Search

Editor's Note

The East Asia Institute (EAI) presents the results of its January 2025 public opinion survey on South Korean perceptions of political polarization and democracy. The survey highlights four key trends: (1) intensifying political polarization, driven more by partisan and emotional divides than ideological differences, (2) declining public trust in democracy, (3) widening partisan gaps in confidence toward core democratic institutions, and (4) the influence of political polarization on foreign policy preferences and perceptions of the U.S., China, Japan, and North Korea.

2025 EAI Polls on Polarization and Democracy in South Korea

 

Ⅰ. Political Polarization

"Political polarization is deepening, driven more by emotional and partisan divisions than by ideological differences."

Ideological Breakdown: The ideological breakdown of respondents was 27.1% progressive, 46.3% centrist, and 27.7% conservative. Compared to 2021(27.7% progressive, 41.8% centrist, and 26.2% conservative), there has been no significant change.

 

Perceptions of Ideological Extremism: Supporters of both the Democratic Party of Korea (DP) and the People Power Party (PPP) tended to perceive the opposing party as holding more extreme ideological positions. DP supporters felt ideologically closer to their party and politicians than PPP supporters did, although PPP supporters also reported a strong ideological affinity with their own party. Respondents generally perceived political leaders (Lee Jae-myung and Yoon Suk Yeol) as more extreme than their respective parties.

 

Unfavorability Ratings: Unfavorability ratings for the two major parties were 54.1% for the DP and 68.7% for the PPP, which increased by 10.4%p and 20.9%p over the past four years. Notably, among the party supporters, unfavorability rating for the opposing party exceeded 90%, with 94.6% of DP supporters disliking the PPP and 93.5% of PPP supporters disliking DP.

 

Generational and Gender Differences in Favorability Ratings: Women in their 20s showed the largest gap in favorability toward politicians and parties. On a 100-point scale, Yoon Suk Yeol scored 10 points, while Lee Jae-myung received 44.9 points. In contrast, men in their 20s exhibited low favorability for both politicians, with Yoon scoring 22.6 points and Lee 24.9 points. A similar pattern appeared in party favorability: women in their 20’s rated the PPP 15.1 points and the DP 52.7 points, while men in the same age group rated both parties at similar levels: PPP 32.6 points, DP 31.8 points.

 

Emotional Polarization and Negative Sentiments Toward Parties and Leaders: Among respondents who rated either party below 50 points, 56% described the DP as "infuriating" or expressed a desire to hold them accountable for their wrongdoings, while 60.6% characterized the PPP as "disgusting" and expressed a desire for its removal from the political arena. When asked about political leaders, respondents expressed even stronger negative sentiments. 66.3% wanted Yoon Suk Yeol removed from politics and 60% wanted Lee Jae-myung removed from politics. These findings indicate deepening emotional polarization, with many expressing a desire to eliminate rival factions from politics altogether.

 

● A majority (57.8%) predicted that political conflicts will worsen within the next year. This is significantly higher than those who believe conflicts will remain the same (22.5%) or improve (19.7%).

 

Ⅱ. Korea’s Democratic Backsliding

"Declining Public Trust in Korean Democracy… Weakened Commitment to the Democratic Systern"

 

Declining Satisfaction with Democracy: Only 45.8% of respondents were satisfied with the way democracy functions in South Korea, falling short of a majority. Similarly, only 46.7% evaluated the political systern as "democratic," while 32.7% perceived it as "not democratic" – a notable increase from 21.6% in 2021.

 

Partisan and Demographic Differences in Democratic Commitment: Support for democracy varied based on party affiliation and socio-demographic factors. While 90.6% of DP supporters agreed that "democracy is always better than any other systern," only 61.4% of PPP supporters shared this view. Notably, 31.6% of PPP supporters said that "in some situations, dictatorship is better than democracy.” Political independents were the most indifferent, with a significant share responding that “it doesn’t matter whether it’s democracy or authoritarianism.”

 

Gender and Generational Gaps in Attitudes Toward Democracy: 77.9% of women agreed that "democracy is always better than any other systern," compared to 71.9% of men, indicating a stronger commitment to democracy among women. This gender gap was even more pronounced among those in their 20s and 30s. While only 62.6% of men in their 20s and 64.2% in their 30s agreed that democracy is always better, 80.9% of women in their 20s and 86.5% in their 30s expressed the same view—significantly higher than their male counterparts.

Ⅲ. Trust in Key Institutions and Electoral Fairness

"Trust in Core Democratic Institutions Varies Sharply Along Party Lines"

 

Growing Distrust in the Presidency, Declining Distrust in Other Institutions: 67.5% of respondents reported distrust in the president, a sharply increase from 32.5% in 2021. In contrast, distrust in the National Assembly and the judiciary has declined: 59.0% expressed distrust toward the National Assembly, a 9.2 percentage-point decrease from 2021. Distrust in the judiciary fell to 40.2%, marking a 22.4 percentage-point decline.

 

Partisan Divide in Trust Toward Key Democratic Institutions: Among DP supporters, 35.1% distrusted the National Assembly, while 85.1% of PPP supporters expressed the same sentiment. A similar pattern emerged regarding the judiciary, with 60.8% of PPP supporters expressing distrust, compared to 20.7% of DP supporters.

 

Partisan Divide in Trust Toward Key Democratic Institutions: Among DP supporters, 35.1% distrusted the National Assembly, while 85.1% of PPP supporters expressed the same sentiment. A similar pattern emerged regarding the judiciary, with 60.8% of PPP supporters expressing distrust, compared to 20.7% of DP supporters.

 

Polarized Views on the Constitutional Court and National Election Commission(NEC): 32.9% of respondents expressed distrust toward the Constitutional Court, but opinions varied sharply along party lines: 14.4% of DP supporters reported distrust. 57.3% of PPP supporters reported distrust. 42% of all respondents expressed distrust toward NEC, with a striking partisan gap: Only 16.2% of DP supporters distrusted the NEC, compared to 75% of PPP supporters.

 

Election Fairness:68.8% of respondents viewed the 2022 Presidential Election as fair, with minimal partisan differences: 70.4% progressives, 64% conservatives. However, assessments of the 2024 General Election were much more polarized. While 83% of progressives believed the 2024 General Election election was fair, only 52.2% of conservatives shared the same view.

Ⅳ. Elite Politics and Populism

"High Public Interest in Politics, but Growing Distrust in Elite Governance"

 

High Public Interest in Politics, but Lower Engagement Among Younger Generations: A significant majority (68.4%) of respondents reported that they regularly pay attention to political issues. However, interest was lower among younger age groups, with 41.2% of those in their 20s and 47.4% of those in their 30s.

 

Widespread Distrust in Political Elites: While 67.6% of respondents said that they are well aware of key political issues, more than half (60.9%) believed that politicians and public officials do not care about people like them. Distrust in elite politics was particularly pronounced: 90.5% agreed that "Many people are elected, but little action follows." 86.2% concurred with the statement that "Politicians ultimately compromise to protect their own privileges." 72.5% believed that "The political divide between elites and the general public is greater than the differences among ordinary citizens.”

 

Rejection of Elite Governance, but Mixed Views on Sacrifice for the Nation: 70% of respondents disagreed with the notion that "society functions better when governed by a select group of leaders rather than the general public," indicating broad opposition to elite-driven politics. 47.6% agreed that ”individuals should make sacrifices for the nation”. Support for national sacrifice did not correspond with support for elite governance.

Ⅴ. Institutional Reform

“Decentralization of Presidential Power: 47.3% Agree vs 36.7% Prefer Status Quo”

 

Support for Constitutional Amendments: 53.2% respondents supported constitutional amendments to reform the current presidential systern. By ideological orientation, 63.3% of progressives and 47.9% of conservatives favored reform. Support for constitutional changes was stronger among progressives.

 

Decentralization of Presidential Power: 47.3% agreed that the “president holds excessive authority and power should be redistributed“, which is 7 percentage points higher than the 36.7% who preferred maintaining the current systern. By ideology, 61.3% of progressives supporting decentralization, compared to only 26.3% of conservatives.

 

Electoral Systern Reform: 64.7% of respondents believed the current electoral systern should be changed. The most cited reason for reform (45.4%) was to overcome the detrimental effects of a polarized two-party systern. Other reasons included the lack of demographic and socioeconomic representation among elected lawmakers (21.4%) and the tendency of legislators to focus only on their constituencies rather than national interests (19.4%).

Ⅵ. Foreign Policy

“The Foreign Policy Focus on “Unifying Divided National Opinion” Rises by 15.3 Percentage Points Over Four Years … Reflection of Shift in Policy Direction.”

 

Top Priorities in Foreign Policy: The most frequently cited priority for the government’s foreign policy was “strengthening economic diplomacy” (29.8%), followed by “strengthening the South Korea-U.S. alliance” (24.6%) and “efforts to unify a divided national opinion” (22.1%). This marks a significant shift from the 2021, when the top priorities were “strengthening the South Korea-U.S. alliance” (21.2%), “strengthening economic diplomacy” (14.6%), and “responding to U.S.-China competition” (13.4%). Notably, the proportion of respondents prioritizing “efforts to unify a divided national opinion” has increased by 15.3 percentage points over the past four years.

 

Foreign Policy Priorities by Ideology: Regarding North Korea policy, 44.6% of progressives prioritized “expanding inter-Korean exchanges”, whereas 41.5% of conservatives prioritized “strengthening security posture.” Only 15.7% of conservatives supported “expanding inter-Korean exchanges.”

 

●For the U.S. policy, 50.4% of conservatives selected “strengthening the South Korea-U.S. alliance” as the top priority – far higher than the next most-cited issue, “economic and advanced technology cooperation” (20.6%). In contrast, progressives placed the highest priority on “establishing a more equal relationship with the U.S.” (32.6%), followed by “strengthening the South Korea-U.S. alliance” (26.6%).

 

●With regard to China policy, across progressives, moderates, and conservatives, the top priority was “expanding economic exchanges and cooperation on advanced technology.” This was followed by “cooperation on environmental issues such as fine dust, climate change, and infectious diseases”, and “responding to economic sanctions” in that order.

 

●Concerning South Korea-Japan Relations, until 2021, the highest-priority issue was “resolving historical disputes”, ranking above “promoting forward-looking cooperation in economic, technological, and security fields.” In the 2025 survey, these rankings reversed by a narrow margin. 56.2% of progressives still prioritized “resolving historical disputes”, while only 26.8% supported “promoting forward-looking cooperation.” In contrast, 55.5% of conservative respondents prioritized “promoting forward-looking cooperation,” as the most important task. Only 24% prioritized “resolving historical disputes.”

 

● A majority (57.8%) predicted that political conflicts will worsen within the next year. This is significantly higher than those who believe conflicts will remain the same (22.5%) or improve (19.7%).


 

Translated and edited by: Chaeryn Song, Research Associate    

    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | crsong@eai.or.kr
 

Major Project

Center for Democracy Cooperation

Keywords

Related Publications