea’s relationship with the United States. Most progressive newspapers characterize themselves as nationalist and seek to expedite the inter-Korean reconciliation process while questioning the rationale for the presence of U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula. On the other side, conservative newspapers generally insist that their government should demand greater reciprocity from North Korea while stressing the strategic importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance in resolving the North Korea issue. Korean newspapers’ deep divide and heated debates on key policy issues make for an interesting analytical window to examine the Korean press and better understand South Koreans’ changing views of the alliance.

The U.S. and South Korean news media also differ in terms of the capacity to reach their respective national publics. Compared with their Korean counterparts, U.S. newspapers generally have much smaller circulations. For instance, the New York Times, has a weekday circulation of only about 1 million. Moreover, in the United States, there is no national newspaper in any strict sense. In contrast, many major news media in South Korea are larger in circulation and more national in scope. Chosun Ilbo has a daily circulation of more than 2 million, thus reaching a significant portion of the ROK’s approximately 47 million people. Even though Hankyoreh cannot claim the same volume of readers, it has strongly influenced policy making during the progressive governments and is now a leading critical voice of the Lee administration’s key policies...(Continued)