Andrew J. Nathan is Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, and is engaged in long-term research and writing on Chinese foreign policy and on sources of political legitimacy in Asia. Nathan is chair of the steering committee of the Center for the Study of Human Rights and chair of the Morningside Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Columbia. He has co-authored several books on China including Peking Politics, 1918-1923; Chinese Democracy; Popular Culture in Late Imperial China, Human Rights in Contemporary China, and Crisis; The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security. Nathan's articles have appeared in World Politics, The China Quarterly, The Asian Wall Street Journal, and the International Herald Tribune, among others.

 

 


 

 

Summary

 

Is the U.S.–China relationship characterized as one of mutually beneficial cooperation or tempered by discord? Andrew Nathan, Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, argues that while the two sides are cooperative in many aspects, their relationship is punctuated by a deep sense of mistrust between the two powers. However, Dr. Nathan dismisses prospects of power transition by pointing out the closing gap between the U.S. and Chinese capabilities is not as rapid as it was thought to be, and that the security balance remains unlikely to change anytime soon. With respect to the U.S. rebalance strategy, Dr. Nathan views it as a symbolic expression to remind Asia and China in particular of the continued existence of U.S. strategic interests in the region. For countries like North Korea, China may offer an alternative towards modern statehood where the regime can achieve economic development while maintaining control over its people. However, Dr. Nathan points out that it will be difficult for Pyongyang to follow Beijing's footsteps as long as the regime remains unwelcomed by the international community. Dr. Nathan argues that the most pressing challenge for China can be found in the fluid domestic conditions spanning from the Uyghur and Tibetan issues to Hong Kong and Taiwan. According to Dr. Nathan, external connections of minority groups, intellectuals and the civil society make Chinese foreign policy more guarded and defensive against the perceived threat against the regime.

 

In relation to South Korean allegiances, Dr. Nathan stresses the importance of balancing its economic partnership with China and its military alliance with the U.S. while asserting its position as an influential middle power. He also points to the security threat presented by North Korea as a core reason for robust military ties with the U.S., and argues that maintaining such partnership would be in the best interests of South Korea even after unification. Regarding the U.S. THAAD missile defense, Dr. Nathan believes that the South Korea should evaluate whether such a system will prove effective and add value to its security, and that it should also consider what message it hopes to convey to both the U.S. and China in making its decision.

 

“The relationship is intensely two-sided with important areas of cooperation as well as important areas of conflict, and is overlain by a very deep mistrust on both sides. The Chinese see everything that the Americans do as an attempt to protect or even expand American power […] The Americans generally tend to see everything that the Chinese do as a kind of long term strategy to push back at American interests.”

 

The Current State of U.S.–China Relations

- Areas of cooperation and conflict coexists between U.S. and China amid mutual distrust.

- U.S.-China power transition is a premature thought given no foreseeable change in the security balance.

 

• The relationship between U.S. and China today is intensely two-sided with important areas of cooperation as well as areas of conflict. It is overlain by a very deep mistrust on both sides where China sees everything that the U.S. do as an attempt to undermine Chinese interests while the U.S. tend to see everything China does as a kind of long term strategy to push back American interests.

 

• The cooperative side of the U.S.-China relations not only include robust economic ties and student exchange programs, but also the ability to manage areas of potential conflict such as Taiwan and North Korea. They also cooperate in the Iran nuclear talks as well as other global issues, including climate change.

 

• Potential areas of conflict between the U.S. and China can be found in their differing strategic interests throughout the Asia-Pacific. The Chinese consider the U.S.-led alliance system as a security threat given that it surrounds China. For the U.S., security cooperation with its key allies such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines, and partner countries such as Vietnam, Burma, and India are crucial to maintain its influence throughout the region.

 

• It is too early to discuss the notion of power transition between the U.S. and China since China will not be able to overtake U.S. power in any foreseeable future. Recent trends suggest that the relative decline of U.S. capabilities as well as the increase in Chinese capabilities will be protracted and the security balance between the two countries are unlikely to change anytime soon.

 

• The objective of the U.S. rebalance is not to change the status quo in Asia, but to send a signal that the U.S. continues to hold vital interests in Asia and retains the capability to protect such interests. In this sense, the rebalance is more of a symbolic expression, and the U.S. has retained and will likely continue to retain a robust military presence in Asia.

 

The Chinese Model of ‘Modern State’ and International Relations

- Sustaining an authoritarian regime on top of a growing middle class seems implausible, but may be what the Chinese leadership envisions.

- North Korea cannot succeed with Chinese style reform as long as it is not welcomed by the world.

 

• China is an authoritarian system sitting on top of a modern economy and a big middle class. It continues to further institutionalize their system by making it more responsive and accessible to the public while maintaining strong control. The West would view this as a contradiction, but this seems to be the vision for the Chinese leadership.

 

• China is a country with a lot of complexity in large parts of its territory, and those groups all have foreign policy implications. Intellectuals and the civil society are also connected to the outside world in a way that makes the Chinese leadership feel their domestic political system is under attack. Such perception contributes to China's external policies to be guarded and defensive.

 

• It will be difficult for North Korea to adopt the Chinese model as long as the regime remains unwelcomed by the international community. Last year, the UN COI report found North Korea's Kim dynasty to be held accountable for crimes against humanity. Such findings will prevent the U.S. to strike any strategic bargain as it once did with the Chinese during the 1970s.

 

U.S.–China Relations and the Korean Peninsula

- South Korea needs to balance, not tilt, between U.S. and China.

- The deployment of the U.S. THAAD system in South Korea is a decision that South Koreans need to make.

 

• As a major middle power, South Korea needs to balance its position between the U.S. and China by managing Chinese influence and ensuring its alliance with the U.S. This stance would likely continue even after unification.

 

• The question over the U.S. THAAD system requires both technical and political considerations. Technically, South Korea needs to evaluate whether this system will add value to its defense capabilities. Politically, South Korea needs to decide what signals it is sending out to the U.S. and China.

 

• As China puts more public pressure over South Korea, there is more incentive for Seoul to push back by insisting on its autonomous policy-making position. The South Korean government should be able to tell both U.S. and China that its decision will be based on the principles of national sovereignty...(Continued)

 

 


 

 

Through the Smart Q&A, East Asia Institute (EAI) seeks to offer timely and in-depth analysis on current issues by conducting video interviews with domestic and international experts. EAI takes no institutional position on what is said in the interviews and they are solely the position of the interviewees. This report was prepared by Michael Parker and edited by Jaesung Ryu.

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