Joel S. Wit is a Senior Fellow at the U.S.-Korea Institute (USKI), Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Mr. Wit previously served as an official at the U.S. State Department and as Senior Advisor to Ambassador Robert L. Galluci from 1993-1995 and as Coordinator for the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework from 1995-1999. He was also a key participant in the establishment of the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organization (KEDO). He has written numerous articles on North Korea and nonproliferation and is the coauthor of the book Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Brookings Institution Press, 2004). At USKI, Mr. Wit is managing the 38 North program (http://38north.org), a website devoted to analysis of North Korea.

Summary

How effective has the U.S. “strategic patience” been towards North Korea? Mr. Joel Wit, Senior Fellow at the U.S.-Korea Institute (USKI), Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), claims that a lack of clear priorities among the U.S. and its allies in dealing with North Korea has led the regime to continue developing its nuclear technology and to seek recognition from other countries as a de facto nuclear state. In the worst case scenario, Mr. Wit argues that North Korea could possess nearly one hundred nuclear weapons by 2020. While some policy makers, including President Obama, have stated that the North Korea is destined to “collapse” at some point in the future, Mr. Wit makes the case that the Kim Jong Un regime is showing no signs of imminent disintegration and hoping to “wait them out” is not the most effective policy. Nor should North Korean policy be seen as one of simple engagement or non-engagement, he argues. Rather, the international community’s response to North Korean aggression should be one which forces Pyongyang to choose between nuclear weapons and economic development via the strategic use of diplomacy in areas such as making sanctions effective, increasing international cooperation, and considering additional military measures when necessary. In light of the various objectives of the key regional actors, this will not be easy. But Mr. Wit argues that such obstacles should not prevent the U.S. from taking a more proactive stance towards North Korea and its nuclear program in the coming years.

“I think our policy has been a disaster. I think that it has not had any effect on North Korea’s nuclear or missile programs, that we have not been able to put sufficient pressure on North Korea to change course ... Overall, the effect has been that North Korea has used the past five years to put in place a foundation for rapidly expanding its nuclear program and for seeking the acceptance of other countries of its status as a nuclear power.”

“A policy towards North Korea should indeed be forcing them to make a choice between nuclear weapons and economic development. We should be looking for ways to sharpen that choice for them.”

Problems in Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Program in the U.S.

• The U.S. policy toward North Korea under the Obama administration has been ineffective. The U.S. has been unable to exert sufficient pressure on Pyongyang to stop its development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and the regime now continues to seek international recognition as a de facto nuclear state.

• It is a long-term fantasy that the North Korean regime will collapse anytime soon. Analysts have constantly underestimated the durability of the North Korean regime, while North Korea has shown for a long time that they are capable of enduring repeated crises.

• South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China all have the divergent interests, and cooperation in regards to North Korea has been difficult to attain. This has been creating space for North Korea to pursue their own agenda.

• It is a mistake to consider denuclearization and nonproliferation as separate issues. Once North Korea acquires more nuclear weapons, the risk of proliferation increases.

Finding an Effective Policy towards North Korea

• The U.S. government should prioritize North Korea’s WMD program in order to prevent a worst case scenario in which North Korea could possess nearly a hundred nuclear weapons by 2020. Among other things, this will also mean that South Korea will be increasingly unable to achieve reunification as envisioned by its current policies. • Informal Track II meetings between the U.S. and North Korea should continue, as they are a valuable way to obtain a more complete picture about what the North Koreans are thinking and the varying strands of thought coming from Pyongyang. The U.S. government should pay more attention to these meetings in order to devise an effective strategy against North Korea.

• The United States and South Korea are the two most important outside parties in terms of North Korean security since North Korea does not consider China, Russia, or Japan as a security threat. These three parties need to reach an agreement if a solution to the nuclear issue is going to be found.

• While it will be difficult for South Korea to take leadership on the North Korean nuclear issue, there are other venues that which Seoul can play an active role such as trying to move forward the inter-Korean dialogue and the Six Party Talks, and enforcing the UN sanctions regime.

• Shaping policy towards North Korea is not about making choices between engagement and not engaging. It is about looking for ways to sharpen the choice for North Korea between nuclear weapons and economic development. This would require making the existing sanctions more effective, pushing China to exert more pressure on Pyongyang, and considering additional military measures to safeguard U.S. and South Korean security. But most importantly, having an effective, active, and aggressive diplomatic strategy would be key in order to realize such goals...(Continued)

Through the Smart Q&A, East Asia Institute (EAI) seeks to offer timely and in-depth analysis on current issues by conducting video interviews with domestic and international experts. EAI takes no institutional position on what is said in the interviews and they are solely the position of the interviewees. This report was prepared by Ben Forney and edited by Jaesung Ryu.