Following is the second in a series of articles on the relationship between South Korea and China, on the occasion of a May 27 summit between presidents Lee Myung-bak and Hu Jintao. - Ed.
A month before the epochal Sept. 19 agreement came in 2005, the members of the six-party talks spent over two weeks grounded in Beijing, trying to persuade the North to sign the draft.
In the middle of it all was host China, showing exceptional enthusiasm by volunteering the role of a cajoler, and mobilizing a work force of about 200 from some nine departments of its Foreign Ministry to work on the negotiations day and night. China also boasted closer cooperation with the United States, with China`s Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing telephoning U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to brief her on the progress of the talks. China`s fervor was one of many representations of its new goal for the 21st century - to become the world leader through multinational frameworks by highlighting cooperation, instead of intimidation.
"For China, denuclearizing North Korea has become a true priority. A nuclear-armed North means fortified defense power of Japan and the United States, as well as more complications in managing the Taiwan issue," said professor Yoo Ho-yeol of Korea University.
While China was more aloof to Pyongyang developing its weapons of mass destruction in the 1990s, it became noticeably more aware upon the second nuclear crisis in 2002, under new leader Hu Jintao, who took office in November the same year. China, which had left the nuclear issue as a bilateral problem between North Korea and the United States, came up with a range of multinational alternatives, eventually leading to establishment of the six-party talks in 2003. The talks gathering the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan and Russia became the first permanent negotiations and dialogue channels among the regional players of Northeast Asia.
"Unlike in the past, a larger threat of WMDs comes from potential nuclear states such as North Korea rather than from other powerful states who fall under the so-called 'balance of threat,'" Park Doo-bok, an honorary professor at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, said.
The six-party talks therefore gives China double satisfaction. One, of peacefully managing North Korea`s nuclear problem, and two, of giving Beijing an opportunity to play a leading role in expanding the nuclear talks into a security mechanism for Northeast Asia.
There are, however, also limits and obstacles, such as growing skepticism of the efficacy of the six-party talks, which focus on "compromising" rather than "pressuring" the complete denuclearization of the North. China's influence on Pyongyang is also weakening, more so as the North continues to inch closer to the United States.
For instance, in March 2007 during a visit to the United States, North Korea's chief negotiator Kim Kye-gwan met former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and asked whether the United States was interested in "strategic relations" with Pyongyang.
"By that, Kim was asking the United States whether it is willing to use North Korea to keep China in check, which clearly shows just how the trust level between Pyongyang and Beijing has changed," Park Doo-bok said.
Indeed, the first and foremost interest for North Korea in attending the six-party talks appears to be normalizing relations with the United States, starting with the lifting of two key political sanctions by Washington in return for its nuclear program's declaration and disablement.
Korea is currently listed among the states sponsoring terrorism and falls under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Under the Sept. 19 Joint Statement and the follow-up Feb. 13 and Oct. 3 agreements, Pyongyang and Washington are to work on normalizing their relations in line with the denuclearization process. China, which remains the largest donor to the destitute North, therefore is left with lessened political influence, the observers say.
"While problems are being created on the trust level (between China and North Korea), the value of North Korea to China`s Northeast Asian strategy remains intact. In other words, while China`s influence in an objective perspective exists, there is a limit to wielding actual persuasion," Park Doo-bok said.
The lowering trust level began to form upon China's change of global policy. While it had highlighted the special bond between the two in the past, the new China reflects more of its national interest in its North Korean policies, the observers explained.
Lee Tae-hwan of Sejong Institute recently pointed out in his article published by the East Asia Institute that China`s newfound drive to take leads in multinational organizations like the six-party talks remain "ive."
"China's multinational diplomacy has no other choice but to be selective, not to mention how China`s strategic tools in participating in multinational diplomacy are also restrictive," Lee wrote.
As an example, Lee pointed to the problem with Taiwan`s independence, which China wants to remain a bilateral problem between Beijing and Washington, rather than through a multinational framework.
So it depends on how the United States will deal with it, and how the bilateral relations between Beijing and Washington will develop, in order for China to be able to succeed in fostering the six-party talks into a Northeast Asian security body, he explained.
China`s enthusiastic participation in the multilateral cooperation in the region began in the 21st century, with a goal to wipe out the so-called "China-threat theory," and instead be recognized as a responsible powerful state, according to Lee.
When looking back, China had remained isolated in the 1940s through the 1960s. As the former Soviet Union became China`s biggest threat in the 1970s, China began forging ties with the United States and officially participating in international organizations such as the United Nations. Its role in the global bodies, however, remained passive. The participation level began to increase in the 1990s, as China began its rapid economic surge. Upon the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, China went all-out into the multilateral organizations, joining the World Trade Organization in 2001.
China began to underscore its role from a mere participant to a leader in multilateral diplomacy, especially after the Sept. 11 terrorist attack in 2001. China cooperated with the United States, and actively participated in such multilateral talks as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN plus Three, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and Asian Security Conference, among others. On paper at least, the members to the six-party talks pledge to do just that, to start discussing the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism by setting up a separate working group. The working group headed by Russia, however, is yet to open its first session.
Experts, in the meantime, are mixed as to whether the six-party talks will remain intact and effective throughout the rough course of verifying North Korea`s both open and clandestine nuclear programs and dismantling them. Some say that the launch of a tougher South Korean government under conservative Lee Myung-bak and an anticipated administration change in the United States this winter may force the six-party talks into limbo.
"For some of the South Korean negotiators, they deem that they have taken out all they can (from the North and its nuclear programs) through this six-party talks' framework," a diplomatic observer said on condition of anonymity.
But Yoo Ho-yeol disagreed. "While it is possible for the six-party talks to undergo readjustment with the U.S. government change, it will remain in China`s utmost interest to continue playing its role. It is more appropriate for Seoul to understand this and keep the six-party talks going. The fact that the Lee Myung-bak administration does not have a detailed action plan on North Korea only shows that it is not that interested. It does, however, not mean that it is skeptical of the six-party talks' efficacy," he said, adding that it is crucial to continue cooperating with China.
Lee Tae-hwan said in his article that neither China nor the United States believe North Korea's nuclear problem is something that can be solved in a short period of time. "It is China's principle position that it will not become impatient even when a long amount of time is needed (to denuclearize the North). China is not only interested in the North`s nuclear situation but also in managing the North, in order to maintain China's influence in the future settlement of peace on the Korean Peninsula," he wrote. "In order to use China's rise as an opportunity, the South must maintain a partnership and propose what are common interests for China and the South and to construct a cooperative mechanism to manage threats," he added.
Formation of the six-party talks
China's arrangement of the six-party talks was a stark contrast to its position in the 1990s when it was more "understanding" of the North`s nuclear programs development.
Upon the first nuclear crisis in 1994, all China did was release a statement stating obvious principles. When the United States and South Korea suggested holding four-way talks in 1996, China was still less than interested, believing that the North Korean problem should not be taken off the agenda as an international issue. But China joined in, when Pyongyang agreed to "listen" to a joint briefing by Seoul and Washington. Three more rounds of the four-way talks were held, under the leadership of the United States. But when this arrangement failed to keep North Korea`s attention, the talks eventually died down, and instead bilateral contacts between Pyongyang and Washington remained.
During the second nuclear crisis in 2002 upon the allegation of North Korea running a clandestine uranium enrichment program, there was greater need for negotiation, but Washington refused to directly deal with North Korea.
The United States instead initially demanded a gathering of the United Nations Security Council Permanent Five members along with South Korea, Japan, Australia, the European Union and the North. In an obvious response, the North rejected the proposal. Then in February 2003, then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell suggested during his stop in China on his way to the inauguration ceremony of former President Roh Moo-hyun, that China would be the perfect player to arrange a multilateral framework on North Korea's nuclear issue.
At the time, Pyongyang's position was to only talk bilaterally with Washington, while the United States' position was to only talk with the North multilaterally. China, as a compromise, arranged trilateral talks in April 2003. But as the U.S. government remained adamant against exclusively talking with the North Koreans, the three-way talks soon sizzled again.
In an effort to find alternatives, the North decided to come to a new form of multinational talks also gathering South Korea, Japan and Russia, with the United States' consensus that bilateral talks with Pyongyang will be possible within such a framework. The first six-party talks hence convened in August 2003, in the Chinese capital.