It is unlikely that the United States will be able to influence North Korea to denuclearize, a senior U.S. official said Tuesday, in one of the frankest senior government assessments of U.S. policy goals for the peninsula in decades.
“I think the notion of getting the North Koreans to denuclearize is probably a lost cause,” said Director of U.S. National Intelligence James Clapper in an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). “They are not going to do that…that is their ticket to survival.”
The statement is at odds with the U.S. Department of State’s long-held position, which for three decades has pursued verifiable denuclearization of the DPRK and, on Tuesday, sought to distance itself with Clapper’s interview remarks.
“No, nothing’s changed … that’s not our position,” State Department spokesman John Kirby said on Tuesday when asked about Clapper’s statement. “Our policy objective is to seek to obtain a verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.”
SIGNIFICANT STATEMENT
Despite the rapid U-turn, the Clapper statement was notable in the broader context of both North Korea’s relations with the U.S. and South Korea, analysts told NK News on Wednesday.
“It is a belated admission of something which has been clear for over a decade,” long-time North Korea observer Dr. Andrei Lankov said.
“The problem is, however, that the U.S. will have great problems to admit the obvious, largely due to domestic and strategic considerations. I would not expect any immediate change in policy.”
While the State Department was quick to U-turn from the remarks, Troy University lecturer Dr. Daniel Pinkston said it could be explained by reasons that might not, actually, indicate a rebuttal of Clapper’s remarks.
“I think there could be three reasons for this (contradiction),” Pinkston said. “(Either) this message is for a domestic U.S. audience; the message is part of signaling assurances to allies in order to maintain the credibility of extended deterrence; or the person or persons issuing the statement know nothing or very little about the DPRK.”
If an indicator of forthcoming policy shifts, the statement could have a negative impact on U.S. diplomacy towards Pyongyang, Dr. Andray Abrahamian, an Honorary Fellow at Macquarie University said.
“Calling for (denuclearization) is their opening position in a long-term negotiating strategy, in which case, coming out and saying it’s not going to happen is probably a mistake in terms of strategic negotiations,” Abrahamian said. “It’d be better to keep that relocation hidden for now.”
SOUTH KOREAN FEARS
The impact of the statement in South Korea, Abrahamian continued, could be more significant.
“It could really spark something of a panic in conservative political circles (in South Korea) and certainly the impression I get is recently there’s an increasing number of people who think ‘If North Korea is going to have nuclear weapons, we should have them too.'”
Another observer said any possible change in policy could have either a positive or negative impact on South Korea.
“It may provide opportunities for direct talks as long as there is some progress in North Korea-U.S. relations,” said Jaesung Ryu, a former research fellow at the Seoul-based East Asia Institute.
“(But) depending on how Pyongyang responds, the impact of future U.S. policies are more likely to be limited in the sense that they will need a new goal, which may cause additional challenges for Japan as well as South Korea.”
INFORMATION THE KEY
Clapper also used the interview to suggest the U.S. was under-using information warfare techniques against the DPRK.
“…we don’t capitalize on our great weapon, which is information,” Clapper said. “And that’s something they worry about a lot…(just look at) their reaction to the loudspeakers being activated along the DMZ or the dropping of leaflets by NGOs over North Korea… they go nuts when that happens.”
Pinkston said that “Clapper is correct on this point,” because “there are clear inefficiencies and contradictions in the DPRK due to poor governance.”
“Getting information in, and getting people out to learn and see more about the world will help them realize the domestic sources of their inefficiencies and poor governance.”
The U.S. Department of State in September rolled out plans to break the DPRK government’s tight grip on information in the country, allocating approximately $1,600,000 out of its $2,650,000 budget for North Korea-related activities to beefing up information accessibility in North Korea.
But Go Myong-Hyun, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, cast doubt on how effective the plan might be, arguing that the influx of information would only have far-reaching repercussions if the U.S. government developed content accessible to North Koreans.
“Given North Koreans already have access to outside information through USBs or DVDs, we have to think of what kind of content we can ‘additionally’ provide,” Go told NK News in September.
“Secondly, North Koreans have self-censorship and approach information selectively. They’re aware that they will be harshly punished if they are found to have politically sensitive information.”