

# EMBATTLED GARRISONS

East Asia Institute, Seoul, Korea

November 18, 2008

Kent E. Calder

Director



THE EDWIN O.  
**REISCHAUER CENTER**  
FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES  
WASHINGTON D.C.

## CONTENTS



THE EDWIN O.  
**REISCHAUER CENTER**  
FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES  
WASHINGTON D.C.

**UN P-5 BASE PRESENCE AND HOST-NATION DOMESTIC POLITICAL  
CHANGE, 1951-2004**

**CONTACT HYPOTHESIS AND FOUR SCENARIOS**

**PARADIGMS OF BASE POLITICS**

**DFAA LOCAL OFFICE NETWORK**

**THE EMBEDDED HERITAGE OF COMPENSATION POLITICS: OKINAWA'S  
ECONOMY, JAPAN'S CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA'S BASES**

**THE CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OKINAWAN MILITARY LAND  
LEASES**


**POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

# UN P-5 BASE PRESENCE AND HOST-NATION DOMESTIC POLITICAL CHANGE, 1951-2004

		REGIME SHIFT	
		YES	NO
FOREIGN WITHDRAWAL	YES	<b>Conformity</b> US 12 (Panama etc.) UK 8 (HK etc.) France 8 (CAR etc.) Russia 12 (Latvia etc.)	<b>Strategic Withdrawal</b> US 4 (Saudi Arabia etc.) UK 6 (Belize etc.) France N/A Russia 3 (Vietnam etc.)
	NO	<b>Successful Accommodation</b> US 6 (Kyrgyzstan etc.) UK N/A France N/A Russia 3 (Georgia etc.)	<b>Dormant Volcano?</b> US 20 (Japan etc.) UK 3 (Germany etc.) France 7 (Germany etc.) Russia 4 (Kazakhstan etc.)


3

## CONTACT HYPOTHESIS AND FOUR SCENARIOS




4

## PARADIGMS OF BASE POLITICS



5

## PARADIGMS OF BASE POLITICS THE COMPENSATION POLITICS PARADIGM




Legend:

- : Primary player in the host nation,
- : Secondary player outside the host nation,
- : International secondary player,
- : Secondary player in the host nation,
- : International secondary player,
- : Resource flow
- : Influence flow


6

## DFAA LOCAL OFFICE NETWORK



7


## PARADIGMS OF BASE POLITICS THE BAZAAR POLITICS PARADIGM



Too many games of negotiation to hammer out stable policies




## PARADIGMS OF BASE POLITICS THE FIAT POLITICS PARADIGM



Legend:

- : Primary player in the host nation, 
  : Secondary player in the host nation, 
  : Resource flow, 
  : Influence flow, 
  : Secondary player outside the host nation, 
  : Player with no role in this paradigm, 
  : Influence flow


## PARADIGMS OF BASE POLITICS THE AFFECTIVE POLITICS PARADIGM



Legend:

- : Primary player in the host nation, 
  : Secondary player in the host nation, 
  : Resource flow, 
  : Influence flow, 
  : Secondary player outside the host nation, 
  : Player with no role in this paradigm, 
  : Influence flow


# THE EMBEDDED HERITAGE OF COMPENSATION POLITICS OKINAWA'S ECONOMY, JAPAN'S CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA'S BASES



11

## THE CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OKINAWAN MILITARY LAND LEASES


### Rising Dependency of Okinawan GPP on Military Land Rental Fees



12

# THE CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OKINAWAN MILITARY LAND LEASES

## Decreasing Commercial Land Prices



13

## POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Grand Strategy

I. *Beware of over-extension*

II. *Make political risk reduction a priority*

III. *Liberating occupiers are acceptable, but colonizers are not*

IV. *“View basing imperatives in a global systemic context”*

V. *Opposition groups are going global, so policy-makers need to do so also*

14

**I. *Be alert to the dangers of political transition***

**II. *Networks count: Focus on building inclusive host-nation political networks, including members of the Opposition***

**III. *Study best-practice institutions everywhere, and share the understanding of cross-national experience***

15

**I. *Contact matters***

**II. *Build common equities, especially at the grassroots level***

**III. *Emphasize the local level, and build “incentives to agreement” there***


**IV. *“One size does not fit all”***

16

# "The Emerging Base Politics of Pyeongtaek: Analysis and Recommendations"

## Alexander Cooley

Associate Professor  
Barnard College and Columbia University's  
School of International and Public Affairs



---

"Toward US-Korean Complex Alliance"  
East Asia Institute Conference  
Seoul, November 17, 2008

## Overview of Key Themes of Presentation

1. Turning the Corner in the ROK-USFK Alliance:  
The Stabilization of the US Bases Issue at the National Level in Korea
2. Prospects for US Forces in Pyeongtaek:  
How to Institutionalize Supportive Local-Central ROK Relations and Local-USFK Relations
3. Policy Recommendations for ROK, Pyeongtaek and USFK Officials

# **1. Turning the Corner: Party Politics and US-ROK Security Relations**

- ROK Presidents and Leadership from both Conservative and Progressive Parties Approved the Base Consolidation and Relocation Plan.
- USFK Presence and Legal Agreements No Longer a National Party Politics Wedge Issue as in the 1997 and the 2002 Presidential Campaigns.
  - Related Issues about the Implementation of Agreements such as Cost-Sharing are Politicized
- Follows the Pattern of Party Consolidation and Stabilization in Other US Allies.
  - Early 1980s: Socialist Parties in Greece (PASOK) and Spain (PSOE) Campaigned Against the U.S. Military Presence
  - Once in Power, they adjusted some of the legal arrangements and gained some concessions from US side
  - Since, US Military Presence is no Longer a Major Political Issue for these Left-Leaning Parties (despite policy agreements such as the Iraq War)

# **1. Turning the Corner: Procedural Legitimacy of Governing Accords**

- Successful, if at times contentious, Renegotiation of Status of Forces Agreement in 2001.
- ROK National Assembly Approval of the USFK Relocation to Pyeongtaek (December 2004) and Land Partnership Plan (LPP).
- New Legal Arrangements Governing ROK-USFK Relations have been Debated and Ratified by a Democratic Legislature.
  - Political Argument about U.S. or Authoritarian Imposition of Legal Arrangements can no longer be made by Mainstream Opponents
  - Anti-Base NGOs and Civil Society have Less of a Legal Argument to Make Against the USFK Presence
  - While Disagreements Remain over the Precise Funding Formula, Broad Framework has been Agreed to and Ratified

# 1. Turning the Corner: The Stabilization of Public Opinion Towards USFK

## Conservative and Progressive Public Opinion Broadly Supports the U.S. Troop Presence in Korea (with qualifications)

- Even Progressives Believe that:
  - U.S. Presence in ROK has fostered Economic Prosperity
  - Oppose a Rapid US Troop Withdrawal (though they have supported reductions and opposed conflict in Iraq)
  - Would Like to Strengthen the US Alliance
- Some Remaining Specific USFK-Related Policy Disagreements:
  - Transferring Operational Control of the Command Structure by 2012
  - USFK and Whether it Inhibits ROK Engagement with North Korea
- Understated Convergence on the Current and Future Necessity of the US-ROK Security Alliance and USFK Presence
  - Anti-Americanism and Anti-Bush Administration Sentiment Separated from Perceptions of USFK

Source: Haesook Chae and Steven Kim, *Washington Quarterly* 2008.

5

# 2. Institutionalizing Cooperative National-Local-USFK Relations Over Pyeongtaek

## Importance of Well-Managed Local-Central Relations

- Decentralization: Often Implicates US Military Presence Issue in Local-Central Political Disputes (budgeting, autonomy, planning)
  - Island Politics in: Azores/Portugal, Sardinia/Italy, Greenland/Denmark, Okinawa/Japan
  - Local communities often clash with central authorities over budgets and base-related externalities (environment, social disruptions, SOFA tax-related matters, driver's licenses)
- The Importance of Clear Jurisdictional Divisions
  - Local courts should not challenge terms of bilateral treaties
  - Local Politicians Should not challenge National Agreements for local political gain
- Establish Tripartite Working Groups and Committees
  - Should Meet Monthly or Bimonthly; Serve as a Forum to Discuss and Resolve Implementation issues

6



## **2. Institutionalizing Cooperative National-Local-USFK Relations Over Pyeongtaek**

### **Anti-base Campaigns of NGOs and Civil Society Groups Will Continue at the Local Level**

- National NGOs have Used the Pyeongtaek Relocation to Mobilize Local Opposition to Land Expropriation
- NGOs likely to Continue to Mount Information Campaigns about Base-Related Issues: Environment, Sexual Crimes, Black Marketeering, Urban Planning and Land Use
  - Run effective information campaigns and websites:  
<<http://usinkorea.org>> <<http://usacrime.or.kr>> <Ohmynews>
- Korean Anti-Base NGOs are Forging Alliances with Similar Global Groups
  - Global networking and consultation over tactics and strategies

7

## **2. Institutionalizing Cooperative National-Local-USFK Relations in Pyeongtaek**

### **The Okinawa Model: The Political Economy of Cooperation**

- Despite Active anti-base NGOs, Media and Labor Party, a small (but tacit majority) continues to Support USFJ Presence on Okinawa. WHY?
- Tokyo's Public Works Spending
  - For Accepting US Bases, Tokyo increases central govt. contributions to public works projects and Infrastructure development on Okinawa
  - Special Funds to Support Local Communities for the USFJ Relocation until 2017 will be Conditioned on their Compliance with Relocation Steps
- Targeted Payments and Selective Incentives for Okinawans
  - Private landowners: Receive above-market rental payments from GOJ
  - Construction companies, utility companies, base workers unions benefit from increased Home Nation Support (Calder 2006)
  - DFAA Provides Burden Reduction payments to Base Hosting Communities to compensate for noise, pollution and base-related inconveniences

8

## **2. Institutionalizing Cooperation: Managing Base-Related Incidents**

- Base-Related Incidents (Training and Traffic Accidents, Sexual Crimes) can Throw US Military Presence into a Political Crisis
  - 1995: Rape of 12 year-old girl in Okinawa
  - 1998: Severing of Cable-Car by Marine Prowler in Cavalese, Italy
  - 2002: Highway 56 Accident in Korea
  - 2006: Shooting of Kyrgyz Base Worker Outside of Manas Base
- Base Incidents Can Escalate into a Broader Crisis IF:
  - U.S. is slow to respond and/or apologize (stays in legal mode and Hides Behind SOFA)
  - If US-Host strains are already Politicized, Incident Acts as a Symbol (eg. “Unequal Relationship, “Uncaring or Undisciplined U.S. Military”, “Lack of Host Country Sovereignty”)
- Incidents Should Be Approached:
  - As Exercise in Crisis Management, Not Establishing Legal Liability
  - Local Media Should be Informed and Briefed about Incident and SOFA
  - Open Back Channels for Communications Should be Maintained between Local Authorities and US Military

## **3. Policy Recommendations: For ROK Government and Pyeongtaek Authorities**

- Ensure a Clear Jurisdictional Division between the Local And Central Government for the Management of Base-Related Issues and Legal Questions.
- Develop an Economic Strategy so that Home Country Financial Support also builds Local Political Support for USFK.
- Institutionalize Tripartite Working Groups and Contact Committees to Manage and Resolve Base-Related Issues.
- Develop in Coordination with USFK and US Embassy a Set of Crisis Management Procedures and Media Strategy in the Event of a Future Negative Base-Related Incident.

### **3. Policy Recommendations:**

#### **For USFK and US Officials**

- Establish a Robust Program of Community Relations, Local Partnership and Volunteerism.
- Work together with Local and ROK Government Contacts and Committees to Anticipate Politically and Socially Sensitive Issues.
- Establish a Sophisticated and Informative Website that Includes an FAQ, Queries Section and Regularly Updated Information About USFK in Pyeongtaek.
- Update Orientation and Training Materials to Emphasize the Nature of Korea's New and Vibrant Democratic Society, its Developed Economy and Technical Expertise.

# Coexistence of Civil and Military Societies

## - The Case of Kaiserslautern, Germany -

Juergen Nehmer

Senior Professor of the University of Kaiserslautern  
Technology Ambassador of Kaiserslautern



# Part I:

## Regional Situation



# Kaiserslautern in the Heart of Europe (1)

Germany



# Kaiserslautern in the Heart of Europe (2)

Rhineland-Palatinate





# Kaiserslautern in the Heart of Europe (3)



## City Impressions (1)





## City Impressions (2)





## City Impressions (3)





## City Impressions (4)



## Facts About the City

- Population: ~ 100.000 (city) + 100.000 (region)
- Culture
  - Theatre
  - Concert Hall
  - Culture Center (Kammgarn)
- Sports
  - Soccer Stadion (48.000 seats)
  - 2 Golf courses
- Science
  - University of Kaiserslautern (10.000 students)
  - University of Applied Sciences (5.000 students)
  - 9 Research Institutes (800 scientists)
- Jobs: 68.000 in the Region

# Facts about US Military in the KL Region

- Facilities
  - 9 Baracks and Depots in and around Kaiserslautern
  - Ramstein Air Base
    - Largest US Airbase outside of USA
    - Logistic hub for all military activities in Mideast and Africa
  - Landstuhl Regional US Military Medical Center
    - All wounded soldiers get their first treatment here
- Some Numbers (Status 2006)
  - 47.000 US citizens (largest US community outside of USA)
    - 25% of population in rural area, 12% of population in the city
  - 20% of jobs in the region depend on US military
    - direct jobs in civil service: 5.700 (US military is largest employer)
    - indirect jobs through military orders and private investments: 30.000
    - (1,8 Billion EURO/year)

## Part II: Appreciative Coexistence of Civil and Military Societies

# Impacts of Civil-Military Coexistence

- **Social Life**

- Benefits
  - Cultural diversity
  - Internationality
  - Friendships
  - Cross Atlantic Marriages
- Risks
  - Danger from military equipment/weapons
  - Noise
  - Harassment (night bars, etc.)

- **Economy**

- Benefits
  - Jobs (jobs in civil service, orders, private expenditures)
  - Attractive for US companies to settle down(9 companies in Kaiserslautern)
- Risks
  - Dependency from military (sudden troop reduction or relocation)

## Strategy for Appreciative Coexistence (1)

- **Minimization of the Risks of Military Presence**

- Social Life
  - Contracts regulating reduction of harassment and danger from weapons, airplanes (e.g. noise reduction by airplanes, runway relocation, transport rules for weapons, etc.)
  - Cooperation between military police and local police ( control of harassment)
- Economy
  - Development of a strong local high-tech research capacity
  - Development of a conversion strategy (military→high-tech)

# Strategy for Appreciative Coexistence (2)

- **Promotion of the Benefits of Military Presence**
  - Social Life
    - Land allocation strategy for US military
      - key: attractive housing concept for families
    - Welcome events for new military personal and their relatives
    - German-US meeting center
    - German-US academy
    - Joint sport events
  - Economy
    - Business Club
    - Lobbying Concept for the Region


## Realization in Kaiserslautern (1)

- Social Life
  - Land Allocation Strategy
    - Military Bases
      - allocated areas in safe distance from the city
    - Housing
      - land for gated communities (provide better protection)
      - houses and apartments in city and rural areas rented out by German owners (12% US citizens in town, 25% in rural areas)
  - Cultural Interactions
    - German-American Community Office (GACO)
      - Service for newcomers and their families ( tourist office at Ramstein air base, city-tours, assistance for public transportation, ...)
      - International meeting place
    - Atlantic Academy (lectures and courses promoting mutual appreciation)
    - German American Women Club
  - Cooperation with Military Authorities
    - tight cooperation between German and US military police
    - contracts concerning military flights (corridors, flight altitude, time restrictions)

## Realization in Kaiserslautern (2)

- Economy
  - **American-German Business Club (AGBC)**
    - Operates a chapter in Kaiserslautern
    - Promotion of contacts between German and US companies
  - **Partnership Program**
    - State Level: Between Rhineland-Palatinate and South Carolina
      - Both States share similar structural problems concerning military presence and economy
    - City Level: Between Kaiserslautern and Columbia/SC and Davenport/Iowa
      - Scientific cooperation on the subject of assisted living technologies
  - **Lobbying for Kaiserslautern in Washington**
    - City employs a lobbyist with tight connections to Capital Hill
  - **Strengthening of the Science Location Kaiserslautern**

## Science Alliance Kaiserslautern





# University Campus with Science Park



## University Campus (1)






## University Campus (2)



## University Campus (3)





## University Campus (4)



## Fraunhofer Center (1)



## Fraunhofer Center (2)



## Facts about the Science Location Kaiserslautern

- 11.000 students
- Scope: Natural Science and Technology
- Research Focus: IT
  - University Departments
    - 100 staff
  - Fraunhofer Institute for Industrial Mathematics (ITWM)
    - 200 staff
  - Fraunhofer Institute for Experimental Software Engineering (IESE)
    - 200 staff
  - German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI)
    - 150 staff
  - Max-Planck-Institute for Software Systems
    - 150 staff (final)

# Part III:

## Grand Challenge: Conversion



## Conversion

- Cause
  - Drastic Reduction/Relocation of Military Bases due to Global Political/Military Events
    - Break Down of the Soviet Union
    - Unification of Germany
    - Iraq War
    - September 11th Event
- Risk
  - Dramatic sudden loss of regional financial power and jobs (reduction of the risk: see part II)
- Chance
  - Conversion of military structure into an attractive civil structure





# The Crisis

- Trigger Event: German Unification 1990
  - Complete withdrawal of French troops (1.500)
  - Reduction of American troops
    - 2001: -22.000 (inclusive relatives)
    - - 2006: -12.000
    - Direct effect on job loss: 5.700
    - Indirect effect on job loss: 15.000
- Unemployment Quote 1991: 7,3%
- Unemployment Quote 1997: 14%
- Unemployment Quote 2007: 8,4%
- Unemployment Quote 2008: 7,3%

# The Conversion Concept

- Private-Public-Partnership (PPP)
  - The members:
    - City
    - PRE Consortium (Investor's Group of Regional Companies)
    - Scientific advisors from the university and research institutes
  - The Conversion Strategy
    - Development of a long term framework for integration of military areas into urban development plan
    - Strict orientation to market needs and local competencies
    - Incentives for potential investors: pre-funding of buildings by PRE Consortium
    - Stepwise realization through focused conversion projects
    - Attraction of State, Federal and European funding sources

# Example: The PRE Park I

- 1937: Construction of the Holtzendorff-Barracks
- 1945: Takeover by US military and French Military later
- 1992: Complete withdrawal of French Military
- 1992 – 97: Planning, Search for Investors
- 1997: Takeover by PRE Consortium
  - Mix of companies, living areas, entertainment, restaurants
  - Companies: concentration on core competencies → IT
- 2008: Status
  - 100 companies
  - 200 Mio € investment
  - 2.500 jobs (1.250 new)
  - Latest News: John Deere (utility vehicles) founds its European Research Center in Kaiserslautern
- Largest Successful Conversion Project in Europe

## PRE-Park I 1998



# PRE Park I Today



## Recommendations

- Listen carefully to US Military requirements and concepts
- Don't try to convince US Military of YOUR visions but develop concepts around THEIR requirements
- The housing concept is very important in order to attract families to stay with the soldiers
- Provide a convenient infrastructure for transportation and shopping in the city
- Don't spend too much effort in cultural integration
- Be prepared for the change -> Have a plan what to do with barracks when US troops leave -> Science!
- German Solutions are not transferable to Korea
  - Cultural differences
  - language and script



# Relocating US Forces in Japan and the Base Relations

**Chang-hee Nam**

Inha University  
EAI Conference, Nov. 18

## Contents

1. The Negotiation Process
2. Overview of the Relocation Plan
  - 1) In the mainland
  - 2) In Okinawa and to Guam
3. GOJ's Base Relations Investments



# Negotiation for USFJ Relocation

- The stalemate dragged on by domestic politics(Diet general election), sovereignty concerns and legality issues raised by JMOFA, and local objections drove the US negotiation team up the wall
- Koizumi's initiative ending frustrating three years of deadlock of USFJ relocation consultations (2003-2005 summer) saved the negotiation

## Contending actors on the Japanese side regarding relocations

	Receptive “Big(Kanagawa) package”	Resistant “Small package”
National Level	JDA(ASDF HQ) Moriya VM & NIDS VD Yamaguichi  <b>Koizumi II</b>	Deputy Cabinet SG-Futabashi JMOFA-Takeuchi VM & Treaty Div. people  <b>Koizumi I</b>
Local Level	Business community of Iwakuni etc.	Local governments (Kanagawa prefectures including Zama), Iwakuni city & NGOs, Okinawa prefecture, Okinawa Nago city

# LOGICAL steps taken after stalemate

- 1) common strategic objectives
- 2) joint mission & roles
- 3) relocation & force structure


Negotiation proceeded smoothly and expeditiously once the two agreed on common strategic objectives, meaning regional security (NK, Taiwan)

## Speeding up the negotiation

- 2005. 8. General election in Japan
- 2005.10. 2+2, “US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future” 1) Common strategic objectives (NK and China, etc.) and 2) 15 joint missions
- 2006.2. 2+2, Draft of relocation released
- 2006.5. 2+2, “US-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” 3) relocation of Futenma and Guam
- 2007. 5. 2+2, “Alliance Transformation: Advancing US-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation” (Guam cost-sharing & BMD readiness and cooperation, 3) force structure)

# Finalized blueprint

(source: redrawn with figures on Korean and Japanese newspapers printed in June 2005)





A tip to memorize the plan easily:  
four odd numbers, 1-3-5-7

- ONE: I Corps Forward C. to Camp Zama
- THREE: III MEF to Guam (actually mostly command personnel)
- FIVE: Collocation of ASDF HQ with the 5<sup>th</sup> Air Force HQ in Yokota
- SEVEN: relocation of the 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet Aircraft Wing F-14's Night Landing Practice to Iwakuni AB



# Camp Zama- a bird eye's view

source: google earth (searched on Oct. 27, 2008)



# Atsugi(left) and Yokota(right)AB surrounded by heavily populated vicinity areas


source: google earth (searched on October 27, 2008)





# Iwakuni AB runway expansion to receive more airborne tanker C-130s and NLPs

source: website of Yamaguchi Prefecture (searched on 2008/10/24)



## Lingering base relations problems and efforts to alleviate frustration in Okinawa

Pictures taken from a booklet, OBRO, "Okinawa no beigun kichi no sugata"





[illegible]

# Camp Schwab area to relocate Futenma MCAS by newly constructing an airfield


(source: Okinawa prefecture website, searched on 2008/10/24)




## GOJ's base relations investments =SMA+FIP+BVM+SACO+2007 law

- By Special Measures Agreement (SMA) for cost-sharing with USFJ or *omoiyari yosan*
- By SOFA based voluntary Facilities Improvement Program (FIP), equivalent to ROK MND's ROKFC
- By 1974's Base Vicinity Measures Law (*kichi shuhen taisakuho*)
- SACO investments since 1996
- By the newly passed law in 2007, Special Measures Law on USFJ Relocation (*zainichibeigun saihen suishin tokubetsu sochihoan*)

Total US forces related budget(2008)=  
419.3 bil yen(5조 4천억원) (rate 1 yen=1.3 won )



## SOFA SMA host nation support





## JMOD's Cost sharing efforts: Barracks by Facility Improvement Program



## FIP base relations measures within installations- sewage disposal facility at Atsugi





## FIP Base relations measures within installations- Hush house at Atsugi



## Base relations measures to vicinity community – welfare facility in Fussa-shi funded by JMOD





## AB noise abatement measures for vicinity households (funded by MOD)



## Noise abatement measures for vicinity community in Yokota AB



## USFJ realignment-related cost in 2008 (19.1 billion yen)

- US marine (8,000 and family members) relocation to Guam= 0.4 bil yen
- Realignment in Okinawa= 5 bil
- US army HQ reform= 0.3 bil
- Relocation of Carrier Air Wing= 5.8 bil
- FIP for training relocation= 0.2 bil
- Relocation Facilitating initiative= 6.4 bil
- Other training relocation= 0.9 bil

## Relocation subsidy(saihen koufukin) based on 2007 law

- Relocation facilitating mechanism(*shikumi*):
- 10%(when agreed), 25% with environmental impact assessment, 66.7% (when construction begins), and 100%(after complete relocation) of promised subsidy based on certain formula will be granted to local governments for 10 years
- 07 amount: Tsugaru(4.5 bil won), Misawa(2.9 bw) .....after some local resistances ...Nago(12.6 bw), Ginoza village, Iwakuni(9.9 bw), and finally Zama. All 39 related localities have accepted the relocation plan

GoJ's financial support to Guam project= 6.1 bil USD  
(out of total cost, 10 bil \$=12조원) (rate: 1\$=1200 won)



2.8 bil USD By Japan's Direct Investment	Command post building Barracks Schools
3.2 bil USD to be collected in Longterm Lease Rent	Family houses(5,200 units) Power supply and other infrastructure

## Conclusion I- faces of negotiation

- The negotiation in Japan was more systematic, logical, and comprehensive
- Prudence with political calculation but strong determination after the election
- Addressed enhanced jointness and less intrusive basing (Okinawa), implying the alliance moves on to higher readiness for regional and global security and a combined missile defense architecture



## Conclusion II- impact on the alliance

- Japan's strong commitment to the alliance was reaffirmed by the unprecedented financial support for the Guam project
- Japan's faithful requirements-fulfillment policies again aimed at diplomatic and strategic gains (i.e., Yoshida's allegiances and rear logistic support in the Korean War led to the S.F. Peace treaty plus post-war resurgence under US protection)

# THANK YOU

- So much for a Korean view of USFJ relocation and the base relations





# New Model of Pyeongtaek for Peace & Prosperity

---

**Yeongmi YUN**

Pyeongtaek University

1



## Building a Future Strategic ROK-US Alliance

- ◆ Korea and the U.S. is putting forth effort to build a future strategic ROK-US Alliance—an alliance that came into effect in November 1954—on the basis of advancing amity and cooperation that is appropriate to the 21<sup>st</sup> century security environment.
- ◆ The most important conceptual approach for the future strategic ROK-US Alliance is the strengthening of “future strategic alliance” on basis of “traditional amity and alliance relations.”

2

## The 21st Vision of the ROK-U.S. Strategic Alliance



- ◆ The vision for the strategic alliance has three dimensions; values alliance, trust alliance, and peace-building alliance.
- ◆ The well-rounded relationship not only covers the existing defense relationship, but also deepens and expands the scope of the ROK-U.S. Alliance to address the political, economic, diplomatic, and cultural issues within the relationship.
- ◆ From a regional perspective, the mutual defense treaty limited geographically to the Korean Peninsula needs to become a constructive alliance that contributes to comprehensive world peace at various levels by extending the collaboration to include Northeast Asia and the multilateral order and international security.

## Readjustment of the ROK-U.S. Alliance and the Future Strategic ROK-U.S. Alliance



- ◆ Readjustment of the ROK-U.S. Alliance: More discussions are expected on transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) and the relocation of U.S. forces in Korea(USFK).
- ◆ Advancing the process of USFK base relocations and the subsequent land transfer, adjustments to the responsibility and authority of the UN Forces Command corresponds to ROK national interests.
- ◆ The Global Defense Posture Review(GPR)'s adjustments to the role and scale of U.S. Forces in Korea also correspond to ROK national interests.
- ◆ The decrease in additional USFK forces is not for seen in the meantime and it is expected that force presence will stabilize at approximately 28,500 soldiers.

## Relocation of the USFK to Pyeongtaek: Background




- ◆ To diversify the training area and large-scale USFK military base focused around the Seoul metropolitan area
- ◆ To design a way for the U.S. to effectively run and maintain their forces through the elimination and merger of USFK bases and training grounds scattered around Korea and the return of lands given to the US military
- ◆ To resolve the neighboring citizens' regular complaints, it was decided that U.S. base relocation was the best option.
- ◆ To continue and strengthen the ROK-US military cooperation, and to expand the given conditions for stable stationing of USFK.

## USFK Pyeongtaek Base Promotion Process



- ◆ In 1987, then presidential candidate Roh Taewoo publicly pledge to relocate the US Yongsan Garrison away from Seoul's urban center.
- ◆ After many rounds of ROK-U.S. talks, it was decided on July 7, 2004 at the 10<sup>th</sup> meeting of FOTA that the Yongsan Garrison would be relocated, and the LPP readjustment negotiations would include the restoration and return to local governments by 2011 the 16,420 million m<sup>2</sup> of land granted for US military use.
- ◆ In early October 2006 in Washington, DC at the 38<sup>th</sup> meeting of the SCM, it was agreed upon that the relocation of USFK base to Pyeongtaek would be postponed 4~5 years from 2008 to 2012.
- ◆ According to the 'Master Plan Agreement,' the construction for each installation will begin in 2008.

## Current Status of USFK Base Relocations and LPP I



7

## Current Status of USFK Base Relocations and LPP II



◆ When the relocation of the Yongsan Garrison and the US Army 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to South of the Han River is completed, it is expected that the USFK bases will be classified into two authority regions (central, south).

◆ Korea is offering the U.S. military additional lands in Pyeongtaek and Pohang to comprise 12 million m<sup>2</sup> (11.6 million m<sup>2</sup> from Pyeongtaek, 0.1 million m<sup>2</sup> from Kimcheon, and 0.3 million m<sup>2</sup> from Pohang), that totals 25.25 million pyong.

◆ The land being offered to USFK will be decreased by 66% in comparison with the past.

The scattered USFK bases now numbered 41 installations and it will be reduced to 17 bases. KRW 714.1 billion can be effectively reduced from the existing LPP required budget .

8






If the lands granted to the U.S. military increases to a total of 8.06 million pyong, then it will comprise about 6% of Pyeongtaek City.

**Current Status of USFK Base Relocation and LPP**

	Total (Million m <sup>2</sup> )	Land (Million m <sup>2</sup> )	
		Existing	Additional
Total	26.6	15.1	11.5
K-6(naval base, Pangseong)	14.9	5.5	9.4
K-55(air force base, Songtan)	11.7	9.6	2.1

## Approved Land Use Surrounding K-55 and K-6



## USFK Pyeongtaek Installation's Special Features



- ◆ Base population increase: U.S. military and civilian contractors, family, and Korean support personnel are expected to increase five-fold from a 9,000 to a 43,300 presence.
- ◆ The U.S. military troop presence of 17,000, military family members of 12,800, civilian contractors of 4,700, and Korean support personnel and KATUSA members of 8,600.
- ◆ The base is expected to contain about 500 buildings such as the main headquarters, administrative facilities, maintenance and supply depot facilities, soldiers' dormitory, family housing, hospital, and other facilities.

## USFK Pyeongtaek Installation's Special Features



- According to GPR, the Pyeongtaek and Osan regions as a USFK hub is supposed to function like a Main Operating Base (MOB).
- The permanent base posting of the large scale US military presence suggests that the U.S. military will carry out its own missions independently.
- The role of the base is designed to contribute to the security cooperation with the surrounding region and to other parts of the world.

## Positive Effects of the Relocation



- On September 2006, a survey of the structured questionnaire was conducted to 300 current residents (19 years and up, males and females) of Pyeongtaek City.
- In the section asking the Pyeongtaek residents on the positive effects of the relocation, the most frequent reply (59.1%) was “the creation of regional employment, and economic activation.” The next most frequent response (12.7%) was “National and regional security through stationing of US troops.”

Survey Responses	Rate(%)
Regional employment creation, and economic activation	59.1
National and regional security through stationing of U.S. troops	12.7
City and regional development through the construction of new USFK facilities	12.2
Improvement of regional administration due to the cooperation of the military, civilians, and government	7.2
Increased possibility that one can experience various foreign cultures	4.4
Increased educational opportunities by attracting foreign educational organizations	2.2
Not sure	2.2
Total	100.0

13

## Negative Effects of the Relocation



- On the other hand, when Pyeongtaek residents were asked about the negative effects of USFK relocation, the responses were “harming the education environment through cultural deterioration”(37.0%), “environmental contamination”(27.9%), “criminal activities by US military members” (11.8%), and “decline in Pyeongtaek’s image due to the ‘military base city’.” (8.5%).

Survey Responses	Rate(%)
Harming the education environment through cultural deterioration	37.0
Environmental contamination	27.9
Criminal activities by US military members	11.8
Decline in Pyeongtaek’s image due to the ‘military base city’	8.5
Insufficient compensation for the private lands	6.3
Distortion of city development	4.2
Not sure	4.3
Total	100.0

14

## Important Features of USFK Pyeongtaek Base



- ◆ **K-55:** US 7<sup>th</sup> Air Force Command will play a central role in the US Air Forces Korea.
- ◆ **K-6** the new Pyeongtaek Base is planned to be the new central headquarters of USFK. Because, Yongsan's USFK Command, UNC, CFC, the 8<sup>th</sup> Army Command, US Naval Forces Korea and Special Operations Command Korea, and the 303<sup>rd</sup> Intelligence Squadron, and other camps under the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division currently north of the Han River will eventually be relocated to south.
- ◆ **The merits of a Pyeongtaek Base;** its proximity to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Naval Fleet Base and ability to utilize a runway within it. When the base is completed, Pyeongtaek will play a role in connecting the army, naval, and air force bases of the adjoining Camp Humphreys' and Osan Air Force Base, 20km to the northeast, and the Pyeongtaek Naval Base, 20km south.

15

## USFK Relocation Costs



- ◆ In March 2007, the ROK Ministry of National Defense estimated that the master plan to relocate U.S. bases to Pyeongtaek will be in the range of KRW10 trillion (USD 10 billion), which will not only cover the Yongsan Garrison move, but also the relocation of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to Pyeongtaek.
- ◆ Korea's burden sharing was initially assumed to be about KRW 5 trillion. But with special assistance for Pyeongtaek to be KRW 1 trillion, the restoration cost for the returned base lands, SOC construction cost outside the Pyeongtaek military base, it is expected to grow to KRW 7 trillion.
- ◆ Furthermore, after the MND took an comprehensive inspection in the USFK relocation agency from March to May 2008, it reported that KRW 1 trillion's increase was inevitable. The total sum of Korea's burden is expected to be KRW 8 trillion

16




## USFK Relocation Costs

### 평택기지 조성 비용 변동

■ 토지구매비	1조105억원(이미 집행)	▶ 1조105억원
■ 기지공사비	4조5800억원	▶ 5조5800억원(1조원 추가)
■ 평택지원비	1조원	▶ 1조원
■ 반환기지 환경치유비 및 기지 밖 SOC	1조3573억원	▶ 1조3573억원
계	7조9478억원	8조9478억원

### 용산기지 관련 사업 시기 변동




17

## Building the Future Strategic ROK-US Alliance

◆ The base divided into 3 parcels (Parcel 1, Parcel 2, Parcel K) is under construction.

◆ The USFK is in charge of the construction for Parcel 1, which broke ground in March. Construction is expected to be completed January 2010 and Hanjin Heavy Industries broke ground on Parcel K on September 2007 and will start construction in November.

◆ Parcel 2 is expected to start construction in the mid-2008, with ROK and the U.S. shouldering the respective costs at 55% to 45%. The Korean government plans to put the project out for separate bids and the U.S. side will bundle the bids in a turn-key fashion.



## Enactment of a Pyeongtaek Regional Special Law



◆ In Dec. 31, 2004, the Korean government enacted the following law “The Special Law on U.S. Forces Bases Relocation Plan.”(Pyeongtaek Support Law)

◆ The two plans to relocate USFK bases and support the Pyeongtaek region will be run concurrently. On April 16, 2007, the 2008 Development Program of Pyeongtaek City was publicized.

◆ According to the program, the amount of total investment to Pyeongtaek’s regional development would be KRW 3,148 billion, which is 16.37% of the planned total investment.

◆ It is planned to invest KRW 18.8 trillion in 8 areas of 89 sectors until 2020, including agriculture, manufacturing, city improvement, traffic & distribution, tourism, etc. Especially, the 4 areas of 16 sectors will be supported by the national special budget, which include the construction of cutting-edge industry complex, developing the Pyeongtaek Lake to tourism site, building the new agricultural area, and improvement of the region surrounding the base.

## SWOT Analysis on the Pyeongtaek Development



Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strong request for development</li> <li>• Proximity to the latent market with big purchasing power</li> <li>• Proximity to the region with high human resources</li> <li>• Merits of the Pyeongtaek Port</li> <li>• High accessibility and traffic convenience</li> <li>• Deregulation and support by the central government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regulations against development</li> <li>• Difficulty in regional integration</li> <li>• Low prestige of the region today</li> <li>• Weakness of the industrial structure</li> <li>• Military base can be an obstacle to development.</li> </ul>
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Potential Power in the Age of the West Coast</li> <li>• Increasing exchanges with the expansion of Chinese market</li> <li>• Deregulation and support by the central government</li> <li>• Increase of commercial traffic with the development of Pyeongtaek Port</li> <li>• Prospect for the growth of tourist industry</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development failure without well-designed programs</li> <li>• Transforming into a military city</li> <li>• Loss of the initiative over the Pyeongtaek Port</li> <li>• Increase of discord in the region</li> <li>• Continuing regulations on the Metropolitan area</li> <li>• Regulations on business because of environment protection</li> </ul>

## Prospects for the Pyeongtaek Development



- ◆ Pyeongtaek, as a Northeast Asian model of international peace city, should be seen as the heart of the ROK-US Alliance and cooperation.
- ◆ Although the relocation projects are delayed because of costs and construction problems, the development programs will continue, and it will play a core role in developing this region.
- ◆ It is expected that the regional economy of Pyeongtaek will vitalize by the construction of the new base. The Gyeonggi Development Research Institute estimates that the multiplier effect from the base construction projects will be about KRW 440 million and that there will be an increase of job opportunities for 30,000 people.

## Principles for the Relocation: Strengthening the National Security and the ROK-US Alliance



- ◆ Promoting the regional development and improving the standard of living
  - Setting up the new city construction plans and a utilization scheme for returned lands used by the US military
  - Seeking regional economic growth and development
  - Removing the negative causes that would impede the quality of living
- ◆ Expanding the regional governance system
  - Increasing the citizens' participation, information accessibility, and cooperation with the US military members
  - Improving the policy acceptance through citizens' participation, communication of policy, etc.
  - Encouraging communication and cultural exchange between domestic citizens and USFK members



- 23

