EAI Fellows Program Working Paper Series No.35
 

Author

Professor Thomas U. Berger is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Boston University. (BA, Columbia College; PhD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). His specialization includes German and Japanese politics, international relations and comparative government in East Asia, political culture. Thomas Berger joined the Department of International Relations at Boston University in 2001. Previously, he taught for seven years at the Johns Hopkins Department of Political Science in Baltimore. He is the author of Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan and is co-editor of Japan in International Politics: Beyond the Reactive State. His articles and essays have appeared in numerous edited volumes and journals, including International Security, Review of International Studies, German Politics and World Affairs Quarterly.

Introduction

Over the past few years, East Asia has been beset by a wave of territorial disputes involving maritime boundaries and the ownership of small, largely uninhabited islands, rocks and reefs. While many of these disputes have been simmering for decades, they have taken on an unprecedented intensity since the start of the 21rst century and are rapidly moving up the region’s diplomatic agenda.

The rise of these maritime disputes poses new problems as well as opportunities for the US alliances. In certain respects, these tensions have encouraged the United States to reengage with the region politically and militarily, reinforcing its existing alliances, staking out the parameters for a stable and productive relationship with the People’s Republic, and seeking out new partnerships with countries such as India and Vietnam. In other respects, however, the rise in maritime disputes creates potential complications for the alliances. Most obviously, they create the possibility that the US will become entangled in militarized conflicts that it would prefer to avoid. Conversely, they could possible engendering feelings of abandonment on the part of allies, leading them to look for alternative arrangements for meeting their strategic needs. On a more basic level, misunderstandings and frustrations that could emerge over these issues could be a considerable source of intra-alliance tension and lead to major political crises and even — if mishandled — alliance break down.

The ultimate impact of the rise in maritime tensions on the alliances is, of course, impossible to predict. Nonetheless, it may be possible for policy makers and analysts to gain some purchase on the question through the use of International Relations theory. Different theoretical perspectives offer different insights on the dynamics that are driving the development of maritime tensions and point to ways in which they may influence the alliance relations. While this essay advocates using a combination of perspectives to better understand the origins of the tensions and their implications for the alliances.

Historically, the study of alliances has been dominated by the Realist approach, with a strong emphasis on how the states act on the basis of rational calculations in response to threats. A secondary line in the literature draws on Liberal International Relations theory to emphasize the role that alliances as international institutions can play in allowing states to overcome mutual suspicions and work together to pursue common international political aims.

To date, however, the third major theoretical perspective in international relations, Constructivism, has not been applied to the study of alliances, even though in the case of Asian territorial disputes many of the kinds of forces that are stressed by Constructivist theory — nationalism, national identity and historical memory — appear to play a major role. US and Allied policy who are not accustomed to thinking about alliance management issues in ways that take into account these types of factors seriously are thus prone to either discount their effects, or conversely to exaggerate them. One of the purposes of this essay is to add in a systematic fashion a constructivist perspective on the issue of Asian maritime disputes in order to help delineate more precisely the types of policies that may be useful in dealing with them in the context of the alliances.

In the following, this essay will provide a brief overview of the development of the principle maritime disputes in the region. Next, the three major theoretical approaches in contemporary IR theory — Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism — will be applied in turn to explain the sources of the tensions and the ways in which may influence alliance relations. In conclusion, some tentative thoughts will be offered on the ways in which the United States and its partners may wish to move forward on the issue.  

The development of Maritime Disputes in East Asia

Conflict is certainly nothing new to maritime Asia, and struggle for control over many the seas and islands in maritime Asia has been a feature of regional politics for many centuries. Territorial disputes in the modern sense, however, only became common in the late 19th century, with the introduction of Western notions of sovereign states with exclusive control over territories with clearly defined borders. Many of the current disputes have their origins in this period.

Arguably the issue first emerged clearly in the context of control over the Kuril island chain in the mid-19th century. At the time, Imperial Russia was beginning to expand its influence in the Far East, while Japan — still under the rule of the Shogunate — having consolidated control over Hokkaido was beginning to move Northwards. The Treaty of Shimoda, in 1855, established diplomatic relations between Japan and Tsarist Russia and demarcated their initial borders. Under the terms of the treaty, control over the four southern-most islands of the Kuril island chain was given to Japan.

Soon thereafter, the Qing dynasty clashed with Germany and France, who were encroaching on South East Asia and surveying the South China seas. While the Qing dynasty laid claim to much of the region, it lost de facto control over the region after a disastrous naval confrontation with France in which much of China’s Southern fleet was sunk. The Sino-French convention of 1887 created a red line in the Paracel islands region which divided the administration of the region between the France and China. In the face of Republic of Chinese protests, France expanded its control over the region in the 1930s, before being replaced by the Japanese during World War II...(Continued)