EAI Fellows Program Working Paper Series No.36
 

Author

Hyon Joo Yoo an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Trinity University. She received her Ph.D. in Government from Georgetown University in 2008. Previously, she was a research fellow at the Korea Development Institute in Seoul and a lecturer in the Department of Government at Georgetown University. Dr. Yoo has received several grants and fellowships from institutions including the East-West Center, the Institute for Humane Studies, the Korea Foundation, Georgetown University, and American Political Science Association.

Introduction

How and under what circumstances do domestic factors impede cooperation between alliance partners? More specifically, under what conditions does domestic politics in Japan and South Korea prevent decision makers from pursuing effective cooperation with the United States? These are key research questions with respect to inefficient and even inconsistent alliance policy choices employed by Japan and South Korea in the past few decades. For instance, after deciding to join the US Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems in the late 1990s, Japan procrastinated in developing and deploying BMD technologies. It took Japan almost seven years to follow through with its promise to the United States. Another example includes South Korea’s missile defense (MD) policies. Seoul has refused to join the US systems to develop the Korean style MD programs, but it has procured US technologies that are interoperable with the US-led regional BMD. * Please do not cite without author’s permission. Suggestions are welcome.

There are many explanations for the problem of cooperation between alliance partners. One category of argument involves alliance literature (Walt, 1990; Snyder, 1997; Weitsman, 2004; Pressman, 2008). The prediction of balance of threat theory shows that international environment or external threats have a strong influence on the cohesion of alliance. In other words, disagreements between alliance partners over the degree of threats can hinder alliance cooperation. Moreover, the argument of alliance security dilemma demonstrates that the lack of cooperation between alliance members is driven by alliance dynamics. When states feel the fear of entrapment because their allies are belligerent to initiate aggression against others, they reduce support for alliance partners and decrease cooperation. However, these assessments are not sufficient to explain specific details of alliance policy choices by Japan and South Korea. Importantly, existing work on alliance fails to explicate why Japan has been slow in fulfilling its commitment despite mounting external threats. It also fails to explain South Korea’s inconsistent and even contradictory posture on MD policies. 

The second category of argument focuses on domestic political constraints that explain why alliance partners have trouble in maintaining constant cooperation (Doyle, 1986; Milner, 1997; Moravcsik, 1997). They assume that alliance policies are caused by conflicts between various domestic actors as they attempt to maximize their influence in the society. This line of argument is applicable to Japan because the frequent shifting of leadership and internal turmoil between political parties in the mid 1990s made Japanese alliance policies look inconsistent. Moreover, growing liberal elites because of social and generational changes rendered South Korea reluctant to cooperate with the United States in the past ten years. Nevertheless, this approach that turns to idiosyncratic domestic politics in explaining foreign policy outcomes tend to marginalize the causal weight of international factors. To be precise, if ineffective and inconsistent alliance policies by Japan and South Korea are driven by their internal politics, what explains the necessity of their cooperation with the United States from the outset?

The third line of argument refers to the cost of maintaining alliance. As Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhouser have argued, in an asymmetric alliance that involves states with different relative material capability, weaker partners tend to ride free on the collective security goods provided by stronger states (Olson and Zeckhouser, 1966). The argument of collective goods theory predicts that alliance cooperation is difficult to achieve, particularly when such a choice creates a financial burden to smaller powers. James Morrow has also claimed that the cost-benefit analysis on maintaining alliance can impact cooperation between alliance partners (Morrow, 1991 and 1993). All in all, this line of argument can explain why South Korea has chosen indigenous MD programs that are less expensive than the US BMD. However, it does not offer an account for why Seoul has gradually increased military expenditure that might go beyond the requirement of indigenous systems not to mention why South Korea’s cooperation with the United States has been inconsistent. Japan’s case has also revealed that this argument has limited applicability because the government had intention to cover the cost of MD-related programs but failed to do so.

This article seeks to offer an alternative explanation for why states fail to employ effective cooperation with their alliance partners. Although international pressures provide incentives for states to choose cooperative policies toward allies, domestic variables limit the efficiency of such choices. Here I suggest political and social obstacles that can undermine the processes of implementing alliance cooperation and make alliance policies appear inconsistent. As a result, states cannot fulfill the requirement of alliance tasks and face some criticisms from alliance partners. In line with neoclassical realism, I will introduce a theoretical framework that delineates the conditions under which domestic obstacles preclude efficient alliance cooperation.

In a broad sense, this article is consistent with a major debate about balancing in the study of international relations. According to structural realism, since increased alliance commitments or cooperation with alliance partners can strengthen or enlarge the role of alliance vis-à-vis external powers, such choices are seen as balancing actions (Waltz 1979). However, the meaning of balancing at present is so broadly defined that it cannot depict some occasions in which states do not respond to alliance agreements and even fail to honor commitments despite constant external pressure. A simple dichotomy of balancing and non-balancing is not sophisticated enough to describe detailed foreign policy choices. In actuality, a wide range of works in international politics saw this problem. One of the most distinct examples involves the inter-war period in which Great Britain and France failed to form an alliance or engage in balancing against Nazi Germany. As Randall Schweller has observed, ‘(these) countries have failed to recognize a clear and present danger or…have simply not reacted to it or…have responded in paltry and imprudent ways’ (Schweller, 2004: 159). The concept of underbalancing that Schweller has introduced refers to a situation in which an expected effective balancing behavior driven by mounting external threats is hindered by internal politics. In light of this, I present slow balancing (slow cooperation with allies) and inconsistent balancing (inconsistent cooperation with allies) that indicate balancing behaviors that look sluggish or even inconsistent because of domestic obstacles.

Japan and South Korea are least likely cases for an assumption that domestic sources have influence on state behavior (See King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994; George and Bennett, 2005). After the end of the Cold War, security policy options by Japan and South Korea were most likely determined by international elements. One can argue that the absence of the Soviet threat, the lack of imminent threats, and growing economic interdependence with Cold War enemies make Tokyo and Seoul less motivated to increase cooperation with Washington. This is particularly challenging to a proposed theory because the lack of clear and imminent threats makes it difficult to differentiate between the causal influence of international politics and that of domestic politics. Accordingly, without the clear impact of external factors, one does not know why states choose balancing or cooperation with alliance partners as opposed to other options, not to mention why domestic variables have a causal influence. On the other hand, the opposite side of story is also true. One can claim that Japan’s security policy choices have been driven by growing perceived threats from North Korea and China. Japan has been responding gradually to increasing external threats in the post Cold War era and its domestic politics do not play a role in Japan’s security strategy. For these reasons, analyzing alliance policy options by Japan and South Korea needs process tracing to discern the putative influence of domestic politics that lie between international politics as ‘hypothesized cause’ and policy options as ‘observed effect’ (Bennett, 2004: 22).

This article is composed of two parts. In the first part, I differentiate neoclassical realism from major schools of thought in international relations. Then I introduce a theoretical framework about domestic obstacles. In the second part, I examine alliance policies by Japan and South Korea, focusing on their missile defense policies. I conclude by summarizing my arguments and suggesting policy implications...(Continued)