The 8th EAI GlobalNet 21 Forum was held at Mae-hwa Hall in Press Center on Feb. 13.

The presenter was Robert J. EINHORN, a senior adviser in the CSIS International Security Program, where he works on a broad range of nonproliferation, arms control, and other national security issues. Before coming to CSIS, he served in the U.S. government for 29 years. From November 1999 to August 2001, he was assistant secretary for nonproliferation at the Department of State, where he was responsible for nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, missile delivery systems, and advanced conventional arms.

The topic of this forum was “U.S. Policy toward North Korea”. The Summary is as follows:
He first noted that Bush Administration policy toward North Korea has been marked by division. He identified three major groups struggling to define American policy toward North Korea: hardliners, transformers and moderates.

The hardliner group believes that making new nuclear deal would be a mistake given North Korean track record. The group considers that North Korea treats getting rid of nuclear and giving up the regime same so North Korea would surely cheat on any agreement. For this reason, it is uncomfortable with the Six-Party Talks Joint Statement on 19th, September 2005 and, therefore, this group continues opposing bilateral agreement between U.S. and North Korea. The hardliners support a more moderate position only tactically, because they think talks will fail, mobilizing international pressure in North Korea. They have also seized on the anti-counterfeiting measures as a way to destabilize the regime.

The transformer group does not like Kim Jong Il and it shares the hardliner skepticism about the regime giving up its nuclear weapons. It doubts America can undermine the North Korean regime especially without assistance from South Korea or Japan and see no choice but to negotiate. The transformers are more positive than hardliners’ opinion about South Korea’s assistance that is used to leverage North Korea’s independence. It would offer tangible rewards to North Korea in an agreement only for tangible improvement in market mechanisms, human rights, and military policies. Also, the transformers are positive about the Roh government efforts, but think that South Korean aid must be more conditional and used to produce change in the North. The transformers see anti-counterfeiting measures as additional negotiating leverage.

The moderate group likewise thinks regime collapse is unlikely and hopes to see change in the North, but it is less confident than the transformers that nuclear agreement will provide sufficient leverage. It does not think an agreement should be held hostage to transformational goals, but that progress should be matched with reward. The moderates would still pursue anti-counterfeiting measures, but less aggressively or visibly. Similarly, the moderates believe bilateral talks between America and North Korea are a good way to let the North know what they would need to do to be rewarded.

Einhorn concluded by remarking that there is a lot over overlap in Washington among the three groups, even within individual positions. However, a common conclusion for all is that there is not viable military option. He said it was unclear which group would prevail, but that President Bush does not need to make a decision while keeping its nuclear weapons and pursuing the current strategy, while the Bush Administration may see little benefit in moving toward normalized relations. Therefore, further progress will require North Korea seriously coming to the negotiating table and the Bush Administration making a credible statement that it will normalize relations if the North gives up its nuclear weapons...(Continued)