Population	Nationwide adults aged 18 and older
Sampling Frame	Hankook Research Master Sample (970,000 people) Politics/Society Panel (70,000 people)
Sampling Method	Proportional selection by region, gender, and age (as of April 2025)
Sample Size	1,509
Survey Method	Web survey
Response Rate	22.5% (among 6,701 sent, 1,509 completed the survey)
Survey Date	2025. 6. 4. ~ 2025. 6. 5.
Survey Agency	Hankook Research Co. Ltd.
Composition of Respondents	[Gender] Male 49.6%; Female 50.4%   [Age] 18 to 29: 15.3% 30 to 39: 15.0% 40 to 49: 17.4% 50 to 59: 19.5% 60 to 69: 17.8% Over 70: 15.1%

 

Ⅰ. The 21st Presidential Election

 

● Polarization and Electoral Dynamics: The 21st presidential election was marked by entrenched political polarization. Despite variables such as the martial law declaration and impeachment crisis, potential fragmentation within the conservative bloc, renewed debate on constitutional reform, internal turmoil during the ruling party’s nomination process, and the potential rise of a third party, the final outcome revealed strong consolidation along progressive–conservative lines. This outcome underscores the deep and persistent polarization in Korean politics.

 

● Emotional Partisan Divide: Despite a large centrist segment (37.6%), political discourse remains dominated by small but highly mobilized ideological extremes. These groups often engage in adversarial politics grounded in mutual hostility. The 2025 presidential race was shaped less by policy debate than by reciprocal expressions of disfavor between the two leading candidates. As a result, centrist voters were fragmented rather than consolidated.

 

● Prospects for Political Conflict: Post-election, the political landscape is expected to return to binary confrontation. A majority of respondents (67.8%) anticipate increased political conflict within the next year. While pragmatic leadership—emphasizing negotiation, compromise, and problem-solving—is needed, a parallel effort to advance structural political reform will be essential to address the root causes of polarization.

 

● Voter Retention and Shifts: Among those who supported Lee Jae-myung in the 2022 election, 92.2% voted for him again, while only 3.6% switched to Kim Moon-soo. Conversely, of those who voted for Yoon Suk-yeol in 2022, 75.5% supported Kim Moon-soo, 11.9% shifted to Lee Jae-myung, and 8.3% voted for Lee Jun-seok of the New Reform Party. These patterns suggest a relatively cohesive progressive base, in contrast to partial fragmentation among conservatives.

 

● Voting Motivations: Supporters of Lee Jae-myung cited his qualifications and experience (63.5%) and policy pledges (8.9%) as key reasons for their choice. In contrast, Kim Moon-soo's supporters emphasized his morality(43.6%) and experience (20.5%). Issue salience differed sharply between groups: 68.4% of Lee's voters cited the martial law declaration and impeachment as decisive, while 68.5% of Kim’s voters pointed to concerns over Lee’s legal risks and ethics controversies.

 

● Policy Priorities for the Next Administration: Asked to identify top priorities for the next administration, 42.5% of respondents selected economic issues—job creation, inflation control, and growth. This was followed by political reform (10.7%), including constitutional and electoral systern changes, and population-related challenges (8.5%) such as the low birth rate and demographic decline.

Ⅱ. Perception of the U.S. and ROK-U.S. Relations

 

● Perceptions of Political Alienation: A majority of respondents (60.6%) felt that politicians and public officials do not care about people like themselves. This sentiment was particularly pronounced among conservatives (69.3%), compared to progressives (56.6%) and centrists (54.7%). Notably, 62.8% of conservatives also reported a strong understanding of major political issues—a level comparable to progressives (62.9%) and significantly higher than centrists (42.8%).

 

● Affective Polarization: Supporters of Lee Jae-myung reported a mean favorability score of 7.8 toward their candidate, while rating Kim Moon-soo at just 1.87. Conversely, Kim’s supporters rated their candidate at 7.4, while giving Lee a low score of 2.43. These figures reflect intense affective polarization between the two voting blocs.

 

● Partisan Loyalty and Hostility: When asked whether they would continue to support their current party in the future, 96.6% of Democratic Party (DP) supporters and 85.6% of People Power Party (PPP) supporters answered affirmatively. However, cross-party perceptions revealed entrenched hostility: 86.1% of DP supporters said the PPP was not a party they could ever support, and 84.3% of PPP supporters said the same of the DP.

 

Ⅲ. Perceptions of the Political Situation

 

● Views on the Martial Law Declaration and Constitutional Court Ruling: A large majority (71.6%) viewed former President Yoon Suk Yeol’s declaration of martial law as unconstitutional and anti-democratic. This perspective was held by 93.4% of progressives and 72.8% of centrists. Even among conservatives, 51.9% assessed the action as unconstitutional, though 37.5% viewed it as a legitimate exercise of constitutional authority. Only 3.3% of progressives and 7.6% of conservatives described it as legitimate. In contrast, views on the Constitutional Court’s impeachment ruling revealed stark ideological divides. Among progressives, 91.6% supported the decision, as did 64.8% of centrists. Among conservatives, however, 44.9% considered the decision to be wrong, compared to 41.5% who agreed with it.

 

● Attribution of Responsibility for the Martial Law Declaration: When asked which party bore greater responsibility for the December 3 martial law attempt and impeachment crisis, 50.5% of respondents pointed to the ruling People Power Party (PPP), while 20.0% blamed the opposition Democratic Party (DP). Another 25.7% assigned blame to both parties. Among DP supporters, 81.0% blamed the PPP, while 12.2% held both parties accountable. Conversely, 52.0% of PPP supporters blamed the DP, 31.7% cited both, and only 15.0% attributed responsibility to their own party.

 

● Perceptions of the Ruling Party’s Response to Impeachment: A majority of respondents (57.0%) believed the ruling PPP should have acknowledged its faults and accepted the impeachment process. This view was overwhelmingly held by DP supporters (91.4%) but was shared by only 33.1% of PPP supporters. Instead, 50.4% of PPP supporters said the ruling party should have more actively opposed the impeachment and defended the president—highlighting a clear partisan divide in views on the proper role of the ruling party during the crisis.

 

 

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■ Edited by Chaeryn Song, Research Associate
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | crsong@eai.or.kr