EAI Middle Power Diplomacy Initiative Policy Recommendation 2

Author

Sungjin Kim is a research professor of the Green School (Graduate School of Energy and Environment) at Korea University. Prior to this, he was a researcher at Science and Technology Policy Institute. He has also spent time teaching at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Kookmin University, and University of Seoul. He received his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. in International Relations from Seoul National University. His work focuses on global environmental politics and influence of technology in politics.

Climate change is considered one of the most important issues for which the international community must come together to address. The global climate change regime is at a crossroads between extinction and survival. Discussions on the specifics of the post-Kyoto regime, which began at COP13 in 2007, are still adrift due to disagreements over whether developing nations should be subject to binding emission commitments as well as over emission targets and timeframe. A final decision on the post-Kyoto regime after 2020 is planned to be made in 2015 at COP21 in Paris, but prospects are not rosy.

Since 2008, South Korea has made significant strides on the climate change front. The nation has carried out active climate change diplomacy under the banner of ‘Low Carbon Green Growth.’ On the back of this effort, the nation is now the host of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) secretariat and has turned ‘Green Growth ’into a distinctive national brand.

Amid the changing landscape in global climate change politics, Korea must solidify its national stance and make proposals in regards to the new regime. Korea is currently the world’s seventh largest CO2 emitter, and the nation’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are consistently on the rise. Hence, Korea must actively engage in global climate change negotiations in order to avoid major losses while contributing to bringing about a global agreement. Korea’s proposals must be founded on careful consideration of how the various options regarding the structure and mechanisms of a post-Kyoto regime and resulting scenarios may affect Korea’s national interest and international stature. And this has to be based on meticulous observations and calculations on what the next global climate change regime will look like and where the other member countries stand on the matter.

Assuming universal participation as per the Durban Platform, the means of arriving at country-specific emission targets and timeframes will pose the greatest hurdle toward an agreement. There are several possible standards for setting GHG emission targets under the new regime. First is using GHG emissions as a standard. However, an agreement will not be reached if it is proposed that every nation cut its respective total emissions by a set percentage. This is because there will be opposition from China, India, and other developing countries whose emissions are high but whose historical responsibilities for climate change are relatively small. Grandfathering is a method that most respects the independence of member nations as emission targets is set in proportion to current emissions. However, this does not coincide with the goal of cutting GHG emissions to combat climate change. Therefore, the international community is considering per capita and other unit-based emission schemes.

A case-in-point is the ‘contraction & convergence’ approach, which is being examined as a candidate for the post-Kyoto regime. As per this approach, member nations would be required to get their respective per capita emissions to a set global average by a certain year. This approach would ease resistance from China and India, which are high-emitting nations but also very populous.

The second method uses GDP as the standard. The first approach that could be considered involves equalizing the GDP-to-net welfare ratio or the abatement cost ratio for the sake of fairness. However, this would put equal burden on developed and developing nations, the latter whose historical responsibility for climate change is relatively small. As such, an agreement would be difficult to reach. Another notable approach under consideration is the GHG intensity scheme, wherein emission targets are assigned based on the emissions-to-GDP ratio. By linking GHG emission targets with economic growth, the approach could minimize loss to national economic competitiveness. However, the principle of fairness may be compromised because of the approach’s heavy emphasis on growth.

The third is a mixed approach. It would involve creating an integrated national portfolio comprised of population, per capita GDP, cumulative emissions, total emissions, per capita emissions, rate of emissions increase, and GHG intensity. An example of a mixed approach currently in use is that of Greenhouse Development Rights (GDR). GDR uses per capita cumulative emissions and GDP as a mixed indicator for a given nation’s responsibility and capacity. A multi-stage approach could also be considered. With this approach, different emission goals and timeframe would be assigned in consideration of the member nations’ divergent stages of development. Multiple stages could be set up, from the commitment-free lowest stage to the highest stage of the most stringent binding commitments, and in so doing, engender gradual changes in national systems.

The fourth is a bottom-up approach wherein emissions targets are not set and left to the discretion of each nation. If this approach were adopted, nations would only cooperate in the areas of technology transfers, financial support, and emissions trading. There would be no obligations to fulfill, so member countries could carry out self-regulating and voluntary GHG emissions efforts. This bottom-up approach is called ‘intended nationally determined contributions (INDC).’ Governments have focused and evaluated positively INDC since COP19 in Warsaw. Currently, the possibility that it will be accepted as the post-Kyoto regime in COP21 is very high. However, the scheme is lacking in terms of accountability and consistency, so its impact would be limited in tackling an issue of as great a global importance and urgency as climate change.

The Korean government must make detailed calculations on the benefits and drawbacks that each of these options would entail for Korea and rank the options accordingly. In addition, it must also think beyond national interest and thoroughly deliberate on the fairest and most effective means of inducing universal participation before starting negotiations. This must be accompanied by government-wide information exchanges and the clear delineation of Korea’s position.

Recommendations

1. Korea must Transition from Indistinct Bridge to Active Leader

Korea has defined its diplomatic role in global climate change politics as a ‘bridge’ between developed and developing nations. An important function of middle-power diplomacy is indeed mediating between advanced and developing countries when disagreements arise. In terms of vision, however, Korea’s climate change diplomacy lacks clear character and has remained indistinct, merely lingering in the ‘bridge’ rhetoric. Despite being an OECD member nation, Korea has a developing nation status in the UNFCCC and do not have binding commitments even for the second commitment period. Korea announced that it would take the initiative and lead by example by adopting the highest possible emission target for a developing nation (30% cut from BAU levels by 2020). However, Korea also made it clear that the pledge was voluntary and nonbinding. That is, Korea has expounded colorful diplomatic rhetoric but only went so far as proposing a voluntary emission goal.

As of 2012, Korea had the world’s 15th-highest GDP, 31st highest per capita GDP, and 7th highest level of CO2 emissions. If despite its global stature, Korea does not take on any meaningful responsibilities and merely stresses its developing-nation status and the accompanying commitment exemption, it is bound to be criticized by advanced countries. From the standpoint of developing nations, in the meantime, Korea’s Green Growth strategy may be construed as more growth- rather than green-oriented and thus merely replicating the climate-change–inducing activities of advanced nations. To avoid being regarded as a fence-sitter reaping the benefits of both sides of the fence, Korea must take sincere and meaningful action while also assuming active leadership responsibilities. Furthermore, the nation must come up with a more detailed definition of ‘Green Growth’ and draw on its knowledge competencies to devise and disseminate Green Growth implementation strategies to faithfully carry out its norm diffuser role as a middle power.

2. Korea must Craft Meaningful Leadership Approaches on the International Stage

To strengthen its leadership role, Korea must find areas of specialized focus and actively propose them to the international community. Korea has developed unique mechanisms like unilateral CDM and the NAMA registry, suggested them to the international community, and contributed to addressing climate change. They were effective ideas Korea could propose as a developing country. However, it is now time for Korea to engage in diplomatic efforts befitting a middle power. To this end, there are several ideas Korea could consider.

2a. Korea must Contribute to Creating a Long-term Fund to Assist Developing Countries.

Korea should draw up a strategy so that it can play an active role in global climate fund negotiations while proposing measures that will place the GCF at the center of the efforts to long-term capitalization under the new global change regime. In this regard, President Park Geun-hye’s speech at the UN Climate Summit was appropriate, urging funding for the GCF and reiterating Korea’s commitment to responsibly fulfilling its funding pledge. Korea must make use of diverse regimes, such as the G-20 and APEC, to persistently push for the completion of GCF’s business model and the capitalization of GCF...(Continued)