권영세 통일부 장관은 윤석열 정부의 대북정책 “담대한 구상”의 핵심 내용을 북한이 비핵화 의지를 표명하였을 때 경제를 포함한 군사, 정치 분야를 아우르는 포괄적 지원을 하는 것이라고 설명합니다. 또한, 지난 정부에서 북한과 체결한 합의는 존중하고 계승하되, 인권문제 등을 포함하여 단순히 대화국면을 유지하기 위해 지나칠 정도로 유화적으로 접근했던 부분은 개선할 필요가 있다고 지적하고, 중국이 북한문제 해결을 위해 실질적인 역할을 할 수 있도록 견인하는 외교의 중요성에 대해 강조합니다. 아울러, 젊은 세대들을 중심으로 낮아지는 통일에 대한 관심과 지지도 문제를 해결하기 위해 통일에 대한 당위성과 편익성을 지속적으로 설득하는 노력과 남북 간 문화적 동질성 회복을 위해 객관적인 사실을 전달하는 북한 뉴스들에 대한 접근을 보장하는 정책준비를 하고 있다고 밝힙니다.

I. Key Components of the Audacious Initiative

• Minister Kwon explains that the “Audacious Initiative aims to achieve complete denuclearization of North Korea through large scale support, including in the economic, political, and military sectors; to realize peace on the Korean Peninsula, and to shorten the path to unification.”

• Compared to the previous proposals made to North Korea, he highlights that “the biggest difference is that it [the Audacious Initiative] embraces not only the economic but also the military and political sectors.”

• When asked about the detailed measures of security guarantees to North Korea, he states that “we need to cooperate closely with all neighboring countries like the United States, Japan and China, which could have a significant influence on the future developments of inter-Korean relations.” He then adds that “as far as I know, the United States agrees with the overall direction and contents of the initiative, and there haven’t been any issues between the two governments.”

II. Yoon Government’s Roadmap for Resuming the Denuclearization Process

• Minister Kwon indicates that he is thinking of “an effort to bring North Korea to the negotiation table as a part of the audacious initiative.”

• North Korea Policy is built upon “three D” pillars, which stand for Deterrence, Dissuasion, and Dialogue. He states that “we make sure that North Korea is deterred in posing nuclear or missile threats by strengthening the extended deterrence and maintaining sanctions to dissuade North Korea from continuously strengthening its nuclear weapons. ... Then if North Korea would find that there are no ways to maintain its regime, it might find a dialogue as only means to address any economic or other hardships that would follow. We want to shorten this process by employing diplomatic efforts in cooperation with our global partners.”

• In terms of inter-Korean cooperation in the private sector that had not been fulfilled well during the previous administration, he suggests that “it is useful for two Koreas to have civilian exchange with no political color, such as civilian cooperation by religious groups. I think a cooperation in the private sector could seed a bit of trust between two Koreas, and the trust could grow to lead a government-level dialogue.”

• He emphasizes that he will pursue a long-term approach toward North Korea-related issues by saying “if we only work with an aim to make any feats of a given administration, especially during the tenure of a single Unification Minister, it will not address any inter-Korean issues, with no positive future impact.”

• North Korea issue seems to be ideological and sensitive among South Koreans, sharply divided into two camps according to how they perceive it. However, he assesses that “there is not much difference in what people want regardless of which side they belong to. People agree that we need to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea, and ultimately, the unification of the Korean Peninsula.”

• He says that “the most important task in moving toward unification with North Korea is the denuclearization of North Korea. What I want to highlight the term ‘running a relay’ is we should focus on and emphasize common elements”, such as inheriting the agreements signed by the previous government of South Korea with North Korea. Meanwhile, he points out that “we should improve our policies related to human rights issues and other areas that could be considered a bit too conciliatory or appeasing, yet pursued for the sake of continuing dialogue with North Korea.”

Ⅲ. Cooperation with the International Community on the North Korean Problem

• Until now, North Korea questioned the South Korean government’s diplomatic ability to persuade the United States and criticized the Moon Jae-in government’s ‘theory of driver of the Korean Peninsula.’ Minister Kwon states that “Yoon government maintains much more strengthened ties with Washington. ... I think we can take a bold approach to China and North Korea without being misunderstood by the United States.”

• He urges that “China holds most of the keys to doors that lead to denuclearization or the path of opening and reforms in North Korea.” Regarding North Korea-China ties, he claims that “China would not welcome having a nuclear-armed country right next to it. If we can make the best use of this, I believe we can induce China to play a constructive role in solving the denuclearization issue.”

IV. The Unification Policy of the Yoon Government

• Public interest or support in unification has been decreasing, especially among the young generation. Minister Kwon says that “it is necessary to continuously explain and persuade the younger generation about the justification and benefit of the unification.”

• Accessing North Korean documents in South Korea is currently prohibited. Minister Kwon highlights that “we should strive to restore the cultural homogeneity between the two Koreas through broadcasting, media, culture and sports exchanges.” And, he mentions that “it is hard to lift restrictions on all kinds of media at once. We can focus on news outlets conveying news, facts, and official statements, leaving out propaganda media.”■

■ Kwon Youngse_Kwon Youngse is a South Korea’s Minister of Unification. He was a Member of the 21st National Assembly, ROK Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the People’s Republic of China (2013-2015), Secretary-General of the Grand National Party and Saenuri Party (2011-2012), Chairman of the Intelligence Committee at National Assembly (2010-2012), and President of the Korea-Germany Parliamentarian’s Friendship Association (2008-2012). Minister Kwon is a graduate of the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government where he earned Master of Public Administration. And he earned M.A. and B.A. in law at Seoul National University.

■ Typeset by Junghoo Park, Research Associate
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