Author

Nae-Young Lee
(Dept. of Political Science, Korea University, nylee@korea.ac.kr)

Paper prepared for a Workshop on “America in Question: Korean Democracy and the Challenge of Non-Proliferation on the Peninsula,” May 10-11, 2005, Seoul Korea.

During the last half century, the ROK-US alliance has been considered a great success. The alliance has served as an effective security framework to deter North Korean aggression. In addition, it has helped to create a stable environment for economic dynamism and democratic consolidation within South Korea. Yet, the alliance now lie at the crossroads. The change in the global and regional strategic environment in Northeast Asia, the increasing perception gap between the United States and South Korea about threats from North Korea, and policy divergence between the two governments have produced tension, fissure, and mutual distrust between the two allies. Therefore, there are mounting doubts and pessimism about the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance. At a recent academic conference, Cato Institute researcher Doug Bandow said the U.S. has no vital interests in Korea that justify huge costs and sacrifice, and that the two nations need to prepare for divorce (Bandow, 2005).

There have been many signs of rift in the recent bilateral relations. Last March, President Roh Moo-hyun announced that South Korea needs to play the role of “balancer” in Northeast Asia. Even though the Korean government argues that a regional balancer role is based on a strong Korea-U.S. alliance, critics argue that Roh’s stance is shaking the half-century old alliance and that Seoul may be giving the impression it will weaken ties with Washington and maintain a neutral position with Washington or Beijing on regional issues.1 In early April, USFK announced that it will cut up to 1,000 jobs of South Korean employees at U.S. military bases and might withdraw some combat equipment from the peninsula because of reduced financial support from South Korea.

Moreover, a significant erosion of public support for the alliance is considered to further create obstacles for the alliance. The recent wave of anti-Americanism in South Korea has produced a rift in the ROK-U.S. alliance.2 Anti-Americanism in Korea has suddenly gained visibility since the ‘candle light protests’ of November and December 2002 in Seoul. The surge of anti-Americanism in December 2002 was qualitatively different in size and duration from previous incidents that manifested the anti-American sentiment. It was by far, the largest anti-American demonstration ever to be held in South Korea. As anti-Americanism was on the increase in South Korea, tensions were also rising on the Korean peninsula mainly because North Korea declared it would renew its nuclear weapons program. In the past, there had been a general pattern of increased public support for the ROK-U.S. alliance whenever a threat to national security arose. In December 2002, anti-Americanism continued to grow regardless of the nuclear standoff with North Korea.

Many journalists, both in South Korea and the United States, reported that rising anti-Americanism despite increasing security threats from North Korea inflicted major damage on the ROK-U.S. alliance. They argued that anti-Americanism in South Korea reflect a negative image of South Korea to the American public and U.S. government, and could lead to negative consequences such as the withdrawal of the USFK.

3 In winter 2002, anti-Americanism in South Korea was expected to remain for a long time as a source of conflict within Korean society, and pose as an obstacle to ROK-U.S. relations. However, the opinion polls from June 2003 to July 2004 show that anti-Americanism in South Korea has substantially waned. The results showed that public opinion on the ROK-U.S. alliance and USFK reversed from negative to positive and a favorable perception on the U.S. and the ROK-U.S alliance arose among the Korean public.

The main aim of this paper is to examine the changes in public attitude and perception towards the U.S. over the past two years. The empirical data used for the paper are based on polls conducted jointly by the East Asia Institute and the Joong-Ang Daily, Hankook Daily, and Chicago Council of Foreign Relations in December 2002, June 2003, February 2004, and July 2004. Conducted four times with an approximate six-month interval using a similar questionnaire, the opinion poll outcomes are useful in discerning the changes in public attitude towards ROK-U.S. relations...(Continued)