EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper No. 31

Author

Sungbae Kim is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS). In that position, he provides advice to government and contributes to development of policy on North Korea and Korean peninsula issues. Prior to this position, he served as Senior Policy Advisor to the Minister of National Unification (2006). Before taking up that position, Dr. Kim served as Senior Director and Director (2003-2006) of the Strategic Planning Bureau, National Security Council (NSC) of Korea, where he contributed to establishing national security strategy, including devising strategy for all bilateral and multilateral summits (2003-2005). Dr. Kim received his Ph.D. in Political Science at Seoul National University.

I. Back to the Future: Tribute System Returns?

With the rapid rise of China, interest in the traditional political order of East Asia has been increasing. Recent predictions say that China’s economic power will increase to two-thirds of that of U.S. around 2015, and its economic power will be comparable to the U.S. by around 2020 (IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2011). If the present trend is sustained, it is almost certain that China will take the position of hegemon at least in East Asia, if not on a global scale. With China returning as the East Asian hegemon more than one hundred years after it lost that status in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, discussions on the revival of the traditional international order, with China at the center, have come along naturally.

Today, China attempts to manage the U.S.-China relationship in terms of the “New Pattern of Great-Power Relations” (新型大国关係) termed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 (习近平), which is defined as a historically-unprecedented relationship between an established great power and a rising great power. This concept tries to seek an international order with distinct Chinese characteristics. A case in point for China’s desire to exert its ideals on the international system is the “Chinese Dream” (中国梦), which President Xi frequently stresses. The “Chinese Dream” emphasizes a wealthy and powerful state, the rehabilitation of the Chinese nation, the happiness of the people, peace, development, and cooperative prosperity (习近平 2012; 习近平 2013; 陈向阳 2013). The vision of a “Chinese Dream” should not be interpreted independently of the rich historical resources that China possesses, and it will likely accompany the reinterpretation of the traditional order. In a sense, the “Chinese Dream” is a modern version of historical Sinocentrism. Then, what was the essence of Sinocentrism in the past, and how was the concept of China itself defined? Were Sinocentrism and China constructs that were built only by the Chinese people? Or was China what East Asians made of it? How China interprets its own history is urgent and essential. It may not be desirable for the entire region if China interprets East Asian tradition with expediency and tries to apply it to the present.

While it is important to understand China’s perception of the traditional East Asian order and its interpretation of the present, it is equally critical to know the thoughts and practices of China’s neighbors. A careful look into the interactions of the various regional participants is necessary in order to deeply understand the organizing principles that exist beyond just the superficial and institutional understandings of the traditional East Asian order. China has not been the only one to treat its neighbors in a Confucian way. Other nations, including Korea, have employed the same practices. In this context, it is intriguing to study how Korea, which used to have the most typical investiture-tributary relationship with China, interpreted China and tried to maintain the Sino-Korean relationship. The future of the East Asian order will be settled not simply by the will of China alone. Instead, the collective strategic choices of its neighboring countries will also become significant variables. Therefore, China’s international political choices in the context of its future relationship with Korea should be the center of attention.

Modern studies on Korea’s traditional methods of response in the Sino-Korean relationship, which ensured its survival for thousands of years in the face of China’s regional asymmetric power, may provide meaningful implications for predictions on the future East Asian order and will help Korea to make healthy strategic choices.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze Korea’s traditional Confucian strategies toward China in order to understand the traditional East Asian order and to predict the future East Asian order. As a theoretical premise, a brief preliminary review will be made of the existing frameworks for China’s traditional foreign relations and the traditional East Asian order. The possibility of alternative models will be suggested by considering cultural and power/imperialistic factors simultaneously and by clarifying the characteristics and limitations of existing dominant models such as the Fairbank School and the New Qing History School. In addition, case studies on traditional Korean Confucian scholars will reveal the complexity of the traditional order of East Asia by displaying Korea’s complicated strategies toward China, in which ideology and strategy were at work concurrently. Through this, the following will be found: the traditional East Asian order reflects both cultural and power factors; it was constructed reciprocally by China and its neighbors; and the definition of China was at the core of the East Asian nations’ strategic choices. Moreover, it is also explored that cultural factors are as important as power distribution in the reconstruction of the future order of East Asia with the return of China, and that soft power is an essential part of Korea’s strategies toward China.

II. Frameworks for Traditional Chinese Foreign Relations

In the context of rising China, recent studies on Chinese traditional foreign relations have gained popularity in China. The so-called “Chinese school” and “new Sinocentrism” are representatives of this trend. In contrast to overseas studies of the traditional East Asian order, those originating in China, despite its position at the very center of East Asia, were previously rare. It is only recently that interest in the tributary system from the perspective of international politics – rather than general historical studies – has started.

Qin Yaqing anticipates the emergence of a “Chinese school” in the area of international politics with the rise and integration of China into the international community. According to him, the three intellectual resources that will lead to the creation of this new school of thought are the two-thousand-year-old notion of Tianxia and the tributary system, one hundred years of revolutionary ideas and their practice, and three decades of reform and related experiences (Qin 2006; Qin 2011, 50). However, a Chinese school in international politics has just begun and is at an immature step in its development process. Although there have been profound studies of the tributary system and critical reviews of Western studies for years, there is no new theory in sight yet (Zhou 2007; Zhang and Xu 2007; Zhang 2009; Zhou 2011).

New Sinocentrism is not only immature but also dangerous. Among others, Zhao Tingyang’s attempt to present the concept of “All Under Heaven” (天下, Tianxia) as a system of global governance that can replace today’s international order looks rather threatening (赵汀阳 2005; Zhao Tingyang 2011). It is understandable to try to introduce the idea of empire that will appear beyond modern nation-state systems and to compare it to the traditional notion of “All Under Heaven.” And it is true that “All Under Heaven” might provide significant implications in that it, unlike the modern international order, does not have a strict distinction between “inner” and “outer” on the basis of territorial borders or assume that there is only one geographic, cultural, and political space. Yet in order to claim the possibility of the application of the traditional order to the present, it requires a deeper understanding of the historical system itself. For example, the concept of “All Under Heaven” cannot be separated from Li (禮) and the investiture-tributary system (冊封朝貢, Cefeng-Chaogong) which operated as the central principles of the East Asian international order at that time. If one highlights the spontaneity of the reemergence of “All Under Heaven” and overlooks the hierarchy of it, it risks misconstruing the political power reality and covering up intentions to disguise an asymmetrical power distribution with an idealistic notion. The selective interpretation of tradition, if combined with Chinese nationalism, may lead to very serious consequences.

Thus, a thorough understanding of the tradition is a matter of special importance, rather than a rash claim. In any event, it will be crucial how China tries to interpret the traditional East Asian order. President Xi’s idea of the “Chinese Dream” (中国梦) seems to reflect to some degree the Chinese school or new Sinocentrism, but it must be discussed much more...(Continued)