Jaewoo Choo is Chair and Associate Professor of Chinese foreign policy in the Department of Chinese Studies at Kyung Hee University, Korea. Prior to his teaching at Kyung Hee, Professor Choo worked as a researcher at a number of think tanks in Korea.

At least for the time being, China’s foreign policy goals are focused on the preservation of the status quo in its peripheries, including the Korean Peninsula. China sees its long absence of war or military conflict as evidence of the well-preserved peace and stability of its security environment. Conversely, it conceives that this status quo has been conducive to achieving its foremost national goal, economic modernization. It continues to strive to improve its security environment within the equilibrium.

There seems to be one growing exception, however, in the case of the Korean Peninsula, however. China’s support for the replacement of the Korean War Armistice with a peace agreement and a peace regime is in stark contrast to its status quo policy. Given China’s long advocacy as a peace-loving nation, it seems only logical that putting an end to Korea’s current technically-at-war status would make sense. Beijing has its own reasoning and logic behind its supportive call for a new peace arrangement on the peninsula. A confrontational international structure around the peninsula, for instance, can only be overcome by a peace agreement, a precondition necessitated by the Armistice. Hence, a peace agreement before normalization of this structure is perceived to be path-dependent.

However, serious challenges arise if a call for a peace agreement and regime is put forth without much thinking regarding the strategic implications. Chinese scholars and experts tend to overlook this factor in their appraisal. On the surface, theirs is a just and righteous call that a peace agreement must replace the Armistice. It is critical to the installment of “perpetual peace” on the peninsula. It is also logical that such peace can be guaranteed by forging a peace regime, an assurance mechanism that will supplement the “peace” endowed by the agreement.

If Chinese claims are correct, why are they not embraced by others? There must be something wrong in what the Chinese widely believe. Although their analysis of the imperatives for a peace agreement and regime is undeniable, as we shall see, their call for a peace agreement and regime still remains contradictory to the status quo orientation of their mother country’s foreign policy. Moreover, their work seems to lack insight regarding the strategic and structural implications of the full implementation of such a peace arrangement. Furthermore, Chinese pundits must define the meaning of a new peace in a more articulated way in the context of a new regional order to effectively defend their nation’s support for a peace agreement and regime.

Chinese Reading of a Peace Agreement and Peace Regime

The Chinese government and analysts highly value the idea of replacing the Armistice with a peace agreement and forging a peace regime as an operational framework for such an arrangement. China sees these two steps as an alternative choice to so-called cross-recognition of the two Koreas by their neighboring states. Since the latter has not materialized, China sees the call for a peace agreement and regime as a resultant development. A peace agreement and regime are viewed as a better alternative to North Korea and those who do not have formal ties to it, namely the United States and Japan. Chinese experts argue that a peace agreement between the United States and North Korea, for instance, would be a critical prerequisite to the normalization of their relationship and the further consolidation of peace and stability on the peninsula.

Chinese scholars and analysts (“Chinese” hereafter) are highly appreciative of their government’s longtime support for the ideas of replacing the Armistice with a peace agreement and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. China’s support can be traced as far back as 1973, when the two Koreas first mentioned a “peace agreement” in their joint statement, also known as the “July 4 Joint Statement.” Since then, the Chinese further highlight that regardless of who has initiated the discussions on a peace agreement and regime, the Chinese government has consistently conveyed strong support both in action and in words. During the first discourse of formal negotiations prompted by the so-called Four-Party Talks from 1997 to 1999, the Chinese further elaborate, China declared its desire to play a proactive role and make constructive contributions. As evidence of its stance, for instance, it delivered five principles for the reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula and four points for the establishment of a peace regime at the fourth plenary session of the Four-Party Talks in January 1999.

Most Chinese defend their government’s position on the basis of the following four imperatives.

1. A new trend in history

The Chinese claim that historical imperatives imply the need to overcome the prevalence of “Cold War thinking” held by the major powers and the two Koreas, which is still very much perpetuated by the Armistice. In other words, such thinking must transform into something more fit and suitable to the current phase of development in world history, that is, the “post–Cold War” world. In the post–Cold War era, the Chinese believe that economic security overrides traditional security on the priority list of the foreign policy agenda; prosperity and development are the key concerns of nations; sustainable development is the theme of the twenty-first century; and dialogue and cooperation, rather than confrontation and alliance, are the preferred means to solving international conflicts. In sum, new thinking is needed to serve the interests of the people and nations living in a new century.

The last time the Chinese government publicly expressed its concern over the remnants of Cold War thinking was in May 2008 during South Korean president Lee Myong-bak’s visit to Beijing. The spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when asked about the Korea-U.S. alliance, depicted it as “a product of a bygone era.” He further elaborated the reasoning behind his statement as based on a premise that the situation in Northeast Asia has changed and the regional issues should not be viewed through a Cold War lens. From Beijing’s perspective, Cold War thinking is strongly embedded in the South Korea-U.S. alliance.

Chinese scholars and experts hold a similar view on the issue. They are explicit in their argument in relating the South Korea–U.S. alliance as a factor in those allies’ Cold War way of handling North Korea and security on the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese still see the South Korea–U.S. alliance as a dominating factor in shaping the perception of the North in Washington and Seoul. In the Chinese assessment, Cold War thinking is one of the major obstacles to the realization of “perpetual peace” on the Korean Peninsula.

To substantiate their argument, the Chinese highlight those issues underscored by America’s outdated and outmoded strategic calculus and behavior. Although the Clinton administration once adopted an “engagement policy” toward the North, a “containment policy” eclipsed it. Strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance was vigorously pursued beginning in 1997 by expanding the scope and range of the Japanese military forces’ maneuverability to support U.S. military activities within their vicinity. Moreover, the U.S. push of Japan and South Korea to host the so-called Theatre Missile Defense system, the Chinese argue, is another controversial aspect of the U.S. engagement policy. The Chinese interpret it as American unwillingness to offer security assurance to the North and the adversarial perception upheld by the United States regarding the North.

The Chinese find a similar trait in measures adopted for the South Korea–U.S. alliance in 2003. While the United States justified its military presence for the sake of the “peace and stability” of the Korean Peninsula, the Chinese counterargue that the U.S. decision at the fifth U.S.-ROK Future Alliance Policy Planning meeting to transform the forces into one with greater flexibility and much greater forward deployment capability is a salient example of America’s Cold War thinking. To the Chinese, the U.S. factor is the critical variable for the realization of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

Furthermore, the Chinese argue that the United States did not fare any better with a leadership change thereafter, as the new administration shifted its policy orientation on North Korea to containment. The Chinese find the cause of America’s refusal to continue the agreed framework with the North in the United States’ ever worsening perception of the North, once dubbed part of an “axis of evil” and a rogue state. In the eyes of the Chinese, the United States wanted to seek “peace and stability” in a rather hard fashion. The fact that the possibility of subverting the regime in Pyongyang received full consideration in Washington validates the Chinese argument. They further proclaim that America’s inconsistent, even contradictory, policy toward North Korea is a significant risk factor for the stability and peace supposedly guaranteed by the current Armistice.

2. Changes on diplomatic fronts

Observing the changes on the diplomatic fronts of North Korea, Chinese analysts attribute the obsoleteness of the Armistice to this factor. Although North Korea adamantly remained a hermit kingdom throughout much of the 1990s despite the demise of the bipolar system, it decided to come out of its isolation in diplomatic terms at the dawn of a new century. The Chinese argue that the changes on both North Korea’s diplomatic fronts and posture function as a requisite international condition to replace the Armistice by a peace agreement. Hence, such a peace agreement will be feasible because a peace mechanism will be effectively at work as a result of the North’s improved relations with the West.

Beginning in 2000, North Korea normalized relations with Italy, Australia, and Great Britain. It also joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that year. In the first half of the following year, it established diplomatic relations with the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, Spain, Germany, Luxembourg, Greece, Brazil, New Zealand, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Turkey. As of today, the North has diplomatic relationships with twenty-five of twenty-seven EU nations, and is also formally recognized by the European Union. North Korea’s successive normalization with the western European states is significant because most of them once fought against the North in the Korean War.

In addition, North Korea was also given a chance to normalize its relationship with the United States if it abided by all the requirements provided in the so-called 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework (the “Framework” hereafter). However, the North’s desire to improve relations with the United States failed to witness any progress other than symbolic, yet historic, visits by North Korean general Cho Myong-rok to New York in 1999 and then secretary Madeline Albright to Pyongyang in 2000...(Continued)