EAI MPDI Working Paper No. 6

 

Author

Seungjoo Lee is a professor in the department of political science and international relations at Chung-Ang University. Professor Lee received both his B.A. and M.A. from Yonsei University, and received his Ph.D. in political science from University of California at Berkeley. He previously served as an assistant professor in political science at National University of Singapore, assistant professor in international relations at Yonsei University, and postdoctoral fellow at the Berkeley APEC Study Center. His recent publications include Northeast Asia: Ripe for Integration? (2008) and Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of Ideas, Interest, and Domestic Institutions (2010). Professor Lee has also published many of his research papers in prominent journals such as The Korean Political Science Review, Comparative Political Studies, The Pacific Review, and Asian Survey. His current areas of research interest cover the subjects of East Asian regionalism, global FTA networks, middle power diplomacy, and development cooperation.

 

 

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I. Introduction: Middle Power Diplomacy in Development Cooperation

 

With the era of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) being scheduled to be phased out in 2015, major players of development cooperation came to share a growing consensus that a new world order is absolutely necessary. However, in contrast to the late 1990s where traditional donors exerted an overwhelming dominance in shaping the new agenda for the MDGs, the global landscape of development cooperation has become much more complex in the 21st century. The transition into the new era does not play out in a political vacuum, as a diverse range of players and stakeholders with varying views and shifting roles actively participate in the global discussion on development. I argue that three factors are clearly at work in creating the new world order of development cooperation in the 21st century: power shift, the complex nature of the global governance in development cooperation, and national strategies of development cooperation policy. First, underlying this dynamic of cooperation and competition is the power shift that is symbolized by the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States, as both countries work hard to forge a global architecture that can systematically better reflect their interests in the new era. In this regard, the U.S. and China have entered into architectural rivalry, setting a fundamental contour in establishing the new order of development cooperation.

 

Second, the international environment heading into the post-2015 era is quite different from that of the time when the MDGs were formulated, as the number of emerging donors, both state and non-state, has rapidly increased in the twenty-first century. In terms of state actors, non-Development Assistance Committee countries, such as BRICs and Arabic countries, have emerged as new donors. Non-state donors have also increased not just in numbers but in influence. Both international-governmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), ranging from GAVI, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Global Environment Facility to the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation have flourished. As demonstrated by the fact that the Gates Foundation ranks third in aid for the health sector after the U.S. and the Global Fund in 2009, non-state donors have already firmly established their status and roles in development cooperation.

 

Issue complexity has dramatically increased also, as issues that were separated in the past are now intertwined with each other, calling for new thinking in development cooperation. Most importantly, it is necessary to seek collective wisdom that can sort out intertwined issues, identify the linkages between them, and offer constructive solutions to the problems. Climate change, natural disasters, diseases, and economic crises are just a few examples in which such collective wisdom is absolutely needed. In addition, there is a widely-shared consensus among the community of development cooperation that one actor, either state or non-state, cannot deal with emerging issues single-handedly (Manning 2006). These new developments signify that it is indeed time to think of “a global answer to global problems” (Martin 2005).

 

Third, although the majority of countries cooperate to pursue the intrinsic goals of development cooperation, it is difficult to completely detach development cooperation policy from individual countries’ interests. In reality, major players in development cooperation have displayed a dual dynamic of cooperation and competition in constructing the new order. On the one hand, they share a common view that it is of paramount importance to find a new global governance framework for the sake of sustainable development. On the other hand, they compete against each other to realign the coming global order of development cooperation toward their interests.

 

The rapidly shifting nature of development cooperation in the 21st century presents middle powers with a noble opportunity. First, as John Ravenhill succinctly argues, changing contexts, not changes in material conditions, are crucial for middle powers to enhance their influence in global politics (Ravenhill 1998). Aware of their material constraints, middle powers are likely to seek niche diplomacy where middle powers concentrate resources on specific issue areas (Evans and Grant 1991). Development cooperation is a natural candidate for niche diplomacy.

 

Second, the sheer fact that various players of development cooperation reveal potentially conflicting interests gives ample room for middle powers to maneuver. Assuming that today’s global politics is organized in a networked fashion rather than hierarchically (Kahler 2009), middle powers will be able to increase their visibility and influence, even if they are not equipped with material power that can dictate the world order. Middle powers are better positioned between various players of development cooperation: developed and developing countries, traditional and emerging donors, state and non-state actors. Taking advantage of their positions within the complex network, middle powers will be able to execute positional power (Kim 2009).

 

Third, of course, the possession of favorable positions within the network does not guarantee middle powers influence and prestige. In order to enjoy the material benefits that accrue from such positions, middle powers should be able to become an “entrepreneurial leader” in global politics (Young 1991). In contrast to traditional middle powers that were largely content with the “first followership” (Cooper 1989), middle powers in the 21st century in the realm of development cooperation, tend to seek a more activist role. The role of middle powers’ is extremely important under the current architecture of development cooperation. The global discussions on 21st development cooperation have been had by various fora such as the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), United Nations (UN), World Bank, the Group of Twenty (G20) Summit, indicating that there is a greater need for systematic linkages among them. However, major players of development cooperation have yet to find a way as to how to establish linkages. Going beyond narrowly defined national interests, middle powers are likely to accommodate other players’ interests to organize the global governance of development cooperation by linking multiple fora.

 

In short, the current landscape of development cooperation needs middle powers to take more initiative and embrace an expanded role. This change also coincides with South Korea’s ambitious launch of its middle power diplomacy strategy. Under the banner of “contribution diplomacy,” the Lee Myung-bak government identified development cooperation as a crucial means to elevate South Korea’s diplomacy to the next level. The Lee government claimed that it is time for South Korea to join international efforts to address global issues. Upon its inauguration, the subsequent Park Geun-hye government ambitiously launched its “middle power diplomacy” in conjunction with the Peace Process of the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative as its diplomatic goals. Development cooperation emerged as one of the promising areas for middle power diplomacy. That is, development cooperation and middle power diplomacy were combined to form an important pillar of South Korea’s diplomacy.

 

This paper is organized in the following way. Section two examines the way in which complexity has dramatically increased in development cooperation in the past decade. Section three explores the transition process into the Post-2015 era from the MDG period. Section four identifies contending issues among major stakeholders to probe the possibilities for South Korea’s middle power diplomacy. Section five examines how South Korea has executed middle power diplomacy in the area of development cooperation, particularly since its accession into the OECD DAC. Section six draws theoretical and practical implications.

 

II. Power Shift and Changing Global Architecture in Development Cooperation

 

The competition between the U.S. and China has intensified in development cooperation. It is not just because they are attempting to take more favorable positions in shaping the new global architecture of development cooperation, but because they tend to take advantage of foreign aid as a means to expand their global influence (Lum et. al. 2008). The rivalry between the two great powers poses imminent pressures to the current global order of development cooperation underpinned by the OECD DAC members that share global goals and norms.

 

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, in 2010, the Obama government announced the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) that specified the unification of defense, diplomacy, and development (U.S. State Department and USAID 2010). In this report, the U.S. government made it clear that while maintaining a cooperative stance to the existing global governance model led by the OECD DAC, it would still design and implement an independent development cooperation strategy. Specifically, the Obama government identified six core areas that build on U.S. strengths: sustainable economic growth, food security, global health, climate change, democracy and governance, and humanitarian assistance (U.S. State Department and USAID 2010: x). The Obama government also ascertained that the U.S. should construct an encompassing network and partnerships to advance its development cooperation diplomacy.

 

Under the banner of civilian power, the report suggests that the U.S. government unify the expertise of various civilian organizations involved in U.S. diplomacy. Diplomacy in the 21st century continues to bare witness to the rise of emerging actors such as governmental agencies, transnational networks, companies, foundations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious organizations, and civilians. To adapt to this changing reality, the U.S. government should utilize and coordinate civilian power, strengthen regional and global linkages, and create networks with NGOs. Development cooperation should create a new partnership with the civilian sector to adapt to this changing environment rather than solely relying on the USAID or the State Department. In doing so, the report argues that the U.S. government could take a leadership role in reconstructing the global architecture of development cooperation into one that “could help nations come together as partners to solve shared problems” (U.S. State Department and USAID 2010: 19). This signifies that the U.S. government seeks to usher in a meaningful change in the existing global architecture of development cooperation without fundamentally negating its very foundations, primarily guided by the OECD DAC members. However, the mere fact that the U.S., the biggest donor, is pursuing a new development cooperation policy puts a strain on the current order of development cooperation.

 

China also displays a similar strategic nature in its foreign aid policy. Equipped with its enormous financial resources, China has attempted to increase its contribution of foreign aid, commensurate with its economic status as the second largest economy in the world. The rise of China in development cooperation is in stark contrast to Japan that has been in relative decline in the 21st century. The OECD DAC estimates that China spent US$ 2.85 billion of concessional financial assistance in 2012. China would rank 13th on the list of OECD DAC countries (OECD CRS database). However, given that China takes a broader definition of foreign aid to include concessional loans, debt relief, and investment, the amount of China’s foreign aid substantially increases under this definition. Within these circumstances, one study estimates that the amount of Chinese foreign aid actually reached about US$30 billion in 2007, demonstrating that China has already emerged as a major donor in development cooperation (Lum et. al. 2008). In addition, the scope of China’s foreign aid is global as it offers foreign aid to 123 countries (Information Office of the State Council 2011). This reflects the fact that China utilizes foreign aid to deepen diplomatic relationship as well as secure its energy supplies. An illustration of this is how China concentrates 45.7 percent of its foreign aid to African countries (Information Office of the State Council 2011).

 

Like the U.S., tightly linking foreign aid to its national interests, China attempts to use it to increase its global influence. Despite mounting criticism against China’s foreign aid, however, China somewhat successfully utilized foreign aid to enhance its soft power (Kurlantzick 2007). Furthermore, promoting quite a different goal of foreign aid from that of other advanced donors, China has quite effectively strengthened its position in development cooperation (Lum et. al. 2008)...(Continued)