Fellows Program on Peace, Governance, and Development in East Asia

AbstractWhy are some governments adaptable but not others? Why has China’s government, in par-ticular, displayed remarkable flexibility and adaptive capacity? While many observers acknowledge that China’s bureaucracy is adaptive, few have tried to explain the sources of its unusual adaptability. To adapt means to select strategies or to make changes that improves performance according to some measure of success. Central to adaptive capacity, hence, is the definition of success itself. Effective adaptation requires a clear definition of and attractive rewards for achieving success. The main instrument for defining success in China’s bureaucracy is the sys-tem of cadre evaluation targets. I document the evolution of evaluation targets over time, highlighting the problem of mission creep and the challenges that such a change poses to China’s governance..

Quotes from the Paper“China’s bureaucracy, on the other hand, is widely described by China experts as “entrepreneurial,” “developmental,” “nimble,” and “adaptive.” China’s national government makes ample use of policy experiments, encourages and incorporates social feedback into policy-making, coopts private entrepreneurs and new influential groups, studies and learns from the experiences of other coun-tries, while local officials pursue creative—even if problematic—ways of fostering growth and generating revenue.”

“My research aims precisely to fill this theoretical gap. I do so by drawing on an established interdisciplinary field that has yet been introduced to China studies and political science more broadly: complex adaptive sys-tems (also known as “complexity” for short)”

“In China’s bureaucracy, the key instrument for defining success is the sys-tem of “cadre evaluation targets.” This institution comprises a list of targets assigned by higher-level governments to lower-level governments, according to which local officials throughout the country are scored and ranked annually.”

“.....by studying the evolution of cadre evaluation targets, we gain concrete insights into the ability of China’s central authorities to effectively signal policy priorities and guide local bureaucratic behavior...... But again, if we look concretely at the targets assigned, it will be clear that adding more targets to an already exhaustive list of mandates is unlikely to modify bureaucratic incentives.
These institutional changes in turn have deep economic consequences because China’s economy remains heavily dependent on local state actions. Whether and how central authorities may continue to guide local bureaucratic behavior through targets is one of the toughest political challenges in years to come.”

AuthorDr. Yuen Yuen Ang is an Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Michigan. She studies development, complexity, and Chinese political economy. Her research seeks to deepen our understanding of development as a complex process, by developing new theories and tools that capture its dynamic, non-linear, and multi-dimensional reality. Focusing on developing countries and emerging markets, particularly China, she explores three interconnected themes: (1) how markets emerge in the absence of good governance and state capacity, (2) the underlying conditions that enable effective adaptation within governments, and (3) the interactive relationship between corruption and economic prosperity. She is the author of How China Escaped the Poverty Trap (Cornell University Press, Cornell Studies in Political Economy, 2016). The book examines all three themes within a unified framework and lays the foundation for her research agenda. It won the 2017 Peter Katzenstein Book Prize for “outstanding first book in international relations, comparative politics, or political economy.” It has been reviewed at the World Bank, Straits Times, Foreign Affairs, Harvard’s Building State Capability Blog, and other outlets.