지난 5월 10일(수) 동아시아연구원(EAI, 원장 손열 연세대 교수)은 <글로벌NK (Global NK: Zoom & Connect)> 프로그램의 일환으로 “동아시아 핵 경쟁과 확전 가능성 대응: 미래 한반도 질서 구축을 위한 한미중 협력방안” 국제회의를 개최하였습니다. 첫 번째 세션에서는 한미중 안보 전문가들은 지속되는 북한의 핵 위협과 억지체제의 미래 및 미중 관계 현황에 대해 논의하였습니다. 참석자들은 양국 간 “전략적 경쟁”의 정의에 대해 열띤 논쟁을 벌이면서도, 미국과 중국 정부 모두 양국의 관계 악화에 책임이 있다는 인식을 공유했습니다. 나아가 한미중뿐만 아니라 모든 관여 국가들이 한반도 평화에 대한 공동의 이익을 모색하여 협력을 도모해야 한다고 강조했습니다.

 

■ 일시: 2023년 5월 10일(수), 09:30-11:10

■ 장소: 웨스틴조선 서울호텔 오키드룸

■ 참석자(가나다순): 김인한(이화여대 교수), 박원곤(EAI 북한연구센터 소장; 이화여대 교수), 존 박(하버드대 벨퍼센터 국장), 매튜 번(하버드대 케네디스쿨 교수), 자칭궈(북경대 교수), 장투어셩(궈관 싱크탱크 주임), 하영선(EAI 이사장; 서울대 명예교수)

 

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■ 발제: 매튜 번 교수(하버드대 케네디스쿨)

“Deterring Without Provoking”

• Whenever a state makes its key decision, its security implication to the adversary and the adversary’s potential response must be considered. In this context, in order to maximize security, the state must assess both the defense-deterrent value and provocation risks.

• What the ROK and U.S. see as deterrent and defensive may be seen as an offensive threat to the DPRK. In crisis, therefore, North Korean misperceptions of ROK-US actions could provoke unwanted escalation.

• Escalation risks link deterrence of large-scale war and smaller provocations. “Core” deterrence, or stopping a full-scale war “out of the blue” is likely to be strong, but deterrence of smaller-scale provocations may fail. Big concern on deterrence lies on the inadvertent steps that could lead to war when small conflicts get out of control.

• In planning responses to provocations, combined ROK-U.S. forces need to consider both the effect on deterring further outrages and the risk of provoking DPRK.

• “Deterring Without Provoking” Policy Dilemma #1: ROK-U.S. want conventional superiority for defense and deterrence, but history suggests that side facing conventional inferiority is more likely to use nuclear weapons.

• “Deterring Without Provoking” Policy Dilemma #2: ROK and U.S. want to improve their ability to target DPRK nuclear forces, thereby exacerbating DPRK fear of such targeting. This increases incentive to build more weapons or even pre-delegate nuclear use authority.

• So how do we mitigate these dilemmas? Reduce the temperature, strategically include provocation risk in planning, apply confidence-building measures, and employ nuclear restraints.

 

■ 발제: 자칭궈 교수(북경대)

“The Imposed Strategic Competition: China’s Response and Its Position on the North Korean Nuclear Program”

• The term “strategic competition” is “imposed” on China by the U.S., and China has never accepted this term. China believes that this term does not adequately capture the complicated bilateral relationship. Outright “public” competition is untraditional for Chinese—instead, Chinese tend to compete under the table.

• United States’ determination to engage in a “strategic competition” has resulted in a distinct pattern of behavior that makes the relationship more difficult and confrontational. Trump and Biden have both been pursuing high-tech decoupling, supply chain redirection, and military preparation in places of China’s interest.

• Of all U.S. actions, China is most concerned about U.S. challenge against the territorial sovereignty and integrity over Taiwan. Under this circumstance, China is rethinking its national strategy.

• Since Biden came into office, U.S. policy toward China has become less volatile and outright provocative. Yet Congress poses the problem—it has become increasingly proactive over Taiwan, passing bills and resolutions unfavorable to China.

• While U.S. “containment” policy against China aims to take away China’s stake in the international order, China must be stronger and more capable to “wreck the [U.S.-led] order” if it finds interest in doing so. Against this background, China rethinks its nuclear policy.

• China’s nuclear policy has been based on three pillars: (1) minimum in number, (2) no first use, and (3) nonproliferation. With growing U.S. threat, there is growing voices in China calling for a stronger stance.

• In short, U.S. should stop meddling with Taiwan and engage with China. It is never too late to stop confrontation and seek cooperation.

 

■ 발제: 박원곤 소장(EAI 북한연구센터; 이화여대 교수)

“North Korea’s Nuclear Maneuverings: Signaling the Demise of Longstanding Pursuit for Complete Denuclearization?”

• Since 2019 until today, DPRK continues provoking, developing nuclear weapons, and pursuing its “Frontal Breakthrough” policy. “Frontal Breakthrough” constitutes four principles: (1) self-reliance, (2) ideological indoctrination, (3) confrontational policy toward ROK and U.S., and (4) nuclear development “in the most sophisticated way.”

• Clearly, DPRK’s ultimate goal is to be recognized by the world, U.S. in particular, as a de facto nuclear state. In this context, complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) and complete denuclearization are rather unrealistic.

• While North Korea continues provocations, there are clear differences in its behavior that have serious implications. Pyongyang explicitly states that the provocations target ROK and U.S., conducts tests during ROK-U.S. joint military exercises, deploys missiles for tangible warfare, diversifies platforms to launch the missiles, and broadcasts its provocations to its own people.

• While the international community must not holistically disregard the possibility of a seventh nuclear test, DPRK is facing some critical difficulties. Strengthening ROK-U.S.-Japan ties and advancement of the high-tech sector are burdensome to the DPRK. While Kim Jong Un declared that DPRK will achieve 1.4-fold increase in GDP by 2026, this is virtually impossible partially due to its self-imposed border closure.

• For effective economic development, North Korea must inevitably come to the negotiating table and take meaningful steps for denuclearization. Without such actions, there remains no chance for sanctions relief.

• Partial denuclearization without a clear and comprehensive goal of complete denuclearization could provide space for DPRK to find ways to retain its nuclear arsenal indefinitely.

 

■ 토론1: 존 박 국장(하버드대 벨퍼센터)

• In a perception vs. reality perspective, we are currently seeing an important dynamic of perception being greater than reality. In fact, contrary to this perspective, historical reality shows that the U.S. is resilient and adaptive to changing order. It also suggests that the U.S. is not in an irreversible decline.

• If the strategic competition between U.S. and China is “imposed” by the U.S., as Professor Jia Qingguo suggests, this perception reflects that there is a clear difference in how the two countries are defining or the term.

 

■ 토론2: 장투어셩 주임(궈관 싱크탱크)

• Kim Jong Un’s claim that North Korea made a “significant nuclear achievement” is “not totally groundless, but overstated.” The international community is concerned about DPRK’s potential nuclear test, but it seems unnecessary for them to conduct it. DPRK already has sufficient capability to deter U.S., ROK, and Japan.

• Yet nuclear conflict due to miscalculation could be possible. In an event of a serious military confrontation between ROK-U.S. and DPRK, North Korea may strike first or the U.S. may strike preemptively.

• Some Chinese experts believe that DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons reduced the possibility of conflict on the Korean Peninsula. This, however, increased the risk of nuclear proliferation, potentially creating a domino effect in the region. North Korea’s development of weapons could provide U.S. an excuse to deploy strategic asset to ROK or Japan, thereby posing immense security threat to China.

 

■ 토론3: 김인한 교수(이화여대)

• Professor Bunn mentioned that ROK-U.S. should avoid provocation and provide reassurance to secure deterrence. Yet this begs an important question about South Korea’s security concerns from the lack of its capability to deter DPRK’s “nuclear” attack. ROK-U.S. must find a balance between keeping a strong alliance and alleviating DPRK’s security concern.

• Regarding Professor Bunn’s call for the need to “reduce the temperature,” the international community should keep in mind that various approaches like the Sunshine Policy and Six-Party Talks have been taken, but were ineffective.

• On Professor Jia Qingguo’s presentation on the “imposed” competition, one should remember that ROK and U.S. never shut China out of the table. China should fulfill its duty by raising its voice against DPRK provocation because this is also a China problem.

 

■ 토론4: 매튜 번 교수

• One important aspect in deterring Kim Jong Un from using nuclear weapons is convincing him that the U.S. will not threaten regime survival as long as he doesn’t attack (the U.S. or its allies in the region).

• China has done just as much as the U.S. to “impose” the strategic competition.

• Given that Secretary Blinken officially said that he hopes to schedule his trip to China, hopefully U.S. and China will get back to conversation. There are many world challenges like climate change, future pandemic, and nuclear war, for which U.S.-China cooperation is required.

 

■ 토론5: 자칭궈 교수

• China has its own share of responsibility for deteriorating bilateral relationship. China could have handled better in some respect.

• At the moment, U.S. and China both face opportunities and shared interest in stabilization and even improvement of bilateral relationship. Biden has flexibility to handle the relationship with China, and China needs to restore economic growth.

 

■ 토론6: 박원곤 소장

• DPRK emphasizes its right to survival, which includes permanently halting joint military exercises and deployment of strategic assets, and withdrawal of the USFK. At the same time, DPRK knows that ROK and the U.S. will not attack them first.

• Nevertheless, both the ROK and U.S. governments need to work on signaling the possibility of dialogue with North Korea. Biden administration’s “calibrated and practical approach” still remains elusive.

• Meanwhile, it is critical for ROK to enhance its own deterrence capability with the help of the U.S. and Japan. As South Korea needs to pursue integrated deterrence with the U.S., it has no choice but to further strengthen the ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation.

 

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■ 김인한_이화여자대학교 정치외교학과 교수.

■ 박원곤_동아시아연구원(EAI) 북한연구센터 소장; 이화여자대학교 북한학과 교수.

■ 존 박_하버드대 케네디스쿨 벨퍼센터 한국프로젝트 국장.

■ 매튜 번_하버드대 케네디스쿨 제임스 R. 슐레진저 교수.

■ 자칭궈_북경대학교 교수.

■ 장투어셩_궈관 싱크탱크 주임

■ 하영선_동아시아연구원(EAI) 이사장; 서울대학교 명예교수.

 

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■  담당 및 편집: 박지수, EAI 연구원
    문의: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr
 

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