This is the 27th article of a special series analyzing political changes in Korea. In cooperation with the Korean Political Science Association, we will offer in-depth analysis of Korea`s political development since the civilian uprising in June 1987. Participating in this special report are a group of professors teaching political science at major local universities. - Ed.
Since the 1987 democratic transition, civic organizations have grown tremendously as major players in Korean politics. Nongovernmental organizations in particular have acquired ascendancy over other such organizations, and have recently played an active and sometimes key role in the political and policy processes.
One of the most important roles of Korean NGOs is pressing for reforms in the political process. Major NGOs and their coalitions have been at the forefront of campaigns for reform.
Their efforts have focused on areas such as monitoring the election process, increasing political participation, decreasing political corruption, monitoring the legislative process in the National Assembly and increasing its transparency, and pushing for democratization within political parties.
They have argued that the momentum and pressure for political reform should come from civil society because most political parties and politicians have been reluctant to carry out necessary reforms on their own.
The so-called "blacklist campaign" led by the Citizens' Solidarity for the 2000 General Elections is the most high- profile case. Composed of some 900 civic organizations, this group reviewed the backgrounds of all candidates, and blacklisted 86 corrupt and incompetent individuals who had engaged in any of the following: military coups or other antidemocratic activities, corruption, violations of election laws, tax evasion, draft dodging, and other illegal or immoral activities.
It was found that institutional reforms in the political sphere had been blocked in the legislature, and that the only way to carry out necessary reforms would be to change the legislators.
The campaign had some significant success, and, in spite of some criticisms and allegations against it, various survey results at that time showed that 60 to 90 percent of the Korean people supported the blacklisting campaign.
In the end, 59 out of the 86 politicians on the list were defeated in the April election; that is, 68.6 percent or two out of three blacklisted candidates failed to be elected. More surprisingly, 95 percent of those listed by the Citizens` Solidarity were defeated in Seoul and its vicinities.
Some argue that the campaign has raised the quality of Korean politics by educating the public, reducing the influence of regionalism on peoples' voting decisions, and inducing the major parties to recruit younger candidates untainted by corruption or antidemocratic behavior.
Some even referred to this outcome as a "voters' revolution" in the spirit of "the June 1987 democratic movement," referring to the peak month of popular mobilization that finally brought down authoritarianism in Korea.
Another major political role played by Korean NGOs is their participation in policy reform, often in cooperation with the government. Prior to the 1987 democratic transition, state-society relations in Korea were inherently antagonistic and characterized by persistent, violent confrontations between militant people`s movement groups and repressive authoritarian regimes. In the post-transition period, this relationship began to change.
Particularly, reformist democratic governments needed strong support from civil society to counter the resistance of vested interests and conservative forces. Consenting to the legitimacy of the reformist governments, NGOs in turn became more positive about cooperating with the government.
It was under the Kim Young-sam government that a more cooperative relationship between NGOs and the government first developed. The government began to support NGOs financially, to consider their policy proposals seriously, and, on occasion, even to enact some of their recommendations into law. Under the Kim Dae-jung government, the relationship shifted even more toward one of cooperation, complement, and mutual empowerment.
The Roh Moo-hyun government was launched under the banner of "the Participatory Government." It remains controversial whether the government has lived up to its name, but, to date, the Roh administration did not seek to further develop a cooperative relationship with the NGO sector.
For example, the government established a new position of senior Secretary to the president for civil society in the Blue House; it institutionalized a close consultative relationship between NGOs and the presidential office; and it recruited civil society leaders to the presidential office and other government agencies.
Probably, the pharmaceutical industry reforms of the Kim Dae-jung government best illustrate this reform alliance between NGOs and the government. The essence of the pharmaceutical reforms was to mandate the separation of the prescription and dispensing of drugs.
Before this reform was implemented, physicians and pharmacists both prescribed and dispensed drugs, resulting in the overuse and misuse of drugs.
In this case, NGOs played an active role in the whole policy process, from the agenda-setting stage to the enactment process. Empowered by the government, civic groups consisting mainly of progressive academics and former people`s movement activists were significantly involved in raising pharmaceutical industry reforms as a critical social issue.
They helped to diminish the resistance of doctors and pharmacists, to push the presidents of the Korean Medical Association and the Korean Pharmaceutical Association to agree on major concerns, and even participated in the policy implementation of some technical issues such as the classification of drugs into preion and non-preion types.
This case exemplifies the Kim Dae-jung government's attempt to incorporate the input of civil society into the policy process, and to integrate the support of civic groups into the reform process. It is widely believed that the above reform would not have been implemented without the strong demand and support of civil society and civic groups.
The political and policy roles of Korean NGOs have been so influential that some even hold the somewhat extreme view that NGOs have acquired the status of the fourth branch of the government. At the same time, NGOs have been regarded as the most trusted institution by the Korea public.
However, more recent surveys show that Korean NGOs' once-prominent status is in clear decline. Particularly problematic is their credibility. The data in the following table, based on the Joong Ang Daily`s 2003 and 2005 surveys, show that NGOs` institutional-trust ranking has ped from first to fifth between 2003 and 2005.
In turn the most recent surveys conducted by the East Asia Institute on the influence and credibility of 24 power organizations in Korea, which is based on a nationwide survey of 1,543 citizens, reveal the current status of PSPD (People Solidarity for Participatory Democracy) and CCEJ (Citizens` Coalition for Economic Justice), the two most prominent NGOs, to be in steady decline (East Asian Institute, 2007). Conducted in 2005, 2006 and 2007, the surveys examined the influence and credibility rankings of 24 leading organizations in Korea such as big corporations (Samsung, Hyundai Motor, SK, and LG), judicial institutions (the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and Prosecutors' Office), political institutions (the Blue House, National Assembly, and four major political parties), and other public and private organizations, including PSPD and CCEJ. The surveys results show that the influence and credibility rankings of the two NGOs ped notably in those years.
Particularly noteworthy is the finding that the credibility and influence rankings of the two leading NGOs in Korea were lower than those of some big corporations and judicial institutions for three years in a row.
How can we explain the recent decline of NGOs' standing? We find the answer in NGOs' over-politicization and in the erosion of NGO-government relations.
NGOs' direct political participation such as in the blacklist campaign is problematic. The most serious element is the danger of over-politicization. That is, NGOs' direct and excessive political participation, as in the case of that campaign, may damage the image of NGOs' neutrality, and can sap their credibility.
This is particularly important in Korea because most people expect NGOs to be nonpartisan and even pure. In other words, people want these groups to remain uncontaminated by dirty politics.
The second round of the blacklist campaign - launched during the 2004 general elections - seems to have aggravated the situation. This time, overwhelmed by the possibility of President Roh's impeachment, and distracted by the diverse strategies of a variety of civic organizations over a wide ideological spectrum, the campaign failed to attract citizens' attention and to make any significant impact on the election.
Worse still, the advent of numerous politicized NGOs - the New Right NGOs in particular - may have left the impression that most NGOs are partisan and power-oriented, thus damaging the appearance of neutrality and devotion to the public interest which is essential. This recent experience helps explain the declining status of Korean NGOs.
NGOs' alliance and partnership with the government in policy reform, as in the case of the pharmaceutical industry reforms, contains the danger of co-optation. That is, there is a serious question of whether NGOs are getting so close to the government that their credentials for independence and autonomy are weakened or lost. It is important to recognize the limitations of the apparently cooperative relationship between NGOs and the government.
In the pharmaceutical business reform process, some NGOs were even funded by the government for their supportive activities, which raised serious questions of conflict of interest. Considered an ally of the government, rather than as an independent force, such NGOs even became the target of criticism when the reform campaign ran into various difficulties such as lengthy physician strikes and consumer dissatisfaction.
That is, the NGOs were criticized for both lacking expertise and neglecting their duty to critically evaluate the government`s policies. This and other cases of cozy alliance between NGOs and the government lead us to ask whether the relationship has become too close for comfort.
Korean NGOs absolutely need to address their declining credibility and influence. We may characterize the current stage as a situation in which NGOs are now stigmatized as being overly politicized and potentially being co-opted by the government.
Such humiliating epithets as "citizens' movements without citizens," "politicized NGOs," and "handmaidens of the government" are often aired by the media to further derogate their reputation. The urgent task for Korean NGOs is to restore their non-partisan and non-governmental credentials.
In light of the danger of over-politicization, it is not advisable to pursue more direct forms of political participation such as the blacklist campaign. NGOs' political participation can take a variety of forms, the most politicized one being partisan involvement.
For Korean NGOs to regain their credibility, it is crucial to stay away from outright partisan politics, and to concentrate on more indirect and neutral activities such as non-partisan election monitoring and policy advocacy.
The co-optation problem creates a major tension in NGO-government relations. Synergy comes from engagement and cooperation between the two parties. But, in engaging the government, NGOs need to maintain at least some autonomy, and always be wary of being co-opted by it.
For Korean NGOs, it is time to strike a balance and to give priority to their independence and non-governmental credentials. When engaging the government and entering in cooperation with the state, it is imperative that they consider seriously whether the engagement and the entry do not impinge on their independence and neutrality.
In addition, Korean NGOs need to work on their own structure and character so as to enhance their accountability, transparency, democracy, and expertise. These are well-known virtues of NGOs that in turn help elevate their credibility and reputation.
It is also very likely that a more accountable, transparent, internally democratic, and well-informed NGO has a better chance to present itself as a legitimate partner that`s qualified to create synergy with the government, and thus contribute to democratic governance.
However, it takes two to create teamwork, and the government needs to play its own role. Above all, judging from the serious nature of Korean NGOs' poor resources base, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to address their resources problem without at least some financial support from the government.
A fundamental caveat here is that there is always the danger of the government politicizing the allocation of government subsidies in order to favor more pro-government NGOs, thereby infringing on the independence of NGOs.
This forewarning, however, is not grave enough to abolish the government funding itself. This will be tantamount to throwing the baby out with the bath water. The solution is to devise ways to avoid the danger of politicization, while making good use of government funding to create a genuinely cooperative and collateral relationship between NGOs and the government.
As an alternative to the current direct subsidization of NGOs, the government can adopt more indirect modes of subsidizing NGOs, such as by giving them tax-exempt status, postal and internet discounts, free use of public facilities and land, provision of state-sponsored internships, etc.
The government can also encourage and provide various incentives for citizens' donations and volunteer work. As for government funding, it is possible to establish a private foundation to manage the allocation of government subsidies in an independent and rational manner. The foundation may not be entirely free from government intervention, but this can be the second-best approach.
In general, it is important for government leaders in Korea to realize that co-optation strategies do not work to their advantage, in the long run. The effort may win over some NGOs in the short run. But this is detrimental to long-term trust building between NGOs and the government, and will just aggravate their relationship.
Concerned with political controversies over cooperating with the government, and the consequent ill effects on their image as neutral and moral, NGOs are likely to shy away from engaging the government, and may even reject more benign and constructive opportunities to cooperate.