Analyzing U.S.-China Relations

In studying the dynamics of U.S.-China relations, one of the most important questions is what data should be used. A review of all classified documents from the two countries may be the ideal way to secure reliable data, but it is not viable. Interviews with key officials in the two governments could be the next best choice but it is still extremely hard to know whether that person is telling the truth or not. In this regard, the official statements of the two countries are the only reliable and authoritative source for research. Of course in official statements, propaganda may be included and they cannot always be taken at face value. However, as information is ubiquitous in this era of globalization, a government would pay a tremendous cost if it expresses contradictory policies in its own official statements. We can therefore assume that official statements provide information on the general direction of the two country’s policies.

Which documents can be accepted as official statements? The United States, of course, makes its policies well known throughout the world and has shown high levels of consistency across different departments of the government over its foreign policy. The official statements of the United States are therefore easily accessible through various official government websites including the State Department. On the other hand, China maintains a rather closed socialist system and there are not many documents that could be identified as official statements except for the regular press conferences of the Foreign Ministry. Even with these press conferences, the spokesperson usually responds to selected questions raised by the media. This brings a considerable limitation in collecting official statements from China. In order to address this difficulty, U.S.-China Relations (UCR) Statement Factsheets include editorials of the news outlets run by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as official statements.

Data collection began from November 2010. This period is important because first, it marks one year since the U.S.-China summit in November 2009 and second, it coincides with the G20 Seoul Summit held in November. Particularly the G20 summit was meaningful as it “clearly demonstrated that we are in a period of transition where the United States is no longer the world’s hegemon, yet no new power emerges.” (Sohn and Cho 2010, 1) Third, Xi Jinping was appointed as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission on 18 October, 2010 and is expected to be the next leader of China. This appointment then signals a new period where the next generation of leaders in the CCP will begin to assert their influence and views. For both the statements from the United States and China, English texts are used presented by either the official government department or a CCP-affiliated media outlet. The reason for not using Chinese language sources is that official statements in Chinese tend to be directed at a domestic audience, and the focus here is on the international messages that are being conveyed. The data is collected everyday and published as a monthly report, UCR Statement Factsheet. The UCR Briefing will analyze the UCR Statement Factsheets and summarize what has happened during the period in narrative form. The UCR Briefing will also focus on critical factors and issues in understanding the present and future of U.S.-China relations. This UCR Briefing No. 1 covers official statements of the United States and China from November 2010 to February 2011.

Core Interests and Power Transition

Assuming the power gap between Beijing and Washington could be narrowed or even diminished in the near future, this briefing shares the same concerns with power transition theory; “when a revisionist (or dissatisfied) latecomer overtakes an erstwhile leader of the international system, major war would occur.”(Chan 2007, 2 ; Kugler and Lemke 1996, 7-10) The literature on power transition theory has been focused on the relations between “power transition” and the “outbreak of major wars.” Recent studies though have paid attention to the fact that power transition does not always lead to great wars and has tried to identify the conditions that lead to peaceful transition. Such research points out that it is crucial for two major powers going through power transition to respect each other’s core interests. (Kupchan 2001, 18-33; Zhu 2006, 23) In other words, depending on the degree to which both states show respect to each other’s core interests, positive or negative perceptions will emerge. Once established, these perceptions will intensify according to the logic of “path dependence theory” (Pierson 2000, 251-267), and result in either peaceful transition or war. Therefore, the core interests of each state are certainly important factors that deserve more attention when studying the future direction of U.S.-China relations.

This briefing will first identify the core interests of Beijing and Washington. Then, it will observe the behavior and reaction of the two countries on certain issues which are related to the core interests of each side.

The Core Interests of China and the United States

In identifying the core interests of the two major powers, the Obama administration’s National Security Strategy (The White House 2010) and China’s State Councilor Dai Bingguo’s remarks on the core interests of China during the 2009 Strategic and Economic Dialogue (中国新闻社 2009/07/29; U.S. Department of State 2009) are important documents.

The 2010 National Security Strategy points out four “enduring national interests” which the Obama administration believes the U.S. strategic approach should pursue: security, prosperity, value and international order. For “security,” the strategy focuses on i) nonproliferation and nuclear security, ii) war against a far-reaching network of hatred and violence, and iii) peace and stability in the Middle East. “Prosperity" for the administration is a strong economy that will be the foundation of American leadership. It further stresses that the importance of balanced and sustainable growth will build a stronger foundation for the United States and global economic growth. Regarding “values,” it emphasizes that support for universal values such as human rights and democratic values will enhance efforts to advance security and prosperity.

Strengthening international norms and supporting a “just peace” are argued as fundamental to the interests of the United States. Finally, in terms of “international order,” the administration suggests that addressing the problems of our time such as climate change and pandemic diseases also form part of the enduring interests of the United States.

In addressing China’s core interests, State Councilor Dai stated that “to ensure that our bilateral relationship will move forward on the track of long-term and sound development, a very important thing is that we need to support, respect, and understand each other, and to maintain our core interests.” He also went on to emphasize the three core interests of China: upholding its basic systems and national security, preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity, and maintaining economic and social sustained development. A recent study (Swaine 2011) argues that among the three core interests that State Councilor Dai mentioned, China has been emphasizing the second, “preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity” more than any other interest. Specifically, Swaine points out that China has been elucidating that Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang-related issues are its core interests and that these issues are nonnegotiable in nature. According to Swaine, Chinese officials stated that China will even use force to defend what it has defined as its core interests.

The way in which the core interests of the two major powers are defined shows a great difference. First, while the United States does not present a clear priority among its core interests, China explicates its priority and even presents “nonnegotiable” interests. Second, instead of presenting any priority among its interests, the United States rather emphasizes that “each of these interests is inextricably linked to the others: no single interest can be pursued in isolation, but at the same time, positive action in one area will help advance all four.” China, on the other hand, identifies its interests separately, and does not express any position on any linkages among those interests. Third, and most importantly, the United States has defined its interests by using words based on notions of “network,” “value,” “international norm,” and “international order” but China is more focused on “territorial integrity” and “economic and social sustained development.”

It can be said that the core interest discourse of the United States is based on a “complex network” model (Ha 2011, 10-16) whereas, for China it is focused on nation building or “rich nation, strong military” model (Samuels 1996, 1-32). This shows that even though both Washington and Beijing are living in 2010s, they pursue their interest along different paths. While the two countries may try to explain and emphasize their key concerns to the other and define their core interests using words that the other side could understand and accept, the meanings are often interpreted and perceived in different ways. In other words, both the United States and China establish their core interest based on different organizing principles of international relations. As their premises are different, the meanings of the words they are using to define their strategic concepts are different and consequently this makes it almost impossible for them to properly communicate with each other. This shows the structural limitation in U.S.-China relations, which instead of “seek common ground while reserving differences” ends up as “same bed, different dreams.”

Major Issues in U.S.-China Relations from November 2010 to February 2011

[Table I] shows seven major issues in U.S.-China relations from November 2010 to February 2011 and the position of Washington and Beijing on those matters. (Kim 2011)

A closer look at the positions of the two states reveals cleavages between them ─ the United States stresses “seeking common ground” while China underlines “reserving differences” ─ even though both of them continue to emphasize “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive” bilateral relations. The most heated confrontations took place over human rights as well as the Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang issues which both states have defined as their core interests. It would be natural for the United States to assume that China inherently holds revisionist intentions as it continues to reject calls to respect international norms such as democracy or freedom. This in spite of the United States having emphasized that protecting these “universal values” is one of its most important national interests. From Beijing’s perspective though, it suspects that Washington is attempting to balance against them in what is viewed as U.S. encroachment of China’s legitimate rights despite Beijing’s repeated claim that sovereignty and territorial integration are nonnegotiable core interests.

It can be assessed that even though both China and the United States clearly manifest their core interests through various channels, both sides continue to infringe upon each other’s core interests when dealing with specific issues. This confrontation reached a peak in 2010, but both sides have managed to successfully bridge their differences in the run up to the U.S.-China summit meeting in January 2011. This was particularly the case for issues such as the revaluation of the Yuan, North Korea, and Taiwan. However, even if the summit meeting could be regarded as a success to some degree, it is still hard to express optimism for the future of U.S.-China relations. Not only because both sides failed to narrow the gap on human rights issues, but there are also still many unresolved disputes despite the fact that both sides manage to reduce differences. For example, while there is agreement on the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, China has criticized the position of the United States for insisting upon the precondition that North Korea must display concrete actions showing its “seriousness.” On Taiwan as well, both sides adhere to the “One-China” policy but China strongly opposes continued U.S. adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act...(Continued)