EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 24

Author

Dong Sun Lee is an associate professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University. His research interests include East Asian security and international relations theory. Dr. Lee received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago, conducted research for the East-West Center, and served as a visiting scholar at George Washington University before assuming his current position. He is author of Power Shifts, Strategy, and War: Declining States and International Conflict (Routledge, 2008) and of articles in scholarly journals, including Asian Security, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Journal of East Asian Studies, and The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis. He also contributed to edited volumes such as The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia (Stanford University Press, 2008) and The International Encyclopedia of Peace (Oxford University Press, 2009). His current research focuses on North Korea and alliances of the Asia-Pacific region.

I. Introduction

What will be the character of military relations between China and the United States in 2025? Will they be embroiled in a competition for power or will they have forged a cooperative relationship? If elements of competition and cooperation coexist, what will be the nature of that coexistence, and which aspect will prevail to what degree? This paper aims to answer these questions by utilizing international relations theory and empirical data on the national powers of China and the United States.

This paper has both academic and practical significance. In the year 2025, the United States and China will be the two greatest nations in terms of national power, and their military relations will not only define the basic atmosphere of the Asian security environment, but will also affect the international security order. Given that security problems occupy the core of international relations, changes in U.S.-China military relations could have great ripple effects in economics and other issue-areas. In particular, it could be said that South Korea’s fate depends on the bilateral relations between the United States and China, since they exert the greatest influence over the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, an accurate analysis of that crucial relationship is essential for South Korea’s search for a long-term national strategy enabling the country’s wise adaptation to the international environment and maximization of its national interests. Besides this practical necessity, the central question has an academic importance as well: the future of U.S.-China military relations is one of the most heatedly debated subjects in the discipline of international relations. Schools of thought and individual scholars have offered a variety of projections, seeing this debate as an ideal chance for testing their theories. It is expected that as the passage of time makes new facts available for assessing the accuracy of predictions, it will be possible to distinguish gems from pebbles among numerous contending theories. As eminent philosophers of science have stressed, the process of prediction and verification constitutes the foundation of scientific advances (Lakatos 1976; Hempel 1933). This research has an academic value in that it participates in this process.

I argue that moderate competition will take place between the United States and China by 2025. As Beijing’s regional leadership strategy and Washington’s offshore leadership strategy come into collision, each country will form its own sphere of influence. The United States will remain the leader of maritime Asia by relying on its superior air and naval forces; China with its superior ground forces will be able to establish its leadership in the adjacent continental region, except for Russia and India. Beijing and Washington will engage in competition, particularly over gray zones where the two spheres of influence abut (for example, the Korean Peninsula) and over sea-lanes that both powers need. However, the two states can avoid an all-out power competition, since neither of them will strive for regional hegemony. Also mitigating the competition is the fact that China will accommodate the United States in regions outside of Asia, due to China’s lack of effective power-projection capability.

The rest of this paper comprises five sections. The first section, which presents an analytical framework, lays out key theoretical assumptions and concepts. In particular, this section offers exposition on the elements of national power and interests, as well as a typology of security strategies and military relations. The second section seeks to portray the Chinese and U.S. national interests, drawing upon international relations theory and historical experience. It also examines the past and current trends of national power and predicts future trajectories. Building upon the analysis of national power and interests, the third section predicts the two countries’ security strategies. The fourth part analyzes the nature of military relations produced by the interaction of those security strategies, and considers other factors that are believed to shape international relations. The last section summarizes the research findings and attempts to predict U.S.-China relations beyond 2025.

II. Analytical Framework

U.S.-China military relations are primarily dependent on the type of security strategy each state adopts. The properties of their security strategies will determine the nature of the mutual relations between them. Again, those properties are substantially affected by their national interests and power. The causal relationship is depicted in the figure below.

[FIGURE 1] Determinants of Military Relations

This research assumes that the United States and China will rationally choose optimal security strategies, taking into consideration their given national interests and power. Although policymakers do not always make the best choice in reality, it is relatively rare that they make an irrational decision that diverges widely from the optimal one. Also, the rationality assumption is highly useful for predicting the future, by allowing pertinent simplification of reality. Assuming rational policy decisions is reasonable for this research which aims to predict the future, since it is practically impossible to predict an irrational choice.

1. Types of Security Strategy

It is security interests and national power that mainly determine the nature of security strategy. Other factors including domestic politics may have some impact. However, when national survival is at stake, states will primarily pursue national interests based on their evaluation of national power—the most important policy instrument. Power is defined as military force that a state possesses for self-defense, along with tangible and intangible assets (economic power, population, technology, natural resources, and so on) that can be used to cultivate military power. Among numerous factors comprising national power, military strength (which is readily available for responding to a security threat) is the most important, followed by diverse resources including economic power that are necessary to support military power. Hard power clearly has limitations, and soft power—cultural and ideological attraction—can be useful for security under certain circumstances. However, it is less important than hard power. Therefore, military power can be viewed as the most important factor determining the nature of security strategy...(Continued)