Abstract   

The future security environment in East Asia will be influenced in several ways: the continued U.S effort to maintain its global influence, China’s strategy to expand its influence in the region, the two countries’ reciprocal interactions, the capacity for resource mobilization which effects their strategic decisions, and the corresponding reaction of East Asian countries. In particular, the financial crisis is proving to have had a far more negative effect on the resource mobilization capacity of the United States than on China. The financial crisis has further created anxieties toward the U.S.-centered political economic structure, weakening the justification and reliance on the so-called unipolar world order that prevailed during the twenty years following the end of the Cold War. With China continuously maintaining a high growth rate even after the financial crisis and becoming the greatest holder of American debt, the relative decline of the United States in the economic sector is now an undeniable reality. China has increasingly asserted itself in East Asia and this new posture highlights the potential for confrontation in U.S.-China relations. Following the financial crisis, East Asia’s security environment will not go through a fundamental change that involves drastic shifts in power. Rather the effects of the crisis will be felt in an indirect but comprehensive way that will have an impact on East Asian countries’ perspectives and resource mobilizing capacities in the mid to long run.

It is still unclear whether future U.S.-China relations in East Asia will show a confrontation over influence or comprehensive cooperation to meet transnational security challenges. However, if the two countries were to succeed in re-identifying each other’s interests in terms of common goals in the region, within a multilateral cooperative network, it would be possible to expect stability in East Asia. Of course there are certain pitfalls; firstly regarding short-term policy, it is really hard to find common ground between the “offshore balancing strategy” of the United States and China’s policies for defending its “core interests.” Secondly, the financial crisis may lead to strengthened bilateral interdependence, but it could also lead to deteriorating security relations between the two as the crisis has incited unilateral approaches.

The Cheonan incident is a very good example of this kind of pitfall. The tug-of-war between the two regarding the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises in the Yellow Sea which included the participation of the USS George Washington aircraft carrier revealed the intense power struggle between them. This was very different from their previous official position towards each other, which included China as a “responsible stakeholder.” It is possible to say that the United States successfully maintained its influence in this region following the Cheonan incident and its subsequent strong measures of support for South Korea. The relocation issue of the U.S. Marine Corps base in Okinawa also concluded in a favorable way to the United States. Meanwhile China also tried to secure its influence in the region. By expressing strong opposition toward the joint U.S.-ROK exercises in the Yellow Sea and the subsequent modification in the scale of the exercises, China successfully secured respect from the United States that the Yellow Sea was under their exclusive area of influence. This case clearly shows that the two countries have no intention of giving up their respective influence in East Asia. We can then expect that the logic of balance of power will prevail for some time in the region.

In this regard, it would be inappropriate and naive to expect that the future military security order in East Asia will not experience conflict because the Cold War-era has ended. It is always possible that tension can increase in the areas where the parties’ core interest is not at stake. Although the Global Financial Crisis had an impact on slowing down military buildup in the region, the recent provocations by North Korea has cast a negative effect back on the region. However, it is important to remember that it can be not only expensive but also dangerous to pursue unilateral security as it can easily fall into the pitfall of a security dilemma. Long-term security can be established through multilateral cooperation. If this basic principle could be widely shared among East Asian countries, it could be possible to manage security relations in the region more effectively.

The full text in Korean is available here