EAI Fellows Program Working Paper Series No.30

Author 

Andrew Yeo is Assistant Professor of Politics at the Catholic University of America. His broad research interests lie at the intersection of international relations and comparative politics. His first book, Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests (Cambridge University Press, 2011) explores the politics of overseas military bases, focusing on the impact of security alliances on social movements and state response to domestic anti-base pressure. His other works have appeared in Comparative Politics, International Studies Quarterly, and Journal of East Asian Studies. Professor Yeo’s research and teaching interests include international relations theory, international security, overseas U.S. military presence, social movements and transnational politics, East Asia, and North Korea. He received his PhD from Cornell University in 2008.

 
This paper was submitted to "EAI Fellows Program on Peace, Governance, and Development in East Asia" supported by the Henry Luce Foundation based in New York. All papers are available only through the online database.

At the height of the Six Party Talks (SPT) in 2005, the continuous stream of dialogue and consultations among Northeast Asian states generated a sense of optimism about the creation of a permanent regional multilateral security forum. Moreover, the rapid expansion of inter-regional linkages throughout the 2000s made Northeast Asia look ripe for community-building rather than rivalry as predicted in the early 1990s. Despite this optimism, the momentum towards Northeast Asian community-building had come to a temporarily halt by the end of the decade. North Korea declared the Six Party Talks (SPT) dead in 2009. The sinking of the Cheonan and North Korea’s artillery barrage against Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 only hammered this point home further. Tensions in U.S.-Sino as well as Sino-Japan relations in late 2010 also tempered growing multilateral ambitions for Northeast Asia.

Despite increasing economic interdependence and a growing sense of Asian regionalism, one is left wondering whether East Asian multilateral initiatives have actually reduced mistrust or curbed nationalist sentiment in Northeast Asia. East Asian governments rhetorically speak the language of a growing “community” but continue to hedge and balance against their least trusting neighbors. Can regional institutions form the basis of peace, cooperation, and security in Northeast Asia? Is it possible for multilateral institutions to transcend the default bilateral hub-and-spokes system? Noting the trend towards greater Asian multilateralism, how do we explain the institutional processes leading to change in Northeast Asia’s regional security architecture?

Adopting a case-oriented research approach, I examine the Six-Party Talks on North Korean denuclearization as a basis for understanding the prospects of Northeast Asian multilateralism and change in the regional security architecture. As a starting point, I assume a position consistent with other East Asian commentators skeptical about the growth of multilateral institutions in East Asia, much less the development of a Northeast Asian community. The basis of this skepticism is rooted in the postwar institutional choices and ensuing development of Northeast Asia’s regional architecture. Additional dispositional factors such as historical animosity, political and socioeconomic differences, and the regional distribution of power further complicate the path to greater institutionalization. Therefore, I argue that rather than shaping policy outcomes towards its intended direction, the SPT as a multilateral forum more often reflects the power, identity, and status of member states making it difficult to achieve cooperation on multilateral initiatives. Despite this initial skepticism about the prospects of further regional institutionalization, I suggest how multilateral arrangements can still foster the notion of a regional community in a very loose sense. In particular, shifts in the security environment will open opportunities for greater multilateral cooperation in conjunction with current bilateral alliances through a process of institutional layering.

This paper is organized into two parts. The first part provides a brief overview of existing scholarship on East Asian multilateralism and the historical roots of the bilateral hub-and-spokes system. I then present my theoretical framework, grounding the empirical evidence for growing multilateralism in the historical institutional literature. The second part highlights the Six Party Talks (SPT). I use the SPT to examine the process of institutional layering and the prospects of establishing a more permanent multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia. I conclude by summarizing my key arguments and offering brief comments on regional identity and the idea of an East Asian community.

From Bilateralism to Multilateralism

East Asian Multilateralism

At the start of the post-Cold War era, Aaron Friedberg noted the “thin gruel” of Asian regional institutions in contrast to Europe’s “thick alphabet soup.” Asia’s soup still needs to “thicken.” But one will definitely take note of more floating alphabets today compared to the early 1990s. These include the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN + 3, ASEAN + 6, and the East Asian Summit (EAS) to name a few. Other regional institutions such as the Korean Economic Development Organization (KEDO) or the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) have come and gone, either dissolving or evolving into some other institutional arrangement.

Recent scholarship also attests to the growth of East Asia multilateralism over the past decade. These volumes vary in their outlook regarding the prospect of multilateralism in Asia. Scholars optimistic about Asian regionalism highlight the potential growth of an East Asian regional community. This community is not necessarily based on formal institutions, but through informal ties and networks. Production chains, network ties, and shared norms all contribute to the formation of a regional identity.

Others take a more functionalist approach and see multilateral institutions as a product of specific needs arising from crises or evolving structural conditions in East Asia. A functionalist or utilitarian approach takes greater stock of formal institutionalization. The number of multilateral institutions has certainly increased over time. This fact alone is noteworthy given the continued reliance on and legitimacy of bilateralism as the basis of regional security. Even Beijing, which suspiciously eyes bilateralism as a constraint directed against its rise, acknowledges U.S. military presence as a stabilizing force. Realist-functionalists do see an increasing role for multilateral arrangements as the regional environment evolves or as new issues and crises emerge. However, they fall somewhere between ambivalent and skeptical on the question of an emerging East Asian community, particularly one rooted in multilateral institutions. Realist-functionalists do not rule out the future growth of a more permanent regional security institution. However, Asia’s new multilateralism “is still at a stage where it is best understood as an extension and intersection of national power and purpose.” In the foreseeable future, the regional security architecture will be characterized by overlapping multilateral institutions layered on top of the hub-and-spokes bilateral system...(Continued)