지난 2월과 4월 <2•29 합의>와 장거리 로켓발사라는 북한의 이중적 신호와 관련한 김양규 · 스티븐 레인저(Stephen Ranger) EAI 아시아안보연구센터 연구원의 기고문, "The Deal and the Rocket: Understanding North Korea’s ‘Inconsistency’"이 국제정치안보네트워크(International Relations and Security Network: ISN)의 ISN Blog에 게재되었습니다. 김양규 · 스티븐 레인저 연구원은 기고문을 통해 북한이 이중적 신호를 보내고 있는 배경을 살펴보고, 북한의 추가 도발 방지 및 북핵문제 해결을 위한 국제사회 공조 방안을 제시하였습니다. 스위스의 취리히 연방공대(Swiss Federal Institute of Technology: ETH Zurich) 산하 안보연구소(Center for Security Studies)는 1994년부터 국제정치 및 안보 연구의 발전을 위해 유관 연구기관 및 전문가들의 연구 결과물을 공유하는 '국제정치안보네트워크' 디지털 플랫폼을 구축하고 운영해 왔으며, EAI는 2011년 10월부터 EAI의 연구결과물을 ISN을 통해 세계 지식 공동체와 공유하고 있습니다.

 

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The Deal and the Rocket: Understanding North Korea’s “Inconsistency”

 

It is becoming all too common for North Korea to engage in provocative behavior in order to grab international attention. This time around though, the announcement by North Korea on March 16, 2012, to conduct a satellite launch seemed to catch the Obama administration particularly off guard. For the United States, this latest provocation went completely against the spirit of the Leap Day Deal agreed to only two weeks before in which North Korea would freeze its uranium enrichment activities and place a moratorium on further missile and nuclear tests in exchange for U.S. humanitarian assistance.

 

While this satellite launch could be expected for a country committed to military-first politics and in the context of the celebrations for the centenary of the birth of Kim Il-sung, the pursuit of the Leap Day Deal comes across as a redundant effort. Following the satellite launch, reports are now emerging that North Korea will conduct a nuclear test which will have further implications. Given that the satellite launch and a nuclear test would scupper any agreement with the United States, why did North Korea bother to show up and negotiate the deal?

 

We may consider two scenarios that rest upon how to interpret the meaning of the Leap Day Deal. The first is that this reveals inconsistencies in the regime’s decision-making process; specifically that Kim Jong-un is unable to establish his own strategy. This is based on the belief that there is little logic in concluding an agreement with the United States shortly before making the announcement to conduct the satellite launch. From North Korea’s perspective, it would surely make more sense to carry out the provocation first, draw in attention from the international community, and then try to negotiate later. Concluding an agreement and then breaking it within such a short period would yield few tangible benefits. Such inconsistencies in the decision-making process would also indicate that some kind of internal debate or even power struggle exists within the regime.

 

An important point to consider is that the satellite launch was apparently decided upon by Kim Jong-il before his death in December 2011, which would mean Kim Jong-un had little choice but to carry it out. In this regard, the second scenario holds that the pursuit of the Lead Day Deal reflects efforts by the Kim Jong-un regime to signal its true intentions to initiate dialogue. This tells us that the Kim Jong-un regime is struggling to cope with the legacy of his father’s rule while also seeking to develop his own policies. Knowing that the satellite launch would be considered an extremely provocative act, the Leap Day Deal was a way to indicate to the United States that it has sincere intentions to come back to the Six-Party Talks...(Continued)

 

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