The Deal and the Rocket: Understanding North Korea’s “Inconsistency”
It is becoming all too common for North Korea to engage in provocative behavior in order to grab international attention. This time around though, the announcement by North Korea on March 16, 2012, to conduct a satellite launch seemed to catch the Obama administration particularly off guard. For the United States, this latest provocation went completely against the spirit of the Leap Day Deal agreed to only two weeks before in which North Korea would freeze its uranium enrichment activities and place a moratorium on further missile and nuclear tests in exchange for U.S. humanitarian assistance.
While this satellite launch could be expected for a country committed to military-first politics and in the context of the celebrations for the centenary of the birth of Kim Il-sung, the pursuit of the Leap Day Deal comes across as a redundant effort. Following the satellite launch, reports are now emerging that North Korea will conduct a nuclear test which will have further implications. Given that the satellite launch and a nuclear test would scupper any agreement with the United States, why did North Korea bother to show up and negotiate the deal?
We may consider two scenarios that rest upon how to interpret the meaning of the Leap Day Deal. The first is that this reveals inconsistencies in the regime’s decision-making process; specifically that Kim Jong-un is unable to establish his own strategy. This is based on the belief that there is little logic in concluding an agreement with the United States shortly before making the announcement to conduct the satellite launch. From North Korea’s perspective, it would surely make more sense to carry out the provocation first, draw in attention from the international community, and then try to negotiate later. Concluding an agreement and then breaking it within such a short period would yield few tangible benefits. Such inconsistencies in the decision-making process would also indicate that some kind of internal debate or even power struggle exists within the regime.
An important point to consider is that the satellite launch was apparently decided upon by Kim Jong-il before his death in December 2011, which would mean Kim Jong-un had little choice but to carry it out. In this regard, the second scenario holds that the pursuit of the Lead Day Deal reflects efforts by the Kim Jong-un regime to signal its true intentions to initiate dialogue. This tells us that the Kim Jong-un regime is struggling to cope with the legacy of his father’s rule while also seeking to develop his own policies. Knowing that the satellite launch would be considered an extremely provocative act, the Leap Day Deal was a way to indicate to the United States that it has sincere intentions to come back to the Six-Party Talks...(Continued)