The last twenty years have witnessed fundamental changes in the international landscape with the end of the Cold War, the events of 9/11, and more recently the Global Financial Crisis. The threats and challenges that the ROK-U.S. alliance faces in the twenty-first century are all derived from these changes. Following the Global Financial Crisis, the influence of the United States as the global superpower is relatively declining while the hegemonic voice of China is becoming louder. At the same time, the future of North Korea is uncertain with the ongoing delicate succession process of handing power from the frail Kim Jong-il to his young and inexperienced son Kim Jong-eun. These international shifts raise significant questions yet also provide an opportunity to prepare for a new era.

 

The East Asia Institute and the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) jointly held the 4th “ROK-U.S. Alliance Conference” with support from Pyeongtaek City. The topic for this conference was “ROK-U.S. Alliance: Planning for the Future” and brought together a number of scholars, experts, politicians, and media from both South Korea and the United States. Reflecting the future challenges, the conference held three sessions looking at the changing strategic environment, non-military planning for Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) collapse, and the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance. The following is a summary of the main points and policy recommendations from the discussions in each of the sessions.

 

Session I: The Changing Strategic Environment and its Implications for the Alliance

 

Coping with the Rise of China

 

- The ROK-U.S. alliance must understand the impact of China’s leadership transition process.

In the run-up to China’s leadership transition in 2012, Beijing has been evidently more vocal in its foreign policy toward Washington. Efforts must be made by the alliance to understand the impact of the political competition at work during this delicate transition period. By understanding the domestic context, it will be possible to interpret China’s limits and expectations on the world stage.

 

- China’s support for North Korea will run counter to its own interests.

In 2010, North Korea twice launched belligerent action against South Korea, the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. In both cases, China backed North Korea without question as it reaffirmed its close partnership. This support makes it difficult for the ROK-U.S. alliance to contain the DPRK’s threats. China’s continued support for the North Korean regime in spite of provocative actions will work counter to its stated goal of peace and stability in the region.

 
- The U.S.-China Summit is an opportunity to pressure China on North Korea.

The U.S.-China Summit in January 2011 is a good opportunity to persuade China to increase its pressure on North Korea. Currently, Beijing holds most of the cards in dealing with Pyongyang and can exert a great deal of influence through its aid and diplomatic support.

Countering the North Korean Threat

 

- South Korea must deal with North Korea’s limited warfare threat.

Both the sinking of the Cheonan and the attack on Yeonpyeong Island revealed North Korea’s ability to wage limited warfare without incurring a destructive full-scale war. The attacks also revealed shortcomings in South Korea’s ability to efficiently respond and manage such crises. In order to cope with this asymmetrical threat, Seoul needs to enhance its policy planning regarding which direction Pyongyang’s strategy is heading. Such forward thinking will be critical for managing tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

 

- Seoul must close the gap between its words and deeds toward North Korea.

The Lee Myung-bak administration in South Korea has come under a brunt of domestic criticism for the way it has handled North Korea’s provocations. Particularly following the Yeonpyeong Island attack, Seoul was accused of failing to respond adequately to a direct threat. In response, the Lee administration has been stepping up its rhetoric against North Korea. However, this echoes much of what was voiced before following the sinking of the Cheonan. This shows that there is a gap between words and deeds in Seoul’s response to Pyongyang’s aggression. It is critical that in the future, rhetoric and strong words match actions and responses on the ground. Yet this must only be utilized having taken into account all possible consequences. Any gap in this regard will likely be taken advantage of by the North Korean regime to deadly affect.

 

- The alliance should continue to pressure North Korea through international organizations.

Bringing about international attention and pressure on North Korea can be very effective for not only resolving the situation but also gaining credibility for South Korea.

Soft Power and the Alliance

 

- The benefits of soft power must be utilized by the alliance.

Soft power is becoming more evident in international relations as governments increasingly invest in their public diplomacy resources. The ROK-U.S. alliance could enhance its role overseas by using its soft power.

 

- South Korea’s soft power can be used to engage North Korea.

South Korea should do more to use its soft power toward North Korea. In fact, the Republic of Korea’s democracy and prosperity is a soft power asset that is already having a major impact upon the North Korean regime and wider population. Radio broadcasts and the use of cell phones among ordinary North Koreans will help to spread further the soft power of South Korea.

 

Session II: Non-Military Planning for DPRK Collapse

 

Stability of the North Korean Regime 

 

- There is a need to distinguish instability from collapse.

Predictions of North Korea’s imminent collapse were prominent at the end of the Cold War. They have resurged again with Kim Jong-il’s deteriorating health and growing internal difficulties related to the succession process. However, there needs to be a deeper understanding of the current situation in North Korea which means categorizing the difference between instability and collapse. The North Korean regime may be suffering instability but this cannot be considered state collapse as it still exercises an iron fist upon the country.

 

- A failing central economy does not translate into overall economic collapse.

The collapse of the central economy in the 1990s and the ongoing economic problems in North Korea should not be interpreted as signs of a wider collapse. Since the famine of the 1990s and the collapse of the state Public Distribution System, North Koreans have engaged in market activities to survive. This unofficial economy has prolonged the survival of the system and allowed the population to muddle along despite efforts by the regime to control these activities.

Preparations for Collapse

 

- Military planning must not ignore civilian contingency planning.

While the military is expected to take the lead in a post-DPRK collapse scenario, civilian planning must also figure in military planning. Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, one of the greatest failings was the lack of civilian planning. State collapse in North Korea means collapse of all institutions including public services. It will be of critical importance to gain the support of the population through effective contingency planning to cope with such a power vacuum. 

 

- The alliance needs to examine what contacts exist in North Korea.

At present, South Korea and international organizations have some contacts on the ground in North Korea. These range from the South Korean-operated Kaesong Industrial Park to international aid programs, all of which involve cooperation with local DPRK officials. Such contacts could be used in future contingencies to facilitate operations and dialogue with the wider population.

 

- Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) must be involved in planning.

NGOs can play an important role in state collapse scenarios, with extensive experience and expertise in areas that governments often find hard to operate in. Many NGOs have had long experience of operating in North Korea and will have important contacts that could support aid operations. While cooperation with these NGOs will be vital, the government must sill lead the way as they will be providing basic security. 

 

- Which DPRK institutions should be maintained in North Korea following any collapse must be considered.

An important question following the collapse of the DPRK is to what extent should existing institutions be maintained. Following the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. military disbanded many state institutions including the military which resulted in a power vacuum that fermented instability and violence. Which institutions should be preserved and which should be removed is a fundamental question that needs to be answered at an early stage. 

Coping with China’s Role in Future Contingencies

 

- China’s interests in North Korea need to be taken into account.

China has significant investments in North Korea, including ports and islands it has leased for extended periods. It would be easy to forget about China’s interests due to the euphoria from the prospect of unification. It is possible to imagine that following such a collapse China will make a move to secure those investments. An example would be Russia’s actions at the end of the Kosovo War in 1999 where it moved its troops to occupy the main airport before NATO forces arrived. In this regard, it is important that the ROK-U.S. alliance does not provoke a proactive response from China. The interests of Beijing must be noted and considered following any DPRK collapse scenario. Considering the sensitive nature of such discussions, Track 1 or 1.5 dialogues would help to bridge misunderstandings...(Continued)

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Session I

Moderator 
Sook-Jong Lee

 

Presenters 
Victor Cha
Kang Choi
Evans Revere

Session II

 

Moderator 
Abraham Denmark

 

Presenters 
Patrick Cronin
Beomchul Shin

Session III

 

Moderator 
Young-Sun Ha

 

Presenters 
Abraham Denmark
Du Hyeogn Cha
Markus Garlauskas