아시아안보연구센터는 11월 22일 콜로라도주립대(University of Colorado at Boulder)의 스티브 챈(Steve Chan) 교수를 모시고 Smart Q&A를 진행하였습니다. 동아시아연구원은 스마트 Q&A를 통하여 다각적인 관점으로 이슈를 조망함으로써 현안에 대한 이해도를 높이고, 관련 정책에 대한 창의적이며 전략적인 아이디어를 창출하고자 합니다.

인터뷰

Professor Steve Chan, University of Colorado at Boulder

질문 내용  

1) “Credible Commitment” and U.S.-China Relations

Your EAI Fellows working paper entitled “Money Politics: International Credit/Debt as Credible Commitment” examines why the United States and China have entered into a creditor/debtor relationship. Could you explain to us your argument of why two competing countries would maintain such a relationship when traditional realism cannot account for such behavior? In this regard, would it be possible for Beijing to use its massive holdings of U.S. debt as a way to challenge Washington’s position on Taiwan?

2) U.S.-China Relations, Taiwan, and Maritime Issues in Asia

The Taiwan issue has generally been a major point of conflict in U.S.-China relations, particularly over arms sales. However, in recent years maritime issues in East Asia have come to the fore such as the South China Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In what way would other issues in the bilateral relationship such as the South China Sea dispute develop into a trigger for conflict?

3) China’s Rise and the Prestige Factor

Many experts argue that as China has been successfully rising, even in a global order designed by the United States, time is on China’s side and therefore it will not challenge the United States in the near future. In your book China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory, you mention about rationalist and prospect theories stating that “people are more inclined to gamble in order to avoid a possible loss than in a comparable situation dealing with a prospective gain.” Furthermore, in the book you go on to argue that “latecomer on the ascendant would be reluctant to gamble.”

However, it is also true that states do not always play a rational game, and that the “prestige factor” is a strong feature in international relations. Is it not possible then that if or when China finally overtakes the United States in terms of economic capabilities, Beijing might consider it needs to establish a global order based on its own culture/history? Particularly when considering the potential latent Sino-centrism that may exist in China. Would not the Chinese leadership be tempted to think that they will do much better in terms of its economy and security if they play games by the rules designed by them?

4) East Asia after 2012

With the simultaneous leadership transition in the main countries of East Asia including the United States, China, Russia, South Korea, and Taiwan, the year 2012 will be a period of uncertainty. How will the main issues facing the region become more politicized during this period? And how can we avoid the pitfalls that come with such uncertainty?