Editor’s note

An observation of national responses to the COVID-19 pandemic among Asian countries shows that countries that have implemented democratic processes for pandemic policies have been more successful in handling the pandemic. Japan’s measures against the COVID-19 pandemic, undeniably, conformed to democratic processes and refrained from imposing extreme restrictions on civic liberties. Nonetheless, Japan’s pandemic policy, unlike that of South Korea and Taiwan, yielded limited success. Maiko Ichihara, associate professor at Hitotsubashi University, posits that the Japanese government failed to earn the trust of the public as not only were there inconsistencies among pandemic policies, but there were also no clear indications on the scientific grounds on which the policies were drafted. Additionally, contradictions among press conferences held by government officials and the lack of a single entity responsible for the dissemination of information at the government-level further weakened the public’s faith in the government. Such ambiguity, in fact, has not been limited to the government’s countermeasures to COVID-19, but has long been a prevalent issue. In this regard, the author underscores the pressing need for increased government transparency and accountability.  

※ The following are excerpts from the article. For the full text, please check the attached file at the top of this page.
 

Introduction[1]

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, Asia experienced the most prominent decline in liberal democracy of any region in the world. With extreme restrictions on freedom of movement through strict lockdown measures, repression of media freedom under the guise of combatting fake news and cracking down on criticism of the government, the decline of liberal democracy that we have observed over the past fifteen years has accelerated rapidly.

Among Asian countries, the crisis of democracy is most pronounced in South and Southeast Asia,[2] while the Northeast Asian region has remained relatively stable. South Korea and Taiwan, in particular, have gained international respect for their democratic COVID-19 measures. The South Korean government implemented a COVID tracing system that, while not entirely problem-free, recognizes privacy rights and became a model for combatting COVID-19 as a democracy. In the case of Taiwan, there has been a strengthening rather than a decline of democracy, with increased cooperation between the civic tech community and the government.

In terms of damage caused by the pandemic, there is a difference between the democratic countries in the subregions of Northeast Asia and Southeast/South Asia. India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, countries that have sought to contain COVID-19 by undermining democracy (by, for instance, enacting anti-fake-news laws to restrict media freedom and making examples of lockdown violators through inhumane treatment), have the highest number of COVID-19 cases in Asia. By contrast, Taiwan and South Korea, which implemented democratic COVID-19 control measures, succeeded in restraining the pandemic to a significant degree.

This observation suggests that the degree of compliance with democratic processes may be correlated with the effectiveness of COVID-19 countermeasures. Such seems to be the case in other parts of the world as well: while countries with populist political leaders such as the United States, Brazil, and India have the highest number of COVID-19 cases, democracies with non-populist political leaders and high levels of trust in government such as Australia, Finland, Norway, and New Zealand have controlled the pandemic successfully.[3]

Looking at Northeast Asia, it can be said that that Japan, like South Korea and Taiwan, is a democracy where populism is relatively well contained. However, unlike Taiwan and South Korea, Japan has not been internationally recognized for its COVID-19 response. This is because although Japan’s COVID countermeasures are relatively democratic, the government has not won the trust of the public due to the lack of transparency in the information distributed. ■

• Maiko Ichihara is an Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Law at Hitotsubashi University, Japan, and a Visiting Scholar in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She is also a co-chair of the Democracy for the Future project at the Japan Center for International Exchange. Throughout her career, she has undertaken research on international relations, democracy support, and Japanese foreign policy. Her recent publications include: “Universality to Plurality? Values in Japanese Foreign Policy,” in Yoichi Funabashi and G. John Ikenberry, eds., The Crisis of Liberalism: Japan and the International Order (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020); and Japan’s International Democracy Assistance as Soft Power: Neoclassical Realist Analysis (New York and London: Routledge, 2017).

• Typeset by Jinkyung Baek, Director of the Research Department
  For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) I j.baek@eai.or.kr