



Lost in Translation? The Clash of Core Interests and the Future of U.S.-China Relations

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Analyzing U.S.-China Relations

In studying the dynamics of U.S.-China relations, one of the most important questions is what data should be used. A review of all classified documents from the two countries may be the ideal way to secure reliable data, but it is not viable. Interviews with key officials in the two governments could be the next best choice but it is still extremely hard to know whether that person is telling the truth or not. In this regard, the official statements of the two countries are the only reliable and authoritative source for research. Of course in official statements, propaganda may be included and they cannot always be taken at face value. However, as information is ubiquitous in this era of globalization, a government would pay a tremendous cost if it expresses contradictory policies in its own official statements. We can therefore assume that official statements provide information on the general direction of the two country's policies.

Which documents can be accepted as official statements? The United States, of course, makes its policies well known throughout the world and has shown high levels of consistency across different departments of the government over its foreign policy. The official statements of the United States are therefore easily accessible through various official government websites including the State Department. On the other hand, China maintains a rather closed socialist system and there are not many documents that could be identified as official statements except for the regular press conferences of the Foreign Ministry. Even with these press conferences, the spokesperson usually responds to selected questions raised by the media. This brings a considerable limitation in collecting official statements from China. In order to address this difficulty, *U.S.-China Relations (UCR) Statement Factsheets* include editorials of the news outlets run by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as official statements.

Data collection began from November 2010. This period is important because first, it marks one year since the U.S.-China summit in November 2009 and second, it coincides with the G20 Seoul Summit held in November. Particularly the G20 summit was meaningful as it “clearly demonstrated that we are in a period of transition where the United States is no longer the world's hegemon, yet no new power emerges.” (Sohn and Cho 2010, 1) Third, Xi Jinping was appointed as vice chairman of the Central Military Commission on 18 October, 2010 and is expected to be the next leader of China. This appointment then signals a new period where the next generation of leaders in the CCP will begin to assert their influence and views. For both the statements from the United States and China, English texts are used presented by either the official government department or a CCP-affiliated media outlet. The reason for not using Chinese lan-



guage sources is that official statements in Chinese tend to be directed at a domestic audience, and the focus here is on the international messages that are being conveyed. The data is collected everyday and published as a monthly report, *UCR Statement Factsheet*. The *UCR Briefing* will analyze the *UCR Statement Factsheets* and summarize what has happened during the period in narrative form. The *UCR Briefing* will also focus on critical factors and issues in understanding the present and future of U.S.-China relations. This *UCR Briefing* No. 1 covers official statements of the United States and China from November 2010 to February 2011.

Core Interests and Power Transition

Assuming the power gap between Beijing and Washington could be narrowed or even diminished in the near future, this briefing shares the same concerns with power transition theory; “when a revisionist (or dissatisfied) latecomer overtakes an erstwhile leader of the international system, major war would occur.” (Chan 2007, 2 ; Kugler and Lemke 1996, 7-10) The literature on power transition theory has been focused on the relations between “power transition” and the “outbreak of major wars.” Recent studies though have paid attention to the fact that power transition does not always lead to great wars and has tried to identify the conditions that lead to peaceful transition. Such research points out that it is crucial for two major powers going through power transition to respect each other’s core interests. (Kupchan 2001, 18-33; Zhu 2006, 23) In other words, depending on the degree to which both states show respect to each other’s core interests, positive or negative perceptions will emerge. Once established, these perceptions will intensify according to the logic of “path dependence theory” (Pierson 2000, 251-267), and result in either peaceful transition or war. Therefore, the core interests of each state are certainly important factors that deserve more attention when studying the future direction of U.S.-China relations.

This briefing will first identify the core interests of Beijing and Washington. Then, it will observe the behavior and reaction of the two countries on certain issues which are related to the core interests of each side.

The Core Interests of China and the United States

In identifying the core interests of the two major powers, the Obama administration’s *National Security Strategy* (The White House 2010) and China’s State Councilor Dai Bingguo’s remarks on the core interests of China during the 2009 Strategic and Economic Dialogue (中国新闻社 2009/07/29; U.S. Department of State 2009) are important documents.

The 2010 *National Security Strategy* points out four “enduring national interests” which the Obama administration believes the U.S. strategic approach should pursue: security, prosperity, value and international order. For “security,” the strategy focuses on i) nonproliferation and nuclear security, ii) war against a



far-reaching network of hatred and violence, and iii) peace and stability in the Middle East. "Prosperity" for the administration is a strong economy that will be the foundation of American leadership. It further stresses that the importance of balanced and sustainable growth will build a stronger foundation for the United States and global economic growth. Regarding "values," it emphasizes that support for universal values such as human rights and democratic values will enhance efforts to advance security and prosperity. Strengthening international norms and supporting a "just peace" are argued as fundamental to the interests of the United States. Finally, in terms of "international order," the administration suggests that addressing the problems of our time such as climate change and pandemic diseases also form part of the enduring interests of the United States.

In addressing China's core interests, State Councilor Dai stated that "to ensure that our bilateral relationship will move forward on the track of long-term and sound development, a very important thing is that we need to support, respect, and understand each other, and to maintain our core interests." He also went on to emphasize the three core interests of China: upholding its basic systems and national security, preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity, and maintaining economic and social sustained development. A recent study (Swaine 2011) argues that among the three core interests that State Councilor Dai mentioned, China has been emphasizing the second, "preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity" more than any other interest. Specifically, Swaine points out that China has been elucidating that Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang-related issues are its core interests and that these issues are nonnegotiable in nature. According to Swaine, Chinese officials stated that China will even use force to defend what it has defined as its core interests.

The way in which the core interests of the two major powers are defined shows a great difference. First, while the United States does not present a clear priority among its core interests, China explicates its priority and even presents "nonnegotiable" interests. Second, instead of presenting any priority among its interests, the United States rather emphasizes that "each of these interests is inextricably linked to the others: no single interest can be pursued in isolation, but at the same time, positive action in one area will help advance all four." China, on the other hand, identifies its interests separately, and does not express any position on any linkages among those interests. Third, and most importantly, the United States has defined its interests by using words based on notions of "network," "value," "international norm," and "international order" but China is more focused on "territorial integrity" and "economic and social sustained development."

It can be said that the core interest discourse of the United States is based on a "complex network" model (Ha 2011, 10-16) whereas, for China it is focused on nation building or "rich nation, strong military" model (Samuels 1996, 1-32). This shows that even though both Washington and Beijing are living in 2010s, they pursue their interest along different paths. While the two countries may try to explain and emphasize their key concerns to the other and define their core interests using words that the other side could understand and accept, the meanings are often interpreted and perceived in different ways. In other words, both the United States and China establish their core interest based on different organizing principles of international relations. As their premises are different, the meanings of the words they are using to define their strategic concepts are different and consequently this makes it almost impossible for them to properly communicate with each other. This shows the structural limitation in U.S.-China relations, which instead of "seek common ground while reserving differences" ends up as "same bed, different dreams."



Major Issues in U.S.-China Relations from November 2010 to February 2011

[Table I] shows seven major issues in U.S.-China relations from November 2010 to February 2011 and the position of Washington and Beijing on those matters. (Kim 2011)

A closer look at the positions of the two states reveals cleavages between them — the United States stresses “seeking common ground” while China underlines “reserving differences” — even though both of them continue to emphasize “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive” bilateral relations. The most heated confrontations took place over human rights as well as the Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang issues which both states have defined as their core interests. It would be natural for the United States to assume that China inherently holds revisionist intentions as it continues to reject calls to respect international norms such as democracy or freedom. This in spite of the United States having emphasized that protecting these “universal values” is one of its most important national interests. From Beijing’s perspective though, it suspects that Washington is attempting to balance against them in what is viewed as U.S. encroachment of China’s legitimate rights despite Beijing’s repeated claim that sovereignty and territorial integration are nonnegotiable core interests.

It can be assessed that even though both China and the United States clearly manifest their core interests through various channels, both sides continue to infringe upon each other’s core interests when dealing with specific issues. This confrontation reached a peak in 2010, but both sides have managed to successfully bridge their differences in the run up to the U.S.-China summit meeting in January 2011. This was particularly the case for issues such as the revaluation of the Yuan, North Korea, and Taiwan. However, even if the summit meeting could be regarded as a success to some degree, it is still hard to express optimism for the future of U.S.-China relations. Not only because both sides failed to narrow the gap on human rights issues, but there are also still many unresolved disputes despite the fact that both sides manage to reduce differences. For example, while there is agreement on the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, China has criticized the position of the United States for insisting upon the precondition that North Korea must display concrete actions showing its “seriousness.” On Taiwan as well, both sides adhere to the “One-China” policy but China strongly opposes continued U.S. adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act.

[Table I] Summary of the Stance Expressed by the United States and China on Major Issues

No.	Issue	U.S. Stance	China’s Stance	Note
1	Future Direction of U.S.-China Relationship	<p>[Conflict]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. U.S.-China relations are inseparable from the Asia-Pacific web of security alliances, economic networks, and social connections. 2. History shows that societies are harmonious and nations are more successful when the universal rights and responsibilities of nations and people are upheld. 3. Instead of focusing on differences between the two countries, values shared by both peoples must be emphasized. 	<p>[Conflict]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The zero-sum Cold War mentality of ‘friend-or-foe’ identification must be abandoned. 2. Respect each other’s choice of development path and core interests (sovereignty, territorial integrity). 3. Must intensify exchanges and cooperation by improving mutual understanding while reserving differences. 4. The U.S. should shoulder most of the responsibility for the comparatively deteriorated U.S.-China relations in 2010. 5. It is a problem that the word ‘partnership’ is no longer recorded in official documents by the U.S. when addressing China. 	Coexistence of Conflict/Cooperation



		<p>[Cooperation]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. China's 'peaceful rise' benefits the United States. The U.S. welcomes a strong and prosperous China that plays a greater role in world affairs. 2. The U.S. and China share special responsibilities to address global challenges. 3. The U.S. aims for a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China. 4. It is necessary to build bilateral trust with China. 	<p>[Cooperation]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The U.S. is a great partner for China's reform and opening. 2. A sound U.S.-China relationship is conducive to peace, stability, and prosperity in the world. 3. It is necessary to further enhance strategic mutual trust with the U.S. 4. Challenges from the U.S. against China largely take advantage of vulnerable domestic affairs; thus it is important for China to enhance its civil livelihood. 	
2	Economic Cooperation	<p>[Conflict]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The revaluation of the Yuan is required to resolve global economic imbalances. China's authorities have allowed the Yuan to appreciate against the dollar but it still remains substantially undervalued. 2. Exchange rates need to be adjusted in response to market forces. China's undervalued currency is putting pressure on its trading partners to adopt measures to prevent their own currencies from appreciating. 3. China must remove its trade-distorting government intervention intended to protect domestic industries and must contribute to world economic growth and development 4. The U.S. demands are fundamentally in China's long-term interests. <p>[Cooperation]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The prosperity of Americans depends overwhelmingly on the economic policies pursued to strengthen American competitiveness. 2. The U.S. should tend to the core foundations for its national economic security, which are the capacity to save, invest, innovate, and learn. 3. The U.S. welcomes China's transition from export-driven growth to one driven by domestic consumption. China will need to protect intellectual property and open up opportunities for government procurement to new entrants. 	<p>[Conflict]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The quantitative easing policy of the U.S. shifts the burden of economic adjustment to dollar holders around the world. 2. U.S. economic recklessness is at the root of the problem. Along with the issue of the dollar as a regular currency, the global financial system is in urgent need of democracy. 3. The trade imbalance between the U.S. and China is due to the international industrial division of labor and U.S. export restrictions over high-tech products, not China's exchange rate policy. 4. U.S. protectionism (anti-dumping, countervailing probes, intellectual property rights, etc) is a greater problem than China's. <p>[Cooperation]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. China will continue to steadily advance the reform of the RMB exchange rate regime and boost domestic demand. 2. Making the RMB an international currency will be a fairly long process. 3. The U.S. has proved to constantly correct itself after facing major crises, and China should also endeavor to find the most efficient route to modernity rather than chasing after U.S. GDP rankings. 	Coexistence of Conflict/Cooperation
3	Cooperation on Military and Security Issues	<p>[Conflict]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Chinese have every right to develop its military but its intentions must be made clear. 2. The primary concern of the U.S. is not monitoring what's happening with the Chinese military, but seeking transparency to be able to fully understand their capabilities and motivations. 3. China is investing in very high-end, high-tech capabilities and there is a need for reduction through strategic dialogue with the U.S. 	<p>[Conflict]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. China has adhered to peaceful development. Its weaponry development aims to safeguard its national sovereignty and thus is not directed against any other country 2. The U.S. does not seem to accept the fact that China will sooner or later possess a first-class military. China will not forego its own basic rights. 3. China is one generation or more behind the U.S. in arms system and weaponry performance. China will not be a fast-growing but fragile country. 	Coexistence of Conflict/Cooperation



		4. Usually Chinese military buildup aims to constitute a broader 'anti-access/area denial' against the U.S.	4. The U.S. is continuing to pay close attention to China's military progress, support Japan's Self-Defense Army to spur its overseas operational capacity, and further increase the influence of the U.S. military in Southeast Asia	
		[Cooperation] China's civilian and military leadership seem determined to carry the relationship further with U.S. armed forces. The U.S. is encouraged to take the relationship to the next level	[Cooperation] The expansion of exchanges and co-operation between the militaries contribute to deepening mutual trust between the two countries	
4	Human Rights	[Conflict] 1. The values that Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo espouses are universal. The U.S. calls for the immediate release of Liu Xiaobo and the many other political prisoners in China. 2. The U.S. urges China to protect the rights of minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang 3. It is important to establish a positive relationship with China but the U.S. will always raise human rights. That is what the U.S. stands for as a nation. 4. The U.S. urges China to protect the rights of civil society and religious organizations to advocate their positions within the rule of law. 5. China must hold accountable the perpetrators who illegally harassed and assaulted foreign journalists reporting on demonstrations in Beijing. The U.S. urges China to guarantee freedom of the press and freedom of expression. 6. In the short term China may succeed in maintaining a segmented internet but those restrictions will have long-term costs that will one day restrain growth and development 7. The U.S. desires the Middle East authoritarian governments to meet the aspirations of the people and move down the path toward democratic governance.	[Conflict] 1. China has the right to punish in accordance with the law criminal activities. China will not allow any flagrant interference in its judicial sovereignty. 2. There has been a denial of all developing countries' efforts in seeking development and progress that do not accord with Western standards. China will retain its spiritual independence. 3. The West aims to undermine the benign surroundings for China's future development. China must ensure it is not swayed by outside powers. 4. On human rights the U.S. and China should hold dialogue based on mutual respect and the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs. 5. Increasing freedom of information is a goal for Chinese society but China is unable to remove all its firewalls at the moment. 6. Africans have the right to choose their own way of development. 7. Criticism on the double standards of the U.S. toward Tehran and Bahrain. "Universal values" at every stage is volatile. 8. The U.S. Middle East policy that seeks to attain strategic benefits through "universal values", "democracy" and "freedom" disrupts emerging countries in the region.	Conflict
5	Asia-Pacific Region	[Conflict] 1. The U.S. presence in Asia contributes to prosperity and stability. It is not only in the interests of the U.S. but every country in the region has benefited as well, including China. 2. The U.S. supports the inclusion of Japan as a permanent member of the Security Council. 3. The U.S. does not seek to contain China. The growing role of the U.S. does not come at the expense of China.	[Conflict] 1. The U.S. has no justifiable reasons to interfere in the South China Sea and the Diaoyu Island dispute. 2. The U.S. wishes to diminish China's healthy ties with its neighbors, and by encouraging disagreements among Asian countries it seeks to cater more to U.S. interests than to Asia's. 3. China must be on guard against containment policies from the U.S.	Dominating Conflict
		[Cooperation] The U.S. supports the inclusion of India as a permanent member of the Security Council.	[Cooperation] China supports the inclusion of India as a permanent member of the Security Council.	



6	North Korea	<p>[Conflict]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. On the issue of nuclear weapons and Yeonpyeong Island, China must uphold its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions and use its influence to help shape North Korea's behavior. 2. The U.S.-ROK joint military exercises are fully consistent with South Korea's legal right to self-defense and pose no danger to North Korea. 3. It is important for North Korea to demonstrate a seriousness of purpose (cease provocations, reduce tensions in the region, improve its relationship with South Korea, take affirmative steps to denuclearize in line with the 2005 joint statement, abide by its international obligations under UN Security Council resolutions) before the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. The U.S. does not wish to have talks just for talk's sake. 4. North Korea's provocative strike was meant in part to continue burnishing their successor's leadership and military credibility among regime elites, and there may be further provocations to achieve strategic goals. 	<p>[Conflict]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. China does not seek to protect any side and urges both parties (North and South Korea) to demonstrate calm and restraint. 2. The U.S.-ROK joint military exercises cannot deter the North and only intensifies tensions on the peninsula which provides the U.S. with a perfect excuse to "return to Asia." The presence of a U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier shows the U.S. military's desire for supremacy in the region. 3. Easing the tension is the top priority for the Korean Peninsula now. An early resumption of the Six-Party Talks is the only realistic solution. Relevant parties should resolve differences and seek cooperation through dialogue and negotiations. 4. The overall interests of regional peace and stability should be placed first. 5. The strike proves the failure of the hard-line policies of the Lee Myung-bak administration. 	Shift from Conflict to Cooperation
		<p>[Cooperation]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The U.S. and China share common interests in maintaining the Korean Peninsula's stability and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 2. An easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula and having constructive discussions are necessary measures to solve the North Korean problem. 3. Full implementation of the September 2005 joint statement is necessary. 4. Conditions for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks must be created. 	<p>[Cooperation]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. U.S. and China share common interests in safeguarding peace and stability in the region and denuclearizing the Peninsula. 2. The two Koreas must work to ease existing tensions. Sincere and constructive inter-Korean dialogue is an essential step. 3. China expresses concern on North Korea's uranium enrichment program. 4. Conditions for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks must be created. 	
7	Taiwan	<p>[Conflict]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Taiwan Relations Act is law and thus the U.S. has certain obligations under that law. 	<p>[Conflict]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Taiwan issue is the most important and most sensitive of the issues that concern China's core interests. 2. The U.S. securing military alliances with China's neighboring countries, supporting anti-China political exiles, and selling weapons to Taiwan arouses suspicions that it considers China a "strategic foe." 	Regulating Conflict
		<p>[Cooperation]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The U.S. has a "One-China policy." 2. The U.S. seeks to encourage more dialogue and exchanges between the Mainland and Taiwan. 	<p>[Cooperation]</p> <p>China hopes that the U.S. will continue to honor China's relevant commitments.</p>	



Conclusion

While many disputes continued throughout 2010 between China and the United States, they had mainly settled down by the time of the U.S.-China summit in January 2011. It would seem that both sides confirmed a will to repair bilateral relations and a new phase of cooperation would likely unfold in the short run. However, they continue to express profound differences on most areas except for economic issues, in particular these differences relate to each other's core interests. In this regard, it would be hard to expect positive, cooperative, and comprehensive bilateral relations in the long run. It can be expected that whenever a serious problem arises concerning Taiwan, Tibet, or Xinjiang, U.S.-China relations will be aggravated.

Beijing and Washington have both defined their interests based on different organizing principles of international relations. As a result of this, both sides will continue to maintain a strong willingness to improve bilateral relations and to respect each other's core interests, but will still clash over them. Even if the United States proclaims universality in international norms, Beijing will still view this as Washington concealing its intentions to balance the rise of China. Similarly the United States would regard China's emphasis on the supremacy of sovereignty as mere rhetoric to hide a desire to undermine the core interests of the United States in the long run. This difference cannot be easily resolved unless each side agrees to the same international norms when they communicate to the world. The United States believes that their norms are the international standard and China should adhere to these norms. On the other hand, China would refuse to concede to these norms as the international standard and would believe its values will become the standard when it surpasses the United States and becomes the most powerful country in the world.

It can be expected that the fundamental differences between China and the United States in defining their core interests will last for quite a long time. In the short run, the simple solution to manage bilateral relations and avoid conflict would be for both sides to refrain from mentioning about the issues related to each other's core interests. This would only paper over the cracks and therefore not lead to any profound reconciliation. If Beijing and Washington fail to convince and respect each other on their core interests, it will only come to deepen mutual strategic distrust and generate excessive sensitivity toward each other on different issues. For this reason, the transient cooperative atmosphere following the summit should not be taken at face value. ■



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